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Abstract 
Andrew Philip Winrow 
The British Army Regular Mounted Infantry 1880 – 1913 
Cavalry of Poverty or Victorian Paradigm? 
The British Army’s regular Mounted Infantry was arguably one of the most 
important innovations of the late Victorian and Edwardian armies. This thesis 
explores the regular Mounted Infantry model from its origins in extemporised 
infantry detachments overseas to its formal organisation as non-cavalry 
mounted troops before the First World War and juxtaposes its organisation 
and changing roles with its fractious relationship with the cavalry. Using four 
campaigns as case studies, the thesis provides a comparative assessment 
of the Mounted Infantry’s military effectiveness that culminated in it becoming 
the successful archetype for the British soldier in South Africa in the years 
1901- 02. The Mounted Infantry’s uniqueness compared to other nations’ 
armies is considered and the thesis identifies how other armies satisfied the 
requirement for mobile firepower. The Mounted Infantry was abolished in 
1913 prior to the First World War. The reasons influencing this decision are 
analysed and indicate that the Mounted Infantry’s abolition owed more to 
politics than lack of military utility. The thesis concludes that rather than an 
impecunious alternative to an inadequate cavalry, the Mounted Infantry 
paradigm satisfied a particular need borne out of colonial campaigning.  
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
A modest yet fitting epitaph for the military innovation that was the British 
Army regular Mounted Infantry acknowledged that ‘for forty years the 
Mounted Infantry played a not inconsiderable part in many small wars and a 
major role in our one large conflict’.1 Indeed the role of the Mounted Infantry 
in the aforementioned ‘one large conflict’, that of the South African Anglo-
Boer War of 1899 – 1902,2 has been considered to represent the apogee of 
the British Army regular Mounted Infantry model.3 This appears to be a 
surprising if not counterintuitive assertion as this particular conflict is 
recognised to have exposed the weaknesses of the mounted branches of the 
British Army, particularly the British cavalry and its officers.4 Therefore, 
                                                          
1 G. Tylden, ‘Mounted Infantry’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 72, 1943 – 4, pp. 
176-79; Colonel C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (London: HMSO, 1906), p.21, 
recognised the imprecision of the phrase ‘small wars’ but in turn, offered the definition of all 
campaigns other than where both the opposing sides consisted of regular troops, by implication 
often campaigns against indigenous tribes, and to include the suppression of rebellion and 
insurgency. The use of the descriptive word ‘small’, as noted by Callwell, did not necessarily reflect 
the numerical size of either combatant’s forces. 
 
2
 John Laband, The Transvaal Rebellion: the First Boer War 1880 -1881 (Harlow: Pearson, 2005), p.4, 
(hereafter referred to as the ‘Boer War’), Laband argues for the revised appellation of ‘South African 
War’ for this conflict to indicate that this not only reflects the involvement of the Boers and British 
but that large numbers of non-white people and native Africans participated or were caught up in 
the war. However, to avoid confusion or unnecessary repetitive explanation, the well-recognised 
term ‘Boer War’ will be retained, particularly to ensure clarity from the earlier Anglo-Transvaal 
Rebellion or War of 1880 – 81.  
 
3
 Peter Robinson, ‘The search for mobility during the Second Boer War’, Journal of the Society for 
Army Historical Research, 86, 2008, pp. 140 -57. 
  
4 E.M. Spiers, ‘The British Cavalry 1902 – 14’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 57, 
1979, pp. 71-79; Anthony Clayton, The British Officer (London: Pearson, 2006), p.120. 
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considering the contemporaneous enthusiasm for Mounted Infantry in the 
British Army at the end of the Boer War and its popularity with senior army 
commanders, particularly Field Marshal Roberts and Field Marshal Wolseley, 
the Mounted Infantry’s subsequent precipitous decline until its abolition 
immediately before the First World War appears remarkable. Equally, it is 
surprising that so little attention has been paid to the Mounted Infantry by 
historians.5  With longevity of just over thirty years, the Mounted Infantry 
movement remains something of an enigma and a historical review of the 
Mounted Infantry is long overdue.  
The history and details of the regular army Mounted Infantry are poorly 
documented.6 As the Mounted Infantry was only ever a temporary entity, 
configured in crisis, or latterly for peacetime manoeuvres, this state of 
organisational impermanence has contributed to its historical obscurity. Thus 
there are no formal unit histories of the Mounted Infantry, unlike other 
regiments, and the Mounted Infantry did not feature in the peacetime Army 
Lists. Only the multi-volume history of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps (KRRC) 
devotes any sizeable number of pages to the Mounted Infantry in a single 
                                                          
5
 E.M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868 – 1902 (Manchester: University Press, 1992); Marquess 
of Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry 1816-1919, 4, 1899 – 1913 (London: Leo Cooper, 1986), 
refer to the regular Mounted Infantry in twelve out of 333 pages and eleven out of 502 pages 
respectively; Richard Holmes, Soldiers (London: Harper Press, 2011) and Allan Mallinson, The Making 
of the British Army (London: Bantam, 2009), both recent general histories of the British Army, do not 
refer to the Mounted Infantry specifically; Frederick Myatt, The Soldier’s Trade: British Military 
Developments 1660 – 1914 (London: Purnell Book Services Ltd, 1974), an  older text charting 
doctrinal changes in the British Army, refers to the regular Mounted Infantry only on four occasions; 
Spencer Jones, From Boer War to World War: tactical reform of the British Army 1902 – 1914 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), redresses the balance to some extent by devoting six 
out of  258 pages to the Mounted Infantry. 
 
6
 P.A. Talbot, ‘The Regular Mounted Infantry’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 82, 
2004, pp. 306-24. 
 
3 
 
volume, in recognition of that regiment’s pre-eminent association with the 
Mounted Infantry both in terms of a numerical contribution of officers and 
men to its ranks but also the role of the guiding light of Edward Hutton, the 
doyen of Mounted Infantry, who hailed from the KRRC.7 Therefore, the 
historiography of the Mounted Infantry appears fragmented, distributed 
elusively throughout a myriad of regimental histories, campaign chronicles 
and military texts dealing with the Victorian and Edwardian British Army and 
without a complete history of the Mounted Infantry movement having been 
published. Thus the assembling of information and evidence regarding the 
Mounted Infantry remains challenging. In general, outside of personal 
memoirs,8 references to the Mounted Infantry have been primarily as 
footnotes to the Boer War, in connection with Wolseley’s army reforms or 
peripheral to the cavalry’s firepower versus arme blanche debate.9 Indeed, 
despite having been an important topic of military debate in the late Victorian 
army in its own right, most discussions about the Mounted Infantry then and 
now seem inextricably caught up with the arguments over the future of the 
                                                          
7 Major General Sir Steuart Hare, The Annals of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps, IV (London: John 
Murray, 1929). 
 
8 E.A.H. Alderson, With the Mounted Infantry and the Mashonaland Field Force 1896 (London: 
Methuen & Co., 1898);   Anon, Seventeen Months’ Trekking with the Royal Irish Rifles Mounted 
Infantry, (Hertford: Henderson & Spalding, 1909);  Major F.M. Crum, With the Mounted Infantry in 
South Africa: being side-lights on the Boer Campaign 1899 – 1902 (Cambridge: Macmillan & Bowes, 
1903);  Brevet Major W.J. Ottley, With Mounted Infantry in Tibet (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1906) 
are among the more well-known publications of personal memoirs and experiences. 
 
9 Mallinson, The Making of the British Army, p.260; E.M. Spiers, ‘The Late Victorian Army 1868 – 
1914’ The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army (Oxford: University Press, 1994), D. Chandler 
& I. Beckett (eds.) pp. 189-214;  Stephen Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880 – 
1918 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008)  are well-known examples. 
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British cavalry.10 Recently, even in more specialised historical texts dealing 
with the Victorian Army including those by Edward Spiers, the Marquess of 
Anglesey and, recently, Stephen Badsey,11 the Mounted Infantry remains the 
junior partner to the cavalry in both doctrinal debate and in analysis of 
colonial campaigns.12 Furthermore, the Mounted Infantry still risks being 
disregarded as an important military organisation even in recent historical 
scholarship where the Mounted Infantry movement is overlooked almost 
completely.13 Thus, in the absence of previous detailed historical analyses, 
this thesis will redress the fragmentary treatment of the Mounted Infantry 
from the Victorian and Edwardian army historiography, and, by examining 
                                                          
10 Stephen Badsey, The British Army in Battle and its Image (London: Continuum, 2009), p.65; 
Gervase Phillips, ‘The Obsolescence of the Arme Blanche and Technological Determinism in British 
Military History’, War in History, 9 (1), 2002, pp. 39-59; Jones, From Boer War to World War, pp.190-
96; Nick Evans, ‘Sport and Hard Work: Tactics, Reform and Equestrianism in the British Cavalry 1900 
– 1914’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 89, 2011, pp.139-58. 
 
11 Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868 – 1902; Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, 4; Badsey, 
Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry are the texts referred to above.  
12
 Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry, p. 3, the term ‘doctrine’ in this context, 
adopting the definition expressed by Badsey, is taken to represent a formal expression of military 
knowledge and thought, accepted by the army and relevant at any particular time. It covers the 
nature of current warfare and it endeavours to anticipate future conflicts and prepare the army for 
such conflicts and the methods of engaging in them to achieve success. It is recognised that 
alternative definitions of army doctrine exist and include the military theorist J.F.C Fuller’s definition 
of doctrine as ‘a central idea of an army’ and the more recent NATO definition of doctrine as 
‘principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but 
requires judgement in application’; Gary Sheffield ‘Doctrine and Command in the British Army: An 
Historical overview’ British Army Publication: Operations (Shrivenham: DCDC, 2010), E2 – E25, the 
British Army has tended previously, until 1989, to expound a more informal approach to doctrine. 
Throughout the Victorian period, this approach relied upon personalisation of command as well as 
local knowledge passed between successive commanders garrisoning or campaigning in regions 
across the Empire;  Lieutenant Colonel Mike Snook,  Into the Jaws of Death: British Military Blunders 
1879 – 1900 (London: Frontline, 2008); Dennis Judd, Someone Has Blundered: Calamities of the 
British Army in the Victorian Age (London: Weidenfeld, 1973, paperback ed. Phoenix, 2007), as 
further examples of this phenomenon and in particular, when this approach has gone awry. 
 
13 Stephen Manning, Soldiers of the Queen (Stroud: Spellmount, 2009);  Byron Farwell, Mr Kipling’s 
Army (London: W.W.Norton & Co.,1987), do not mention the Mounted Infantry at all; Timothy 
Bowman and Mark Connelly, The Edwardian Army: recruiting, training and deploying the British 
Army 1902 – 1914 (Oxford: University Press, 2012), merely note the Mounted Infantry Schools of 
Instruction. 
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the Mounted Infantry’s doctrine, organisational inception, evolution, military 
experiences and, ultimately, its demise, restore the British Army regular 
Mounted Infantry to a position of qualified, yet arguably deserved, 
prominence. 
Before the inception and development of the regular Mounted Infantry can be 
explored, a problem of nomenclature and definition arises. An imprecise and 
interchangeable use of the terms ‘Mounted Infantry’ and ‘Mounted Rifles’ 
occurs throughout both primary sources and relevant historiography, which 
can mislead or confuse. The term ‘Mounted Infantry’ will be used to refer to 
selected and fully-trained infantrymen, often marksmen, whose mobility was 
enhanced by mounting on horses, ponies, mules, camels or even carts.14 
Crucially, these soldiers were trained to fight on foot as infantrymen and 
instructed to consider their mounts merely as means of improved locomotion 
to and indeed over the battlefield in comparison to their infantry battalion 
colleagues. Mounted Infantry were not trained to fight mounted as cavalry 
and therefore they did not receive training in sword or lance nor the shock 
tactics of a mounted charge.15 Intended to deliver mobile firepower, the 
Mounted Infantry, demonstrating exemplary infantry skills with rifle and 
bayonet, were ‘in no sense cavalry’.16 Thus, although such official documents 
stressed that the Mounted Infantry was not to be considered a cavalry force, 
                                                          
14 British Army Publication, Operations, 0724d, ‘mobility’, in its military context, refers to the speed 
or rapidity of transfer of a military force to where it is required. Conversely, the term ‘manoeuvre’, 
which has ‘both spatial and temporal dimensions’, relates to the flexibility of planned transfer and 
subsequent deployment of forces as required by its commander. 
15
 Mounted Infantry Training 1906 (London: HMSO, 1906), p.17. 
 
16
 Regulations for Mounted Infantry 1897 (London: HMSO, 1889), p.36. 
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other official publications accepted that, whilst only intended to be an adjunct 
to the cavalry, a lack of cavalry, particularly on colonial campaign, might 
require the Mounted Infantry to undertake the more cavalry-orientated roles 
such as reconnaissance, outpost duties, flanking patrols, advanced and 
rearguards.17 This nuanced contention would be fundamental to both a 
misunderstanding and a misrepresentation of the Mounted Infantry as a 
fighting force that eventually contributed to its downfall. 
Conversely, ‘Mounted Rifles’ were mounted, usually horsed, soldiers 
expected to undertake the majority of traditional cavalry roles except the 
sabre-wielding mounted charge. Mounted Rifles were organised generally 
along the same lines as cavalry, unlike the infantry organisation of Mounted 
Infantry, and constituted a more ‘irregular’ and thus frequently volunteer 
cavalry. Archetypically, Mounted Rifles were colonial in origin, formed from 
citizen volunteers with pre-existing skills in riding and shooting who, even 
with prior service in their homeland’s militia, generally lacked enough training 
to be considered by definition, Mounted Infantry or cavalry. Conversely, a 
natural proficiency in riding and shooting, resulting from a predominantly 
rural lifestyle, made these part-time soldiers eminently suitable as Mounted 
Rifles.  Reliant on firearm rather than sword, Mounted Rifles adhered to a 
form of simplified cavalry drill predicated on fighting dismounted like the 
Mounted Infantry. However, when dismounted, Mounted Rifles fought in the 
manner of dismounted regular cavalry, eschewing prolonged fire fights. In 
                                                          
17
Regulations and Field Service Manual for Mounted Infantry 1897, p.52.  
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the absence of previous infantry training, Mounted Rifles, unlike Mounted 
Infantry, were not required to master and apply standard infantry tactics.  
As Badsey noted in his important work on the renaissance of the British 
Cavalry between 1880 and 1918,18 and Jean Bou reflected in his history of 
the Australian Light Horse,19  itself an adaptation of the Mounted Rifles 
model, imprecision in terminology has contributed to confusion and criticism 
of Mounted Infantry and Mounted Rifles or its derivatives such as the Light 
Horse.20 To complicate matters still further, as Badsey has further noted, the 
actual concept of what constituted Mounted Infantry changed significantly 
between 1860 and 1899 with a greater formalisation of procurement of men 
and equipment, organisation, training and an expanding role on the 
battlefield.21 Even if the differences between Mounted Infantry and Mounted 
Rifles were at least theoretically clear, any practical differences between 
Mounted Infantry, Mounted Rifles and cavalry blurred, if not disintegrated, in 
the Boer War between 1900 and 1902.22 The orthodox view indicates that 
this loss of differentiation was most acutely resented by those in the cavalry 
although this remains a generalisation with notable exceptions.23  Clearly, the 
                                                          
18
Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry, pp.14-15. 
 
19 Jean Bou, Light Horse (Cambridge: University Press, 2010), p.3. 
 
20
 Bou, Light Horse, ibid & p.47. 
 
21
 Stephen Badsey, ‘The Boer War (1899 – 1902) and British Cavalry Doctrine: a re-evaluation’, 
Journal of Military History, 71 (1), 2007, pp.75-98. 
 
22
 Bou, Light Horse, p.x; Robinson, ‘The search for mobility during the Second Boer War’, p.143; 
Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry, p.14. 
 
23 Major General John Vaughan, Cavalry and Sporting Memories (Bala: Bala Press, 1954), p.103; 
Stephen Badsey, ‘The Boer War (1899 – 1902) and British Cavalry Doctrine’, pp. 75-98; John Wilcox, 
Fire Across the Veldt (London: Allison and Busby, 2013), whilst only contemporary historical fiction, 
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contextual importance of differentiating between these three variants of the 
mounted arm will be fundamental in ascertaining the Mounted Infantry’s 
importance within the British Army as the concept evolved after 1880. 
However, irrespective of strict terminology, clearly the concept of a Mounted 
Infantryman was not entirely novel and neither was the rationale encouraging 
the inception of the regular Mounted Infantry as part of the British Army, 
which was the desire to combine firepower and battlefield mobility to confer 
tactical advantage. In earlier centuries, this functionality had been the 
preserve of the ‘dragoon’ who fought dismounted using a primitive firearm. 
Whilst conceptually the Mounted Infantry appears to be a Victorian re-
invention of the earlier dragoon archetype,24  the term ‘dragoon’ by this stage 
now denoted a ‘heavy’, often armoured, cavalryman committed to the shock 
tactics of the regimental charge. However, the battlefield of the late 19th 
century was changing. Improving rifle technology conferring greater accuracy 
and lower ballistic trajectories combined with faster reloading inherent in 
breech-loading technology, favoured defensive tactics.25  The resulting 
greater firepower brought to bear by defenders onto the battlefield created a 
deeper zone of lethality for the attack to traverse and the extent of the lethal 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the protagonist, commanding a Mounted Infantry company, faces continued hostility from cavalry 
officers; Stephen Badsey, ‘Mounted Combat in the Second Boer War’, Sandhurst Journal of Military 
Studies, 2, 1991, pp. 11-27, notes how the increased use of rapid dismounting and maintaining 
territorial gain using musketry was remarked upon  approvingly, but perhaps surprisingly, by Douglas 
Haig who is generally considered antipathetic to the Mounted Infantry; Anglesey, A History of the 
British Cavalry, 4, p.39, recounted how the 18
th 
Hussars were considered to be the ‘best mounted 
infantry regiment in the country’ during the Boer War despite the regiment’s early humiliation in 
1899 when much of the regiment and its commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Mőller, were 
captured at the battle of Talana. 
24
Talbot, ‘The Regular Mounted Infantry’, pp. 306-24. 
 
25
 Myatt, The Soldier’s Trade: British Military Developments, pp.36-40. 
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zone necessitated wider flanking movements and geographically more 
extensive reconnaissance to circumvent defences than in previous 
centuries.26 This defensive firepower made direct frontal attacks more costly 
in terms of casualties as shown by the defeats of the British Army early in the 
Boer War.27 These changes to the battlefield accentuated the time-honoured 
requirement for troops with enough mobility and firepower capability to swiftly 
and successfully assault an enemy’s weakest defensive point in order to 
secure victory. Until a greater use of machine guns and quick firing artillery 
occurred, only the infantry with its massed musketry was capable of such 
firepower on the battlefield. Certainly the cavalry, even in its dismounted role, 
was unable to match the infantry’s firepower, in part reflecting the inferiority 
of the cavalry’s carbine, which when compared to the infantry’s rifle, was 
described as little better than a ‘pop-gun’.28  The numerical disparity between 
the size of an infantry battalion and a cavalry regiment exacerbated this 
inequality. Thus the combination of enhanced mobility with the firepower of 
the infantryman armed with the infantry rifle made the Mounted Infantry, the 
reincarnation of the traditional dragoon, a possible solution to the problems 
                                                          
26 Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 
1904 – 1945  (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp.1-2; Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: the 
British Army, the Western Front and the emergence of Modern Warfare 1900 – 1918 (London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1987), pp.37-38; Myatt, The Soldier’s Trade: British Military Developments, pp.203-13.  
 
27
 Major B.F.S Baden-Powell, War in Practice: some tactical and other lessons of the campaign in 
South Africa 1899 – 1902 (London: Isbister & Co. Ltd, 1903), pp.4-41, frontal attacks at 
Magersfontein and Colenso are two of the better known defeats resulting from frontal attacks 
during the early months of the Boer War. On his arrival in South Africa, Roberts issued orders that 
forbade direct frontal attacks in preference to wide flanking attacks and subsequent enfilade.  
 
28
 Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, p.241, carbines were shorter and lighter than the ‘long’ rifles 
carried by the infantry. Due to their shorter barrels they fired at a lower muzzle velocity and thus 
had a shorter range. Initially carbines were single-shot weapons but magazine versions of the Lee-
Metford carbine and subsequently the Lee-Enfield carbine were produced in1894 and 1896 
respectively; J.F.C. Fuller, The Last of the Gentlemen’s Wars (London: Faber, 1936), p.18. 
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of the modern battlefield. Throughout the thesis, evidence of this application 
of mobility and firepower to the battlefield will underpin the principal research 
questions. 
As the regular Mounted Infantry model acquired increasing credence in the 
early 1880s, contrary to the previous pattern of hastily-improvised mounted 
sections abstracted in crisis from regular infantry battalions stationed 
overseas, a formal organisation, drill and approach to training was 
developed, triggering much discussion in military circles.29  However this 
evolution did not occur in isolation from the rest of the British Army. Thus the 
wider implications and the reaction of the rest of the army will be considered 
in later chapters. The subsequent regular Mounted Infantry model was 
predicated on a planned abstraction of selected officers and men from their 
parent infantry battalions for periods of peacetime training. Moreover, as the 
British Empire expanded, the required number of colonial garrisons 
increased. This placed an additional burden predominantly on infantry 
battalions who were most likely to be embarked for imperial duties overseas, 
when compared to the numerically smaller cavalry establishment, and who 
would therefore be required to furnish the Mounted Infantry. This ongoing 
responsibility was exacerbated by a number of additional factors particularly 
the extensiveness of the imperial borders that needed defending; the ever-
present yet uncertain risk of conflict with indigenous peoples that relied on an 
armed response by the local garrison; the difficult terrain along these borders 
with correspondingly poor communications and complex logistical demands 
                                                          
29
 E.T.H. Hutton, Five Lectures on Mounted Infantry (London: Harrison & Sons, 1891), includes 
transcripts of the vigorous, and occasionally acrimonious, debates occurring after each lecture. 
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of the availability of food, water, forage, locally-sourced remounts,30  and 
ammunition; inevitable delays in the arrival of reinforcements from Britain 
due to the lengthy sea voyage and, importantly, the lack of a formal written 
army doctrine for use as guidance in the field. 
This was particularly pertinent in Africa where, at the turn of the 18th century, 
the 91st Foot formed a Mounted Company whilst stationed in the Cape and 
the 75th Foot re-designated its light company as Mounted Infantry, armed 
with double-barrelled carbines and cutlasses, during the 6th Cape Frontier 
War of 1834.31 The forty-strong mounted company of the 24th Foot, formed in 
1875, was deemed a success by the General Officer Commanding Cape 
Colony, Sir Arthur Cunynghame, primarily due to the brevity of its training 
that permitted a rapid expansion in the number of mounted men.32 
Unfortunately, such pragmatic expediency promoted the assumption that 
Mounted Infantry could be extemporised easily and quickly, a belief 
propagated tenaciously by senior army commanders for a number of reasons 
including a desire to prevent the Mounted Infantry becoming permanently 
established and consequently threatening the cavalry’s mounted role, 
avoidance of adding to the Treasury’s financial pressures and both ease and 
rapidity of formation during a colonial crisis. The precedence of successful 
improvisation, even when shown to be a hindrance to the Mounted Infantry, 
would come to symbolise its organisational impermanence, its apparent cost 
                                                          
30
 Sir P. Marling VC, Rifleman and Hussar (London: John Murray, 1931; reprint Hay-on-Wye: 
O’Donoghue Books, 2009), pp. 27-28, described the inadequate number of remounts available with 
previous supplies being exhausted through recent warfare. 
31
 Talbot, ‘The Regular Mounted Infantry’, pp. 306-24. 
 
32
 Tylden, ‘Mounted Infantry’, pp. 176-79. 
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effectiveness and its utilitarian nature in the minds of senior army 
commanders33 such as Roberts who demanded an immediate expansion of 
untrained Mounted Infantry when he took command of the army in South 
Africa in 1900.  
Elsewhere in the Empire, similar experiments with the ad hoc mounting of 
British infantry garrisons to confer beneficial mobility to the troops occurred, 
for example, in New South Wales as early as 1825. As a contemporaneous 
and parallel development, locally-raised militia units began to form and grew 
to prominence following the eventual withdrawal of British infantry garrisons. 
Such colonial militia often evolved into Mounted Rifles units and eventually 
became the basis of a number of the national mounted forces of the self-
governing Dominions such as the Australian Light Horse and the Cape 
Mounted Rifles, with the latter conceived as a colonial gendarmerie in 1855 
before assimilation into the regular army in 1878.34 With the evolution of 
embryonic Mounted Infantry and Mounted Rifles across the Empire, the 
stage was set for the appearance of non-cavalry mounted troops that would 
cause consequent conflict in the military thinking of the army.  
In this thesis, to support an analytical review of the regular Mounted Infantry, 
six principal research questions will be investigated. Whilst these questions 
                                                          
33
 For the purposes of this thesis, the collective term ‘senior army commanders’ refers to those with 
the rank of colonel or more senior. The exception to this definition will be Edward Hutton whose 
influential comments, even when ranked junior to colonel, are so fundamental to the history and 
development of the regular Mounted Infantry that they are noted in the evaluation of the research 
questions of this thesis. 
 
34 Jean Bou, ‘Modern Cavalry: Mounted Rifles, the Boer War and the Doctrinal Debate’, The Boer 
War: Army, Nation and Empire, (Canberra: Army History Unit, 2000), Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey 
(eds.), pp.99-114; The Commandant, ‘The Cape Mounted Rifles’, Cavalry Journal, 4, 1909, pp. 283-
92. 
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will be discussed, defined and clarified in more detail presently, in summary 
the topics are: an examination of the Mounted Infantry’s position and role in 
the prevailing army doctrine, seeking to validate or revoke the espousal of 
the Mounted Infantry concept by senior army commanders, whilst 
determining the Mounted Infantry’s interface with the cavalry; ascertaining 
whether the Mounted Infantry developed a specific identity underpinned by 
esprit de corps; analysing whether Mounted Infantry training delivered a ‘fit 
for purpose’ force and whether, in addition, service in the Mounted Infantry 
provided beneficial military experience for officers aspiring to higher 
command; fourth, investigating the Mounted Infantry’s military performance 
on active service; clarifying whether the Mounted Infantry model translated to 
other armies in the Empire, Europe and beyond and if not, how these other 
armies solved the challenge of bringing mobile firepower to the battlefield 
and finally, evaluating the factors ultimately responsible for the demise of the 
Mounted Infantry just before the First World War. A wide range of primary 
and secondary sources will be used to answer these research questions 
including official British, Imperial and Foreign documents, official army 
appreciations, drill manuals and handbooks, personal papers, published 
memoirs (despite their inherent risk of bias),35 campaign telegrams and 
reports, contemporaneous articles from military journals, historical texts, 
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modern scholarly monographs and collections of essays as well as 
unpublished research scholarship. Nevertheless, despite such a plethora of 
source material, references to the regular Mounted Infantry remain 
fragmented thus arguably contributing to the Mounted Infantry’s historical 
obscurity. 
Although the rationale behind the inception of the regular Mounted Infantry 
has already been noted, its ongoing existence was dogged by persistent 
debate about the Mounted Infantry’s role within the British Army’s doctrine 
and, crucially, how the Mounted Infantry interfaced with the British cavalry. 
Jay Luvaas, in his work on British Army doctrine,36 quoted Lieutenant 
Colonel Charles à Court Repington, a former Rifle Brigade officer and 
subsequently the military correspondent of The Times, who disparagingly 
called the Mounted Infantry (admittedly towards the end of its existence) the 
‘cavalry of poverty’. How valid was such barbed criticism coming from this 
influential commentator on military affairs? Furthermore, irrespective of how 
caustic these words appear, how accurate was their inference?  The phrase 
suggests competition for the mounted role within the army, seemingly biased 
towards an inherent inferiority of the Mounted Infantry. Denoting the Mounted 
Infantry as ‘cavalry’ reflected both Repington’s personal deprecation (rather 
than perhaps a less well informed commentator’s confusion over 
nomenclature) as well as reflecting the doctrinal ambiguity that had arisen in 
the years after the Boer War over how the Mounted Infantry should be used 
on active service. It accuses the Mounted Infantry of being an impecunious 
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second-rate cavalry substitute whose existence owed more to fiscal 
constraint than to military innovation. Gervase Phillips, writing in defence of 
the cavalry, agreed that the inception of the Mounted Infantry owed more to 
Treasury parsimony than pioneering military innovation.37 So, even if 
Repington’s acerbic disparagement is redolent of partisanship, vilification 
and prejudice, was it the truth? 
There is no doubt that prejudice existed in the late Victorian army. As David 
French has explained, a comparative but marked social hierarchy existed 
amongst regiments that placed the majority of cavalry regiments in the upper 
echelons.38 Such a hierarchy, referred to as ‘smartness’, a concept that will 
be considered in detail in a subsequent chapter, ensured social exclusivity, 
class-assured existence, at times career progression through patronage, and 
was a proxy for influence and wealth.39 For a new mounted branch of the 
army, devoid of permanent establishment and therefore without an 
immediately obvious regimental identity, the Mounted Infantry was perhaps 
institutionally disadvantaged and even though the Mounted Infantry 
maintained allegiances to their parent battalions within the regimental 
structure from which, at least until 1900, they were only temporarily 
abstracted, the Mounted Infantry’s social cachet and politico-military 
influence fell well below that of its cavalry counterpart. The Mounted 
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Infantry’s origins lay firmly in the infantry regiments of the line as the Brigade 
of Guards did not participate in abstraction for Mounted Infantry duties until 
1902, with the exception of its anomalous participation in the Camel Corps of 
1884-85. Thus the Mounted Infantry did not aspire to either cavalry 
panache40 or Household Brigade glamour and nor did its organisation, 
training or deployment promote such opportunity or expectation. Therefore, 
when framing the first research question, does the ‘cavalry of poverty’ epithet 
accurately describe the existence of an indifferent force, a cheap ‘make-do’ 
cavalry substitute demonstrating professional mediocrity, an extemporised 
force that was designed to be a financially and organisationally inexpensive 
or whether, conversely, the Mounted Infantry satisfied a particular need in 
the late Victorian and Edwardian British Army? Did the Mounted Infantry fill a 
niche required by the peculiar circumstances of colonial expansion – in other 
words, was it a Victorian and Edwardian imperial paradigm? How did it fit into 
the army’s thinking and how did the Mounted Infantry interface and work with 
its mounted arm compatriots in the British cavalry?  
Conversely, if the Mounted Infantry was not a Victorian paradigm but merely 
an indifferent expedient conceived out of fiscal restriction, why did the 
Mounted Infantry concept receive such fulsome support from senior military 
officers including Wolseley and Roberts, arguably the era’s two pre-eminent 
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army commanders, as well as younger, aspiring enthusiasts particularly 
Edward Hutton, Edwin Alderson, and Ian Hamilton? 41 The Mounted Infantry, 
with its enhanced potential for active service, was not short of supporters or 
proponents yet the arm was not universally supported.42  Predictably, the 
Mounted Infantry’s critics were often cavalrymen or ex-cavalry officers now 
serving in the Yeomanry. However it is hardly surprising that a novel force 
would face opposition from others with opposing vested interests in an 
institution as traditional as the British Army with its inherent tribalism and 
innate conservatism. These factors, and their contribution to the 
development of the Mounted Infantry, will be explored in a later chapter in 
this thesis. There was surprising polarity between the two groups of opposing 
protagonists with, for instance, Colonel George Denison of the Canadian 
militia advocating Mounted Infantry, whilst his colleague, Major General Sir 
Richard MacDougall, another authority on Canadian military issues, disputing 
its value.43 General Sir Edward Hamley, an ex-artillery officer who became 
Professor of Military History at the Royal Military College Sandhurst, was 
somewhat more progressive in his views. Hamley urged the development of 
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a force combining the mobility of cavalry with the firepower of infantry in the 
manner of Mounted Infantry though Luvaas considered that Hamley’s 
interpretation of German tactics44 during the Franco-German War of 1870 – 
71, which convinced Hamley of the need for Mounted Infantry, did not equate 
to a wholesale conversion of cavalry to Mounted Infantry.45  Thus 
differentiation of mounted roles was compatible with retention of both types 
of mounted troops. Interestingly, German army doctrine would reject the 
development of a separate Mounted Infantry arm, at least along strict British 
lines, preferring to identify alternative solutions to the challenge of identifying 
mobile firepower.46  
Returning to the first research question, the Mounted Infantry’s doctrinal 
interface with cavalry remains fundamentally important, not least because a 
fear, if not paranoia, of the cavalry’s potential redundancy through 
replacement by Mounted Infantry appeared to haunt cavalry commanders 
before and after the Boer War.47 Despite the orthodox view of the cavalry’s 
institutional conservatism,48 Badsey makes a strong case for a proactive 
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reformation of the cavalry as a continuum from before the Boer War, 
accelerating in the early 1900s, and subsequently becoming a critical 
contributor to the Mounted Infantry’s eventual redundancy.49 Alternatively, 
both Spiers and Brian Bond have taken a more critical view of the cavalry 
than Badsey, castigating the cavalry for its failure to reform adequately, for 
failing to address its shortcomings in reconnaissance and for its outmoded 
adherence to the shock tactics of the arme blanche charge.50 Comparing the 
retention of the tactic of the mounted charge to the cavalry’s apparent 
obsession with equestrian sports, particularly polo, Gerald de Groot and 
Eliza Riedi juxtapose the cavalry’s seeming reluctance to modernise and 
move away from the glory of drawn sabre and couched lance with its 
tenacious preservation of tradition, excessive promulgation of equestrian 
sports and a disdain for the professional side of soldiering.51 The cavalry’s 
predilection for equestrian sport has been considered to be a peculiarly 
British attitude but risked conflict with its officers’ military professionalism.52 
Although in the wake of the early defeats in the Boer War the whole of the 
British officer corps received criticism, the greatest opprobrium has been 
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reserved for cavalry officers.53 The former Mounted Infantry officer and 
military historian, J.F.C. Fuller apportioned blame similarly, whimsically 
paraphrasing the apocryphal comment made previously by the Duke of 
Wellington by writing that if the Battle of Waterloo had been won upon the 
playing-fields of Eton then in Fuller’s opinion, it would not be so very far from 
the truth to say that the guns of Sannah’s Post were captured on the polo-
round at Hurlingham; that Magersfontein was lost at Lord’s; that Spion Kop 
was evacuated at Sandown and that the War lingered on for thirty-two 
months in the Quorn and Pytchley coverts,54 thus caustically, if unfairly, 
linking enthusiasm for sport with profound military reverse. In a similar vein, 
Bond considered that, for the cavalry, the possession of the lance was more 
than merely an armament or its use a battlefield tactic but represented a 
state of mind epitomising its way of life.55  Nick Evans remains less 
convinced, concurring with Badsey’s revisionism by identifying fundamental 
changes in cavalry tactics, training and attitudes to professionalism even 
before 1899.56 Despite Badsey’s self-evident assertion that being a privileged 
cavalry officer was not in itself proof of gross ineptitude, the perception of the 
idle and incompetent cavalry officer57, a notion that persisted long after the 
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First World War,58 has been both difficult to eradicate and deemed to be an 
exclusively British phenomenon.59 The cavalry’s remarkable resilience during 
this time of change has been characterised, in Bond’s words, as a ‘capacity 
for survival that bordered on the miraculous’.60 However, Spencer Jones, in 
his recent doctoral thesis, partially re-focuses the debate back to the 
Mounted Infantry, citing its unresolved tactical flaws and structural 
weaknesses as more of a direct influence on the arm’s decline during the 
post-Boer War years rather than competition solely from the reforming 
cavalry.61  
However, whilst the cavalry’s doctrinal renaissance was undoubtedly 
important in determining its own fate and, potentially, that of the Mounted 
Infantry, the issue of the numerical paucity of cavalry regiments available for 
both home and overseas duties, which had encouraged the earliest inception 
of Mounted Infantry as ad hoc formations overseas, would also influence 
military organisational policy throughout the Mounted Infantry’s existence. 
The lengthy duration necessary for a cavalryman to attain full training, which 
was significantly longer than for the infantry, precluded a rapid expansion in 
cavalry numbers in crisis unlike the Mounted Infantry. Moreover, in peace, 
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the only overseas posting that attracted significant numbers of British Army 
regular cavalry regiments remained India, unlike the myriad of possible 
garrison postings available to the infantry. Frequently, destinations were 
unsuitable for cavalry regiments, either because the requirement of the 
garrison was better delivered by infantry or by virtue of the inhospitable 
environment being unsuitable for regular cavalry. Only four of the available 
twenty-three cavalry regiments were stationed in India in 1824.62 By 1914, 
the distribution of the twenty-eight cavalry regiments of the line across the 
Empire consisted of nine cavalry regiments in India, two regiments 
garrisoning South Africa and another regiment in barracks outside Cairo.63 
The remaining thirteen regiments, together with the three Household Cavalry 
regiments, were on home service in England and Ireland. In addition, the 
logistics and cost of dispatching cavalry regiments overseas was complex 
and expensive. Often cavalry regiments relinquished their mounts prior to 
embarkation, procuring horses from the departing regiment at its new station. 
The combination of these factors limited both the availability of cavalry 
regiments for colonial campaigning and the number posted overseas thus 
leaving a deficiency of mounted troops along the imperial borders that was 
filled by Mounted Infantry. In 1880, the dearth of immediately available 
cavalry was implicated in the peculiar mixture of cavalrymen, infantrymen 
and other soldiers deemed capable of maintaining their seat in the saddle 
that formed General Colley’s mounted detachment at the outbreak of 
hostilities in the Transvaal Rebellion and which contributed to the mounted 
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detachment’s poor performance when misused as conventional cavalry at 
Laing’s Nek.64  
If the Mounted Infantry’s inception and eventual fate was inextricably linked 
to the availability and doctrinal predilections of the cavalry arm, this thesis 
will analyse the shifting nature of the Mounted Infantry’s proposed roles with 
reference to the cavalry that began as all-encompassing mounted work in the 
absence of any cavalry abroad then as an adjunct to the cavalry and, finally, 
as a limited replacement for cavalry as so-called divisional cavalry and in 
Mounted Brigades alongside regular cavalry and horse artillery. 
Understandably the shifting nature of its roles caused debate and uncertainty 
of function in both the Mounted Infantry and the cavalry. However, when 
considering whether the Mounted Infantry was, in truth, ‘cavalry’, its 
organisation into companies and battalions provides a clear statement of its 
infantry credentials, understood in the context of its evolutionary origin as an 
ad hoc force provided through the mounting of one or more infantry 
companies.  
The Mounted Infantry’s extemporised origins cast a long shadow of historical 
precedence that influenced the Mounted Infantry’s training, organisation and 
doctrine. Therefore, the second research question will extend the 
investigation of the Mounted Infantry’s organisational impermanence to 
whether this affected the evolution of a specific military identity, a concept 
that will be explored in more detail in a later chapter. Furthermore, the 
question of organisational impermanence and any resulting impact on esprit 
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de corps and, ultimately, whether these factors influenced the Mounted 
Infantry’s survival, will be sought.  As the tactical fighting unit of the regular 
Mounted Infantry remained the company,65  the propensity to deploy 
Mounted Infantry in small size units reflected both the Mounted Infantry’s 
supporting roles in cavalry brigades and infantry divisions and also that its 
continued method of configuration remained through comparatively piece-
meal abstraction that was a process which required enough officers and men 
to form a viable force but not so many to fatally destabilise the functioning of 
its residual parent infantry battalion. Nevertheless, with its emphasis on small 
unit size and the increased likelihood of seeing active service overseas, 
predicated on configuration only being required in times of conflict, enhanced 
opportunities for combat experience, command responsibility and even 
promotion, were recognised by the army’s officers.66  Thus this thesis will 
consider the impact of service in the Mounted Infantry on future officer 
promotion. In his retrospective analysis of the regimental origins of senior 
army officers in 1914, Badsey concluded that a greater number of officers 
ranked at or above Major General had Mounted Infantry experience 
compared to those solely with experience in the cavalry, which he interpreted 
as rejecting the widely-held opinion that in the British Army prior to the First 
World War cavalrymen held oligarchic sway in the upper echelons of the 
Army. Previously, Roberts’ biographer, W.H. Hannah, had accused cavalry 
generals of ‘moving in at the gallop’ to take a disproportionate share of 
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command after the Boer War’.67 Although Badsey’s analysis might indicate 
that experience of command in the Mounted Infantry was useful in terms of 
future promotion, clearly any interpretation necessitates a degree of caution 
as a number of variables risk introducing bias. The increased opportunity for 
service in the Mounted Infantry afforded by the expansion of the Mounted 
Infantry during the Boer War resulted in a larger number of officers with 
Mounted Infantry experience compared to those with Mounted Infantry 
service or training prior to 1899. The post-Boer War Mounted Infantry’s 
popularity with senior army commanders68 and the personalisation of 
command prevalent in the late Victorian army, linked with patronage and 
promotion that was a feature of the British Army in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, all potentially skew the apparent predominance of ex-Mounted 
Infantry officers in high command.69  Therefore, the third principal research 
question seeks evidence whether service with the Mounted Infantry was 
advantageous for future high command and, more broadly, whether the 
training of the Mounted Infantry was appropriate for its changing military role 
in ensuring a ‘fit for purpose’ military arm. The former will be achieved in part 
by a prospective, comparative analysis of career progression of junior 
officers commanding Mounted Infantry units in the Boer War but by using 
controls matched for regiment, seniority and rank, previous potential biases 
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inherent in earlier retrospective analyses will be reduced. The originating 
point of 1900 for the analysis, whilst diluting the effect of pre-war Mounted 
Infantry selection, also reduces the impact of the Mounted Infantry’s wartime 
expansion prior to this date. Thus it is anticipated that the true effect of 
Mounted Infantry command on future promotion prospects can be 
determined.  
Whilst, as indicated previously with regards to military historiography, the 
Mounted Infantry has been largely overlooked, similarly there has been little 
work undertaken on the Mounted Infantry’s battlefield experiences or its 
military effectiveness. Military effectiveness can be defined in a number of 
ways and at different levels ranging from the tactical and operational to the 
strategic and political.70  Whilst these issues will be considered in greater 
detail in a subsequent chapter, it is important to acknowledge that a historical 
assessment of the military effectiveness of the Mounted Infantry 
encompasses issues as diverse as the attainment of prior-determined 
tactical objectives, use of logistics and supplies, sustaining of casualties - 
both human and animal, contribution to the success or otherwise of battles 
and campaigns and the Mounted Infantry’s response to adversity, particularly 
environmental in view of the nature of colonial campaigning, or, put another 
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way, its resilience to Clausewitz’s unexpected ‘friction of war’.71 Thus, the 
fourth principal research question, once a clear definition of military 
effectiveness in the late Victorian British Army has been concluded, will seek 
to answer whether the Mounted Infantry was militarily effective, from the 
perspectives of Mounted Infantry commanders, senior army commanders as 
well as with historical hindsight.  This will be achieved through a 
predominantly qualitative assessment of the Mounted Infantry’s contribution 
to a number of major colonial campaigns during the Victorian period, namely: 
the Transvaal Rebellion 1880 – 81; the Egyptian campaign of 1882; the Nile 
campaign of 1884 – 85 and the Boer War of 1899 – 1902. These campaigns 
have been selected specifically to facilitate a comparison of the Mounted 
Infantry at varying times of its evolution across a spectrum of terrain and 
climate and against a range of adversaries favouring different tactics from 
long-distance marksmanship to the shock tactics of the desert warrior.  
The historiography of these campaigns is extensive yet again the references 
to the Mounted Infantry contained within are comparatively sparse. John 
Laband’s history of the Transvaal Rebellion, a recent and arguably the most 
comprehensive of histories of the campaign, recounts the experiences of the 
extemporised hybrid mounted detachment of Mounted Infantry and cavalry.72 
This hybrid force was formed as, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, most 
mounted troops in Natal had embarked for home after the successful 
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conclusion of the Zulu War. A small residual number of King’s Dragoon 
Guards (KDG) were still present in Natal plus hastily-horsed Mounted 
Infantry selected from the 21st Foot, 58th Foot and 3rd battalion of the 60th 
Rifles, most of whom underwent minimal equitation and Mounted Infantry 
training. Laband considers that one conclusion from this campaign was the 
need to use mounted forces tactically in roles for which they had been 
trained or had experience.  Laband thus concludes that failure to appreciate 
this was instrumental in the fiasco of the mounted charge at Laing’s Nek.73  
An extrapolation of this, the benefit of prior Mounted Infantry training before 
deployment, was a pertinent lesson from this battle but it was at variance 
with contemporary army orthodoxy that was based on brevity of training and 
extemporised organisation. It was a lesson that would remain contentious 
with senior army commanders. 
Conversely, the Mounted Infantry deployed in the Egyptian campaign had 
accrued prior Mounted Infantry experience from the preceding African wars. 
Although the Mounted Infantry was used in a number of roles, particularly 
screening the British positions at Alexandria and Ramleh, as gendarmerie in 
Alexandria and on the flank of the advancing British force, William Wright, in 
his history of the campaign, considers the Mounted Infantry’s pre-eminent 
contribution to the campaign was in protecting Wolseley’s desert flank and 
then eventually contributing to the capture of Cairo through its mobility.74 
Moreover, Spiers suggests that the campaign demonstrated that Mounted 
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Infantry and cavalry could work well together, belying future animosity 
between the two mounted arms.75 If, as Anglesey considered, service in the 
embryonic regular Mounted Infantry was coveted by army officers for their 
perceptions of increased preferment and promotion,76 the plaudits received 
by the Mounted Infantry following the Egyptian campaign also contributed to 
its subsequent formalisation as a force within the British Army.  
In the decades following the Egyptian campaign, Mounted Infantry 
organisation, with peacetime abstraction permitting training and development 
of specific drill,77 became more structured although its next deployment in a 
major colonial campaign largely reverted to ad hoc extemporisation redolent 
of earlier years. The 1884 – 85 campaign in the Sudan was notable, from a 
Mounted Infantry perspective, for both the use of Mounted Infantry in a 
variety of roles and the novel utilisation of troops other than line infantry as 
Mounted Infantry in the innovative Camel Corps.  In the eastern Sudan 
littoral, Mounted Infantry fought as both mobile skirmishers advancing before 
the infantry squares but also as erstwhile cavalry participating in mounted 
charges, a role not part of contemporary Mounted Infantry training.78  Whilst 
the exigencies of campaigning may have necessitated this approach, such 
military utilitarianism, presaging the Mounted Infantry’s experiences on the 
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veldt fifteen years later, undermined its ongoing search for an identifiable and 
specific role within army doctrine, permitting frequent re-imagining and 
arguably contributed to the Mounted Infantry’s demise at the end of the first 
decade of the 20th century.  
Elsewhere on the Nile, the Camel Corps was formed under Wolseley’s 
orders as the major component of his Desert Column. As Colonel Mike 
Snook observes, this suggestion was typical of Wolseley’s predilection for 
élite formations of selected men plucked from different regiments and 
brought together as specialised forces.79 This process risked cohesion and 
esprit de corps, factors fundamental to the regimental system and believed to 
confer battlefield resilience in the face of adversity,80  although at the time the 
practical benefits of forming a specialised camel-borne force seemed 
incontrovertible. The Camel Corps comprised four regiments of camel-borne 
soldiers, all of whom were de facto functionally Mounted Infantrymen, 
expected to fight dismounted due to the tactical limitations of their camel 
mounts.81  Only the Mounted Infantry Camel Regiment in the Camel Corps, 
considered by observers as the cream of the Camel Corps,82  actually 
comprised previously-experienced Mounted Infantry.83  The other camel 
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regiments comprised cavalrymen, guardsmen and marines thus unwittingly 
providing controls against which to assess the Mounted Infantry Camel 
Regiment’s military effectiveness.84  Such qualitative comparisons within the 
Camel Corps are complicated though by the uniqueness of the force, its 
embryonic drill, general logistical deficiencies, overall incompetent camel 
husbandry and the harshness of terrain.85  Certainly senior army 
commanders appeared to overestimate the resilience, endurance and 
robustness of health of the camels it purchased, compounded by Wolseley’s 
excessively enthusiastic predictions of the Camel Corps’ mobility, and, 
conversely, underestimated the foot infantry battalions’ ability to cope with 
desert conditions.86  Although the Camel Corps achieved a crossing of the 
Bayuda Desert, its ultimate goal of uniting with the river-borne column to 
march on Khartoum and relieve General Gordon was unfulfilled.  Although 
Snook considers that the Camel Corps was both an unnecessary innovation 
and a logistical failure, there has been no attempt to differentiate between 
the Mounted Infantry Camel Regiment’s effectiveness and that of the other 
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camel regiments.87 This subsidiary research question, contrasting the 
Mounted Infantry Camel Regiment with the rest of the Desert Corps, will 
supplement the extant fourth principal research question of the military 
effectiveness of the Mounted Infantry. 
As previously indicated, the so-called ‘finest hour ' of the regular Mounted 
Infantry in the history of the British Army, has been considered to have been 
the Boer War,88 the fourth major campaign to be examined as a case study 
in the thesis. This assertion of the Mounted Infantry’s military zenith exists 
contrary to the prevailing criticism of the army’s mounted troops during the 
conflict.89  Fought over geographically extensive terrain against superlatively 
mobile Boer commandos, described as the ‘beau-ideal’ of mounted 
infantry,90  the conflict resulted in a predominantly mobile war where 
mounted troops were at a premium.91 With Roberts’ disembarkation as 
Commander-in-Chief in early 1900, extra Mounted Infantry units were 
abstracted urgently in an indiscriminate and peremptory fashion, 
consequently devoid of adequate training, mounts or equipment, a parlous 
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situation that would not have been possible with trained cavalry.92 Roberts 
jeopardised the Mounted Infantry’s pre-war reputation by resorting to such 
extemporisation, an acceptance of minimal standards of equitation and the 
illogicality of extreme brevity of training. By promulgating this strategy, 
Roberts appears to have failed to appreciate the level of equitation needed 
by Mounted Infantry for terrain and to counter the enemy,93 a deficit in 
equitation remarked upon caustically by Douglas Haig,94 and thus directly 
contributed to the Boer War’s exorbitant equine losses.95  Yet during the 
latter phase of the War, when a guerrilla-style insurgency96  existed, its very 
nature of chasing elusive bands of Boers across vast distances with policing 
duties epitomised by searching and destruction of farms, convoy escort and 
railway protection, suited the Mounted Infantry model and encouraged further 
numerical expansion, effectively providing a blueprint for army 
reorganisation. Thus temporarily redundant units such as artillery batteries 
were reconfigured into Mounted Rifles.97 Similarly, regular cavalry regiments 
became, sometimes unwillingly, improvised Mounted Rifles, at least for the 
duration of hostilities. With the inception of mobile columns, which often 
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combined Mounted Infantry, colonial Mounted Rifles, irregular locally-raised 
horse and traditional cavalry regiments devoid of sabre or lance, the 
Mounted Infantry concept reached its maturity. Not all Mounted Infantry 
battalions though were necessarily equitable in skill or performance.98 Even 
pre-war trained Mounted Infantry, in Bou’s opinion, manifested limited 
equestrian skills99 leading to a polarity of opinion over the Mounted Infantry’s 
performance even during the years of insurgency,100 a phase of the War that 
Bill Nasson has called evocatively ‘the war of running evasion’.101 
Nonetheless, irrespective of initial problems in horsemastership,102 the 
Mounted Infantry matured as a mobile fighting force effectively combining 
mobility and firepower. The utility of the Mounted Infantry in the Boer War 
was described in verse by Rudyard Kipling in MI: 
          I wish my mother could see me now, with a fence-post under my arm, 
 And a knife and a spoon in my putties that I found on a Boer farm, 
  Atop of a sore-backed Argentine, with a thirst that you couldn’t buy. 
         I used to be in the Yorkshires once 
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        (Sussex, Lincolns, and Rifles once), 
        Hampshires, Glosters, and Scottish once! 
        But now I am MI.103 
This verse paints a less than heroic portrait of the Mounted Infantry, clearly 
participating in looting and destruction, perhaps reflecting the policy of farm-
burning that became symbolic of the measures to limit the insurgency but 
which had originated, initially sporadically, prior to the fall of Pretoria in mid 
1900.104 The verse indicates the heterogeneity of the origins of the Mounted 
Infantry with the poem expressly allowing the naming of regiments to be 
amended ad libitum for the relevant audience. This heterogeneity surrenders 
prior regimental affiliation to a novel allegiance to the Mounted Infantry. 
Capturing the Mounted Infantry’s utilitarianism, Kipling continued: 
          That is what we are known as – that is the name you must call 
          If you want officers’ servants, pickets an’ ‘orseguards an’ all – 
          Details for burin’-parties, company-cooks or supply – 
          Turn out the chronic Ikonas! Roll up the – MI!105 
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Although an advocate of the private soldier, Kipling was not afraid of 
criticising senior army commanders, remarking in the same poem of the ‘red 
little, dead little Army’, perhaps representing a thinly-veiled censure of the 
outmoded tactics that contributed to the comparatively high casualty rates in 
the early battles of the war. Another of Kipling’s poems, Stellenbosch, 
ridiculed the timidity of senior officers reluctant to pursue action for fear of 
reprimand and consequent exile home or to the remount depot at 
Stellenbosch.106  Clearly, MI described a force without tradition or glamour, 
perhaps unloved by the rest of the army. It is not too fanciful to suggest that, 
despite Kipling’s poem, this lack of clear identity, glamour or tradition has 
contributed to the historical obscurity suffered by the Mounted Infantry.  
Another contingent of mounted troops in South Africa was the Imperial 
Yeomanry which will be considered briefly only as a comparison to the 
regular Mounted Infantry. Despite its misleading name, the Imperial 
Yeomanry was not conceived as an extension of the domestic volunteer 
cavalry trained in arme blanche tactics. Despite initial opposition from a 
recently constituted War Office committee configuring the new force,107  the 
inadequate time available for the Imperial Yeomanry to attain competency 
with edged weapons and the evident primacy of musketry on the veldt, 
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meant that the Imperial Yeomanry was conceived as volunteer Mounted 
Infantry configured in infantry-style companies.108  Whilst traditionally-trained 
yeomen did volunteer to serve in the Imperial Yeomanry, no complete 
domestic yeomanry regiment formed an Imperial Yeomanry battalion en 
masse109. At the time, Wolseley disagreed with the proposal for the formation 
of the Imperial Yeomanry on grounds that it was a dangerous experiment 
using civilians without prior inculcation of the rudiments of military discipline 
although, in rebutting Wolseley, Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary of State for 
War, considered these risks exaggerated.110 Unsurprisingly, the foundation 
of the Imperial Yeomanry was not universally popular with traditional 
Yeomanry or regular cavalry officers. Douglas Haig was one of the most 
vociferous, decrying all non-cavalry mounted troops, particularly the Mounted 
Infantry but also the Imperial Yeomanry, while saving some of his most 
venomous criticism for irregular colonial Mounted Rifles whom he castigated 
as being ‘only good for looting’.111  The post-war decade would witness 
Haig’s influence in matters military in the ascendancy, thus the effect of his 
antipathetic views of the Mounted Infantry on the arm’s survival will require 
clarification. John French, another influential cavalryman, was less 
antagonistic to non-cavalry mounted troops and in his evidence to the post-
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Boer War Royal Commission on the War in South Africa,112  French stated 
that he considered the Mounted Infantry to be very useful in respect of their 
mobility although he was still critical of their riding skills and discipline.113  
Thus contextually outside the remit of this thesis, the Imperial Yeomanry and 
colonial Mounted Rifles will be included in analysis when related to the 
doctrinal debate domestically or in the imperial development of mobile 
firepower.  
Despite the apparent universality of the Mounted Infantry model immediately 
after the war and even if, to quote Kipling, ‘we are now all MI’, the Mounted 
Infantry would not outlast the decade as an organisation. The Mounted 
Infantry suffered a fatal decline to abolition, which on initial consideration 
appears to be both precipitate and, if the Mounted Infantry’s contemporary 
popularity with many senior army commanders is true, inexplicable. Shortly 
after the Mounted Infantry’s abolition, an anonymous article in the Cavalry 
Journal,114 a professional military publication not renowned for its support of 
the Mounted Infantry, acknowledged a sense of regret and resignation felt by 
those who had served in the arm. The article cited the cause of the Mounted 
Infantry’s demise as a combination of increased cavalry numbers, the impact 
caused by the closure of the Mounted Infantry Schools of Instruction and the 
relief from the lifting of the burden of losing hand-picked men to form 
Mounted Infantry companies on mobilisation felt by infantry battalion 
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commanders.115 Nevertheless, the reasons for the Mounted Infantry’s 
demise have remained a topic of debate. Badsey and Spiers conclude that 
the Mounted Infantry was phased out for want of a political champion during 
a period of doctrinal competition created by the successful reform of the 
cavalry.116  They accuse the Mounted Infantry leaders of institutional 
negligence, asserting that the decision not to create a permanent Mounted 
Infantry organisation during peacetime not only reflected fiscal pressures but 
also the Mounted Infantry leaders’ reluctance to support their own arm, 
preferring to retain their positions within their parent infantry regiments. Peter 
Robinson rejects this interpretation of events questioning which Mounted 
Infantry commanders guiltily chose the option of wartime extemporisation 
over peacetime permanence and organisational stability and, perhaps more 
importantly, even if this was true, then why?117  In his exploration of the 
British Army regimental system, French defines the important benefits of the 
regiment,118 an organisational backdrop against which the prior regimental 
allegiances of Mounted Infantry officers requires understanding. Can the 
allegation that Mounted Infantry officers refused to relinquish their ties to 
their parent infantry regiments be substantiated and, moreover, even if true 
was this causal in the Mounted Infantry’s decline? Alternatively, if the 
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Mounted Infantry’s impermanence was a factor in its demise, why was this 
fundamental organisational principle supported and sustained?119  Certainly 
Roberts and Wolseley were ardent supporters of both the Mounted Infantry 
and the regimental system but, admittedly, by the mid-1900s their influence 
was beginning to wane. Spiers considers that Mounted Infantry commanders 
returning from the Boer War capitulated to the prevailing belief of the 
cavalry’s social and military superiority and thus willingly subjugated the 
Mounted Infantry to performing limited protective duties rather than retaining 
more wide-ranging and independent strategic roles as it had on the veldt.120 
Talbot concurs but exculpates the Mounted Infantry commanders for such 
behaviour as their surrender only occurred in the presence of sustained 
attack from the cavalry lobby.121 Bond also blames the Mounted Infantry, 
considering that its painfully slow development pre-1899 and inadequate 
training for war, had serious repercussions for its continued existence 
thereafter, although it is difficult to reconcile his view with the ultimately 
successful expansion of the Mounted Infantry post-1900 into a largely well-
regarded mounted force that eventually helped secure victory in South 
Africa.122 
Conversely, both Bond and Spiers have been critical of the cavalry’s reform 
with Spiers emphasising the influence of the cavalry’s prevailing fear of its 
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subordination to the Mounted Infantry if a more firepower-orientated doctrine 
was adopted at the expense of the arme blanche.123 Badsey concludes 
differently, considering the cavalry’s reformation to be more successful than 
previously postulated and that it contributed materially to the downfall of the 
Mounted Infantry by rendering the latter redundant functionally by dually 
embracing dismounted firepower whilst retaining arme blanche capability. It 
is likely that the cavalry’s doctrinal renaissance was indeed an element in the 
Mounted Infantry’s demise at a time when the Mounted Infantry, a force 
previously used to a multidimensional functionality, became constrained in a 
more limited role exposing the arm to criticism of being a cavalry-substitute. 
Besides, Badsey considers that the abolition of the Mounted Infantry was not 
necessarily a bad thing for future army doctrine, citing Kipling’s MI as 
evidence for a need to refresh the concept of mobile firepower without 
degrading the mounted arm into ubiquitous utilitarianism.124  Clearly Badsey 
views this utilitarianism as unwelcome although it is possible that the 
Mounted Infantry’s functional ubiquity may have merely reflected the 
peculiarity of active service in South Africa and the multifarious tasks 
allocated to the Mounted Infantry. As previously noted earlier in this chapter, 
the traditional distinctions previously evident between cavalry, Mounted 
Infantry and Mounted Rifles blurred towards the end of the campaign.125  
Therefore the fifth of this thesis’ principal research questions aims to clarify 
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the various causative factors and their comparative importance in the 
Mounted Infantry’s abolition. 
Returning to the initial research question of whether the Mounted Infantry 
was not, in fact, merely a cheap substitute for a numerically inadequate 
cavalry but rather reflected the British Army’s solution for the application of 
mobile firepower on the battlefields across the Empire, can this explain the 
Mounted Infantry’s apparent uniqueness?126  The solutions identified for the 
development of mobile firepower in other nations’ armies will be reviewed 
with particular reference to the mounted troops of France, Germany, Austria-
Hungary, Russia and the United States as well as in the forces of the British 
Empire, particularly India and the Dominions.127  Furthermore, the impact of 
the conflicts fought by these armies on the evolution of their mounted troops 
will be analysed, illustrated by the campaigns of the American Civil War 
1861- 65, Franco-German War of 1870-71, the American Plains Indian Wars 
of 1865-90 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, including identifying 
the lessons drawn from these conflicts by both their respective forces and 
the British Army. These campaigns have been selected purposefully as they 
not only cover chronologically the time period of the evolution of the regular 
Mounted Infantry in a manner analogous to the campaigns chosen as case 
studies for analysis in the British Army, but they also illustrate comparative 
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changes in cavalry doctrine among these nations with which to contextualise 
individual solutions to the battlefield application of mobile firepower. 
Both Badsey and Phillips have considered the lessons learned from the 
experiences of the American Civil War and European wars of 1866 and 
1870-71.128 They highlight the ambiguities of the lessons from these wars. In 
America, the cavalry forces behaved in some respects more like Mounted 
Infantry than typical European style cavalry by demonstrating a 
comparatively greater use of dismounted firepower. Yet this is not the whole 
story as erstwhile armed blanche cavalry charges took place including, 
almost uniquely, using pistol-fire from the saddle. Dennis Showalter 
considers that this conflict altered the paradigm of the American cavalry 
model with the Union cavalry, in particular, developing into an independent 
strike force, presaging the British mobile columns in South Africa in 1901 – 
02, predicated on mobile firepower and the retention of modified shock 
tactics.129 Thus there remains polarity of opinion whether US cavalry was 
Mounted Infantry or ‘true’ cavalry but could the apparent absence of Mounted 
Infantry in the US Army of the period be explained by this changing paradigm 
of the US cavalry? 
By contrast, the mid-19th century European wars demonstrated more 
traditional cavalry tactics, predicated on shock, but with questionable tactical 
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impact on the battlefield.130  Although such mediocrity may have been due to 
failures in reconnaissance, the impact of modern weaponry and poor military 
planning, Phillips argues that it was failure of command in the cavalry rather 
than from outdated cavalry tactics or faulty army doctrine.131  Nevertheless, if 
employment of traditional cavalry was largely ineffective then should these 
armies have embraced the Mounted Infantry model and if they had, would 
this have provided an additional resource on the battlefield? Moreover, as 
British military strategy re-focussed towards the probability of a European 
conflict after 1905-06, did these doctrines of European armies adversely 
influence the existence of the regular Mounted Infantry? 
Elsewhere in the British Empire, other solutions to the requirement of mobile 
firepower evolved. As noted previously the mounted troops in Australia, New 
Zealand and, to a lesser extent Canada, tended to develop into Mounted 
Rifles rather than either Mounted Infantry or cavalry. Similarly, the Mounted 
Infantry model does not appear to have migrated wholesale to the Indian 
Army although abstraction for Mounted Infantry training did occur in Indian 
Army infantry regiments. Admittedly, Indian cavalry regiments were more 
plentiful than their British cavalry counterparts but were generally organised 
differently through the silladar system, thus superficially resembling domestic 
Yeomanry.132  However, can the apparent lack of Mounted Infantry in India 
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be accounted for by the relative numerical abundance of Indian cavalry 
regiments or does this reflect a more fundamental difference between the 
two armies? Therefore, the final principal research question will investigate 
the British Army regular Mounted Infantry’s apparent uniqueness, identifying 
the alternative strategies adopted in other armies to solve the challenge of 
the applying mobile firepower to the battlefield and answering the question 
that if the Mounted Infantry model was not a viable solution to be adopted 
then why not?   
In summary, the innovation that was the British regular Mounted Infantry 
arose from the experiences of British infantry regiments during colonial 
conflicts, predominantly, though not exclusively, in Africa. The model became 
increasingly formalised after 1888 with the opening of Mounted Infantry 
Schools of Instruction reaching its zenith in 1900 – 02 when the Mounted 
Infantry was a blueprint for the British Army on campaign. Although lauded 
by many senior army commanders, the Mounted Infantry was destined to be 
abolished in 1913. Prevailing historical orthodoxy indicates that the Mounted 
Infantry was only ever intended as an expedient to cover the lack of regular 
cavalry and a redundant Mounted Infantry was superseded by the reformed 
‘hybrid’ cavalry.133 Additional influences implicated in its demise, including 
the vested interests of Mounted Infantry officers, its eventual lack of 
patronage and the refocusing of strategic army planning, have been 
                                                                                                                                                                    
regiment was a kind of joint-stock company in which the trooper paid for his horse and equipment 
when he joined and sold them back when he left’. 
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considered as integral to the politico-military reality that, by 1913, the 
Mounted Infantry was redundant.  
In a eulogy for the late Mounted Infantry in the Cavalry Journal, a sentiment 
was expressed that the debt owed to the Mounted Infantry for its part in 
successful colonial campaigns had not been recognised by the nation or the 
army.134 It was predicted that the glorious deeds performed by the Mounted 
Infantry would soon be forgotten by the rest of the army. Sadly, this prophesy 
was soon realised. Clearly, the industrial magnitude of the warfare of the 
First World War overshadowed memories of the Mounted Infantry’s heyday 
and the accelerating modernity of mechanised warfare appeared to deride 
the continued existence of horsed troops particularly cavalry, a conviction still 
held tenaciously by public opinion and that has resisted the efforts of 
revisionism.135  Perhaps more with optimism than with true conviction, the 
eulogy concluded with the observation that: 
          To the Mounted Infantry as a whole belongs a very large share of the  
          honour of saving the Empire in its most trying hour, and it is, no doubt,  
          only an oversight that this has never been fully appreciated by the 
          public.136 
Therefore, this thesis aims to correct this ‘oversight’ by reviewing the history 
of the British Army’s regular Mounted Infantry, place the Mounted Infantry 
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appropriately in context in the historiography of the late Victorian and 
Edwardian army,  consolidate its fragmented history and, by answering six 
principal research questions, ultimately judge whether the Mounted Infantry 
was indeed merely the expedient stop-gap measure of Repington’s aphorism 
of the Mounted Infantry as a ‘cavalry of poverty’ or whether it was a model 
conceived of its time, an Victorian imperial solution for a Victorian imperial 
problem, a short-lived but potent military paradigm.  
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Chapter Two 
Doctrine and Organisation 
 
During a lecture in 1873, 1 the future Field Marshal Evelyn Wood, then a 
Lieutenant Colonel in the 90th Light Infantry, pronounced presciently that 
Mounted Riflemen were now essential to every enterprising army. Years 
later, a précis produced by the Intelligence Department at the War Office, 
benefitting perhaps from thirty-two years’ hindsight, concurred with Wood’s 
prediction, forecasting still that mobilising large numbers of Mounted Infantry 
bestowed definite military advantages.2  Yet despite the consistency of such 
portents over many years, the regular Mounted Infantry developed in an 
atmosphere of controversy of role, doctrine and organisation to such an 
extent that the author Erskine Childers questioned rhetorically, despite the 
experiences of the Boer War, ‘in what precise and positive way do Mounted 
Rifles differ from Yeomanry, Mounted Infantry and Cavalry?’.3  In asking this 
question so many years after the regular Mounted Infantry’s foundation and 
unsuspectingly only a mere four years before its formal abolition, Childers 
echoed the continuing debate within the army’s officer corps4 that 
                                                          
1 Evelyn Wood, Mounted Riflemen: Lecture at the RUSI on 4th March 1873 (London; W. Mitchell & 
Co., 1873), pp.1-25, the title reflects the imprecision in use of nomenclature throughout 
contemporaneous primary and secondary sources alluded to in the previous chapter. Wood based 
his opinion on his analysis of events in the Franco-German war of 1870-71. 
 
2 TNA WO 163 / 10 Minutes of the Army Council, précis 160, 1905. 
3 Childers, War and the Arme Blanche, p.5. 
4
 Captain C.W. Battine, ‘The Use of the Horse Soldier in the Twentieth Century’, Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institute, 52, 1908, pp. 309-30. 
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demonstrated uncertainty, if not overt distrust, over the seemingly 
overlapping roles of the cavalry and Mounted Infantry.5  That such perplexity 
could remain in the army despite twenty years of formal Mounted Infantry 
training is illustrated by an explanatory article appearing in the Cavalry 
Journal in 19066  where, despite an attempt at distinguishing between the 
functions of Mounted Infantry, Mounted Rifles, and cavalry, clear residual 
ambiguity remained. Edwin Alderson, a senior Mounted Infantry officer, had 
admitted that ‘to say what is the exact role of Mounted Infantry is impossible; 
they have done and will do again all sorts of work’.7  Hubert Gough, a cavalry 
officer in the 16th Lancers but commanding the Composite Regiment of 
Mounted Infantry during the Boer War, remarked insouciantly that ‘I had just 
been appointed to the command of three squadrons of Horse or Mounted 
Infantry, whichever term you may prefer to use’.8  Time has not dispelled this 
tendency to ambiguity in both nomenclature and functionality.9  Thus the on-
going existence, role and organisational basis of the Mounted Infantry 
provided a fundamental challenge to the army’s prevailing thinking that 
                                                          
5
 Brigadier General A.W. Thorneycroft, ‘Some Notes on Mounted Infantry’, Cavalry Journal, 1, 1906, 
pp.161-66. 
 
6 Anon, ‘Mounted Rifles and Mounted Infantry’, Cavalry Journal, 1, 1906, pp. 29-32. 
 
7 Alderson, With the Mounted Infantry and the Mashonaland Field Force 1896, p.5. 
 
8 Appendix Five; General Sir Hubert Gough, Soldiering On (London: Arthur Barker, 1954), p.71; 
Talbot, ‘The Regular Mounted Infantry’, pp. 306-24, the Composite Regiment, as its name suggests, 
included elements from four colonial South African units (Natal Carbineers, Natal Police, Natal Field 
Artillery, Durban Light Infantry) and three British infantry battalions (Border Regiment, Dublin 
Fusiliers and the King’s Royal Rifle Corps). 
9
 Gary Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army, (London: Aurum, 2011), p.41, 
suggests that ‘mounted riflemen’ were improved versions of Mounted Infantry with inherent 
equestrian skills conferring an ability to perform cavalry duties excluding the arme blanche. This 
overlooks the different origins of the two groups as Mounted Riflemen were not fully-trained 
infantrymen. 
 
50 
 
Hutton summarised blandly as ‘the much discussed question of Mounted 
Infantry’.10  
Therefore this chapter will consider the thesis’ initial primary research 
question relating to the doctrine and role of the regular Mounted Infantry. Did 
the inception of the regular Mounted Infantry satisfy a previously unfilled 
need within the army or was it merely a stop-gap interim measure of an 
inferior cavalry substitute that was abolished when no longer required? In 
other words, was the regular Mounted Infantry a model Victorian paradigm or 
an unfortunate mediocrity, the ‘cavalry of poverty’?11 Did the apparently 
changing functions of the Mounted Infantry over its existence from an 
extemporised mounting of infantry companies abroad, through its ubiquity in 
the Boer War, to its formal yet short-lived designation as divisional mounted 
troops temporarily displacing cavalry from some of its traditional roles,12 
reflect ongoing military needs or merely a response to army politics and 
vested interests?13  Was the Mounted Infantry importantly, if only temporarily, 
the ‘fourth estate of the military hierarchy’ alongside the infantry, cavalry, 
                                                          
10 Hutton Five Lectures on Mounted Infantry, Lecture One, 2 June 1886, pp.1-44, by the time of 
publication of his lecture series in 1891, Hutton was Lieutenant-Colonel and Deputy Assistant 
Adjutant General commanding the Mounted Infantry School at Aldershot.   
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 The Times, 16 February 1912, ‘The Mounted Troops of the Expeditionary Force’. 
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 Divisional mounted troops or divisional cavalry were available to the Divisional General Officer 
Commanding tasked with protection of the infantry and artillery from enemy forces, particularly 
cavalry, and required to undertake additional functions such as communication duties and local 
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 F. Crum (‘A Rifleman’), The Question of Mounted Infantry (London: Hugh Rees, 1909), p.93; 
‘Lancer’, ‘The Question of Mounted Infantry: a reply to Rifleman’, Cavalry Journal, 5, 1910, pp.228-
31; A.B.B., ‘A defence of Mounted Infantry: an answer to ‘Lancer’, Cavalry Journal, 5, 1910, pp.398 – 
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combined engineers and artillery14  or did it risk constituting, in the words of 
the 1881 Intelligence Department’s précis, becoming a ‘fifth wheel on the 
carriage’ of the British Army, indicating an experimental, idiosyncratic and 
possibly unnecessary solution to the conundrum of how to merge increased 
mobility with enhanced firepower on the colonial battlefield?15  
In answering these questions, the relationship between the Mounted 
Infantry’s organisation and its roles will be investigated to determine whether 
the Mounted Infantry was ‘fit for purpose’ in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. This necessitates an examination of the processes for the 
Mounted Infantry’s configuration and its resource requirements, coloured by 
the extensive debate around permanence or impermanence, influenced by 
the vicissitudes of manpower abstraction and underpinned by prevailing 
financial imperatives. Thus, in the context of military and political opinion, 
strategic considerations, fiscal constraint and the peculiarities inherent in 
colonial campaigning, the Mounted Infantry’s ability to deliver its roles, 
largely although not exclusively centred on force protection through its 
application of mobile firepower, will be investigated. 
The presence of another mounted arm alongside the cavalry created an 
interface at which institutional friction chafed thus a subsidiary research 
question will clarify the extent to which the Mounted Infantry and cavalry 
accommodated each others’ respective roles or, alternatively, whether the 
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 H.M. Bengough, ‘Combined Tactics’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 36, 1892, pp. 
791-808.   
 
15 TNA WO 33 / 37 Précis on Mounted Infantry 1881. 
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ambiguity articulated by Childers was both the reality of colonial campaigning 
and a source of internal army conflict. Moreover, where did this uncertainty 
place the two mounted arms in the army’s thinking and why, given the 
disquiet occurring between the Mounted Infantry’s supporters and its 
detractors, did the Mounted Infantry garner such high-level support from 
leading army figures including Wolseley, Wood and Roberts as well as from 
aspiring younger officers, most notably Hutton, Alderson, Ian Hamilton, 
Alexander Godley and Beauvoir De Lisle? 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the concept of Mounted Infantry 
was not new and could be traced back to the dragoons of the 17th century. 
Whilst horsed, these soldiers had dismounted to fire their comparatively 
primitive firearms, seldom firing their weapons from the saddle, and carrying 
their firearms slung on their backs when on horseback. Much later, the 
relative merits of whether the modern firearm, either carbine or rifle, should 
be carried slung on the rider’s back or whether it should be attached to the 
saddle precipitated much debate.16 As late as 1902, Roberts indicated his 
view that: ‘I consider it essential that the rifle should be slung by all mounted 
troops when likely to be engaged which on service would practically amount 
to its being always slung except perhaps on the line of march’.17 By 1907 the 
War Office’s official cavalry manual, Cavalry Training 1907, stipulated 
                                                          
16
 British Library, (hereafter BL), Hutton Papers, Add. 50111, XXXIV, ‘The Proposed Mounted Infantry 
Regiment’ 1887, Hutton proposed carriage of a rifle horizontally on a patented saddle; Western 
Mail, 9 February 1888, incorrectly asserted that switching personal carriage from the sword to the 
slung  carbine was symbolic of the transition of mounted soldiers from cavalry to Mounted Infantry. 
17
 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London, (hereafter LHCMA), Godley 
Papers, 3/240, letter from Roberts, 13
 
January 1902, conversely Godley indicated his reluctance for 
the rifle to be carried slung by the Mounted Infantry on grounds of comfort for rider and horse. 
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carriage of the firearm, at least for the cavalry, to be on the saddle, perhaps 
symbolically denoting the cavalry’s relegation of the firearm to a subsidiary 
role but with the dire warning that ‘on no occasion must the rifle be left on the 
horse’.18 Those proponents who advocated the rifle carried slung on the 
soldier’s back, whilst acknowledging concerns regarding the extra weight 
causing fatigue to rider and tunic,19 considered that this approach would 
ensure the firearm’s availability at all times as otherwise it might be lost and 
the soldier left defenceless if he became unhorsed. This view was 
championed by Roberts who described this very predicament when many of 
the 9th Lancers were unhorsed during the battle at Chardeh during the 2nd 
Afghan War of 1878-80.20  Pragmatically however, the Mounted Infantry 
generally favoured the rifle slung over the shoulder with the butt supported in 
a leather bucket.21 
Dragoons of the 17th and 18th centuries rarely used the tactics of the horsed 
charge and merely relied on their mounts for greater mobility than could be 
achieved by the foot infantry.22  In this alone, the dragoon of history was not 
only a forerunner of the Victorian Mounted Infantryman but also laid down a 
basic tenet of the Mounted Infantry that the mount was only to promote 
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 Cavalry Training 1907 (London: HMSO, 1907), p.80. 
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 Wood, Mounted Riflemen: Lecture at the RUSI on 4
th
 March 1873, pp.1-25, although Wood 
favoured carrying the rifle on the saddle to avoid extra weight on the rider but also that a rider 
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operational and tactical mobility through enhanced locomotion.23 
Consequently, neither the dragoon nor the Mounted Infantryman needed a 
well-bred cavalry horse able to provide the speed of shock tactics and any 
donkey, mule or pony available locally with adequate endurance and 
strength could be drafted in as a mount. Thus the Mounted Infantry was to be 
mounted ideally on locally sourced animals most suited to the prevailing 
environment.24  Essentially, the dragoon’s role would be adopted by the later 
Mounted Infantry, being used in the advance for securing bridges and 
vantage points until reinforced by foot infantry and for covering army 
retirements where they, as erstwhile musketeers, cooperated with the 
cavalry.25 However over time, the dragoon metamorphosed into the ‘heavy’ 
armoured cavalryman of the 19th century whose métier was the arme 
blanche charge brandishing edged steel weapons.26  Although the dragoon 
concept had temporarily brought added firepower to operations in the 17th 
and early 18th centuries, by the later 18th and 19th centuries additional factors 
of ballistics and tactics revised the balance of firepower on the battlefield with 
no force capable of combining mobility and firepower except horse artillery. 
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 Mounted Infantry Training 1906,  p.1, mounted drill was to ensure that Mounted Infantry shall 
‘reap the full advantage of the mobility afforded them by their horses’; Captain J.R. Lumley, 
‘Mounted Riflemen’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 1881 – 82, 25, pp. 638-56; for a 
definition of ‘mobility’, see Chapter One, footnote 14; as the Mounted Infantry paradigm matured 
with its doctrinal roles extending, enhanced manoeuvrability remained an aspiration of senior army 
commanders and Mounted Infantry proponents that partly came to fruition during the Boer War 
 
24
 BL, Hutton Papers, Add. 50111, XXXIV, ‘The Proposed Mounted Infantry Regiment’ 1887. 
 
25
 W.H. Greenly, ‘Cromwell’s Cavalry’, Cavalry Journal, 1, 1906, p.182. 
 
26
 F.N. Maude, Cavalry: its Past and Future (London: William Clowes & Sons, 1903), p.45, though by 
the second year of the English Civil War, dragoons had been witnessed charging like ‘light cavalry’. 
 
55 
 
As evidence of this, during the American War of Independence of 1775-83 
the British Army’s use of cavalry was minimal resulting from the logistical 
difficulties of transporting cavalry regiments across the Atlantic causing 
excessive equine losses, whilst the densely-forested terrain proved 
inhospitable to cavalry movement. To this must be added the numerical 
paucity of cavalry regiments within the British Army.27 At this time, the 
strength of the cavalry at home, including Household Cavalry, did not exceed 
4,000 men of whom several hundred were unavoidably dismounted due to 
fiscal constraints.28  The cavalry’s low number contributed to the relative 
infrequency with which cavalry regiments were sent overseas compared to 
infantry regiments.29  This persisting numerical disadvantage also ensured 
that the occasional proposals for Mounted Infantry to be sourced solely from 
cavalry rather than infantry regiments, an illogical suggestion in view of the 
cavalry’s lack of infantry training that by definition was a pre-requisite for 
Mounted Infantry service, foundered.30  The solution for mobility in America 
was the use of local ponies, procured with comparative ease, with excellent 
long distance endurance but little in the way of speed, hence suitable for 
Mounted Infantry but not cavalry. The 63rd Foot, deployed as Mounted 
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 Rev. H. Belcher, ‘The Use of Mounted Infantry in America 1778 – 1780’, Cavalry Journal, 8, 1913, 
pp. 64-73, ‘British cavalry was too scanty to play anything but a very minor part in this war’. 
 
28
 Belcher, ‘The Use of Mounted Infantry in America’, p. 65. 
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Infantry without prior training and having sourced its own mounts locally, 
fought in a number of small engagements near Charleston and participated 
in the British victory at Camden31. The experience of successfully forming 
temporary Mounted Infantry thus contributed to the durable belief held 
subsequently by senior army officers that Mounted Infantry could be 
extemporised with ease and required only the briefest of training. With ad 
hoc  Mounted Infantry deployed in North America, an awareness of the need 
for improved musketry combined with mobility to combat the superior 
marksmanship of the colonial backwoodsman, itself presaging lessons to be 
re-learned in South Africa in 1899 – 1902, confirmed for senior officers that 
Mounted Infantry under certain operational circumstances could confer 
attributes absent in traditional cavalry.32 Unsurprisingly though, not all 
officers welcomed the Mounted Infantry concept with the Duke of Wellington 
reportedly saying later that ‘I never had much idea of the Dragoon while we 
had him in our own service’.33 
Although not part of any formal doctrine, the variable use of improvised 
Mounted Infantry continued at times of local trouble or crisis elsewhere in the 
Empire. Colonial conflicts exposed the limitations of infantry operations 
devoid of mounted troops resulting in inadequate mobility, reconnaissance, 
scouting and pursuit.34  A temporary Mounted Infantry detachment was 
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formed from the 24th Foot stationed in South Africa by Captain, later General, 
Sir Frederick Carrington, whilst similarly Mounted Infantry saw active service 
in the Zulu War in 1879 with an ad hoc corps formed by Major, later Colonel, 
Barrow.35  Elsewhere, in India, Sir Henry Havelock raised a corps of Mounted 
Infantry from the 10th Foot in October 1858 during the Indian Mutiny. Through 
necessity, his force of forty soldiers trained for only a fortnight before seeing 
action thus emphasising the contemporary acceptance of brevity of training 
for mounted work by troops other than cavalry. Earlier that same year, Sir 
Hugh Rose, eventually Field Marshal and Commander-in-Chief in India, 
mobilised a temporary and rudimentary (by later standards) Camel Corps 
from four officers and one hundred men of the 2nd and 3rd KRRC together 
with two hundred loyal Sikhs. Each man was mounted tandem on a camel 
behind a native driver.36 Numerous other similar occurrences are recorded 
with all these examples pointing to a clear if informal pattern of emergency 
extemporisation, brevity of instruction and transient existence with timely 
disbandment when crisis had receded.37  This contributed to the Mounted 
Infantry model existing temporarily only on active service. The corollary was 
its absence in peacetime that had implications for its organisation and 
training.38  As colonial garrison duties frequently necessitated timely 
response in quelling local insurrection without waiting for reinforcements from 
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home, the local infantry garrison largely bore this responsibility alone. Thus 
the use of locally-mounted infantry companies benefitted from simplicity, 
rapidity and ease of organisation, familiarity of command and cost-
effectiveness compared to the embarkation of cavalry from home, yet it was 
only suitable against an enemy without traditionally trained cavalry where the 
latter’s possession of edged weapons and prior inculcation of arme blanche 
tactics might nullify any advantages accrued from deployment of ad hoc 
Mounted Infantry. To its detractors, the nascent Mounted Infantry was an 
indifferent cavalry substitute devoid of a full range of cavalry functionality. 
However, ad hoc Mounted Infantry never aspired to be bona fide cavalry but 
a local mounted force providing protection for its foot infantry colleagues 
whilst remaining capable of delivering vestigial cavalry duties of 
reconnaissance, security for lines of communication, flank protection and 
both advance and rearguards depending on the requirements of the 
campaign. Despite this doctrinal conundrum, this fundamental 
misunderstanding between aspiration and necessity would contribute, along 
with confusion around nomenclature, to the durable antipathy towards the 
Mounted Infantry exhibited particularly by cavalry officers.39  Clearly, the 
implications for extemporising Mounted Infantry were not solely cavalry-
focussed as the process of forming Mounted Infantry also impacted on their 
parent infantry battalions. If by definition the pre-requisite requirement for the 
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 Hutton, Five Lectures on Mounted Infantry, Lecture Four, 20 April 1891, pp.1-27, in the post-
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has resulted’. 
 
59 
 
Mounted Infantryman was to be a fully trained infantry soldier40  and infantry 
battalions on overseas duty had to be the source of regular Mounted Infantry,  
the question of how Mounted Infantry should be formed remained 
problematic – should it be ‘as required’ or ‘pre-planned’? 
Ad hoc extemporisation had the inherent benefit of configuring mounted men 
where and when required. If brevity of training was permissible, then 
extemporisation removed the problem of men routinely absent from the 
battalion for mounted training. Numerical expansion of Mounted Infantry was 
then simple and only limited by the availability of suitable local mounts and 
personnel. The caveat was that the parent infantry battalion must not be 
denuded of too many of its officers and men in deference to the mounted 
detachment, which would otherwise destabilise the battalion and reduce its 
ability to operate although pragmatically, men could be returned easily to the 
ranks of the battalion as necessary provided the mounted companies were 
not deployed geographically too distant. The assumption that brevity of 
training, in tandem with extemporisation, was satisfactory was questioned in 
the wake of the Transvaal rebellion of 1880-81,41 with the Duke of 
Cambridge, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, objecting to the 
concept of permanent Mounted Infantry regiments but conceding that there 
was benefit in maintaining Mounted Infantry companies in a number of 
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battalions for service when necessary.42  The need for training prior to 
deployment weighed against the benefits of impromptu formation but led to 
the formalisation of peacetime training. The nature of what constituted 
training during the regular Mounted Infantry’s existence will be examined in a 
subsequent chapter. Opportunity for peacetime training would be achieved 
by abstraction of officers and men, either selected men or, less frequently 
volunteers, seconded from their infantry battalions for Mounted Infantry 
instruction, but who remained an integral part of their parent battalions 
returning to regimental duty after conclusion of mounted training. Abstraction 
had its benefits as well as downsides. In addition to facilitating numerical 
expansion, abstraction could spread the load across many infantry battalions 
whilst the obvious problem was the loss of officers and men from battalions 
when most needed at commencement of hostilities.  
Irrespective of its potential flaws, abstraction became the foundation for 
training and formation of Mounted Infantry before and after the Boer War. It 
had not been the only option considered by army commanders. Evelyn 
Wood, one of the founding fathers of the regular Mounted Infantry,43 
suggested a process resembling abstraction but limited preferentially to light 
infantry.44 The light infantry’s independence of action, initiative and self-
reliance seemed traits comparable to those desired from Mounted Infantry in 
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Wood’s somewhat biased opinion (after all he was a Light Infantry lieutenant 
colonel).  Similarly, perhaps to the Mounted Infantry’s future detriment, such 
attributes were within the remit of light cavalry and thus in time, risked 
institutional friction with the cavalry over the duties of scouting and 
reconnaissance.45  As Mounted Infantry would likely deploy as small units 
some distance away from its parent battalion or the bulk of the army, 
attributes of intelligence and resilience inculcated by previous training would 
be particularly useful.  Following the Boer War, an updated but superficially 
similar suggestion for a wholesale re-designation of a number of Rifle 
regiments to Mounted Infantry also failed to gain credence within the army.46 
If accepted, this would have created immediately at least 4,000 Mounted 
Infantry from eight Rifle battalions.  Its rejection was based on needing to 
maintain esprit de corps in the Rifle regiments that might have been 
threatened by such a move. Even more controversially, a conversion of four 
newly-constituted cavalry regiments to Mounted Rifles was suggested by the 
same author at a time when the Mounted Rifles archetype was prevalent in 
South Africa.47 This was not the first time this had been suggested as Wood 
also had considered the possible conversion of several complete cavalry 
regiments to the role of Mounted Rifles almost thirty years previously.48  
Fortunately, considering the longevity of institutional friction between 
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Mounted Infantry and cavalry officers, the resulting acrimony and 
organisational chaos ensuing if such conversion had occurred, was avoided. 
Although for the most part an enthusiast for abstraction, Hutton initially 
advocated similarly to Wood that two complete pre-existing infantry 
battalions be converted into permanent Mounted Infantry thus ‘sacrificing’ 
two pre-existing regiments. Leaving aside the fraught nature of ‘re-roling’ 
regiments, this option would have limited the absolute numbers of Mounted 
Infantry trained and would have been most likely numerically inadequate for 
overseas’ commitments. In fact it is difficult to see how a numerically finite 
home-based permanent regiment could match the flexibility of extemporised 
forces overseas unless the permanent regiment(s) were considered to be a 
form of Victorian ‘rapid reaction force’ always ready for prompt dispatch 
abroad. Despite improvements in maritime technology and the opening of the 
Suez Canal in November 1869 that shortened the duration of transport of 
troops to much of the Empire, most journeys remained comparative lengthy, 
certainly by modern standards, thus diminishing the practicality of ‘rapid 
reaction’ with the risk that hostilities might have ceased by the time of its 
arrival.49 Hutton further vacillated over the question of permanence or 
impermanence proposing in 1887 the formation of a permanent Mounted 
Infantry Regiment, based on a number of schemes predicated on long-term 
abstraction of men from parent infantry regiments but constituted for a finite 
period into a permanent regiment.50  His preferred option was an eight-
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company regiment with each company furnished by an individual infantry 
battalion. The obvious benefit of this permutation was the disruption of fewer 
infantry battalions than in other schemes comprising section-sized 
abstractions from a larger number of battalions. Unfortunately abstraction 
resulting in the temporary loss of men, often the most experienced soldiers, 
from their parent battalions both during peacetime for training and potentially 
permanently on mobilisation, would remain unpopular with infantry battalion 
commanders.51 Naively perhaps, Hutton took an opposing view, optimistically 
assuming that the infantry battalion commanders’ acceptance of abstraction 
signified a pride that their own detachment of Mounted Infantry’s forthcoming 
honour would reflect well on the parent battalion.52  Wood recognised that 
abstraction would always place stresses on parent infantry battalions and he 
sought cost-effective alternatives whilst remaining true to the established 
principle of Mounted Infantry impermanence. His later attempts to proactively 
over-establish infantry battalions to take abstraction into account, a scheme 
previously championed in the Press,53  foundered on fiscal grounds.54 
Despite his suggested permutations for Mounted Infantry formulation, Wood 
supported abstraction with selection by commanding officers on the basis of 
having served in the infantry for a set period, learnt infantry drill successfully 
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and passed a course in musketry.55 These criteria would become more 
stringent over the following years when selection no longer relied on issues 
such as duration of prior service and a modicum of musketry skill but on 
good conduct, marksmanship, minimum age and satisfactory health. 
Importantly, preferential selection on merit, rather than volunteering, 
rendered an aura of corps d’ élite, resonating superficially with modern 
special forces.56  Thus, in hindsight, Wood proposed many of the foundations 
of the regular Mounted Infantry and by championing abstraction, he 
promoted the Mounted Infantry as an impermanent organisation configured 
only in war, though this would be an arrangement later implicated in the 
arm’s demise. 
As the concept of regular Mounted Infantry gained credence,57 the War 
Office undertook an analysis of the options for the organisation of future 
Mounted Infantry.58  Three options were proposed, namely: the formation of 
a permanent corps; a continuation of the previous ad hoc formations 
temporarily abstracted from infantry regiments during periods of crisis, and 
peacetime abstraction for Mounted Infantry training resulting in a cadre of 
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men within their parent infantry battalions ready for reconstitution and 
deployment as Mounted Infantry on mobilisation. Only the first option 
recommended the establishment of a permanent corps yet the debate 
around permanence versus impermanence persisted throughout the 
Mounted Infantry’s existence. The advantages of permanency included 
formalised training opportunities, enhanced promotion prospects for officers 
seeing service in a novel arm, encouraging clarity of role within the army’s 
doctrine and the development of a new regimental identity underpinned by 
esprit de corps. The Intelligence Department’s précis of 1881concluded that 
‘officers who have had practical experience with Mounted Infantry are 
opposed to the formation of a permanent corps’59, a conclusion of surprising 
longevity and durability.60 An important objection to a permanent Mounted 
Infantry, voiced frequently by senior army officers, was the concern that 
permanent regular Mounted Infantry would inexorably trend towards being an 
undertrained ‘inferior’ cavalry, losing its excellence in infantry skills and 
preferring to remain mounted without having any expertise in the cavalry’s 
arme blanche.61 Hutton emphasised that, irrespective of the Mounted 
Infantry’s permanence or impermanence, the ‘Mounted Infantry must avoid 
becoming a species of Yeomanry’ i.e. change from infantrymen to cavalry or 
light horsemen which would destroy the raison d’être of such a force’.62  As 
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late in the Mounted Infantry’s evolution as 1893, the Army Book, an army-
sanctioned semi-official publication authored by serving officers, still 
continued to explain the absence of the Mounted Infantry’s permanency 
through the risk of losing its infantry identity and that a permanent corps 
would spend too much time on equestrian care rather than maintaining its 
infantry skills.63  Conversely, Colonel George Henderson, a renowned 
military theorist at the Royal Military College Sandhurst,64  in promoting the 
concept of permanency,  disputed this unproven assertion of becoming 
indifferent cavalry,65  but identified the possibility of doctrinal co-existence, 
recognising the potential value from inter-arm cooperation combining the 
Mounted Infantry’s rifle power facilitating the cavalry’s operational 
independence.66  
As a process, abstraction had inherent flaws including slowness of training 
predicated on secondment. Despite preceding years of abstraction for 
training at Mounted Infantry schools since 1888,67  by 1905 only forty-eight of 
the seventy-eight home-based infantry battalions had provided men for 
Mounted Infantry training even though numerical requirements had been 
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revised downwards from company to detachment size, in turn posing 
problems of integrating so many detachments cohesively into a Mounted 
Infantry battalion whilst spreading the burden across a larger number of 
infantry battalions.68  The amount of trained Mounted Infantry appears 
disappointingly low in comparison to the rather optimistic predicted annual 
output of twenty complete battalions from Aldershot’s Mounted Infantry 
School after the Boer War,69  which reflected the dual problems of reluctance 
of battalion commanders to release men for Mounted Infantry training and 
the fact that most home battalions remained under-strength whilst still 
needing to find drafts for their linked battalions overseas.70  On balance, 
senior army officers favoured abstraction and organisational impermanence 
over a new regimental force although absolute consensus was lacking.71  
Colonel Henry Hallam Parr, commander of the Mounted Infantry during the 
Egyptian Campaign of 1882, was a vocal supporter of abstraction, extending 
the principle to a suggested register of trained Mounted Infantry reservists. 
General Redvers Buller was adamant that there was no need for permanent 
Mounted Infantry, disagreeing with the concept entirely and suggesting that 
all first-rate infantry should be taught to ride thus becoming potential ‘mobile 
infantry’,72  a suggestion undermined by its impracticality including 
                                                          
68
 TNA WO 163 / 10 Army Council Minutes, précis 160, 1905. 
 
69
 A.J. Godley, ‘The Development of Mounted Infantry training at home’, Cavalry Journal, 1, 1906, 
pp. 52-55. 
 
70
 Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, pp.62-66. 
 
71
 Hutton, Five Lectures on Mounted Infantry, Lecture One: 2 June 1886, pp.1-44. 
 
72
 Talbot, ‘The Regular Mounted Infantry’, pp. 306-24. 
 
68 
 
inadequate resources and time available for training and, of course, cost. It 
was only in Egypt post-1885 and South Africa following the Boer War where 
any form of permanence for the Mounted Infantry was attained. In South 
Africa, infantry battalions arriving for garrison duties relinquished their 
Mounted Infantry companies permanently until re-embarkation for home. 
Neither the infantry colonels nor the General Officer Commanding in South 
Africa liked this arrangement much because of the enforced loss of men and 
the comparative frequency with which Mounted Infantry companies 
comprising the force rotated.73 Remarkably, even the experiences of the 
Boer War failed to settle the issue of permanence versus impermanence.74   
During the post-War years, Childers berated Mounted Infantry commanders 
whom he considered to have betrayed their arm by leaving the force or 
converting to the cavalry, citing the example of Beauvoir De Lisle, a light 
infantry officer with Mounted Infantry command experience, who was 
persuaded by Roberts to switch to the cavalry75 on the grounds that Roberts 
wished to ‘have at least one cavalry officer who appreciated the importance 
of firepower as its primary weapon’.76  Evans indicates that De Lisle was only 
one of several non-cavalry officers, often staff college graduates, who 
transferred into the cavalry on recommendation or through a perception that 
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service in the cavalry might bestow improved career prospects.77  There 
were numerous factors contributing to this perception of enhanced promotion 
prospects in the cavalry particularly a faster turnover of cavalry officers than 
in line infantry regiments.78  Whilst the cost of living and socialising in cavalry 
officers’ messes was more expensive than in county infantry regiments and 
thus potentially prohibitive to a career in the cavalry79, equally the personal 
and family wealth of cavalry officers often meant greater opportunities for a 
career outside the army particularly the managing of family estates80. This 
linkage of landed aristocracy, influential positions in local society and 
preceding service in the cavalry was integral to the association between 
these ex-cavalry officers and command in county Yeomanry regiments.81 
Nevertheless, Badsey suggests that the issue of securing career prospects 
by remaining within the regimental system rather than commanding 
impermanent Mounted Infantry was a factor in the eventual lack of support 
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for the Mounted Infantry.82  Against the hypothesis is the fact that these 
officers, despite service in the abstracted Mounted Infantry, always remained 
foremost officers in their parent regiments. These arguments confer a 
distorted view of the Mounted Infantry’s identity that will be explored fully in 
due course.  
If successful abstraction posed numerous challenges then a scheme was 
proposed to the Army Council in 1905, superficially resembling Hallam Parr’s 
proposal, that permanent Mounted Infantry battalions should be formed from 
volunteers completing their time in short service battalions.83  The proposal 
was for a voluntary extension of service for another six months at the end of 
the two years with the Colours prior to becoming reservists. Whilst this would 
circumvent the problem of losing men from the effective strength of the 
battalion, it was a considerably more expensive proposal than previously and 
forecast to cost a substantial £70,000 extra per annum.  The proposal was 
predicted to be unpopular with those joining the Reserve through loss of 
regimental allegiance as well as an anxiety that reservists would no longer 
be capable of Mounted Infantry duties by the time of mobilisation. Lieutenant 
General Sir James Murray, Master General of the Ordnance, favoured the 
proposal on the grounds that it removed the manpower stresses on infantry 
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battalions while permitting Mounted Infantry expansion through the Reserve 
but the proposal was shelved on the basis of cost.84  
Abstraction for service in Wolseley’s experimental Camel Corps in 1884 had 
clarified the risk and the inadvisability of a peremptory selection of favoured 
troops for Mounted Infantry service by army commanders. Rather than 
relying solely on line infantry battalions as usual for Mounted Infantry duties, 
Wolseley requested that cavalry, Guards regiments and the Royal Marines 
were abstracted to form the Heavy, Light Camel and Guards Camel 
Regiments respectively, although a Mounted Infantry Camel Regiment was 
eventually constituted on more traditional lines from line infantry. Whilst 
Wolseley supported the principle of abstraction, he also favoured hand-
picking officers and men from ‘smart’ regiments85  as in the Camel Corps.86  
Wolseley’s faith in dividing up élite regiments, including the Foot Guards, 
with no experience of abstraction87  and his acceptance of brevity of training 
for those employed as Mounted Infantry (despite the lessons of the 
Transvaal three years previously) resulted in an experimental Camel Corps 
where the majority of soldiers were neither trained as Mounted Infantry nor 
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experienced as camel-borne troops. In retrospect, this example of extreme 
abstraction appears, at best, a gamble and, at worst, culpably foolhardy. 
Nonetheless, pragmatically, the decision for the process of abstraction, 
supported by impermanence, was indeed the correct one at this stage of the 
Mounted Infantry’s inception as ill-advised permanence would have limited 
the Mounted Infantry’s numerical adequacy, ease and timeliness of 
deployment and cost effectiveness.88  
Despite the formalisation of abstraction, the Mounted Infantry still lacked a 
doctrine, particularly around how and in what way the Mounted Infantry 
should be deployed in the field, whether in small mobile detachments 
protecting their own infantry battalions or attached to the cavalry or in larger 
independent formations, a decision dependent upon which mounted roles 
were to be delegated to the Mounted Infantry. Clearly this would be 
important, not only for the Mounted Infantry, but also for other arms, 
particularly the cavalry. This is hardly surprising in view of the lack of an 
overarching formal doctrine for the British Army as a whole.89  The absence 
of a General Staff until the years after the Boer War meant that there was no 
single organisation for analysis of combat and campaign, leaving an overall 
deficiency in the army’s ability to identify, understand and promulgate 
lessons arising from warfare into future army planning and doctrine.90 Thus 
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there were drills and orders but the lack of formal doctrine meant that for 
commanders at all levels, there was, at best operational flexibility, and at 
worst, operational weakness through lack of doctrinal guidance.91 This deficit 
was exacerbated by the flexibility required by the myriad of military 
requirements across the Empire. The consequence was a tradition of 
improvisation, adoption of personalised training and command approaches 
and, as concluded by Jones, a tolerance of individuality that led to an army 
manifesting ‘subtly different tactics’.92  Nevertheless, for the Mounted 
Infantry, its contemporaneous, if basic, doctrine was explained as:  
            The essential fact to be impressed on all is that they [Mounted  
            Infantry] are and are to remain infantry and that the means of  
            locomotion provided by horse, ponies, camels or mechanical  
            contrivances to give them an increased mobility are merely as the  
            means to the end of their more effective service as infantry.93 
The Intelligence Department’s 1881 précis, constituting a briefing paper 
rather than policy or formal doctrine, asserted that: ‘in no case can Mounted 
Infantry be expected to fight on horseback, for it is insisted upon by all 
advocates of Mounted Infantry that the horse is merely a means of 
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locomotion’.94  The subsequent Regulations for Mounted Infantry 1884, 
reflecting drill more than doctrine, further endorsed the infantry basis of the 
regular Mounted Infantry with its singularity of fighting dismounted rather 
than a quasi-cavalry function.95 A contemporary paper encapsulated the 
infantryman spirit of the Mounted Infantry neatly: ‘No Mounted Infantryman 
should ever be allowed to imagine himself, or indeed should wish, to be a 
cavalryman’.96 Even the nearest to a contemporary document invoking 
embryonic doctrine, Regulations for Mounted Infantry 1897, indicated that ‘it 
cannot be too frequently impressed upon all ranks that they are in no sense 
cavalry’.97 The Regulations described the Mounted Infantry’s tactics as 
‘depending upon the accuracy and efficiency of its rifle fire’,98 but also 
indicated an embryonic inter-arm cooperation with cavalry, thus beginning to 
formulate a linkage between organisation, doctrine, and cooperation between 
arms.99 Whilst the Regulations and similar manuals did not equate the 
Mounted Infantry to cavalry, they did emphasise the attributes of working 
with foot infantry in the role of ‘force protection’,100 phrased as being of 
‘immense use as eyes and ears of the Infantry Division’ and thus clarifying 
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the Mounted Infantry’s supportive role of their foot colleagues.101  Force 
protection through mobile firepower, whether as an auxiliary to cavalry or 
protection for infantry, would remain the sine qua non of the Mounted 
Infantry’s existence from a doctrinal perspective, forming a functional thread 
underpinning the Mounted Infantry’s utilisation over its extended three 
decades’ existence.   
Mobility required appropriate mounting of soldiers, usually on animals 
sourced locally, whilst firepower would come from being fully-trained with a 
regulation rifle rather than the cavalry carbine and, later, would also include 
the machine gun.102  The question over the inferiority of the cavalry’s carbine, 
a weapon with which many other nations’ cavalries were also equipped,103  
was the basis of much discussion among senior infantry, cavalry and 
Mounted Infantry officers following the Boer War and, despite a defence of 
the carbine by its protagonists, the improved range and accuracy of the 
infantry rifle resulted in the carbine’s replacement.104 This outcome of the 
Boer War meant that the British cavalry, almost alone among European 
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cavalries, would be armed with the rifle in 1914, considered contributory to 
the high standard of musketry witnessed in the early battles of the First 
World War.105  The numerical disparity in the firing line between cavalry 
regiments and infantry regiments through different numerical establishments 
and the requirement for a quarter of men for horse holding duties, a problem 
also shared by the Mounted Infantry, reduced the cavalry’s firepower. The 
role of horse holders (‘Number 3s’) in managing mounts, ensuring they were 
near enough for rapid remounting if retreat was necessary but not so close 
as to be an easy target for enemy attack, was considered critical to the 
mobility of the Mounted Infantry.106  More men could be released to the firing 
line if more horses’ reins were linked together, although such reining 
practices were more time-consuming.107  Therefore, until the mid-1900s, the 
cavalry was unable to apply the same volume of firepower on the battlefield 
as the infantry and if the carbine’s flaws are included, as much as the 
Mounted Infantry. Thus, for this reason of inadequate firepower, the cavalry 
was inferior to the Mounted Infantry as a mobile reserve of firepower. Hence, 
reflecting the principal research question, the Mounted Infantry did not 
consider itself to be cavalry and the cavalry was unable to functionally 
compete with the Mounted Infantry in terms of firepower, thus pointing 
towards separation of roles between the two mounted arms. 
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However, the wider functionality that could be achieved by the Mounted 
Infantry’s firepower and mobility, including advance and rearguard duties, 
seizing important objectives such as river crossings and exploiting tactical 
advances made by cavalry plus protective duties on the line of march 
especially escorting artillery108  began to extend the repertoire of Mounted 
Infantry functionality towards traditional cavalry tasks,109 a doctrinal drift that 
would accelerate after 1902. However the consequential prediction that 
Mounted Infantry, particularly if a permanent organisation, risked 
degenerating into inferior cavalry would demand rebuttal throughout most of 
the Mounted Infantry’s existence.110  Whilst there were reports of Mounted 
Infantry employing traditional arme blanche tactics, particularly charging with 
rifles and bayonets as makeshift lances, such tactics were neither taught nor 
became official doctrine but were rather examples of local initiative.111  
Although mounted pursuit, especially of tribesmen fleeing from colonial 
battlefields, was an espousal of the arme blanche,112  Colonel Charles 
Callwell, a cavalry enthusiast and author of the semi-official manual ‘Small 
Wars’, admitted that the psychological terror induced by a mounted pursuit 
was not cavalry-specific, indicating that it was not the possession of edged 
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weaponry per se that caused panic and rout but being harried by man and 
horse.113  Despite recognising the opportunity for decisive rout through 
pursuit, Mounted Infantry dogma never encouraged such tactics with Hutton 
warning that ‘it is firepower which alone is really effective against 
savages’.114 To some extent, the expansion of the Mounted Infantry’s roles 
was opportunistic, reflecting necessity arising from a number of factors such 
as: the cavalry’s numerical inadequacy, Roberts’ increasing preference for 
the Mounted Infantry as mounted troops after 1900,115 terrain not conducive 
to regular cavalry work, and fighting adversaries whose tactics negated the 
benefit of the arme blanche as on the South African veldt.116  Irrespective of 
the underlying rationale, assumption of tasks previously the remit of the 
cavalry potentiated institutional animosity. Despite Hutton’s previous 
reassurances that the Mounted Infantry were to ‘support the cavalry rather 
than replace it’,117 during the Boer War, French accused Hutton of attempting 
to interfere with cavalry duties during the advance to Pretoria in 1900, 
confiding to his diary that Hutton was seeking permission to replace Mounted 
Infantry on outpost duty with cavalry.118 One can only imagine how 
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antagonistic this must have seemed, even if a genuine misunderstanding, if 
the cavalry considered that it was to be compelled to undertake mundane 
duties rejected by the Mounted Infantry. Such acrimony was promulgated by 
cavalry officers’ misinterpretation of Hutton’s previous assertion that Mounted 
Infantry, after mobilisation and given enough time in the saddle, could attain 
greater mounted proficiency than expected, perhaps enough to function as 
Mounted Rifles,119  which seemed suspiciously close to claiming Mounted 
Infantry as bona fide cavalrymen.  Although seized upon by his detractors in 
the cavalry as evidence of his predatory tendencies, Hutton was merely 
stating the obvious that experiential mounted training could, as it transpired 
on the veldt, result in the Mounted Infantry attaining good enough equitation 
skills to allow them to extend their roles but without attempting to subvert the 
cavalry’s arme blanche function. Reassuringly, Hutton declared that the 
Mounted Infantry would be ‘valueless’ if expected immediately to perform all 
cavalry duties.120  Hutton attributed much of what he called this ‘uncalled-for 
controversy’ to the confusion in nomenclature between Mounted Infantry and 
Mounted Rifles in both the general and the military press.121 It was 
suggested later in an article in the United Services Magazine that it was not 
only the trespassing on traditional roles that was the problem but the 
appellation of being ‘mounted’ was ‘probably at the root of the evil’.122  If the 
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1889 Regulations, exacerbated by the Mounted Infantry’s assuming of 
reconnaissance duties during the 1889 Cavalry Manoeuvres,123  reportedly 
caused grave concern in the cavalry for highlighting the Mounted Infantry’s 
capacity to undertake cavalry’s most characteristic mounted duties, its other 
importance remained the perpetuation of the erroneous perception, 
purportedly held by both regimental and more senior cavalry officers and 
those in the Yeomanry, that it heralded a forced re-designation of cavalry 
regiments as mounted detachments of infantry regiments.124  
As already noted, reflecting the army’s contemporary strategic focus on 
imperial conflict, the regular Mounted Infantry, uniquely within the British 
Army, only routinely formed and deployed on active service.125 With regards 
to a European conflict, the Mounted Infantry, predicted by many 
commentators likely to be found inadequate against well-trained enemy 
cavalry through the Mounted Infantry’s lack of personal weapons and 
equitation skills, was also deemed numerically too low in number whereby 
casualties sustained in combat would have a deleterious effect on 
operations126 - particularly as contemporary orthodox predictions within the 
army high command expected a deployment of massed cavalry on both 
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sides.127  As the opening moves of a future European war were envisaged as 
beginning with a clash of opposing cavalries,128  the Mounted Infantry was 
presumed to be at risk of tactical surprise, paralysis then annihilation whilst 
still mounted. This fear led to the tactical imperative that Mounted Infantry 
should never be caught out in the open by enemy cavalry.129 The argument 
was that the Mounted Infantry’s deficit in defensive personal weapons would 
place it at a major disadvantage in a mêlée whilst its rifles, even if fired from 
the saddle, posed more threat, particularly to the firer’s horse, than providing 
salvation in the face of the enemy.130  Hutton proposed the additional arming 
of the Mounted Infantry with personal defensive weapons, either a revolver 
or a double-barrelled pistol (for greater firepower at close proximity) to 
reduce the risk from attacking cavalry.131 Unsympathetically, Wolseley 
vetoed the provision of side-firearms emphasising that Mounted Infantry 
should always fight dismounted as infantry and not mounted as cavalry thus 
preferring the introduction of a sword-bayonet as a personal weapon if 
necessary - despite Hutton’s trenchant objections. The sword-bayonet was 
clearly impractical to use when mounted and contributed next to nothing in 
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terms of personal defence.132 Conventional advice when attacked by enemy 
cavalry remained to seek refuge dismounted in broken, wooded or marshy 
ground where the opposing cavalry’s innate advantages of speed and 
momentum would be neutralised133  and the Mounted Infantry’s superior 
firepower optimised. However this view of the defencelessness of the 
Mounted Infantry when opposed by cavalry was later repudiated in Childers’ 
War and the Arme Blanche, where he asserted that enemy cavalry should 
hold no terror for any infantry, mounted or foot, whose expertise with the rifle 
and bayonet remained paramount, citing how foot infantry was inculcated 
with the principle that it could defend itself well against cavalry with Childers 
seeing no reason, despite being horsed, for the Mounted Infantry to differ.134 
None of these arguments considered the possibility of cooperation between 
Mounted Infantry and friendly cavalry in engaging the enemy whereby 
symbiotic cooperation (rather than mutually exclusive solo combat) could be 
a force multiplier. Sadly the debate merely emphasised that the two mounted 
arms focussed on problems rather than identifying solutions to help 
cooperation. Yet a successful if embryonic symbiosis had been 
demonstrated at the Cavalry Manoeuvres of 1890 where three companies of 
Mounted Infantry, totalling 400 officers and men, were deployed alongside 
the cavalry, mimicking in rudimentary style, European rather than colonial 
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conflict.135 Hutton considered that these Manoeuvres had proved the worth of 
mobile infantry as a source of firepower to the cavalry whilst legitimising the 
concept of abstracted Mounted Infantry with brief but formalised peacetime 
training.136 The Times announced prematurely that the Manoeuvres had 
resulted in a ‘thoroughly good understanding [being] established between the 
two arms’137 and a new dawn of cooperation and tolerance between the two 
arms heralded – again erroneously claiming that a ‘pleasant result is the 
burying of the cavalry and Mounted infantry’s war hatchet’.138  Thus 
throughout these years, the Mounted Infantry did not seek to function 
primarily as cavalry but more as a mobile mounted force providing infantry 
protection for a colonially-focussed army whilst being prepared to undertake 
extended mounted duties if required by circumstance which argues against it 
being an impecunious cavalry-substitute. As detailed later, the doctrinal shift 
post-1902 would however exacerbate any misconceptions as to the 
differences between Mounted Infantry and cavalry with, perhaps unwisely; 
the former being allocated traditional cavalry roles.  
Contrary to the debates around function, the Mounted Infantry’s organisation 
remained surprisingly consistent throughout its existence.139  The basic 
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military and administrative unit of Mounted Infantry remained the company140 
with four companies constituting a Mounted Infantry battalion.141  Usually the 
company was commanded by an infantry major supported by one captain, 
three subalterns and thirteen non-commissioned officers.142  Within each 
company there were four detachments (called sections) of one officer and 
approximately forty non-commissioned officers and men with the detachment 
further subdivided into groups of four men who lived and worked together. 
Although not a unique arrangement, this organisational structure of the 
Mounted Infantry whereby the officer and his section were from the same 
infantry battalion contributed to cohesion, discipline143  and esprit de 
corps,144 a principle lauded in the Press on grounds of the benefits from 
retaining shared regimental traditions.145  Such a decentralised approach to 
working and discipline146  was anticipated to be advantageous in the field. 
Although the Mounted Infantry was resolutely infantry in origin, not all duties 
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in a horsed unit could be performed without cavalry-based knowledge so two 
farriers, two shoeing smiths and two saddlers, were borrowed from cavalry 
regiments.147  This dependence on technical staff from the cavalry would 
adversely affect the Mounted Infantry during the Boer War, exposing a 
deficiency in its organisational framework, most marked with its deficiency in 
farriers and veterinary officers as will be discussed in a later chapter. The 
company-based structure was predicated on abstraction from four parent 
infantry battalions brigaded together (or at least from the same military 
district). Functionally the comparative small size of the company suited the 
Mounted Infantry’s roles well, particularly when distributed widely for 
scouting, advance or flank guard, dispatch riders, artillery battery protection 
and armed police duties as indicated in Regulations for Mounted Infantry 
1897.148  The Regulations indicated that:  
          effective action of Mounted Infantry depends upon the accuracy,  
          rapidity and efficiency of its rifle fire. It should therefore always 
          manoeuvre in small bodies which will be sufficiently large to defend  
          themselves if attacked by cavalry and will also be sufficiently  
          numerous to produce a solid fire effect’.149   
 
Despite later protestations by Roberts and Ian Hamilton to the Elgin 
Commission that the Mounted Infantry had never had the opportunity for 
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large scale deployment in which to show the arm’s worth,150 such 
counterinsurgency operations151 after 1900 suited small sized units. Cairnes’ 
assertion that ‘our experiences in the Boer War have taught us, I think, that 
the battalion is no longer the best fighting unit for infantry’,152  proposed that 
the infantry company was the ideal numerical size for such small operations 
whereas more extensive operations needed much larger formations 
approximating to brigades. If this contention reflected the realities of the 
changing nature of warfare, at least in South Africa, the mobility and accurate 
long-range firepower of the decentralised command model of broadly-
distributed, company-sized Mounted Infantry became a prototype for other 
army units, thus transiently functioning as a blueprint for the colonial army on 
campaign.153   
If the organisation of Mounted Infantry at its basic level was not contentious, 
matching organisation with function, how the Mounted Infantry fitted into the 
wider army organisation at mobilisation was less certain. Although historically 
extemporised whenever needed, with increased formalisation of the Mounted 
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Infantry by 1899, mobilisation plans paired companies and allocated each to 
a cavalry brigade thus emphasising its adjunctive role in cavalry support.154 
However the exigencies of the campaign in South Africa meant that after its 
precipitate expansion, twenty-eight regular Mounted Infantry battalions were 
formed during the War, theoretically configured into a Mounted Infantry 
Division, but with the overwhelming tendency remaining the scattered 
distribution of Mounted Infantry companies among mobile columns. This 
reflected the increasing reliance on the Mounted Infantry archetype by senior 
army commanders for this particular campaign.155  Initial mobilisation in 1899 
had included the two prior-trained Mounted Infantry battalions comprising 
eight companies from Aldershot. However the rate at which other infantry 
regiments released their trained detachments for Mounted Infantry service 
remained variable, frequently reflecting their commanding officers’ 
unwillingness to support abstraction.156 Nevertheless, only a minority of the 
Mounted Infantry subsequently formed in 1899 – 1900 had received prior 
peacetime training, a deficiency mitigating subsequent failures of the 
Mounted Infantry during the campaign.157 Thus the lessons of Laing’s Nek in 
the Transvaal campaign of 1881 and the Nile campaign of 1885, that of the 
tactical inadequacies of briefly extemporised ‘in-theatre’ training for Mounted 
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Infantry, were not acknowledged by Roberts or if they were then the 
exigencies of the campaign in South Africa seemingly out-weighed such 
considerations. Regardless, the training available failed to match the 
requirements of terrain and of countering a highly-mobile adversary and was 
additionally exacerbated by hopelessly unrealistic training schedules 
advocated by some commentators in the Press158  that ignored the 
campaign’s pressing manpower requirements. The inability in 1899 to field 
no more than two trained battalions was a powerful indictment of the pre-war 
process of abstraction and training after a decade of training at Aldershot 
when the number of battalions should have exceeded ten if abstraction had 
functioned smoothly.159 Despite the Mounted Infantry’s eventual ubiquity in 
South Africa, post-war planning regarding the arm’s position in the army’s 
organisation reverted to a modified pre-1899 state. Throughout the following 
decade, the Mounted Infantry reverted, in part, back to a force protection role 
as non-cavalry divisional mounted troops providing both a mobile reserve 
and communications function but for infantry divisions rather than its pre-
1899 role as an auxiliary to the cavalry.160 As divisional mounted troops, six 
Mounted Infantry battalions were to mobilise with two companies of Mounted 
Infantry allocated to each Infantry Division.161 Discussion continued at the 
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War Office whether the Imperial Yeomanry or the Mounted Infantry was best 
suited to this role.162  Previously, the possibility of converting Yeomanry to 
Mounted Infantry had been received with dismay by Yeomanry colonels who 
cited, amongst other reasons, inadequate training opportunities, traditional 
links with the regular cavalry and a ‘general disinclination’ of their regiments 
to convert.163 In his evidence to the Elgin Commission, Lord Chesham 
decried the Mounted Infantry precept of the Imperial Yeomanry and although 
he accepted the necessity of deployment as Mounted Rifles, he expressed 
his satisfaction that the post-war Yeomanry had returned to its cavalry 
origins.164  Nevertheless the specific role of the post-war Imperial Yeomanry 
at mobilisation remained a topic of debate with the Chief of the General 
Staff’s enthusiasm for the Yeomanry neutralised by the logistical problem of 
forming the Yeomanry into divisional cavalry within the necessary five day 
period required at mobilisation.165  The Committee’s agreed, if temporary, 
solution, advocated by the Adjutant General, was thus the use of Mounted 
Infantry, mobilised in companies, and with equipment upgrades using 
Yeomanry kit and additional supplies.166  However this was not the end of the 
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deliberations with a précis presented to the Army Council in 1908 which 
outlined four possible solutions to the conundrum of providing mounted 
support to a future expeditionary force.167  In brief, these options included a 
form of abstraction from Yeomanry regiments with extra funding for six 
months’ training (although the practicality of the availability of yeomen for 
such training was questioned by the Adjutant General). Two of the other 
options were the inception of two Irish Yeomanry regiments as Special 
Reserve and, alternatively, divisional cavalry formed from cavalry reservists. 
The fourth option was the continued use of Mounted Infantry as divisional 
cavalry, a solution that was accepted in the short term.168 Moreover, the 
Mounted Infantry was also to be designated a novel role in mixed Mounted 
Brigades alongside regular cavalry, horse artillery and cyclists. By virtue of 
this designation, Mounted Infantry overtly and formally crossed over into 
traditional cavalry work especially reconnaissance,169 with detractors of this 
arrangement predicting operational confusion as cavalry and Mounted 
Infantry trained using separate tactical manuals and adhered to different drill 
- although one Mounted Infantry enthusiast opined optimistically that the 
cavalry could now be released solely for its arme blanche function of shock 
tactics,170 an argument that received qualified support from cavalry 
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officers.171 Unfortunately these designations as divisional mounted troops 
and in mixed Mounted Brigades propagated the institutional rivalry between 
the two mounted arms. Furthermore, these new roles, particularly a sharing 
of the responsibility for reconnaissance, posed new challenges for the 
Mounted Infantry as these duties would require improved standards of 
equitation and faster horses resulting in greater costs and problems of 
procurement.172 No longer could the Mounted Infantry necessarily be content 
with locally sourced mounts of varying quality. Advantageously perhaps, the 
organisation of Mounted Infantry into Mounted Brigades would offer an 
opportunity of deployment in a larger numerical size,173 the benefit of which 
remained optimistically conjectural.174 Unfortunately any mutual benefit for 
both mounted arms remained obscured by the friction between the 
respective officer groups. Godley, now Commandant of the Mounted Infantry 
School, in claiming that the Mounted Infantry, in its new iteration, could 
substitute for the cavalry in virtually all of the latter’s roles excluding its arme 
blanche function, appeared to have over-stepped the mark even if he was 
merely stating the obvious.175  In reality the plan for mixed Mounted Brigades 
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remained hypothetical and did not materialise176  despite deployment during 
the Manoeuvres of 1905.177  Eventually, the Mounted Infantry would be 
replaced as divisional mounted troops by cavalry squadrons recently made 
available by the repatriation of two overseas cavalry regiments, supported by 
companies of cyclists.178 Beneficially this enforced redundancy of the 
Mounted Infantry theoretically diminished the infantry’s manpower shortfall 
through potential Mounted Infantry abstraction. The new configuration 
restored the cavalry’s primacy in ground-based reconnaissance and secured 
its claim to be the army’s horsed arm (excepting horse artillery). It also 
combined the tactical application of military cycling, which was particularly 
pertinent as the army’s strategic focus turned towards conflict in Europe in 
the years prior to 1914, as will be discussed in a later chapter. However, that 
the military cyclist was, in fact, another incarnation of the Mounted 
Infantryman179  was not always fully appreciated.180  Yet despite the Mounted 
Infantry’s redundancy from its duality as divisional mounted troops and in 
Mounted Brigades in mobilisation plans, it was acknowledged in the Press 
that Mounted Infantry might still be of future value in colonial campaigning as 
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it was in East Africa during the First World War.181 Thus, in conclusion, apart 
from its basic unit of configuration, the Mounted Infantry’s organisation and 
doctrinal roles slowly changed over its existence, never satisfactorily 
identifying a definitive place within the wider army organisation, particularly in 
terms of its interface with the cavalry where their respective functions 
became blurred, until comparatively shortly before its abolition when its 
plurality of mounted function fatally jeopardised its survival through its overt 
transgression into traditional cavalry roles. 
Returning to the first principal research question of whether the Mounted 
Infantry was a Victorian paradigm or merely a ‘cavalry of poverty’, the 
financial implications of its impermanence, being solely an active service 
organisation, and the process of abstraction need clarification to understand 
the fiscal influences affecting both the Mounted Infantry’s existence and its 
eventual abolition. In comparison to the costs of a cavalry regiment, an ad 
hoc mounted company cost a modest £1724 18s,182 with expenditure 
amounting to little more than locally sourced mounts and rudimentary 
equipment as evidenced by the discrepant costs between the Mounted 
Infantry in the eastern Sudan littoral and a four squadron cavalry component 
based at Suakin in 1885 where the Mounted Infantry cost 45 per cent less 
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than the cavalry.183  This extra expense of maintaining cavalry also 
influenced Hutton’s arguments that it would be folly economically to fritter 
cavalry away on disparate colonial campaigns,184  not least because of the 
embarkation and subsidence costs but also the expense of redressing its 
losses when the lengthy duration of training required by cavalry was also 
taken into account.185  Thus financial considerations suggest that the cost-
effectiveness of the Mounted Infantry was a positive driver for its continued 
existence, yet it is far from certain that this was the pre-eminent or sole 
factor. Clearly costs depended on whether a permanent or an impermanent 
force was considered. Permanent Mounted Infantry regiments were forecast 
to cost in 1905 between £390,000 and £472,000 depending on composition, 
in comparison with continued impermanency, founded on abstraction, which 
cost between £109,000 and £178,000 and thus was the obvious choice 
financially with savings identified between 54 per cent and 77 per cent of a 
permanent force.186  The other monetary comparison aspect was 
comparative cost against foot infantry. The extra work required of the 
Mounted Infantryman in providing equine ‘stable’ care attracted the higher 
cavalry rates of pay, identified early by Wood in 1873 as a necessary cost,187 
but without which employment in the Mounted Infantry might be unpopular 
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with the rank and file.188  The issue of remuneration for Mounted Infantry 
officers was more complex and absorbed much administrative time in 
wrangling over issues of ‘top-up’ pay and provision of mounts. The crux of 
the matter was whether Mounted Infantry officers should be provided with 
horses at Government expense during training and active service or whether, 
based on the use of these horses for private leisure activities, the cost should 
be borne by the officers themselves, at least whilst in training. By 
extrapolation, if mounts were to be provided at taxpayers’ cost, should the 
horses be reserved purely for military purposes?189  The situation was 
clouded further by different rules for Mounted Infantry officers stationed in 
South Africa where private use of mounts was permitted on payment of an 
annual fee of £10, although the semi-permanence of Mounted Infantry in that 
country was cited by the Quarter Master General as a valid explanation of 
this anomaly.190  Mounted Infantry officers had received cavalry rates of pay 
during the Boer War, thus providing a precedent for enhanced pay191 but 
paying cavalry pay to Mounted Infantry officers during peacetime training 
was rejected by the War Office on grounds of cost,192  despite objections that 
a pay differential would compensate for the Mounted Infantry officers’ extra 
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responsibilities.193  Mounted Infantry officers pointed out their increased 
likelihood of combat due to the Mounted Infantry’s active service raison 
d’ȇtre, which, without additional financial inducement, might deter future 
applicants.194  With both Roberts and the Treasury applying pressure, the 
matter was dropped and only those who used privately purchased horses for 
Mounted Infantry work, a situation discouraged by the advent of 
Governmental provision of mounts, received the pay uplift.195  Although the 
cost differential between training a cavalryman and Mounted Infantryman 
was estimated at no more than two pence a day, thus making this financial 
aspect of training fairly equitable,196 restrictions on expenditure rendered the 
Mounted Infantry dependent on the temporary loan of horses from cavalry 
regiments, a less than ideal situation due to both the unsuitability of the 
larger cavalry horses for training and for precipitating a further and potentially 
avoidable cause of acrimony between senior officers in the two mounted 
arms.197 Nevertheless, the costs associated with the Mounted Infantry model 
would be implicated eventually in its demise with the cavalry’s supporters 
arguing that the removal of the Mounted Infantry from the Mounted Brigades 
would save money that would be better spent on the cavalry and funding the 
newly-established Cavalry School.198  Perhaps if the conclusion that the 
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Mounted Infantry was cheaper than the cavalry cannot be ignored, it may be 
contended that the ‘cavalry of poverty’ epithet was only tenable if the 
Mounted Infantry’s existence was predicated solely on the rationale of being 
a cavalry-substitute. Otherwise the risk is of comparing dissimilar forces with 
confusion around what is meant by being ‘cavalry’. However, at no time did 
the Mounted Infantry cause the disbandment of a cavalry regiment, which not 
only undermines the notion that the existence of Mounted Infantry was 
practically an organisational ‘death warrant’ for the cavalry as a force but 
also indicates the possibility that both arms could co-exist and cooperate 
militarily together. Nevertheless, inter-arm cooperation in the British Army 
appeared a distant aspiration despite calls for improved working together by 
other arms, most notably, cavalry and horse artillery, even as early as the 
Cavalry Manoeuvres of 1894.199  As Bidwell and Graham have concluded, 
the lack of tactical inter-arm cooperation was long-standing with the three 
main arms of cavalry, infantry and artillery generally working in isolation from 
each other.200  However, in the post-Boer War years, there were indeed 
advocates of closer cooperation between arms, including cavalry and 
Mounted Infantry, with Brigadier General Bethune writing that the pre-war 
competition between the two arms should now, in the light of the experiences 
in South Africa, be replaced by collaboration whereby the ‘Mounted Infantry 
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should be a source of strength to cavalry’ rather than a competitor.201 This 
was not an evangelical or esoteric opinion as Mounted Infantry Training 1906 
also recommended that the Mounted Infantry should act tactically in 
combination with cavalry, horse artillery and machine guns wherever 
possible to optimise options for manoeuvre and for the application of 
firepower.202  The manual even included machine gun and pom-pom 
sections within a putative Mounted Infantry battalion,203  although the 
potential beneficial tactical value of machine guns with both cavalry and 
Mounted Infantry had been mooted as early as 1884.204 However, there was 
no consensus among army officers of either regimental and general rank as 
to the value and use of machine guns.205  Thus, cooperation, never mind 
integration, of arms remained a distant ambition. 
In this chapter the organisational and doctrinal interfaces between the 
cavalry and Mounted Infantry have been considered. When employed 
colonially as an impromptu mounted force, considering the numerical paucity 
of cavalry regiments available overseas, little friction between the two 
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mounted arms occurred. With the increasing formalisation of the regular 
Mounted Infantry and in the presence of an evolving if informal operational 
doctrine within the wider army, the arms’ interface became frictional 
stemming from an uncertainty whether the Mounted Infantry was to be a 
competitor or an adjunct to the cavalry. Their fundamental tactical differences 
were described by Alderson of the Mounted Infantry as ‘the creed of 
Mounted Infantry was “stand steady, fire low and no living thing can get near 
us”, whilst that of the cavalry should be “swords out, knee to knee and we 
can smash anything”’.206 Here was a recognition of firepower and arme 
blanche being complementary rather than mutually exclusive and 
emphasised functionality of weaponry and the joint possession of mounted 
mobility. Nonetheless, this doctrinal uncertainty bred suspicion bordering on 
overt hostility with one author remarking that the ‘Mounted Infantry has, 
speaking generally, had much to contend with in the service. Cavalrymen 
have regarded it with, at best, good-natured contempt’.207  Ostensibly this 
friction referred to the contest over primacy of weapon although, as will be 
discussed in a subsequent chapter, what appears as an argument over 
edged weapons versus firearms was a metaphor for the inherent 
philosophical differences between the cavalry and infantry. It became 
extrapolated to be a perceived threat to both their respective tactics and 
even more fundamentally, as a threat to the way of life of cavalry officers and 
                                                          
206
 Alderson, With the Mounted Infantry and the Mashonaland Field Force 1896, p.6. 
 
207 Denman, ‘The Future of Mounted Infantry’, pp. 382-91. 
 
100 
 
their position in the army and society.208  But was this institutional friction pre-
ordained? Previously Wood had concluded that the cavalry and the Mounted 
Infantry should remain discrete branches of the mounted arm with a 
separation of role, a contention with which Wolseley concurred as he 
considered the two mounted arms doctrinally distinct and unlikely to be able 
to master each others’ tactics with any misguided attempts to merge them 
tactically resulting in a ‘very bad mongrel; a bad dragoon’.209  Roberts held a 
similar view although his apparent anti-cavalry prejudices may have 
contributed to his stance.210 Conversely, experiences in South Africa 
persuaded Childers that all mounted troops should become de facto 
Mounted Rifles, forsaking steel weapons but combining enhanced equitation 
with rifle firepower.211 Clearly this suggestion was hugely antagonistic to the 
cavalry212 and by diminishing pre-requisite infantry skills, found little favour 
with the Mounted Infantry either with Major Crum, a Mounted Infantry officer 
and an author of a polemic promoting the arm, considering this proposal 
excessive.213  In attempting to advance his agenda in favouring firepower 
over the arme blanche even before the end of hostilities in South Africa, 
Roberts sought the views of a broad church of army officers on the rearming 
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of the cavalry with the rifle as its carbines had been outranged by the Boers’ 
Mausers214 and despite some polarity of opinion, there was a majority 
consensus among respondents that this would be appropriate.215 Thus a 
small step towards the Mounted Infantry paradigm was taken. 
However, it was not just armaments that functioned as a proxy for doctrinal 
and social differences but also how the Mounted Infantry was mounted. The 
horsed nature of the Mounted Infantry contributed to the frictional interface, 
again ostensibly through predictions of logistical competition216 although the 
Mounted Infantry’s mounts could by definition include camels, elephants, 
bicycles and carts. The use of carts for infantry mobility, presaging modern 
mechanised infantry, was intermittently raised over the years and their 
introduction would have removed concerns over the Mounted Infantry’s 
equitation and logistical competition with the cavalry whilst clarifying the 
cavalry’s social distinction of being the only horsed arm. Conversely, Godley 
was staunchly antagonistic to the option of mobilising infantry in carts then 
calling them ‘Mounted Infantry’ as he considered wheeled transport would 
degrade the arm’s mobility, manoeuvrability and prevent the Mounted 
Infantry from working alongside cavalry.217  Although the capability to 
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transport comparatively large bodies of troops together in carts was 
superficially attractive to army commanders, the challenges of sourcing 
enough horses and carts plus concerns over the latter’s limited off-road 
functionality were fatal disadvantages to the suggestion.218  The prospect of 
Mounted Infantry transported in motorised vehicles was not overlooked219 but 
the scarcity and mechanical unreliability of Edwardian motor vehicles 
prevented any early trials and gave rise to a contemporary opinion that it was 
‘very doubtful if these [motor cars] will ever be generally used as a means of 
imparting mobility to infantry’.220  Nevertheless, the almost exclusive equine 
basis of the Mounted Infantry’s mobility associated with persistent, if often 
unfair, criticism of its equitation remained a proxy measure for the rivalry over 
role and identity. More recently, Badsey has shown that the doctrinal 
interface was more nuanced than previously considered with French and 
Haig prepared to reform the cavalry to accommodate dismounted fire tactics 
but not at the expense of its arme blanche capability,221  a position 
grudgingly noted by Hutton who was impressed by Haig despite the latter’s 
ill-concealed dislike of the Mounted Infantry.222  Conversely, French offered 
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qualified support for Mounted Infantry, recognising some of its attributes223 
and facilitating the Mounted Infantry’s use of cavalry and artillery mounts in 
his command at Aldershot for a week of training that uniquely combined 
training of all four Mounted Infantry battalions at once.224  This was not 
evidence of any lessening of his support for the cavalry but recognition and 
qualified acceptance of the Mounted Infantry’s different functionality225.   In a 
surprising mitigation of senior cavalry officers’ behaviours, Godley 
considered that much of the cavalry backlash against Mounted Infantry 
resulted from the Mounted Infantry protagonists’ unwise and overenthusiastic 
pronouncements on the Mounted Infantry’s likely replacement of the 
cavalry,226 an indictment for which Godley ironically bore much responsibility. 
Colonel Bengough suggested a similar sentiment, indicating that the 
Mounted Infantry had, in fact, suffered more from ‘misplaced zeal of its 
friends than from the sneers of its opponents’.227 Denman claimed that the 
Mounted Infantry attracted denigration on account of its ‘execrable 
equestrian skills’.228 In similar vein, Colonel McCalmont, 4th Dragoon Guards, 
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observed that cavalry officers were not strongly opposed to Mounted Infantry 
in support229 but blamed the Mounted Infantry for assuming traditional 
cavalry work which he considered was the cause of the cavalry receiving an 
inadequate share of overseas active service which had retarded the cavalry’s 
fortunes .230  Even Roberts, unquestionably pro-Mounted Infantry, considered 
that few other changes in the British Army had faced so much hostile 
criticism and active opposition.231  That such hostility and opposition could 
persist despite leading opposing protagonists agreeing, even obliquely, on 
the value of dismounted firepower by mounted troops shows how remarkably 
difficult it was to dispel the tribal prejudices prevalent in the British Army,232 
even though the Mounted Infantry offered an opportunity in terms of 
firepower analogous to the benefits realised by the inclusion of horse artillery 
in a cavalry brigade.233 Hutton claimed that the debate held wider 
implications for the whole of the British Army and not just mounted troops 
stating that ‘this question of mobile infantry is one of the greatest importance 
as I cannot but feel that it bears strongly upon the general efficiency of the 
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British Army as a fighting machine’.234  The irretrievably suspicious interface 
between the cavalry and Mounted Infantry, regardless of mitigation, was 
likened appropriately to ‘asking a huntsman to do game-keeping’.235  Yet 
despite such mutual distrust, the Mounted Infantry had garnered a 
substantial amount of support from senior commanders and younger aspiring 
officers with Wolseley and Wood as the founding fathers of the Mounted 
Infantry,236 and, as will be shown in a later chapter, there is evidence to 
support the assertion that Roberts should also be considered as a major 
influence on the development of Mounted Infantry, at least in India.237 
In conclusion, returning to the principal research question regarding the 
Mounted Infantry’s doctrine and organisation, the evidence presented 
indicates that the Mounted Infantry, initially conceived to satisfy a particular 
need during colonial warfare, developed a durable organisation consistent 
with doctrinal requirements and which evolved over three decades to a 
complicated duality shortly before its abolition. Despite this drift of military 
role, the Mounted Infantry’s basic organisation was unchanged although its 
projected deployment was subject to seemingly ceaseless re-definition from 
cavalry adjunct to mobile infantry reserve and the role of force protection. In 
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the context of the cavalry’s limitations, both numerical and logistical, and with 
its doctrinal predilection favouring arme blanche and retention of the cavalry 
carbine,238  the Mounted Infantry fulfilled a role in the late Victorian army that 
no other arm could satisfy. But in particular, the Mounted Infantry never 
aspired to be sabre-wielding cavalry. Although fiscal restraint was considered 
carefully by the War Office and clearly favoured a force cheaper than the 
cavalry, the doctrinal debate centred much more on functionality than just 
cost. Indeed in respect of the Mounted Infantry’s impermanence, the cost-
effectiveness of abstraction was but one favourable attribute with others 
including ease of numerical expansion and retention of high-class infantry 
skills. Unfortunately, institutional friction between cavalry and Mounted 
Infantry officers, largely predicated on the Mounted Infantry being horsed but 
also involving a perception by cavalry officers of the risk of their forced 
conversion to mounted companies of Infantry regiments,239 poisoned the 
possibility of useful symbiosis. When the Mounted Infantry was finally 
allocated a discrete doctrinal role post-1902, rather than continuing its 
wartime utilitarianism, this subsequent trespassing into traditional cavalry 
work not only confirmed the cavalry’s previous suspicions but also exposed 
the Mounted Infantry to sustained debate as to its suitability for such roles. 
Rejecting the epithet ‘cavalry of poverty’, the Mounted Infantry was 
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unequivocally ‘infantry mounted and not cavalry disguised’,240  whether 
considering its infantry company basic organisation or its separate 
regulations and drill.241  Excluding the anomaly of the Camel Corps and later 
in the Boer War, Mounted Infantry was sourced solely by abstraction from 
infantry battalions, a process that potentially weakened the battalion but 
conferred benefits through prior infantry training.242  Although prophesies of 
future disaster on the lance points of enemy European cavalry remained 
durable fears, Mounted Infantry supporters predicted its value in participating 
in a great cavalry screen at the commencement of hostilities because of its 
mobile firepower.243  It remains unfortunate that the Mounted Infantry’s 
inception and development was continually overshadowed by controversy 
when a setting aside of discord could have permitted beneficial cooperation 
where Hutton, faithful to his conviction that inter-arm cooperation could 
exceed any solo independent action by either cavalry or Mounted Infantry 
claimed that: ‘the two services are quite distinct’.244 And, in conclusion, this 
affirmation neatly encapsulates the troubled doctrine of the Mounted Infantry.  
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  Chapter Three 
Identity and Training 
 
As already concluded in the preceding chapter, the British regular Mounted 
Infantry’s existence was characterised by three important issues of debate: 
that of its organisational permanence versus impermanence, the inter-
relationship of its informal doctrine with its military role and its doctrinal 
interface with the cavalry. Contextualising these debates was the Mounted 
Infantry’s transformation from improvised mounted detachments of overseas 
infantry garrisons to a final institutional incarnation as non-cavalry mounted 
divisional troops, by way of utilitarian ubiquity during the Boer War. Mirroring 
this transformation was the evolution of Mounted Infantry training from the 
misplaced belief in minimalist brevity to formalised training predicated on 
attendance at the Mounted Infantry Schools, eventually reinforced by 
peacetime simulation during inspections and manoeuvres. These parallel 
changes in role and training contribute to the challenge of determining 
whether the Mounted Infantry developed a specific identity in the late 
Victorian army, a challenge complicated by the lack of a clearly articulated 
understanding by the army of what was meant by ‘Mounted Infantry’, an 
appreciation that changed radically between 1860 and 18991 and continued 
to change following 1902. It is therefore questionable whether a Mounted 
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Infantry identity or esprit de corps2  was possible due to such confounding 
factors. 
At a time when the regular Mounted Infantry movement was still embryonic, 
a United States (US) army officer writing in the United Services Magazine 
observed prophetically, that: ‘being merely a provisional force, and, having 
no permanent status, they [Mounted Infantry] will have no esprit de corps to 
urge them on’.3 He argued that the current organisation of the Mounted 
Infantry would lead to confusion in role and result in producing an inferior 
cavalry force. He concluded bleakly that despite being a force of great 
promise, uncertainty of role and lack of esprit de corps would remain 
problematic for the Mounted Infantry and, in his opinion, had already 
contributed to the reverses in the recent Transvaal War. A contrary view, 
expressed in the Army Book for the British Empire, supported the Mounted 
Infantry’s impermanence as a means of maintaining its infantry-based 
identity and expertise rather than perceiving it as an organisational weakness 
that would prevent the formation of an identity underpinned by esprit de 
corps.4 Thus a lengthy, vigorous and occasionally acrimonious debate 
ensued within the army, played out in the Press and military debating circles, 
that questioned the Mounted Infantry’s organisational basis compared to the 
traditional regimental system, rightly considered the fundamental basis of the 
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British Army,5 and, in consequence, whether the Mounted Infantry developed 
an identity and esprit de corps.6 For if there was no regiment to belong to 
and no associated traditions and mores as seemingly in the impermanent 
regular Mounted Infantry, then whence lay its esprit de corps? This was a 
more important question than merely a desire for spectacle, music, uniform, 
flags and traditions,7 for both Wolseley8 and Roberts, among other 
contemporaries, considered esprit de corps fundamental to military culture9 
and integral to army discipline, military efficiency10 and maintaining the 
regimental system.11 
Therefore this chapter seeks to answer the thesis’ second main research 
question, whether the Mounted Infantry’s organisational impermanence 
affected the evolution of an identifiable military identity and whether this 
impacted adversely on both the development of esprit de corps and the 
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Mounted Infantry’s institutional survival. In other words, did the Mounted 
Infantry’s temporary organisation prevent it from developing a distinctive 
specific identity within the British Army resulting in its eventual decline to 
abolition? Furthermore, considering Badsey’s indictment of the Mounted 
Infantry officers’ apparently divided loyalties,12  to what extent did such 
officers’ pre-existing regimental allegiances impact on the Mounted Infantry, 
its identity, esprit de corps and survival? Moreover, if the combination of the 
Mounted Infantry’s organisational impermanence and changing roles 
potentially influenced its identity and esprit de corps then equally, these 
factors threatened the state and competency of Mounted Infantry training, 
not least because of the time pressure imposed by cyclical abstraction. 
Consequentially did the training of Mounted Infantry officers and men suffer?  
Although historically brevity of training, often predominantly experiential, was 
deemed acceptable in the opinions of a number of senior officers,13  the 
different experiences in the 1881 Transvaal and 1882 Egyptian campaigns 
suggested that prior training was preferable to experiential learning on 
campaign and over the next decades, as the Mounted Infantry’s 
responsibilities expanded, training requirements increased with 
corresponding pressures on training time. Thus the competing problems of 
time available through abstraction and the depth and breadth of training 
demanded by evolving doctrinal role created a tension for the Mounted 
Infantry. This was exacerbated by the lack of peacetime configuration of the 
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Mounted Infantry, at least until the Manoeuvres of 1898, which prevented 
rehearsal of the training instructed at the Mounted Infantry Schools. 
However, a positive corollary of the Mounted Infantry functioning purely as 
an active service arm was that, for junior officers at least, the Mounted 
Infantry offered valuable combat, command and leadership experience 
relatively early in their careers.14 Badsey, whilst challenging the enduring 
myth that all senior army officers in 1914 were from the cavalry,15 concluded 
that more senior officers in 1914 had Mounted Infantry experience than had 
cavalry credentials.16 Whilst an important observation, Badsey’s 
retrospective analysis risks bias from only including those officers already 
successful in their careers. His analysis neither examines the impact of pre-
Boer War training nor, prospectively, the effect of wartime Mounted Infantry 
command on officers’ future promotion opportunities. Therefore the chapter 
will consider whether Mounted Infantry training matched the roles demanded 
of the arm and broadly, whether the training of the Mounted Infantry 
produced a force ‘fit for purpose’. Evidence will be sought as to whether 
Mounted Infantry command provided preferential career progression for 
future higher command. Did selection for command of Mounted Infantry 
imply recognition of innate qualities in a junior officer or was Boer War 
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experience (when the opportunities for the Mounted Infantry reached its 
maximum) merely a fortunate coincidence?  
Clearly, the training of the Mounted Infantry cannot be assessed in isolation 
but requires consideration in the context of the British Army’s doctrinal 
development and evolution of training during the late Victorian and 
Edwardian eras, especially the accelerated reform of the cavalry in the years 
after the Boer War (particularly dismounted firearm and reconnaissance 
work), and the evolution of the infantry from volley-firing in close order ranks 
under direct officer control to an infantry practising ‘fire and movement’ 
tactics,17 predicated on fire discipline, individual marksmanship and personal 
initiative. Such skills were needed on the dispersed battlefields that had 
evolved from the interaction of smokeless ammunition, enhanced lethality of 
modern low trajectory magazine-loaded rifles and breech-loading artillery 
and where direct officer control was no longer possible.18  Naturally, these 
changes affecting the infantry would, by extrapolation, also impact on the 
Mounted Infantry whose exemplary infantry ability, required before specialist 
Mounted Infantry training, was sine qua non for their selection.19 
Before the research questions can be explored, the concept of identity 
requires clarification. Identity implies elements of both ‘distinctiveness’, 
marking out the group or individual as a separate entity to those external to 
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the group, and ‘sameness’ for those members of the group, conferring 
allegiance and a sense of ‘belonging’ rather than mere opportune grouping.20 
Clearly such attributes are challenging when applied to the regular Mounted 
Infantry. While abstraction conferred distinctiveness to the abstracted men by 
virtue of their selection into this novel force, their transfer into the Mounted 
Infantry also conferred a ‘sameness’ with men similarly abstracted from other 
battalions but who had been imbued previously with different and distinct 
identities of their own parent regiments. Successful completion of the training 
programme also cemented these notions of distinctiveness and sameness 
through the newly acquired skill of equitation, Mounted Infantry drill and its 
nascent doctrine. Abstraction did not necessarily require nor result in a 
relinquishing of prior allegiances as it was merely a transient period before 
returning to the parent regiment. The pre-requisite for generic infantry 
experience and training before Mounted Infantry abstraction meant that 
mounted training also risked creating a tension between the Mounted 
Infantry’s identity as fully-fledged infantry and as mounted soldiers.21 They 
were no longer solely infantrymen but neither did they consider themselves 
bona fide cavalrymen.  
However, the concept of identity is just one part of an organisation’s culture22 
and to qualitatively assess this for the Mounted Infantry, a structured 
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 French, Military Identities, p.1 & p.98. 
 
21 F.H. Maitland, Hussar of the Line (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1951), p.39, for an eye-witness 
description of the tensions between foot and mounted soldiers. 
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approach to analysis of organisational culture is essential. Charles Kirke, 
using the methodology of social anthropology, has proposed a four-domain 
tool to investigate the organisational culture of the British Army. His construct 
comprises the following categories, namely: formal command structure, 
informal command structure arising from key relationships, functional 
structure derived from participants’ attitudes, expectations and roles and, 
finally, loyalty and identity.23 Kirke includes the prevailing societal 
environment as an overarching influence that he terms the ‘cultural stripe’.24  
Here a bi-directional reflection of contemporaneous societal values, 
influencing both the attitudes of public and the military establishment, 
provides a backdrop to the army’s own culture.  Clearly Kirke’s model is only 
one such analytical tool as shown by alternative definitions of organisational 
culture and identity.25  When considering the ‘loyalty / identity’ domain, which 
Kirke abbreviates to ‘belonging’, this can exist on multiple levels, both 
formally and informally, at the section or detachment, company and battalion 
levels through to branch or army as a whole. Conversely, a corollary of 
identity is ‘rivalry’, which again functions at many levels and manifests from 
harmless competitiveness to institutional friction endangering the well-being 
of the whole, a situation that threatened during the cavalry versus Mounted 
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Infantry debate both in peacetime26 and in war.27 Furthermore, loyalty to 
one’s own regiment or corps risks promoting prejudice against those 
perceived external to the group. Whilst this may remain harmless 
competition, institutional prejudice may induce unnecessary conservatism 
and stifle change and innovation,28 this being a pertinent factor when 
considering the inception of a new arm such as the Mounted Infantry.  
Before applying Kirke’s model to the Mounted Infantry, the interlocking 
military and societal milieu,29  Kirke’s ‘cultural stripe’, in which the Mounted 
Infantry model evolved, must be considered as it had undergone seismic 
changes in recent history. These changes included the controversial, in the 
opinions of both junior and senior army officers,30 Cardwell – Childers 
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numbering almost a decade after the change. 
117 
 
reforms of abolishing officer promotion by purchase; pairing of most infantry 
battalions into regiments with an overseas battalion and a home battalion 
and, since the 1872 Localisation Act, the principle of geographical 
association rooting the battalion in the local community to support 
recruitment and to foster esprit de corps in the ranks to the benefit of the 
battalion.31 The fourth significant change was the introduction of short term 
service, as laid down in the 1870 Army Enlistment Act, which facilitated the 
development of an Army Reserve32 and, as hoped by the War Office, 
improved recruitment and discipline in the Army. In parallel, there was a 
general increase in interest in matters military in society with increased Press 
coverage underpinned by improving levels of public literacy, in part due to 
the Education Act 1870 and enforced compulsory school attendance since 
1880.33  The embarkation and return of the Camel Corps in 1884-85 elicited 
substantial Press and public interest that was heightened by the inclusion of 
the Household Cavalry, the Foot Guards and line cavalry regiments.34 These 
regiments were considered, in the vernacular of the Victorian age, to be 
‘smart’ by both army officers and the public.35  This construct is difficult to 
define but comprises an amalgam of prestige, fashion and glamour on 
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several levels including distinctiveness of uniform, social class,36 senior 
officer and royal patronage, enhanced promotion prospects through influence 
from patronage, lavishness of officers’ lifestyle, individuals’ personal wealth37  
and expensive leisure pursuits such as hunting and polo.38  Even a 
contemporary military observer noted wryly that: ‘opinions differ very much, 
even in the service itself, as to which regiment can lay claim to be the 
‘smartest’.39 Both French and Badsey have compiled rankings of regimental 
‘smartness’ and although methodology and details differ slightly resulting in 
variation in respective hierarchies, unsurprisingly the overall principle that the 
Household troops, most cavalry regiments and the rifle regiments of the 
KRRC and Rifle Brigade topped the list of prestigious ‘smart’ regiments in 
which to hold a Commission.40  However as French has noted, a regiment’s 
‘smartness’ was only partly influenced by military reputation41  and, equally, 
nor was there automatic correlation between regimental prestige and 
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regimental title.42  In terms of military identity, the concept of ‘smartness’ 
ensured a degree of ‘sameness’ within the regimental family permitting the 
Officers’ Mess to function as self-selecting club,43  reserving membership for 
like-minded individuals of similar social standing and wealth,44  which, as 
Spiers concludes, were essential ingredients of regimental esprit de corps.45  
Therefore the configuration of the Camel Corps, with the notable exception of 
the Mounted Infantry Camel Regiment derived from line infantry regiments, 
was ‘smartness’ personified. However the concept of smartness has 
resonance for the Mounted Infantry. The majority of Mounted Infantry was 
abstracted from line infantry regiments that were on the whole, not ‘smart’ 
and this disparity between Mounted Infantry origins and the generally ‘smart’ 
line cavalry was another ingredient in the mix of the institutional and personal 
friction persisting between respective officers. The most ‘smart’ regiments of 
the Household troops rarely contributed to the Mounted Infantry with the 
contributions to the Camel Corps in 1885 and the Guards Mounted Infantry 
1901-02 being anomalies.  Conversely, the large contribution to the Mounted 
Infantry from the KRRC and Rifle Brigade, two of the more ‘smart’ infantry 
regiments, undermines to a degree the explanation of the Mounted Infantry’s 
demise arising from socially inferior Mounted Infantry officers losing the war 
of influence to cavalry officers or indeed abdicating their responsibilities to 
the Mounted Infantry – a debate that will be dealt with in a later chapter. 
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Thus Kirke’s ‘cultural stripe’, the societal and military milieu, combined issues 
of class distinction, education and military identity associated with the 
changing nature of the domestic population and its relationship with the 
army. 
Returning to the model of organisational culture and its application to the 
Mounted Infantry, the first two domains, that of formal and informal command 
structures, present challenges largely unfamiliar elsewhere in the army. 
Temporary abstraction, with grouping of detachments from a number of 
different battalions into a company,46 with unfamiliar officers and no prior 
traditions codifying behaviour and discipline, arguably threatened the 
cohesion of the Mounted Infantry as a unified force. In diminishing this risk, in 
the context of limited time available for training, a founding principle for the 
Mounted Infantry was that men should be both trained and commanded by 
an officer from their parent battalion of origin, conferring the dual benefits of 
familiarity of command and the tangible link back to the parent regiment to 
which the abstracted detachment was destined to return.47  Additionally, at 
least in principle if not always achievable in practice, Mounted Infantry 
companies on active service were to be commanded by infantry officers thus 
maintaining the Mounted Infantry’s fundamental attribute of remaining 
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resolutely infantry.48 Analysis of the Mounted Infantry battalions that formed 
the Mounted Infantry Division following its re-structuring in late 1900 shows 
that most Mounted Infantry battalion commanders were infantry line regiment 
officers, usually of major rank49 and that very few were from the cavalry.50 
Conversely, anecdotal evidence suggesting ‘reverse tribalism’ exists where 
senior cavalry officers in South Africa objected to infantry officers leading 
mixed higher formations such as mobile columns that included cavalry 
squadrons on the grounds of the infantry officer’s unfamiliarity with the élan 
of cavalry - a seemingly spurious complaint that surely missed the point as 
opportunities to demonstrate tactics demanding cavalry panache were rare 
on the veldt.51 Despite early concerns that relying solely on infantry officers 
could blinker the mobility and initiative of the horsed Mounted Infantry,52  
infantry officers commanding Mounted Infantry remained the norm,53 
although during the latter stages of the Boer War, composite mobile columns 
were at times commanded by officers from most branches of the army and, 
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for a war not renowned for the universal competency of the officer class,54  
there were undoubtedly some very successful commanders of mobile 
columns who were neither trained as Mounted Infantry officers nor as 
cavalrymen.55  Nevertheless, Boer War experiences notwithstanding, the 
abstraction of an officer and men in detachment size from the same 
battalion, further subdivided into close-knit groups of four men, as praised by 
Mounted Infantry enthusiasts such as Alderson, commended a decentralised 
approach to command, ideal for the typical small unit piecemeal deployment 
of Mounted Infantry,56  and comprised the key informal command structure.57 
The process also encouraged soldiers’ self-reliance, personal initiative, 
minimised cross-posting between unfamiliar Mounted Infantry companies 
and reduced the risk of failure of cohesion inherent in the multitudinous 
origins of the Mounted Infantry.58 The primacy of maintaining relationships 
between officers and men during Mounted Infantry duties was demonstrated 
by the Camel Corps of Wolseley’s Desert Column during the Nile Expedition 
1884 – 85. Abstraction on the principles of the Mounted Infantry was 
Wolseley’s preferential method for forming the Corps, not only for the 
purposes of optimal selection but also in consideration of the role of the 
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Camel Corps that will be explored in a subsequent chapter.59 In the Mounted 
Infantry Camel Regiment, largely abstracted from line infantry regiments in 
theatre or the Mediterranean, only its commanding officer, the ill-fated Major 
George Gough, 14th Hussars, and his major, Thomas Phipps, 7th Hussars, 
were not infantry officers.60 Abstraction from cavalry and Foot Guards 
regiments, neither of which had experience in furnishing Mounted Infantry to 
form the other camel regiments, was innovative and maintained the officer-
soldier linkage, yet its application to these regiments was questionable 
tactically with respect to their adaptability to the Mounted Infantry role.61  
Wolseley attempted to influence not only which regiments would be utilised 
but also officer selection. But, in fairness, Wolseley’s preferences were 
founded usually on his personal knowledge of these officers’ previous 
combat or Mounted Infantry experience.62  Such intervention was both a 
reflection of Wolseley’s personality, as exemplified by his accumulation of 
trusted acolytes as senior and staff officers known as his ‘ring’, and his 
sincere view that the success of the Camel Corps rested on the character 
and abilities of its officers.63 Nevertheless, Wolseley was only successful in 
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securing the services of 72 per cent of those officers whom he requested,64  
whilst he was not immune from external pressures, including Royal 
intervention, influencing his appointments that resulted in the brief 
appointment of Lieutenant Colonel Primrose to command the Guards Camel 
Regiment65  and Colonel Stanley Clarke, with no active service or recent 
command experience, to command the Light Camel Regiment.66  This latter 
appointment was in direct opposition to Wolseley’s personal preference for 
Hugh McCalmont, 7th Hussars, whose prior appointment to the latter 
command had to be rescinded.67  The impact of these external influences 
was exacerbated by Wolseley’s tolerance of lobbying by friends, colleagues 
and others of political or social influence who wished to accompany the 
expedition themselves or promote the preferment of favourites. Certainly 
Wolseley’s weakness in permitting such ‘jobbery’ was not unique among 
senior commanders in the late Victorian army.68  
Although clear linkages between junior officers and their abstracted 
regimental detachments in the camel regiments were maintained, the Camel 
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Corps and its command structure received criticism from contemporary 
correspondents69 and latterly historians,70  primarily on account of the 
number of aristocrats serving in the officer cadre of the Corps, with Anglesey, 
in his history of the British Cavalry, derogatorily terming the Camel Corps the 
‘Nile Circus’,71  whilst Ian Hamilton remarked caustically  at the time that the 
Desert Column was ‘the spectacle of most of Debrett’s and the élite of 
London Society riding across the desert on camels’,72  alleging it to be 
nothing more than a dilettante experiment dreamed up by Wolseley.73 
Clearly, by virtue of his employment with the River Column rather than 
participating in the more famous Desert Column’s Camel Corps, Hamilton is 
far from an impartial observer whilst his membership of Roberts’ ‘ring’ of 
patronage, antagonistic to Wolseley, is well-known.  Nonetheless, the 
inference is clear that Wolseley selected officers not on merit but by political 
importance, be that regimental or social. The consequence has been a 
prevailing orthodoxy, as summarised by French, that when the aristocracy 
‘donned khaki, they infused the regular officer corps with an anti-modern and 
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anti-professional spirit’.74  Michael Asher lists six hereditary peers, four sons 
of peers and one count among the Camel Corps officers75  whilst Snook 
reflects the ‘unusually high preponderance’ of aristocratic officers 
participating in some of the Camel regiments as well as an excessive 
number of senior officers in the Guards Camel Regiment.76  Was this 
coincidence or by design? Reviewing Wolseley’s preferred officer selections, 
cross-referenced with the Army Lists of 1885, far from preferentially selecting 
officers with aristocratic connections, only 17 per cent of Wolseley’s 
recommendations were for titled officers.77  Therefore, can the observation of 
a predominance of aristocratic officers in the Camel Corps be explained in 
any other way? Further analysis implicates the regimental composition of the 
Camel Corps as the answer.78 Analysis of the relevant Army Lists indicates 
that 35 per cent of officers in the cavalry detachments of the Heavy Camel 
Regiment were scions of aristocratic families and, although high, this 
percentage merely reflects the percentage of aristocrats serving in these 
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regiments as a whole with, for example, the average percentage of 
aristocratic officers in the Household Cavalry being 22 to 36 per cent.79 
There were fewer but still numerous aristocrats in the Guards Camel 
Regiment80 (23.5 per cent) and Light Camel Regiment81 (9.5 per cent) 
respectively but again this reflects the prevalence of titled officers within their 
parent regiments. The prevalence in the Foot Guards ranged between 19 per 
cent and 26 per cent with a quarter of the officers in the Coldstream Guards 
being titled. For the hussar regiments, who were the sole contributors to the 
Light Camel Regiment, the average was 7.5 per cent. Conversely, a similar 
analysis of the officers commanding detachments in the Mounted Infantry 
Camel Regiment, itself numerically constituting 28 per cent of the Camel 
Corps but derived from line infantry regiments rather than ‘smart’ regiments, 
shows only two officers with aristocratic credentials.82 Gwyn Harries-Jenkins 
confirms the significant number of aristocratic officers in the British Army, 
noting that of 316 landowning Victorian peers who died between 1897 and 
1916, 44 per cent had served in the army, usually in ‘exclusive’ regiments83 
whilst Spiers concurs, with an estimate of 21 per cent of army officers from 
the aristocracy serving in the army in the 1830s.84 Although line infantry 
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regiments on the whole were not ‘smart’ and did not generally attract titled 
officers, a higher prevalence occurred, as expected, in the ‘smart’ rifle 
regiments of approximately 5 per cent.85 Thus this analysis refutes the 
insinuation that the Camel Corps was preferentially populated by aristocratic 
officers inveigled into their posts on the basis of Wolseley’s ‘jobbery’. 
Instead, this analysis confirms the explanation that it was Wolseley’s choice 
of regiments, plus his penchant for forming novel élite units out of existing 
regiments,86 rather than his choice of individual officers, that resulted in this 
embarrassment of camel-borne aristocracy. Moreover, Wolseley defended 
his selection as a desire to use the comparatively over-established cavalry 
and Guards to ease the pressure of abstraction on the line infantry.87   
Wolseley intended to be rather more partisan with his recommendations for 
awards following the end of the campaign, intending to preferentially reward 
the River and Desert columns rather than those fighting in the eastern 
Sudan,88  a discrepancy in proportions of officers promoted or decorated that 
elicited adverse comment in the national Press89 but not borne out by 
analysis of the metrics of promotions, mention in dispatches and award of 
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gallantry medals across the three forces.90 Whilst the Desert Column 
constituted 16 per cent of all forces in Sudan, the percentages of officers of 
the Camel Corps promoted to Major or Lieutenant Colonel was 15 per cent 
and 14 per cent respectively. Ten per cent of senior officers of the Desert 
Column were nominated for the award of the Order of the Bath. Within the 
Camel Corps itself, the percentage of ‘mention in dispatches’ favoured the 
Mounted Infantry Camel Regiment with 32 per cent of recommendations for 
the Camel Corps whilst the Heavy Camel Regiment garnered the largest 
percentage of awards of the Distinguished Conduct Medal (46 per cent). 
There was no evidence of any predominance of titled officers receiving 
awards or promotion. However, as a concluding thought, the presence of 
aristocracy within a regiment91 should not necessarily be seen negatively - 
even from the distance of our egalitarian age. Even in 1914, Francis Maitland 
considered the presence of well-connected officers in his hussar regiment 
conferred an intangible sense of being ‘special by association’ with a 
resulting beneficial impact on discipline and esprit de corps.92  
However returning to the problem of the formal command structure of the 
Mounted Infantry as part of its organisational culture, if abstraction, despite 
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its organisational and fiscal benefits, was potentially a negative influence 
through a removal from regimental structure, Hutton’s optimistic mantra was 
that abstraction, ensuring representation of the parent battalions, maintained 
regimental esprit de corps at the detachment or company level and 
safeguarded both the honour of the Mounted Infantry and the parent infantry 
regiments.93 Hutton’s viewpoint suggests that he never seriously 
contemplated the Mounted Infantry developing a distinct and separate 
identity of its own beyond that of the sub-battalion level,94 which, for the 
majority of the Mounted Infantry’s existence, was the size of unit deployed in 
combat.95 This indicates that the Mounted Infantry did not need to forge an 
organisational identity as it remained, and in Hutton’s opinion, would always 
remain, an off-shoot of the regular infantry. Although in the case of the 
nascent camel regiments, Snook considers that a transfer of loyalty failed,96 
there is no evidence that Wolseley either actively promoted such 
transference nor expected a new identity for the Camel Corps regiments, 
preferring to keep them separate from each other whilst not disturbing 
regimental affiliations,97  identities and esprit de corps of the abstracted 
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detachments.98  Clearly there was no cogent rationale for an inception of a 
novel and persisting identity for a temporary Camel Corps.  
The problems arising from the Mounted Infantry’s command structure were 
exacerbated in South Africa where individual companies from Mounted 
Infantry battalions were often dispersed geographically with, for example, the 
two companies of the Royal Irish Rifles Mounted Infantry, part of the 9th 
Mounted Infantry battalion, never serving under the battalion’s commanding 
officer or with other constituent units of the 9th Mounted Infantry.99  This 
occurrence was far from rare but the decentralised basis of the Mounted 
Infantry’s command structure, at least at the sub-battalion level, inculcated 
resilience to any adverse impact of the army’s tendency to disperse Mounted 
Infantry in small unit size. Thus the opportunity to develop an identity at even 
larger formation size failed during the Boer War despite external views to the 
contrary100 as such formations were never more than theoretical as Mounted 
Infantry battalions were dispersed continually according to the perceived 
exigencies of the campaign.101  Alderson complained that every general 
wished to split up the Mounted Infantry into small groups and in doing so 
‘they render their most powerful striking arm impotent’.102  Ian Hamilton, the 
commander of the Mounted Infantry Division in 1900, bemoaned the lack of 
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opportunity to demonstrate the worth of larger formations of Mounted 
Infantry, a sentiment acknowledged by Roberts.103 However, in defence of 
the frittering away of Mounted Infantry in company or battalion size, Roberts 
reflected that commanders in South Africa always clamoured for the 
inclusion of Mounted Infantry in their commands, emphasising the Mounted 
Infantry’s perceived versatility of combining musketry with mobility.104  
Eventually the composition of mobile columns and brigades on active service 
during the insurgency phase of the Boer War included prototypical all-arms 
components of Mounted Infantry, cavalry, horse artillery and colonial 
Mounted Rifles. Although this arose initially from the need to enhance 
mobility in the presence of a numerically inadequate cavalry force that had 
become dependent on Mounted Infantry and colonial Mounted Rifles, this 
mixing of different troops became an accepted approach in South Africa with 
the Assistant Adjutant General asking in 1901 whether the Commander-in-
Chief approved the composition of a Cavalry Brigade to include two 
companies of Mounted infantry, a machine-gun section and a battery of 
horse artillery.105 Roberts encouraged this approach, particularly with 
reference to the inclusion of Mounted Infantry, although in contrast to his 
reputation of being antipathetic to cavalry, Roberts reflected that arming the 
                                                          
103
Elgin Commission, Cd.1791, II, submission by Ian Hamilton (Q.13845 , p.104); TNA WO 108 / 410 
Home and Overseas Correspondence by Field Marshal Lord Roberts 5
th
 September 1900 – 1
st
 January 
1901, letter to Lansdowne (Secretary of State for War), 29 April 1900;   Elgin Commission, Cd 1791, 
II, submission by Roberts (Q.13282, p.68). 
 
104 TNA WO 108 / 409 Home and Overseas Correspondence by Field Marshal Lord Roberts 12th 
December 1899 – 4
th
 June 1900, letter to Lansdowne, 15 April 1900. 
105
 TNA WO 32 / 6260 Composition of a Brigade of Cavalry 1901. 
 
133 
 
cavalry with a rifle instead of its current carbine might render the requirement 
for Mounted Infantry less pressing.106 Clearly, at the inception of such mixed 
mobile commands, their composition did not encourage the development of 
an over-arching identity for their Mounted Infantry with an attenuated 
command structure succinctly captured by Kipling’s MI:  
          Our Sergeant-Major’s a subaltern, our Captain’s a Fusilier – 
          Our Adjutant’s “late of Somebody’s ‘Orse”, an’ a Melbourne 
          auctioneer.107 
Therefore the Mounted Infantry’s command structure encouraged a Mounted 
Infantry-specific identity at the company and detachment level rather than at 
higher formations including as a branch of the army. Service in the Mounted 
Infantry was popular, securing the ‘pick of the young infantry officers’,108 not 
only because of the opportunity for combat and the experience of 
independent company-sized command in wartime109 but also because the 
Mounted Infantry was, for a period at least, a coveted service on trial, subject 
to much debate in military circles, and therefore attractive to junior infantry 
officers seeking advancement.110  Similarly, the official view was that the 
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‘best’ rank and file from line regiments could be found easily for Mounted 
Infantry work111 which offered opportunities for training with horses that was 
potentially convertible to a marketable trade for employment outside the 
army.112 Nonetheless, as exhaustion with the war in South Africa developed 
in the army during 1901,113  despite earlier enthusiasm,114 service in the 
Mounted Infantry became less welcome,115 primarily due to a perception by 
soldiers of the Mounted Infantry being overworked.116 This sense of 
imposition was exacerbated unfortunately by the apparent injustice of an 
unfavourable pay differential between Mounted Infantry and both its colonial 
Mounted Rifles counterparts and the volunteer Imperial Yeomanry who 
received five times the daily pay of the Mounted Infantry whilst undertaking 
similar mounted roles.117 As indicated in the previous chapter, the issue of 
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pay for the Mounted Infantry remained an interesting side issue throughout 
its existence linking mounted functionality with identity and esprit de corps. 
Leaving aside the wartime antagonism felt by the Mounted Infantry towards 
the Imperial Yeomanry and colonial Mounted Rifles,118  the peacetime 
Mounted Infantry in training had received, for many years, cavalry rates of 
pay reflecting the temporary additional stable duties required.119 Conversely, 
the lack of cavalry pay for Mounted Infantry officers, and consequential 
wrangling in War Office correspondence, remained a minor cause célèbre in 
the years after 1902.120 Conversely, in a frankly bizarre example of logic, 
cavalry rates of pay were given to mobile infantry employed as military 
cyclists on the grounds that, rather than needing compensation for stable 
duties, cyclists would be employed alongside cavalry and that their role was 
likely to require them to spearhead any advance into enemy-held territory 
with the additional pay as compensation for this danger – an arrangement 
that unsurprisingly caused consternation with the Army Council’s Finance 
member.121 Illogically, differential pay rates both marked out the functionality 
of the Mounted Infantry as different from foot infantry in peace but also 
undermined any ‘sameness’ with other mounted troops in wartime. 
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Returning to the model of organisational culture, functionality as a domain 
has been alluded to previously. For the Mounted Infantry, the basis of its 
functionality resided with its combined infantry skills and enhanced mobility 
although doctrinal arguments over role would influence the army and the 
understanding by general public of its identity.122 Clear distinctions between 
Mounted Infantry and cavalry could be obscure to the uninitiated with one 
newspaper defining the functional abilities of the Mounted Infantryman as 
being drilled in fighting both dismounted and from the saddle, which as 
already  discussed in the Introduction indicated a fundamental error of 
understanding 123  even after the Boer War where doctrinal boundaries had 
blurred in practice.124  Even the name ‘Mounted Infantry’ was subject to 
debate in the wider military press with the problem being its connotation with 
the equine.125  Alternative appellations ranging from ‘ranger’, ‘scout’ and 
even ‘chasseur’ were championed unsuccessfully in the Press.126 As the 
Mounted Infantry was horsed, even though its cobs differed from the larger 
cavalry horses, the mere essence of being equine-mounted functioned as a 
marker for all that was at risk, at least in cavalry officers’ opinions, in its 
military role, its horsed identity, existing way of life and, by extension, its 
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social standing in the army and in wider society.127 As a case in example, 
during the debate regarding the abolition of the cavalry’s lance in 1903, the 
Adjutant General asked rhetorically how Lancer regiments, devoid of their 
lances, should be called, suggesting less than helpfully, ‘hussars’.128  Proof 
that the horse and its connotations was the problem129  is the lack of 
antagonism shown towards the mobile infantryman in his reincarnation as 
military cyclist by cavalry officers130  including those antipathetic to Mounted 
Infantry such as Haig.131 Whilst Mounted Infantry enthusiasts, particularly 
Hutton, his protégé Alderson and Evelyn Wood, clearly articulated similar 
visions of what the Mounted Infantry should be,132  others had failed to 
comprehend this, either through wilfulness or misunderstanding, with the 
propagation of friction between protagonists and detractors jeopardising the 
Mounted Infantry’s functional identity.133  Hutton had always emphasised that 
                                                          
127
 TNA WO 32 / 6782 Debate regarding the abolition of the lance 1903. 
 
128
 TNA WO 32 / 6782 ibid. 
 
129
 Battine, ‘The Use of the Horse Soldier in the Twentieth Century’, pp. 309-30, suggested that it 
was merely the horse that divided infantry and cavalry in the post-war army. 
 
130 TNA WO 32 / 6570  Organisation of Cyclist Corps for the Territorial Army 5 September 1907, 
originally military cyclists were volunteers from the Territorial Force and clearly no competition for 
the cavalry in ’smartness’ or standing within the army;  TNA WO 32 / 4737  Provision of Cyclists for 
employment with the Cavalry Division 1913;  Ray Westlake, The British Army of August 1914: an 
Illustrated Directory Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2005), p.83, even ‘smart’ cavalry regiments such as the 
2
nd 
Life Guards eventually furnished a cyclist detachment in 1914. 
 
131
 Elgin Commission, Cd. 1791, II, evidence submitted by Haig (Q.19468, p.411); TNA WO 32 / 6570 
Organisation of Cyclist Corps for the Territorial Army 5 September 1907, Haig as Director of Military 
Training proposed that large bodies of cyclists could be employed with cavalry provided they had 
received proper training. 
 
132 Hutton, Five Lectures on Mounted Infantry, Lecture One, 2 June 1886, pp.1-44; Alderson, With 
the Mounted Infantry and the Mashonaland Field Force 1896, p.5; Wood, Mounted Riflemen: Lecture 
at the RUSI on 4
th
 March 1873, pp.1-25. 
 
133 ‘Lancer’, ‘The Question of Mounted Infantry: a reply to ‘A Rifleman’, pp. 228-31; Major R.H. Carr-
Ellison, ‘Mounted Infantry’, United Services Magazine, 22, 1900, pp. 165-68; TNA WO 33/ 37 Précis 
138 
 
it remained imperative that Mounted Infantry should preserve their identity as 
infantry.134  Hutton’s argument was that preservation of an identity as infantry 
ensured that the Mounted Infantry retained infantry skills in terms of tactics 
such as musketry and the ability to capture then retain territory in the face of 
enemy counter-attack.135 Later a similar argument temporarily scotched the 
tentative proposal for both infantry and cavalry to supply military cyclists on 
grounds that the cavalry lacked appropriate infantry skills.136  
If the functional identity of the Camel Corps is considered, Buller expressly 
enunciated its Mounted Infantry principles, refuting any notion of it being 
camel-borne cavalry137 whilst Wolseley too disabused the cavalry 
detachments of the Camel Corps of any notion of retaining ‘cavalry spirit’.138 
Wolseley was clear he wanted camel-mounted Mounted Infantry for his 
Desert Column,139  raised, equipped, and fighting dismounted as Mounted 
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Infantry, rather than a transposed cavalry.140  This view of camel-warfare was 
not universal as camelry employed in India and littoral Sudan rode two men 
per camel facilitating the prospect of camel-backed combat distantly 
suggestive of cavalry-orientated warfare.141 This suggested minimal cross-
fertilisation in camel warfare expertise from India,142 partly reflecting 
Wolseley’s distrust of Indian troops, whom he considered unreliable against 
an Arab enemy on ethnic and for some, co-religious grounds,143 and his own 
lack of service and command in India. However, despite pronouncements 
from Buller and Wolseley, most of the Camel Corps was not truly Mounted 
Infantry in functionality or identity.144 Camel-borne troops could not match the 
horsed Mounted Infantry’s mobility and manoeuvrability with slower and 
more hazardous mounting and dismounting and limited speed – a weakness 
undermining their utility recognised in Colonel Callwell’s ‘Small Wars’.145 
Furthermore, the dismounted drill necessary of Mounted Infantry was 
allegedly anathema to the cavalry detachments,146 while the Foot Guards 
had no recent precedent for providing a mounted role. 
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Therefore, if the functionality of the regular Mounted Infantry contributed to 
its identity, then as indicated previously, a blurring of functional distinction 
between all mounted troops occurred during the Boer War. Although largely 
unrecognised, if the cavalry and Mounted Infantry on active service were 
now largely indistinguishable from each other, this bilateral loss of prior 
identity was replaced through paradigm shift to a chimera of being a cross 
between Mounted Infantry and Mounted Rifles and that, for some 
commentators, this new breed of mounted soldier should be formalised and 
permanent within the army’s organisation.147  Of course there was precedent 
for the assimilation of specialist troops into permanent regiments such as 
light infantry companies at the beginning of the 19th century.148  Moreover, 
the Mounted Infantry, with its improved equestrianism, became the blueprint 
for the army on campaign in South Africa. With logistical149 and manpower 
limitations and a pressing need for increased mobility, elements of the army 
deemed surplus to prevailing requirements had been reconfigured on the 
Mounted Infantry blueprint to form mobile units such as the Royal Artillery 
Mounted Rifles. Ian Hamilton wrote that:  
          ‘We are going to have six companies of Royal Artillery Mounted Rifles 
           up at Pretoria in a fortnight’s time. I hear the Gunners like the idea 
           immensely. They are working hard at drill and shooting and are 
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           determined that the reputation of the Royal Regiment [of Artillery]  
           shall not suffer at their hands’.150 
For Kitchener and Roberts the Mounted Infantry model was now both 
ubiquitous across the veldt and functionally utilitarian – the ‘ikona’,151 
undertaking all military roles from scouting to convoy escort and participating 
in mobile columns’ drives against the blockhouse lines. This Mounted 
Infantry ubiquity also matched a quasi-official recommendation that actually 
in future, all infantry should be trained as Mounted Infantry – clearly an 
unaffordable and unsustainable recommendation that was not 
implemented.152 A similar state of blurred identity would affect the Mounted 
Infantry in the post-Boer War years when, in its role as non-cavalry divisional 
mounted troops, its identity as horsed infantry undertaking traditional cavalry 
functions overlapped with the reformed hybrid cavalry.153  Thus, although the 
Mounted Infantry achieved some functional identity, this was never distinctive 
enough to confirm a homogenous organisational identity, for a tendency 
towards  being a ‘jack-of-all-trades’ persisted – a doctrinal state resulting 
from the lack of a clear agreement as to the Mounted Infantry’s role within 
the army. Despite Hutton’s dire warnings, 154 the Mounted Infantry in 1901 
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and 1902 had indeed gone some way into being a form of cavalry 
irrespective of its infantry origins. 
Returning to the social anthropological model of organisational culture, the 
fourth domain relates to loyalty, identity and esprit de corps. As indicated 
earlier in this chapter, there were polarised views on the likelihood of 
establishing esprit de corps in the Mounted Infantry. Maguire accused pre-
war abstraction for failing to instil esprit de corps, although his opinion 
elicited an editorial disclaimer rejecting his viewpoint.155 As already noted, 
loyalty and proud ‘belonging’ on behalf of officers and men, critical to esprit 
de corps, was highly valued by senior army commanders for its beneficial 
impact, inculcating pride in the regiment in morale, discipline and military 
efficiency.156  For, as Wolseley remarked, ‘If a regiment has esprit de corps 
strongly developed throughout its ranks, that regiment will be efficient’.157  In 
South Africa, a modicum of ready-made esprit de corps was conferred on 
colonial Mounted Rifles by the appellation of eponymous titles.158 An 
example of this was the colonial Mounted Rifles formed by Major Michael 
Rimington of the 6th Dragoons. Known as Rimington’s Guides, they revelled 
in the informal name of ‘Rimington’s Tigers’ on account of the leopard skin 
worn as puggarees around their slouch hats that underlined by their vaunted 
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reputation as excellent horsemasters.159 However, with Mounted Infantry 
battalions known generally by either their numerical allocation or occasionally 
in the case of companies, by referring to their parent regiment, the 
opportunity for inducing such identity and loyalty appear at first consideration 
to be limited. Nevertheless, the esprit de corps of Mounted Infantry battalions 
in South Africa, particularly the initial eight battalions and Hubert Gough’s 
composite battalion, were considered excellent by contemporary sources. 
Here shared experience, developing loyalty within the formal and informal 
command structure, prior training and evolution of ‘belonging’ replaced 
tradition, spectacle and title to promote esprit de corps.160 As the War 
progressed with further Mounted Infantry expansion, parent infantry regiment 
identity rarely influenced a developing loyalty. Only the 25th Mounted Infantry 
battalion was comprised solely from one infantry regiment, the KRRC161. In 
the pre-Boer War years, a proposed grouping of abstracted companies from 
similar geographical areas together was mistaken by the Press as a method 
for inculcating esprit de corps,162 likened to territorial associations following 
the Cardwell-Childers reforms, but in fact, merely presaged post-Boer War 
proposals that were founded in administrative convenience at mobilisation.163  
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Previously, Wolseley denied a lack of esprit de corps in the Camel Corps as 
he predicted that the 1,100 men of the Camel Corps would be worth two of 
the best battalions of infantry of the line in terms of military effectiveness, 164 
although his reckless prediction predated the use of line infantry for the 
Mounted Infantry Camel Regiment.165 Conversely, the Duke of Cambridge, 
unhappy with Wolseley’s suggested abstraction, proposed a conversion of a 
regiment of Hussars and a battalion of Rifles into the Camel Corps to benefit 
unit cohesion and esprit de corps,166 thus mirroring some of the models 
previously considered in the inception of the Mounted Infantry movement. 
Wolseley maintained his decision in the face of opposition from the Duke of 
Cambridge and Queen Victoria167  with the former raising concerns that army 
esprit de corps had already been threatened by the recent army reforms168 
and that Wolseley’s unsound principle of élite selection would add further 
harm.169 Wolseley’s threat to convert a fifth of each regiment embarked into 
Mounted Infantry, necessitating a larger, more expensive force to be 
embarked, presaged Roberts’ similar method of Mounted Infantry expansion 
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in South Africa in 1900, and would have presumably resulted in a similar dire 
outcome.170 Externally, Wolseley’s confidence in his force’s esprit de corps 
never wavered.171 Similarly Lieutenant Colonel Reginald Talbot of the 
Household Cavalry denied any deficit in esprit de corps in the Heavy Camel 
Regiment as a cause for the breaking of the square at Abu Klea, claiming 
loyally that ‘the Camel Corps was the flower of the British Army’.172 Talbot 
had additional reasons to promote the Heavy Camel Corps as an effective 
fighting force in an attempt to deflect the predicted criticism within military 
circles and in the general Press of his cavalry regiments for their apparent 
failure at Abu Klea.173  In exculpating his command, Talbot dissembled, 
taking care in personal correspondence to warn against leaks to the 
Press,174 claiming that the square wasn’t actually broken in the Arab attack 
as the square had yet to be formed appropriately – an exculpation that will be 
investigated in a subsequent chapter.  
Part of the ‘loyalty / identity / esprit de corps’ construct is the emotional 
concept of self-pride in ‘being the best’ founded in shared experiences 
binding the group internally.175 Clearly, this may occur on a number of levels 
including drill, sporting success, social, formal and informal appearance, 
                                                          
170
 Preston, In Relief of Gordon, p.41. 
 
171
 London Gazette, 25
 
August 1885, despatches from General Lord Wolseley. 
 
172 Captain Willougby Verner, Sketches in the Soudan (London: R.H. Porter, 1885), n.p. 
173
 Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 1 March 1885; Lieutenant Colonel R. Talbot, ‘The Battle of Abu Klea’, 
The Nineteenth Century, 19, 1886, pp. 154-59. 
 
174 Household Cavalry Museum Archives, Windsor, UK, (hereafter HHC), Talbot Papers: letter from 
Lieutenant Colonel R.A. Talbot, 1
st
 Life Guards, 28 January 1885. 
175
 Kirke, Red Coat, Green Machine, p.97. 
 
146 
 
training, and success in operations, with the latter defined by numerous 
metrics. Colonel Henderson considered that, for the Mounted Infantry, 
merely by being selected by their commanding officers for training was 
enough for esprit de corps to develop.176 In terms of ‘being the best’, 
Kipling’s ‘ikona’ proudly claimed that despite its inauspicious origins, the 
experienced Mounted Infantry in South Africa couldn’t be distinguished at 
‘’arf a mile from the crackest cavalry’,177 purposefully using a favourable 
comparison with ‘smart’ cavalry regiments, that was particularly adroit at a 
time when the cavalry versus Mounted Infantry debate was reaching its 
zenith. Memoirs of the Nile Expedition indicate a similar sense of pride within 
the Camel Corps, imbuing a sense of makeshift identity whether focussing 
on appearance or efficiency,178 and the camel regiments promoted 
competition between themselves with McCalmont, as second-in-command of 
the Light Camel Regiment clearly not an impartial observer, recommending it 
as the smartest of the camel regiments.179 The Press added to these 
competitive perceptions among the expeditionary force claiming that the 
dispatch of the Desert Column with its Camel Corps attracted more domestic 
public attention than the embarkation of the River Column,180 predicting 
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greater importance to its role in the outcome of the campaign,181 only to 
withdraw its unequivocal support later in the campaign when it criticised the 
use of the Camel Corps as Mounted Infantry as a tactical error.182  Identity 
and competitiveness co-existed within each camel regiment as well at the 
detachment level where individuality arising from parent regimental traditions 
was prized over the ‘sameness’ arising from membership of a particular 
camel regiment.183 
But what of other factors contributing to esprit de corps, sense of ‘belonging’ 
and identity? For example, the value of uniform in forging identity in the 
Victorian era was well-recognised and moreover it encouraged recruitment184 
and, perhaps even attracted a better ‘class’ of recruit to the ranks.185 
However there were no key uniform changes exclusive to the Mounted 
Infantry of a magnitude to influence the development of identity or loyalty as 
the Mounted Infantry tended to wear the uniform of its parent regiment in 
keeping with its improvised ad hoc origins. Again this underlines that the 
Mounted Infantry were expected to remain organisationally part of their 
parent regiment and therefore did not need to forge a separate identity 
through uniform, traditions and spectacle. However concessions to its 
functional role as horsed infantry meant minor adaptations particularly hard-
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wearing cord breeches becoming accepted issue plus the wearing of 
ammunition bandoliers first seen in the 1881Transvaal and 1882 Egyptian 
campaigns.186  Even Highland regiments’ Mounted Infantry companies in 
South Africa in 1899 - 1902 relinquished kilts, arguably a Highland regiment’s 
most distinctive identity, for cord breeches – an example of functional 
practicality overcoming tradition and previous identity.187  The ammunition 
bandolier worn by the Mounted Infantry not only increased the amount of 
ammunition personally available when operating distantly from the 
ammunition train, particularly when rough terrain or long lines of 
communication encountered on colonial expedition strained logistics, while 
the closing flaps prevented inadvertent loss of cartridges when mounting and 
dismounting rapidly.188 The combination of its infantry dress with minor 
adaptations for its enhanced functionality was not only a cost saving to the 
Treasury (rather than devising a novel uniform) but was particularly apt for a 
temporary and exclusively active service force needing to mobilise quickly in 
theatre and which did not require release of additional kit from depots around 
the country. Furthermore it compared favourably in terms of functionality with 
the cavalry’s uniform of the 1870s and 1880s of tight tunic, riding breeches, 
exuberant headdress and spurs, none of which were conducive to rapid 
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dismounting or dismounted musketry.189 In fact the issue of spurs was a 
minor cause célèbre with the Camel Corps with a contemporary witness 
recording that the Royal Marines’ camel detachment serving in the Guards 
Camel Regiment sang:  
          When years ago I listed, lads, to serve our gracious Queen, the  
          Sergeant made me understand I was a Royal Marine. He said  
          sometimes they served in ships and sometimes served on shore. But  
          never said I should wear spurs and be in the Camel Corps.190    
Even the Mounted Infantry Camel Regiment exhibited pride in their spurs 
until Wolseley prohibited their wearing.191  Symbolically cavalry-orientated, 
the use of spurs was prohibited by Hutton although that did not ensure their 
absence from Mounted Infantry units.192  The rationale for their prohibition in 
horsed Mounted Infantry was sound enough in that despite being mounted, 
the level of equitation required of the Mounted Infantryman was merely to 
keep his seat when moving across terrain whilst spurs would be an 
encumbrance to agility when dismounted. Yet when in later years the 
Mounted Infantry required improved equitation skills for its expanded role 
including reconnaissance and scouting, a re-evaluation of this prohibition 
was necessary.  
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If the horsed Mounted Infantry did not demonstrate significant uniform 
adaptation for its role, the same cannot be said for the Camel Corps, most of 
whom193  wore a novel uniform designed for protection in the desert. Snook 
considers that the wearing of this uniform, admittedly with its antecedents in 
the preceding Egyptian campaign,194 marked the Camel Corps out as an 
élite.195  Mirroring the Mounted Infantry’s previous adaptations, breeches 
were of yellow ochre cord with knee-length blue putties; the foreign-service 
helmet stained with tea and topped off with blue-tinted goggles for protection 
against the glare of the desert sun.  Nevertheless, despite the inclusive 
‘sameness’ conferred by uniform, detachments maintained individuality using 
badges and numerals signifying regiments of origin196  or regimental colours 
worn as puggarees wound around their helmets.197  The sight of a soldier of 
the Heavy Camel Regiment prompted Wolseley to remark:  
          Fancy a Life Guardsman clothed like a scarecrow and with blue  
          goggles on, mounted on a camel over which he has little control.  
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          What a picture!’198   
Furthermore, twenty-nine scarlet tunics were carried for use of the 
detachment tasked to approach Khartoum199 as Wolseley attributed great 
importance to the effect of the red-coated soldier, irrespective of numerical 
inadequacy, to the morale of the besieged and the unnerving of the 
besiegers. Thus, from the perspective of uniform, if considered as a 
microcosm of the organisational culture of the Camel Corps, whilst a novel 
unifying identity was possible, detachments chose to retain the identity and 
their allegiance to their parent regiment. However, this was not how the 
Times saw it, prematurely prophesising a homogeneity whereby ‘the camelry 
is a new force within the British Army’,200  which even then was not a view 
not universally shared by all of the army’s senior officers including those 
participating in the Desert Column.201 
The Boer War encouraged uniform adaptations but not specifically for the 
Mounted Infantry. The widespread replacement of the infantry helmet with 
the soft slouch hat, which was less cumbersome, facilitated prone shooting 
(in a campaign where any exposure to facilitate shooting was likely to be 
fatal) and was considered, at least initially, to be more protective against the 
sun,202 was not specific to Mounted Infantry. Its similarity to the Boers’ 
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hats203 caused confusion, both unintentionally204 and intentionally, being 
used for deception by the Boers in conjunction with wearing other clothing,205  
resulting in a request for the replacement of slouch hats with helmets by the 
Imperial Yeomanry. This request foundered on Treasury parsimony as the 
Imperial Yeomanry was financed privately and was not the financial 
responsibility of Government.206  The 25th Mounted Infantry did not favour the 
slouch hat, being unable to distinguish friend from foe,207  a prediction that 
came to fruition when it was overrun by General Botha’s Boers at 
Bakenlaagte, when hindered by poor visibility and inclement weather.  As the 
war progressed, logistical starvation of Boer insurgents meant that the 
wearing of captured army clothing was now necessity rather than choice 
even though capture thus attired merited capital punishment.208  
If uniform only contributed slightly in passing to the identity of the Mounted 
Infantry, what was the impact of armaments or other equipment? As bona 
fide infantry, the Mounted Infantry’s main armament was the infantry rifle, 
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which during the Mounted Infantry’s existence, after the retirement of the 
Martini-Henry, was the Lee-Metford rifle, introduced in 1888, and latterly, the 
Lee-Enfield.209  The lack of experience with the Martini-Henry rifle in the 
cavalry detachments of the Camel Corps, accentuated by their lack of 
dismounted training, contributed to the criticism of Wolseley’s selection of 
cavalry as Mounted Infantry by his Chief of Staff, Buller, and other officers.210 
This error will be discussed in more detail in a following chapter. Later, after 
the near-disaster of Abu Klea, Wolseley would rue privately his decision to 
use cavalry as Mounted Infantry and he deflected any culpability back to the 
cavalry on the grounds that picked men should have performed better.211 In 
defence of Wolseley’s requirement that the cavalry use infantry rifles, a more 
prosaic reason for arming the whole Camel Corps with the same weapon 
was to avoid logistical problems of transporting two different calibre of small 
arms’ ammunition for rifle and carbine.212  The debate about the arming of 
the Camel Corps presaged the debate decades later about the rearming of 
the cavalry with the infantry rifle during and after the Boer War where, 
despite staunch defence of the cavalry carbine from many quarters, the 
longer range and accuracy of the rifle was acknowledged.213  As noted 
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previously, a side-debate regarding the issuing of a personal protection 
weapon to the Mounted Infantry occurred. 214 Hutton was concerned that 
small detachments of Mounted Infantry, separated from the main force due 
to its wide-ranging role, would be left defenceless if attacked whilst mounted 
if not armed with a personal weapon comparable to the cavalry’s sabre. 
Despite his proposal for the issuing of revolvers, reflecting the side-arms 
available to the Mounted Infantry during the 1882 Egyptian campaign, 
Wolseley rejected the request.215  A similar debate would re-surface in 1912, 
this time over the arming of the Yeomanry with a personal weapon with the 
sword-bayonet once again the suggested, if surprising, compromise bearing 
in mind the Yeomanry’s historical attachment through its cavalry origins to 
the sabre that was implicitly and symbolically cavalry-orientated.216  The 
Yeomanry’s perceived lack of opportunity for sword skills’ training prompted 
debate regarding other options including, most improbably, a ‘stout cudgel’, 
reminiscent of Brigadier General Brabazon’s unusual submission to the Elgin 
Commission for the arming of the Imperial Yeomanry with a tomahawk.217  
As previously noted, the potential utilisation of machine guns had not been 
ignored yet their early mechanical unreliability and cumbersome weight had 
                                                          
214 Hutton, Five Lectures on Mounted Infantry, Lecture One, 2 June 1886, pp.1-44. 
 
215
 Lumley, ‘Mounted Riflemen’, pp. 638-56, the use of a revolver whilst mounted was considered to 
be more of a hazard to rider and horse than to the enemy; Hutton, Five Lectures on Mounted 
Infantry, Lecture One, 2
 
June 1886, pp.1-44. 
 
216
 Major H.G. Watkin, ‘Why not a sword-bayonet for the Yeomanry’, Cavalry Journal, 7, 1912, 
pp.107-09. 
 
217
 Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry, p.168. 
  
155 
 
resulted in some ambivalence among regimental officers.218  Thus the 
machine gun was not an invention that was identified with the Mounted 
Infantry paradigm, although close cooperation between Mounted Infantry and 
machine guns, particularly in flank attacks whereby the increased firepower 
would be beneficial, became part of rudimentary doctrine in Combined 
Training 1902.219  With regards to any other equipment specially for the 
Mounted Infantry as a marker of its identity, Hutton designed a Mounted 
Infantry saddle to aid weight reduction needed for the Mounted Infantry’s 
smaller cobs,220  whilst on the Nile, the Camel Corps debated two patterns of 
wooden saddles221  with neither saddle able to compensate for the camels’ 
failing nutritional status that eventually affected the Corps’ mobility through 
excessive camel losses.222 Thus neither armaments nor equipment were 
major contributors to Mounted infantry identity.  
Of course, esprit de corps and loyalty as determinants of identity have an 
important human component. As Alan Ramsey Skelley noted, esprit de corps 
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played an important role in fostering discipline in the Victorian army and vice 
versa.223  He concluded that good esprit de corps, sound training and 
discipline contributed to good morale. But there are practical difficulties in 
utilising disciplinary records as a marker of esprit de corps in the Mounted 
Infantry for a number of reasons. Clearly, as a force configured for colonial 
active service, the opportunities for misbehaviour on active service were less 
than during routine garrison duties. Using desertion rates as an example, 
such indiscipline in the Nile Campaign was impractical and potentially 
suicidal with death from dehydration or following capture as likely 
outcomes.224 Only five desertions from the Heavy and Guards Camel 
Regiments were recorded and none from the Mounted Infantry Camel 
Regiment in 1884-85.225  In matters as mundane but important as water 
discipline, the experienced soldiers of the Mounted Infantry Camel Regiment 
were considered by Colonel Charles Wilson to have excelled, reflecting their 
discipline and, arguably, their wisdom attained from longer overseas service 
in comparison to the regiments embarked from home.226  Furthermore, the 
men abstracted for Mounted Infantry duty were often the best within their 
parent infantry battalion and perhaps would be expected to demonstrate the 
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best disciplinary records.227 As a practical issue, disciplinary misdemeanours 
were recorded generally against the parent regiment rather than specifically 
ascribed to the Mounted Infantry except where the Mounted Infantry was 
configured semi-permanently as in Egypt after 1885. Analysis of the pay lists 
of ‘A’ Company Mounted Infantry stationed in Egypt between 1886 and 1888 
revealed only two convictions, specifically drunkenness, both in the 
detachment of the 2nd battalion Royal Irish Regiment,228 despite the nefarious 
temptations of Cairo, with no offences committed by soldiers from the other 
Mounted Infantry detachments from the Royal Fusiliers, Rifle Brigade, 
Yorkshire, Cheshire, and Welsh Regiments.229  However, this is not to say 
that those in the Mounted Infantry were perfectly behaved or refrained from 
pugilistic defence of the honour of their parent regiments, underlining that 
loyalty to and identity with the parent battalion remained powerful even 
during Mounted Infantry training.230  There is however anecdotal evidence 
that discipline within the Mounted Infantry was threatened during the retreat 
back across the Bayuda Desert in 1885. Although neither mentioned in 
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official dispatches nor in Evelyn Wood’s memoirs231 and therefore requiring 
caution regarding its veracity, Colonel De Sales La Terrière, then a junior 
officer in the Light Camel Regiment, recounted how the rearguard at Gakdul 
Wells refused to march due to exhaustion and lack of camel transport until 
threatened by Wood with public exposure and consequent regimental 
disgrace.232  The identity of the unit remains obscure but triangulation with 
the details of the Desert Column’s rearguard, circumstantially implicates two 
possible infantry detachments including one from the Mounted Infantry 
Camel Regiment.233  
Therefore, what can be concluded about the esprit de corps of the Mounted 
Infantry?  Surprisingly, in view of the many reasons why abstraction and the 
mixing of unfamiliar detachments of troops together into a temporary 
organisation configured only for active service should have lacked cohesion, 
there is evidence of esprit de corps being present but, as with the notion of 
identity itself, this appears to have functioned at a level more basic than the 
Mounted Infantry movement as a whole thus contributing to morale, 
efficiency, loyalty to colleagues and professional pride at a company level.234  
Even after the demise of the Mounted Infantry, its esprit de corps was kept 
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kindled by the annual Mounted Infantry Dinner. Despite its popularity with 
some senior officers such as Hamilton, Hutton and Alderson,235  not every 
senior officer approved of the Dinner, most vehement being Buller who 
considered it anathema on the grounds of trying to confer distinctiveness to a 
skill to which every infantry officer should aspire.236  Buller, whilst not 
completely antipathetic to the Mounted Infantry per se, had always regarded 
the role of Mounted Infantry to be a requisite of a well-trained infantryman 
with merely the added rudiments of riding rather than warranting 
consideration as a separate military arm.237   
Although a social anthropological model has been applied to the Mounted 
Infantry’s organisational culture throughout this chapter, it is acknowledged 
that other models describing military culture and identity exist. In Military 
Identities, French suggests alternative approaches including the sociological 
requisites for survival of an organisation, namely: ability to propagate the 
group; ability to absorb and train new members; maintain order; motivate 
members whilst demonstrating the benefits of the organisational culture to 
the wider organisation and, finally, successful adaptation to external 
changes.238  If these factors are applied to the Mounted Infantry, many of 
these requisites are indeed fulfilled. Propagation, absorption and training of 
newly selected recruits were satisfied by abstraction and peacetime training 
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in the Mounted Infantry schools and, after 1902, in peacetime simulation 
during manoeuvres. Despite the uncertainty over doctrine and debate over 
organisation, the Mounted Infantry remained sustainable and its deployment 
included in Field Service Regulations until immediately prior to the First 
World War when the Mounted Infantry Schools were closed thus preventing 
training of any further cadres.239  The benefits of the Mounted Infantry to the 
wider army, at least during the war in South Africa, were evident as shown by 
the conversion of units into Mounted Infantry and Mounted Rifles.240 As will 
be explored in a later chapter, it is arguable but not self-evident that benefits 
from the Mounted Infantry to the wider army waned as the focus of strategic 
military planning re-focussed towards a future European battlefield. The final 
factor of ‘adaptability’ was the potential weakness threatening the Mounted 
Infantry’s survival. Frequently the emergence of the ‘hybrid’ cavalryman in 
comparison to the seeming lack of adaptation of the Mounted Infantry has 
been considered the precipitant for the Mounted Infantry’s demise.241 
However this view is only tenable if the Mounted Infantry is seen as a 
formalised homogenous arm with its own identity, rather than as a 
functionality of mobile infantry with an identity indistinguishable from parent 
infantry battalions. The functional adaptation of mobile (rather than ‘mounted’ 
with its equine connotations) infantry into the military cyclist and, later on, 
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mechanised infantry, is supportive of the survival of the Mounted Infantry 
concept.  
Badsey proposes that for infantry regiments there was both an institutional 
and a social stake in promoting their Mounted Infantry detachments around 
the time of formalisation of Mounted Infantry training.242  True, there were 
potential tactical benefits accruable if the battalion was posted overseas and 
had a company already trained in mounted duties yet this hypothesis 
becomes less tenable as peacetime abstraction removed officers and men, 
often reportedly the more ambitious junior officers and accomplished non-
commissioned officers and men in the battalion, for several months’ training 
whilst the home stationed battalion was also depleted by sending drafts 
overseas to its sister battalion. Thus, whilst these pressures could be 
rationalised if the Mounted Infantry was to be in support of its own infantry 
battalion or even its own brigade, the prospect of losing these men for 
configuration as Mounted Infantry at mobilisation when they would be 
attached as fire support  to the cavalry brigades or, latterly, as non-cavalry 
divisional mounted troops protecting a division that might not include its own 
parent battalion, palled the enthusiasm of infantry lieutenant colonels for 
releasing men for Mounted Infantry training.243  Therefore it is difficult to 
identify what institutional or social preferment could be gained by the parent 
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battalions other than the reflection of any plaudits earned by its Mounted 
Infantry on active service, as predicted previously by Hutton.244  
In re-evaluating the principal research question defined at the beginning of 
the chapter, any prospect for the Mounted Infantry of a separate identity as a 
new branch of the army was inauspicious to say the least. Abstraction, 
decentralised command structure, wrangling over doctrinal role and, until 
after the Boer War, reconfiguration only for active service, mitigated against 
a new identity predicated on the emergence of tradition and spectacle. 
However, an identity of sorts emerged from the Mounted Infantry’s 
functionality. Nevertheless, a more traditional identity built on organisational 
allegiance also remained, tied to the parent regiment as exemplified by the 
adorning of the Guards Mounted Infantry slouch hats in 1902 with the ribbon 
of the Brigade of Guards..245  During the Boer War, the sharing of military 
experiences created, albeit temporarily, an identity focussed on the Mounted 
Infantry ‘ikona’ for the duration of hostilities. Although after 1888 the Mounted 
Infantry Schools’ training cadres provided some semblance of permanency, 
their limited scope of drill and basic equitation plus the short duration of the 
courses could not be expected to deliver an organisational culture with an 
overarching identity. Later in 1902, mirroring an initial grouping of companies 
in either geographical or infantry type arrangements,246  the proposed 
grouping of Mounted Infantry from similar regiments to form battalions with 
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named identities such as the Fusilier Mounted Infantry (previously 20th 
Mounted Infantry) or the Rifle Brigade Mounted Infantry (previously 13th 
Mounted Infantry) was more about organisational simplification rather than 
fostering of identity and esprit de corps.247 Counterfactually, the 
establishment of a permanent Mounted Infantry regiment as occasionally 
proposed,248 even if it avoided degradation of its infantry skill, may have 
produced an identity on a more predictable pattern although on a scale 
limited by its permanency as discussed in a previous chapter. Nonetheless, it 
may be contended that an organisational culture did develop in keeping with 
Kirke’s model. A formal command structure meant that, until the exigencies 
of the Boer War, Mounted Infantry command at the detachment and 
company level rested on infantry officers trained as Mounted Infantry and 
who were familiar to their men from the outset – even before selection for 
Mounted Infantry training. Functional roles meant the development of official 
regulations and drill manuals249  as well as a plethora of unofficial texts 
distilling practical experiences for their readers,250 all contributing to a 
functional identity. Despite a number of minor uniform and equipment 
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adaptations to facilitate the Mounted Infantry’s military role, none were 
sufficiently specific to the Mounted Infantry and did not contribute to the 
forging of a branch-wide identity. Therefore, in answering the principal 
research question, the Mounted Infantry’s organisational impermanence did 
impair the evolution of an identifiable military identity but only at the level of a 
formalised homogenous institution and yet, because of maintained identity 
and loyalty at the more basic structural level, there appears to have been no 
failure of esprit de corps251  and thus no proposed adverse effect on the 
Mounted Infantry’s institutional survival. Furthermore, an understanding of 
both the level at which loyalty, identity and esprit de corps existed, with its 
clear link to parent regiment affiliation, exonerates the Mounted Infantry 
officers from the insinuations of sabotaging the Mounted Infantry’s existence 
and survival by their ongoing allegiance to their pre-existing regimental 
family. It is fundamentally incorrect to seek evidence of a homogenous 
Mounted Infantry organisational culture and identity on traditional lines. For 
reasons explored previously, the Mounted Infantry was not conceived as, or 
indeed organised as, a separate branch of the army but a functional structure 
of trained infantrymen with enhanced mobility. Naturally, confusion occurred 
as the spectrum of roles ascribed to the Mounted Infantry continued to 
expand, which, in part, fuelled institutional hostility from the cavalry. With this 
understanding, it is clear that there was no need to develop an identity 
beyond the detachment, company, or less frequently, battalion level as a 
higher identity remained with the infantry arm and the regimental system. 
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Thus, in this context, loyalty to the regimental system did not equate to 
disloyalty to the Mounted Infantry concept.  
If the Mounted Infantry’s organisational culture, and by extension its identity, 
was dependent on several factors, particularly its functional role, then the 
transformation of the Mounted Infantry from ad hoc improvised infantry force 
with brevity of training to a formal organisation predicated on prescribed 
training requirements mirrored the increasingly complex role expected of the 
Mounted Infantry and the confusion and misunderstanding that surrounded it. 
Pre-1880, the only requirements for extemporised Mounted Infantry was the 
ability to retain their seats when mounted and riding across rough terrain,252 
a training considered by senior officers to be amenable to improvisation on 
the march.253 As throughout the Mounted Infantry’s existence the premise of 
having already attained full competence in infantry tactics and musketry was 
a pre-requisite for abstraction, Mounted Infantry training was not primarily 
concerned with improving marksmanship, which was recognised as an army-
wide issue,254 nor in tactics but two-fold, that of improving equitation, when 
experience with horses was decreasing among army recruits,255 and the 
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broader aspects of Mounted Infantry work alongside other military elements. 
Nevertheless, the Mounted Infantry was affected by developments in 
musketry and infantry tactics particularly ‘fire and movement’, using cover, 
reliance on personal initiative256 and individual shooting rather than volley-
firing.257 This is considered in more detail in a later chapter. Therefore, at 
least initially, the emphasis was placed on attaining a basic competence in 
riding and horse care although the other main thrust of training, in keeping 
with the army at the time, was still the inculcation of drill. Eventually Mounted 
Infantry training would encompass more than equitation and would include 
battalion-sized training and tactical exercises.258 Drill manuals and 
regulations were published as early as 1884. In the end there would be a 
plethora of texts for Mounted Infantry, Mounted Rifles, Imperial Yeomanry 
and colonial units, each drawing similar conclusions around drill but none 
advocating precise doctrine.259  The possession of separate drill from those 
of foot infantry and cavalry was both important in practice and contributed to 
a Mounted Infantry identity although as previously discussed, this was far 
from being an organisational identity. Unfortunately such drill had a negative 
side with, as previously noted, cavalry officers of the Camel Corps disdaining 
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participation in Mounted Infantry drill260  until replaced by the improvised 
camel drill, devised by the Corps’ commander, Herbert Stewart. The new 
camel drill was practical but contributed nothing to identity or shared 
‘belonging’ throughout the Camel Corps261  and equally failed to address 
deficiencies in dismounted infantry drill and tactics. As Wolseley’s express 
approach was to drill the Corps exactly as if it was Mounted Infantry,262  the 
abdication of imposing a modified Mounted Infantry drill represents both a 
failure of the Camel Corps as a competent ‘fit for purpose’ force and a failure 
of command. Indeed, the Camel Corps was poorly served in terms of training 
with little experience in camel riding or camel husbandry.263  For the Heavy 
Camel Regiment in particular, there was inadequate training and time 
available to become de facto Mounted Infantry264  with the unfamiliarity of 
Martini-Henry rifle and bayonet magnified by the inadequacy of only 60 
practice rounds per cavalryman during the cavalry’s outward journey.265 The 
value of prior training over extemporisation was sacrificed for the concepts of 
‘éliteness’, ‘smartness’ and military reputation. Similarly this lesson of 1881 
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and 1885 was not heeded by Roberts during his precipitate expansion of the 
Mounted Infantry in January 1900 266 with dire consequences for the 
Mounted Infantry’s competency in horsemastership and contributing to 
exorbitant equine losses, a deficiency that only improved slowly.267  Indeed, 
John Vaughan, a post -War Commandant of the Cavalry School, estimated 
that Mounted Infantry should receive two months’ training prior to active 
service268 rather than, as before in South Africa, only three days.269  Although 
the emerging exigencies of the campaign’s need for mobility perhaps 
mitigated Roberts’ decision, the evident result conclusively disproved the 
effectiveness of ad hoc improvisation once and for all. Nonetheless, the 
Mounted Infantry demonstrated a capacity for successful adaptation that 
arguably paved the way for the rest of the army in South Africa. It 
transformed itself in terms of equestrian skills and tactics, despite a forced 
reliance on experiential training and insufficient equipment,270 successfully 
matching its tactics to the changing nature of warfare in South Africa from 
conventional conflict to insurgency. Rather than fighting pitched battles, the 
Mounted Infantry, although far from unique in this process among the British 
Army, developed tactics for approaching potentially hostile farms and kopjes. 
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Early in the war, extensive flanking rides had been adopted to avoid Boer 
marksmen yet as the conflict wore on tactics evolved which incorporated 
flanking, envelopment and modified direct frontal attacks. Evolving tactics of 
the so-called ‘galloping charge’ included elements of a frontal attack where 
the speed and coordination of the men involved in the galloping charge, with 
the attacking line extended and outflanking the defenders’ position, followed 
by rapid dismounting and completion of the assault on foot, diminished 
casualties in the attackers through their concerted approach which stretched 
the defenders and attenuated their firepower.  But such tactics demanded 
improved equitation from the mounted troops, particularly the Mounted 
Infantry, whose skills, at least initially, had been inadequate for such 
tactics.271  As Notes on Mounted Infantry explained: 
          In the South African War, a new form of tactics sprang into life; tactics  
          which, prior to that war, would certainly have been pronounced 
          suicidal. Had a man before the South African War asserted that a 
          mounted force of sixty rifles would deliberately charge a hill held by, 
          say twenty dismounted men all well versed in the use of the rifle, and  
          further, could charge it successfully, I fancy he would have found some 
          difficulty in getting anyone to agree with him’.272 
Such lessons learned out on the veldt were identified through official reports 
commissioned by the Commander-in-Chief and eventually disseminated 
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through formal orders,273 the revision or provision of new tactical manuals,274 
military lectures275 and personal publications.276 Successful adoption, 
however, spawned unforeseen implications, particularly extending the 
Mounted Infantry’s role into assuming responsibility for reconnaissance from 
the cavalry.277  This acceptance of novel roles for which the Mounted Infantry 
had never trained should not be considered a failure of foresight of its formal 
training programme nor of the Mounted Infantry Schools themselves but 
merely that of expediency in wartime. On the contrary, the opening of the 
Mounted Infantry School of Instruction at Aldershot in 1888 had been one of 
the positive outcomes of the 1881 Transvaal campaign as a response to the 
failure of the campaign’s improvised Mounted Infantry.278 Infantry Riding 
Depots, both at home and abroad, had been proposed by the Intelligence 
Division where selected men would be taught mobility whilst maintaining their 
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infantry skills.279  This initial step towards matching formalised training with 
‘fit for purpose’ functionality was the establishment of a Training Squad at 
Aldershot, a forerunner of the School for Instruction, that accommodated four 
officers and up to 100 men for three months with three sequential courses a 
year. Improbably and reflecting bureaucratic expediency rather than 
thoughtful design, the Commandant, ranked as Deputy Assistant Adjutant 
General on the Headquarters staff, also commanded Aldershot’s School of 
Cookery,280 whilst the Mounted Infantry School’s adjutant had to be borrowed 
initially under protest from an infantry battalion.281 
However the opening of Mounted Infantry Schools did not in itself solve the 
problem of producing adequate numbers of trained Mounted Infantry as there 
was no consensus as to the quantum of trained Mounted Infantry required by 
the British Army, which, in part, reflected that the Mounted Infantry had a 
history of extemporisation when needed rather than being planned with 
future conflicts in mind.282  It was only in the years after 1902, when a formal 
organisational role was identified for the Mounted Infantry by the War Office 
by matching Mounted Infantry companies, initially to cavalry brigades,283  
then to Infantry divisions as divisional mounted troops, that a numerical 
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requirement for Mounted Infantry was established.284  Whilst the principle of 
short training courses, supported through abstraction, ensured a flow of 
officers and men, it was uncertain whether each course should be filled by 
novices or previously trained men seeking ‘refresher’ courses to maintain 
their skills.285  Opinions differed. The Times’ special correspondent, clearly 
favouring the principle of training new men, alleged that many of the courses 
were filled with men who had previously undergone Mounted Infantry training 
whilst, conversely, Haig criticised the Mounted Infantry failing to maintain its 
equitation skills with a lapse of two years since many Mounted Infantrymen 
had practised riding skills, suggesting that refresher training was 
uncommon.286   
If the output of the Mounted Infantry schools in England and Ireland from 
1888 until 1899 was numerically inadequate for the eventual needs of the 
campaign in South Africa, the magnitude and predominant requirement for 
mounted troops had not been predicted, despite the Boers’ reputation as 
consummate Mounted Riflemen, as their tactics in 1881 had been more 
those of investment and tactical defence rather than mobile warfare. 
Although the pre-war trained Mounted Infantry embarked in 1899, comprising 
two battalions, were considered to be competent militarily,287 subsequent 
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Mounted Infantry did not have the benefit of such peacetime training, a 
crucial discrepancy that Godley highlighted to the critical cavalry readership 
of the inaugural edition of the Cavalry Journal.288 Godley believed that parent 
infantry regiments also benefitted from Mounted Infantry training through 
osmosis of advanced skills such as scouting and personal initiative, 
inculcated in Mounted Infantry training, from their Mounted Infantry 
detachments upon return from training.289 Indeed the Mounted Infantry’s 
scouting abilities towards the end of the Boer War, albeit more experiential 
than from training, was considered the equivalent of the cavalry by at least 
one infantry officer,290 although their detractors in the Press and army might 
have considered that this was not ‘setting the bar’ particularly high.291 
Nevertheless, resulting from the increasing utilitarianism of the improved 
Mounted Infantry during the Boer War,292 post-war plans optimistically 
suggested an expansion in Mounted Infantry training by another 3,000 men, 
which quickly foundered due to the projected cost of £75,000. Despite 
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Roberts’ influence in encouraging expansion of Mounted Infantry, even 
expansion by a minimum of 1,000 soldiers was deemed unaffordable by the 
Treasury.293  As more schools opened, both at home and abroad, all 
purporting to train drill to the same standards, variability was suspected, at 
least by Roberts,294 who considered in the immediate post war years that 
Aldershot’s Commandant, Alexander Godley, who had accrued a 
considerable reputation as a trainer of Mounted Infantry,295 should also 
supervise the Mounted Infantry Schools at Shorncliffe and Colchester where 
training standards had been criticised,296  with the Aldershot school, that had 
relocated to nearby Longmoor in 1903, providing  the exemplar for Mounted 
Infantry training among the schools. Longmoor provided enough space for 
mounted training,297 for hunting (recognised as an integral part of officer 
training) and polo.298  In its heyday, two battalions of Mounted Infantry could 
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be accommodated for training at Longmoor, undertaking courses of three 
months’ duration in equitation, horsemanship, scouting, musketry, and 
outpost duty – with the assumption made by senior army commanders that 
the officers and men were already fully trained as infantry.299  Personal 
equitation was completed in the initial fortnight then successively section, 
company and battalion duties and roles, both mounted and dismounted, 
culminated in tactical exercises in weeks nine to twelve and a final week of 
field firing and scouting competitions.300  Therefore the course provided 
instruction in the requisite skills both for traditional Mounted Infantry 
responsibilities and for the extended (cavalry) roles for which the Mounted 
Infantry had been designated after the Boer War with Mounted Infantry 
Training 1906 stressing the importance of practising tactics of manoeuvre 
especially on the enemy’s flanks, seizure of tactically important ground and 
to function as rallying points for retirement.301 Even so, the Chief of the 
General Staff, even as late as 1905, perhaps harking back to simpler (and 
cheaper days) of training, questioned whether Mounted Infantry training was 
now too extensive in comparison to the pre-Boer War years, citing examples 
of apparently successful minimalist Mounted Infantry training abroad, 
particularly in Burma302  although his was a minority view even among senior 
commanders. Additionally, the Mounted Infantry Schools were tasked with 
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another role on mobilisation that of forming the nuclei of Mounted Infantry 
headquarters staff303  in an attempt to diminish concern, recognised in the 
Press, that the novel (and eventually unfulfilled) large scale deployment of 
Mounted Infantry would confound senior commanders unfamiliar with the 
arm.304 In fairness, the principles and utilisation of Mounted Infantry on active 
service was not covered in the curriculum at the Staff College which 
remained more focused on theoretical aspects of war largely illustrated by 
lessons from the Franco-German and American Civil Wars305 although 
analyses of the war in South Africa and the Russo-Japanese War were not 
disregarded.306  Valuable training did not only occur at the Mounted Infantry 
Schools - a notable change in the years after 1902 was the introduction of 
more frequent peacetime tactical simulation through army manoeuvres.307  
Not only did manoeuvres attempt to embed tactics based on doctrine but 
encouraged rudimentary combined cooperative training with other arms, 
notably cavalry and horse artillery. This was in keeping with the tenets laid 
down in Combined Training 1902, now becoming necessary as the Mounted 
Infantry’s role in army doctrine as both protective divisional mounted troops 
for the infantry and in independent mixed mounted brigades with cavalry 
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were formalised.308 Concurrently, the years after the Boer War also 
witnessed an expansion in oversight of the army309 by Inspectors from the 
General Staff reporting to the Army Council, including written appreciations 
of the Mounted Infantry on manoeuvres310  that were disseminated back to 
the units themselves through reports.   
If the benefits of the Mounted Infantry Schools seem clear and Mounted 
Infantry training for officers was popular and considered important in 
practice,311 the utilisation of these officers was more questionable. Broadly 
speaking officer promotion and career advancement in the army was only 
loosely based on aptitude with Evelyn Wood complaining that promotion 
merely relied on the absence of negative comments which encouraged 
acceptance of mediocrity throughout the officer corps.312  At least Mounted 
Infantry officer training specifically cited criteria that included 
recommendation by regimental commander for officer selection through 
demonstrable high standards,313  with the schools remaining an opportunity 
for officers to attain post-Commission training which, as Timothy Bowman 
and Mark Connelly have noted, was a rarity in the Edwardian, and by 
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extension, Victorian, army.314 Most infantry regiments agreed to second 
officers for Mounted Infantry training with 85 per cent of infantry regiments 
having officers undergoing training between 1888 and 1892.315 The average 
number of officers trained per annum at this time period was thirty-six. The 
reasons for a sixth of regiments failing to send officers for training vary. None 
were sent from the Grenadier or Coldstream Guards (although 
representatives were sent from the Scots Guards) for neither Guards 
Regiments had a tradition of overseas garrison duties and were unlikely to 
be subject to active service abstraction with the Guards Camel Regiment and 
the Guards Mounted Infantry being anomalous exceptions. County line 
regiments had no such excuses but failed to respond either through 
overseas colonial postings or through the reluctance of their commanding 
officers to lose their best officers and men on mobilisation.316  Although the 
Foot Guards, other than the Scots Guards, are noticeable for their absence, 
the same cannot be said for other ‘smart’ infantry regiments who did not 
eschew Mounted Infantry training. Analysing Hutton’s nominal role from his 
inaugural tenure as Commandant of Aldershot‘s Mounted Infantry School,317  
and using French’s criteria for ‘smartness’,318 a third of officers abstracted for 
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Mounted Infantry training came from the top twenty most prestigious line 
infantry regiments. However this does not imply that prestigious regiments 
sought Mounted Infantry training preferentially compared to less ‘smart’ 
infantry regiments. The majority of participating line regiments only 
abstracted between one and four officers. Again this undermines Badsey’s 
suggestion of institutional preferment for regiments forming Mounted Infantry 
companies at this time.319 The explanation for this preponderance of officers 
from ‘smart’ infantry regiments arises from over-representation by the Rifle 
Brigade and KRRC with twenty officers seconded for training, reflecting both 
Hutton’s crusading zeal in attracting officers for Mounted Infantry from his old 
regiment, KRRC, and its counterpart and the continuing belief in the army 
that previous light infantry training conferred attributes similar to those 
needed for Mounted Infantry work.320 However, the utilisation of officers 
trained in the pre-Boer War years, at least those from Hutton’s period as 
Commandant, was to be poor. Only six per cent of officers trained as 
Mounted Infantry officers from 1888 to 1892 assumed command of Mounted 
Infantry in 1899 – 1900.321  Further analysis shows that in fact a third of 
Mounted Infantry trained officers (36 per cent) had already left the army by 
1900, thus discounting this possibility as a single explanation for this poor 
conversion of officers from training to command. From the remaining two-
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thirds of the officers still serving in the army, only 9.4 per cent were 
appointed to be in command of Mounted Infantry indicating a poor return on 
four years of specialist training. To this poor return should be added the 
relatively small number of the Mounted Infantry commanders with active 
service experience with the Mounted Infantry. The future General De Lisle 
complained that only he, among Mounted Infantry commanding officers in 
South Africa in 1900, had prior active service Mounted Infantry experience 
with the Mounted Infantry.322  As less than eight per cent of officers were 
employed with colonial forces or with domestic militia, with a smaller number 
on special service in theatre or undertaking duties such as musketry 
instructors, most officers with pre-war Mounted Infantry training, despite 
being a sizeable pool, were still employed on regimental duties, despite the 
critical need for additional mounted troops as recognised by Roberts.323 If 
there was, at best, delay, and, at worst, a woeful failure to use officers with 
pre-war Mounted Infantry training in the initial six months of the war, then 
how can Badsey’s retrospective observation of the preponderance of senior 
army officers in 1914 with Mounted Infantry experience be explained for, as 
Godley proudly noted in his autobiography, the majority of officers who rose 
to high command in 1914 –18 had served in the Mounted Infantry.324  
Therefore the career progression for officers in command of Mounted 
Infantry units in the Boer War has been analysed prospectively using serial 
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Army Lists up to August 1914 with attainment of lieutenant colonel or higher 
rank as end point for the analysis. Using combined regimental and seniority-
matched peers as controls to minimise bias from inter-regimental variation in 
promotion prospects and to circumvent any possibility of regimental 
preferment through patronage, a comparative quantitative assessment has 
been undertaken between those with Mounted Infantry command experience 
and matched colleagues who did not. Analysis reveals that 56 per cent of 
officers commanding Mounted Infantry during the Boer war at a rank of 
captain or major achieved lieutenant colonel rank or higher by 1914 whilst 
only 20.5 per cent of non-Mounted Infantry controls achieved regimental or 
higher command. Interestingly, the time taken, on average, to achieve 
promotion from captain to major was identical between the two populations 
(eight years), whilst the speed of attainment of lieutenant colonel rank 
surprisingly favoured those without Mounted Infantry command (sixteen 
years) rather than ex-Mounted Infantry officers (twenty-six years), an 
anomaly probably explained by the comparatively small numbers of 
individuals included in the analysis.325  Nevertheless, despite the 
confounding variable of sample size, Mounted Infantry officers did not 
achieve promotion faster than their matched peers.326  However, non-
Mounted Infantry officers were three times more likely to leave the army in 
the years 1902-14 than their ex-Mounted Infantry colleagues. Assuming that 
all officers in line regiments had an equal opportunity to achieve lieutenant 
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colonel rank during their careers and that the number of battalions remained 
the same, the chances of captains and majors in the late Victorian army 
attaining this rank was approximately 14 per cent for captains and 25 per 
cent for majors, suggesting that the 20.5 per cent for non-Mounted Infantry 
officers (captains and majors combined) was about average.327 The 
apparently improved promotion chances of the Mounted Infantry officers 
suggests that service in the Mounted Infantry was indeed advantageous for 
higher promotion with more officers with such experience remaining in the 
army although bias from additional variables resulting in increased departure 
from service by those without Mounted Infantry experience cannot be 
discounted. Clearly this analysis must be interpreted cautiously, not least 
because of the relatively low numbers of officers prevents statistical 
exactitude, but also because the process cannot distinguish innate 
differences between the two groups i.e. were the Mounted Infantry officers 
inherently more successful or ambitious than their matched control 
colleagues leading to selection for Mounted Infantry duty in the first place, 
perhaps in keeping with the claim of only accepting the ‘pick’ of the ‘best’ 
officers? Similarly, this analysis does not explain why officers without 
Mounted Infantry experience were more likely to leave the army than their 
matched peers. Nevertheless, in answering one of this chapter’s research 
questions, Mounted Infantry command experience seemed a positive 
prognostic factor in achieving regimental or higher command. 
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The chapter’s other subsidiary question regarding Mounted Infantry training 
was whether Mounted Infantry training matched the roles demanded of it and 
broadly, whether the training of the Mounted Infantry produced a force ‘fit for 
purpose’ Although as discussed previously, whilst the Mounted Infantry 
doctrinally and organisationally espoused infantry origins and the Mounted 
Infantry School propagated infantry-based tactics and drill, there remained 
tension within the army resulting from the institutional friction between 
cavalry and the Mounted infantry. This hostility was never greater than at the 
inception of formal Mounted Infantry training at Aldershot. Chosen for its 
extensive stabling due to the number of cavalry regiments based at 
Aldershot,328  the Mounted Infantry was obstructed on numerous occasions 
including the reluctance by General Drury Lowe, the Inspector General of 
Cavalry, to permit the use of cavalry horses from regiments on furlough or 
the use of Aldershot’s indoor riding schools for equitation training, requests 
that Hutton considered partly to blame for the propagation of institutional 
friction between Mounted Infantry and cavalry.329  Cavalry commanding 
officers appeared to distrust the motives cited for the proposed sharing of 
their horses with the nascent Mounted Infantry330  and although temporarily 
solved by Hutton’s suggestion that horses of cavalry regiments due for 
embarkation to India should be used for Mounted Infantry training with 58 
horses borrowed from the Royal Dragoons, 60 from the 5th Lancers and 118 
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from the 18th Hussars ,331 the obstruction was only solved in 1891332  by the 
purchase of 120 cobs for Mounted Infantry training making it finally 
independent of the cavalry’s horses for training.333  With a touch of hyperbole 
while containing an element of grim truth, these cobs have been described 
as the ‘120 unfortunate steeds who trained the entire mounted infantry of the 
British (home) army’.334 But this arrangement also ensured a more suitable 
animal for training than the larger cavalry horses, which as the Mounted 
Infantry intended sourcing their mounts locally on campaign, were less 
suitable for training. The problem of inadequate provision of indoor riding 
schools for winter training persisted even when the Mounted Infantry School 
relocated to Longmoor, and featured as constructive criticism in the 1909 
Inspection of the Mounted Infantry School at Longmoor.335  Other 
organisational criticisms made by the Inspector General of Forces were the 
lack of isolation lines for sick horses and no wagon shed, yet the report 
otherwise contained glowing recommendations of the enthusiasm of the 
staff, good standards of equitation, excellent demonstration of mounted drill 
and effective execution of tactics, particularly concealing the held horses of 
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advance guards, effective scouting and repelling attacks by cavalry during 
simulated combat.336   
Further aspects of this institutional friction between mounted branches 
affected Mounted Infantry training as the participation of cavalry personnel 
for teaching equitation was withheld by the Inspector General of Cavalry on 
the spurious grounds of being too busy.337 Nevertheless, the absence of 
cavalry rough riders opportunely meant that infantry officers were required to 
train their men, which was of benefit in minimising any dilution of the 
Mounted Infantry ethos through the influence of cavalry teachings, although 
standards were jeopardised potentially by the variability of infantry officers’ 
riding proficiencies.338  Although officers from ‘smart’ infantry regiments might 
possess excellent standards of equitation, a skill honed by their leisure 
pursuits, those from less prestigious regiments might neither ride efficiently 
enough to train their men339  nor command a private income adequate to 
own horses for leisure purposes. Alternative support for equitation training 
was considered from the artillery whose rough riders taught riding skills and 
importantly, though left unsaid, were not cavalrymen and would contribute to 
the Mounted Infantry’s ethos of not relying on the cavalry. Hutton wrote, 
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there was no need to rely on cavalry regiments to train Mounted Infantry as 
the Mounted Infantry may then start to imitate the actions of the cavalry.340 
However this is not to say that institutional friction prevented all forms of 
collaboration between cavalry and Mounted Infantry in training, particularly 
during the Boer War where some cavalry regiments generously placed their 
horses at the disposal of infantry regiments that had been ordered to find 
Mounted Infantry companies for service in South Africa.341  Moreover, the 
chief lesson of the Cavalry Manoeuvres of 1890, a relatively minor affair that 
included just three companies of Mounted Infantry, was, at least in the 
opinion of Hutton, how Mounted Infantry with comparatively short training 
was able to support cavalry, both in terms of its standard of equitation but 
also how its firepower contributed to the impact of the cavalry.342 Hutton 
reprised the modest praise that his three companies of Mounted Infantry 
received from the national Press, concluding grandiosely that the 
Manoeuvres had ‘proven the great value of mobile infantry in regular 
warfare’.343  In fact the inclusion of Mounted Infantry, rather than 
demonstrating favourable inter-arm cooperation, exposed some of the 
tactical differences between how the Mounted Infantry, with its infantry 
origins, and the cavalry thought. Utilising horses borrowed from the 11th 
Hussars, the Mounted Infantry dismounted frequently, hiding their horses in 
farm buildings and successfully ambushed the opposing cavalry comprising 
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the Household Cavalry, 2nd and 5th Dragoons and 8th Hussars. The 
Manoeuvres also demonstrated that the Mounted Infantry did not sustain 
equine casualties any more frequently than some cavalry regiments at 
approximately 11 per cent and decidedly less than some, with the 20th 
Hussars suffering a 38 per cent loss rate, although such regimental 
variations were not considered significant by the Director and his staff, being 
arguably more indicative of their different roles and tasks.344 The following 
year, the failure of a frontal attack mounted by Mounted Infantry during the 
1891 Autumn Manoeuvres in Hampshire,345  and the Director’s conclusion 
that flanking attacks would have been preferable, pre-dated the experiences 
of the early Boer War where this tactical lesson had to be re-learned by the 
army following Roberts’ arrival346 and following costly failures that involved 
frontal attacks against the Boers in 1899 and early 1900.347  During the same 
1890 Manoeuvres, the Mounted Infantry was left scouting across open 
ground despite the presence of cavalry which demonstrated the ongoing lack 
of inter-arm cooperation and the willingness of the Mounted Infantry under 
Hutton to undertake tasks for which it was not trained nor best suited. All of 
this tends to undermine Hutton’s previous claims for the Mounted Infantry as 
adjunct rather than replacement to the cavalry.348   
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Following the Boer War, the pace of reform in the army slowed compared to 
early 1900349  yet peacetime military manoeuvres increased, partly due to the 
purchase of 41,000 acres of Salisbury Plain as a result of the Manoeuvres 
Act 1898.350  Whilst piecemeal deployment of Mounted Infantry on 
manoeuvres was usual, four battalions of Mounted Infantry, comprising about 
1,600 Mounted Infantry, were brought together for large scale manoeuvres at 
Aldershot shortly after the Boer War under Godley, mounted surprisingly on 
borrowed cavalry horses through French’s encouragement (thus 
undermining the usual perception of French as staunchly antagonistic to the 
Mounted Infantry). 351  This permitted a rare opportunity to practice 
manoeuvring large bodies of Mounted Infantry. Conversely, the army 
manoeuvres of 1904 simulated a combined military and naval invasion on 
the Essex coast line but also provided an example of the army’s evolving 
trend towards inter-arm cooperation between a number of different mounted 
troops including 8th Hussars, two companies of Mounted Infantry and a small 
detachment of military cyclists whose ability to move significant distances 
penetrating opposing defence lines impressed senior army officers.352  Not 
all the conclusions drawn from such manoeuvres were recognised as 
important lessons that would be transferable immediately to military planning 
as demonstrated in the 1908 Aldershot Manoeuvres.  This specifically pitted 
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a Mounted Infantry-containing mixed Mounted Brigade against a standard 
Cavalry Brigade with inconclusive results with both sides showing poor 
standards of reconnaissance and a failure to ‘economise’ horseflesh by using 
mounted troops for exhausting amounts of outpost duty when cyclists could 
have done accomplished set tasks faster and quieter.353 The evidence for 
choice between these two types of brigades was thus absent and could not 
inform future planning. Nonetheless, experience of command during such 
prototypic all-arms cooperation was considered valuable by senior army 
officers.354 Therefore, the lessons informing the Mounted Infantry’s 
organisation, doctrine, future deployment and training requirements, gleaned 
from peacetime manoeuvres must be concluded to have been strictly limited. 
However lessons could be identified in more than just peacetime 
manoeuvres. A large number of tactical lessons for the regular Mounted 
Infantry were gleaned from its active service, particularly its experiences on 
the veldt that had indeed been beneficial in terms of training and future 
doctrine. The need to use cover, concealment, subterfuge, initiative and 
personal judgement was summed up neatly if a little facetiously by mimicking 
the phrasing of official drill manuals, as: ‘If you see a Boer galloping, it is not. 
You never see a Boer and he rarely gallops. If you see no one, it is probably 
a Boer’.355  Clearly such aphorisms were not specific to Mounted Infantry but 
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affected the army as a whole.356  Hamilton, a long-standing supporter of the 
Mounted Infantry, considered that important lessons identified for the army 
were, among others, the futility of frontal attacks, the criticality of scouting 
and flank guards and the pre-eminence of the rifle.357  Such lessons 
translated into Mounted Infantry tactics with ‘good’ scouting being one of the 
positive attributes noted during the Mounted Infantry Inspection in June 
1905358  although a similar inspection the following year struck a note of 
warning that the Mounted Infantry scouts failed to dismount enough and that 
the held horses were left exposed to enemy fire,359 a criticism not reserved 
exclusively for Mounted Infantry as the cavalry also received similar criticism 
several years later for the same tactical deficiency.360  
If as a marker of its training programme the Mounted Infantry’s equitation is 
considered, to what level of equitation should the Mounted Infantry have 
aspired? Minimal requirements laid down in the 1884 Regulations stipulated 
a mere three days’ equitation with modest expansion to a minimum of two 
weeks of personal equitation instruction in the 1906 Mounted Infantry 
Training.361 Later, opinions differed with some authors such as Cornish 
suggesting that riding skills, which he did not explicitly link with the role 
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expected of the Mounted Infantry, should equate to that of a cavalry recruit362 
and whilst clearly aspirational, Cornish’s suggestion was also impractical in 
the time available for training.  However the impact of inadequate equitation 
was far-reaching. The semi-official veterinary history of the Boer War 
acknowledged that whilst the Aldershot-trained Mounted Infantry with pre-
war training was competent in equitation, this skill was unsurprisingly 
deficient in the extemporised Mounted Infantry363 contributing to the equine 
losses that marked the campaign364 and prolonging the war, in the opinion of 
the veterinary history’s author, by two years.365 If, in the words of the future 
Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, that ‘no more unfortunate horse ever 
lived than the horse of the Mounted Infantry during the early period of the 
march from the Modder to Pretoria’366, the Mounted Infantry’s equestrianism 
subsequently improved dramatically. In his Practical Hints, Anley illustrated 
the primacy of horsemastership by devoting no less than four pages to horse 
care, stating that ‘every moment devoted to the care and saving of his horse 
is time well spent’.367 Clearly  the growing need for the highest standard of 
riding skills was understood as the riding of the Mounted Infantry at the 
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Inspection in 1909 was deemed excellent by the Inspector General of 
Forces, no less a person than the cavalryman, Sir John French.368 
Therefore, standards of equitation and both mounted and dismounted duties 
can be seen as a continuum that commenced on the veldt and progressed 
throughout peacetime simulation in the subsequent years. Du Moulin of the 
Royal Sussex Regiment recalled his regiment’s steep ‘learning curve’ 
following the formation of new Mounted Infantry companies in November 
1900 and again in mid-1901 to form the 21st Mounted Infantry.369  By August 
1901, more than 1,000 men of the Royal Sussex Regiment were undertaking 
mounted duties in South Africa and although initially considered only fit for 
convoy escort duties, by late 1901 Du Moulin considered them now expert 
Mounted Infantry.370  The need to improve the  Mounted Infantry’s equitation 
competence prompted Hamilton to recommend that new Mounted Infantry 
should be ‘trickled’ into veteran Mounted Infantry battalions to gain 
experience quickly, citing as evidence how the 28th Mounted Infantry from 
Malta, fell prey easily to an ambush by the Boers, purely through tactical 
inexperience.371  
Other failures that would influence subsequent training, apart from those 
associated with inexperienced equitation, arose from the Mounted Infantry’s 
initial lack of adaptation to the type of warfare it encountered. Arguably, the 
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lack of written doctrine, a dependency on drill manuals and the absence of a 
General Staff to provide direction in doctrine and dissemination of lessons 
learned from conflicts across the Empire was the context in which this failure 
of adaptation occurred. Nevertheless, the Mounted Infantry commanders 
must surely bear some responsibility as after all, the active service nature of 
the arm should have ensured that tactical flexibility and adaptation to 
prevailing warfare remained a priority even though there was no attempt to 
provide this in training at the Mounted Infantry Schools. The impact of this on 
military effectiveness will be considered in a subsequent chapter. In the 
Sudan, the Camel Corps needed concentrated firepower against the shock 
tactics of the Arab tribesmen yet, as will be contended in a later chapter, 
although volley-firing had much to commend it in such circumstances, the 
use of the infantry square, beneficial though it was for protection and 
security, did not permit optimal delivery of firepower through its geometric 
configuration. In South Africa, the problems of adequate reconnaissance, the 
climatic factors that permitted long distance marksmanship, the Boers’ 
propensity for concealment and ambush and the army’s predominant drill 
requiring close order advances and volley firing, at least initially, contributed 
to the army’s early failures. However, tactical adaptation, such as the 
pressing requirement to secure high ground overlooking the line of march of 
a convoy, did occur eventually through practical experience as already 
indicated.372  Lessons such as avoidance of being silhouetted against the 
skyline were learnt from the Boers who, in turn, demonstrated their own 
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forms of tactical adaptation, charging into dead ground before rapid 
dismounting then either sniping or advancing on foot as at the battle of 
Bakenlaagte or the development of mounted charges firing from the saddle 
that became more common from mid-1901. The Boers’ habit of rapid 
dismounting and immediate ‘snapshooting’ without any re-alignment of their 
rifle sights conferred such an advantage that Hamilton proposed training 
Mounted Infantry in similar tactics.373 Unfortunately, mounted charges by 
colonial Mounted Rifles and indeed regular Mounted Infantry with fixed 
bayonets as makeshift lances must surely be an example of tactical 
maladaptation in a war unfavourable to arme blanche tactics and whilst 
perhaps understandable in the heat of battle,374  this aberration in tactics was 
disappointingly for Hamilton and Hutton not an isolated phenomenon.  
Returning in conclusion to this chapter’s research questions regarding 
identity and training, the Mounted Infantry evolved a functional, rather than 
organisational, identity despite its changing military role. The formalisation of 
training was an advance on ad hoc extemporisation yet despite amendments 
to the duration of the course and the contents of its programme, the course 
remained focussed largely on equitation and, in the absence of agreed 
formal doctrine, failed to equip the Mounted Infantry with the ability for rapid 
adaptation to the exigencies of warfare encountered overseas. As the 
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eventual role of the Mounted Infantry became clearer, there were attempts to 
instruct a force ‘fit for purpose’ with, for instance, enhanced equitation 
training to support the Mounted Infantry’s extended mounted roles inherent 
to divisional mounted troops. Arguably, the lack of permanence of the 
Mounted Infantry exacerbated this deficiency and contributed to this lack of 
being ‘fit for purpose’. The Mounted Infantry was unique in the Victorian 
army, not least through its state of impermanence and its method of 
abstraction in time of war, but also the comparatively small unit size at which 
loyalty and esprit de corps, functions of its organisational culture, 
preferentially existed. There is little evidence of a homogenous loyalty to the 
Mounted Infantry per se. Such loyalty and allegiance at this level remained 
with the parent infantry regiment although this tendency diminished in South 
Africa where the length of the campaign for the Mounted Infantry battalions  
encouraged an informal evolution of identity transiently focussed more on the 
Mounted infantry battalion rather than parent regiment. But it is 
fundamentally erroneous to seek an identity for the Mounted Infantry as a 
homogenous branch of the army as this was never envisaged, even by the 
Mounted Infantry’s most ardent protagonists. Acceptance of this negates 
allegations of disloyalty by Mounted infantry officers in favouring the 
regimental system. Moreover, rather than demonstrating disloyalty, junior 
officers were often enthusiastic about temporary service in the Mounted 
Infantry, a service that appeared beneficial to their promotion prospects and 
one upon which many senior officers in 1914 could draw during the initial 
weeks of manoeuvre before the spectre of trench warfare descended on the 
banks of the Aisne.
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Chapter Four 
Military Effectiveness 
 
Whether truly prescient or merely optimistic, contemporary authors were 
quick to promote the regular Mounted Infantry model on the basis of its 
participation in colonial campaigning, suggesting that ‘an army possessing a 
large number of mounted men capable of being used as infantry has an 
incalculable advantage over one that has them not’.1  Furthermore, Mounted 
Infantry, not only as a conceptual force but in the reality of active service, 
had ‘won laurels in all our recent campaigns’.2  The contribution of Mounted 
Infantry to a successful conclusion of warfare was indicated as being 
fundamental and even capable of ‘altering the accepted rules of warfare’.3 
These published accolades and predictions seem to indicate that the 
Mounted Infantry was an important factor in the prosecution of war in the late 
Victorian era. Therefore this chapter will explore the veracity of such claims 
in order to answer the chapter’s principal research question of whether the 
Mounted Infantry was a militarily effective force. However, before military 
effectiveness and the metrics by which it may be assessed are defined, the 
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preparatory question of why there should be any question regarding the 
Mounted Infantry’s military effectiveness will be considered briefly.  
Three main issues potentially jeopardised the Mounted Infantry’s ability on 
the battlefield, namely: its organisation, its doctrine and its logistical 
requirements. The first two categories have been dealt with in previous 
chapters but to recap, the impermanent basis of the Mounted Infantry’s 
formation, based on abstraction, both for peacetime training and on active 
service mobilisation, risked unit cohesion and could result in ineffectual 
command, although such potential weaknesses were mitigated by a 
decentralised command structure and a focus of identity and esprit de corps 
at the company level that was the size of formation most frequently deployed 
as a discrete military unit.4  The absence of a clear and consistent doctrinal 
role, or at least one universally understood by senior army and Mounted 
Infantry officers,5  and the tendency for the Mounted Infantry’s role to change 
over the years of its existence,6  remained a risk for the Mounted Infantry’s 
military effectiveness on campaign. Yet, as in South Africa in 1900-02, the 
very nature of the Mounted Infantry’s eventual utilitarianism, celebrated by 
the iconography of the experienced veldt-wise7 ‘ikona’,8  contributed to the 
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Mounted Infantry’s usefulness, at least in the eyes of senior army 
commanders.9   
The third factor that risked the Mounted Infantry’s ability to fight was its 
logistical requirements. These will be considered in more detail later in this 
chapter but as an active service arm, the Mounted Infantry formed only on 
mobilisation for combat overseas usually in hostile territory at the furthest 
reaches of logistical supplies.10 Although this logistical challenge applied to 
other units participating in the same campaign, the fact that the Mounted 
Infantry did not have a permanent peacetime organisation or depot with 
stockpiled equipment,11  meant that they were often required to source 
supplies and equipment locally, including the sourcing of its mounts in 
theatre, although that at least in theory resulted in the use of the most 
suitable animals for the climate and terrain.12  Hence the Mounted Infantry 
not only faced the logistical challenges common to all units of the entire 
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expeditionary force but also idiosyncratic problems specific to its organisation 
and formation.13 
To answer the chapter’s research question, four military campaigns have 
been selected for analysis, which, as indicated in the Introduction, permit a 
comparison of the Mounted Infantry at chronologically different times in its 
evolution, in campaigns against markedly different adversaries and in 
different environments.14 It is acknowledged that other campaigns such as 
those occurring in Burma, Mashonaland, Somaliland or Tibet could equally 
have been included as case studies but nevertheless, the selected 
campaigns are, arguably, the major deployments on active service of the 
British Army during the time period covered by this thesis with which to 
ascertain the Mounted Infantry’s military effectiveness.  Although as Nasson 
has claimed, all these ‘small wars’ shared the common drivers of achieving 
success at minimal cost, both monetary and human, in difficult geo-climatic 
circumstances and requiring a human dimension based on courage and 
morale15  in unfamiliar environments without immediate recourse to 
reinforcements, each campaign manifests its own peculiarities, not least for 
the Mounted Infantry. The functions expected of the Mounted Infantry 
differed markedly from being substitute cavalry in the Transvaal Rebellion 
1881, as an adjunct conferring additional firepower to the cavalry in Egypt 
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in1882, as camel-borne mobile infantry in the Nile Expedition 1885 and as a 
utility force combining cavalry roles with policing duties, including escort 
protection, farm searches and the cross-country pursuit of insurgents, that 
characterised the guerrilla war occurring after the fall of Pretoria. Thus it is 
against this contextual backdrop of four imperial campaigns that the Mounted 
Infantry’s military effectiveness will be investigated. However as a prelude, it 
is necessary to clarify the concept of ‘military effectiveness’ and define the 
metrics used to aid the analysis of the Mounted Infantry on active service.  
As a broad generalisation, the concept of military effectiveness is a 
multifaceted construct with elements pertaining to the overall success of the 
mission or war, the achievement of predetermined objectives for the arm 
itself,16 efficiency in resource utilisation,17  resilience to adverse factors 
including terrain and climate18  as well as in response to contact with 
adversaries,19 and whilst some elements can be assessed objectively, others 
are more subjective depending on the viewpoint and opinion of the observer 
undertaking the analysis.  Military effectiveness can be considered on a 
number of levels including political, strategic, operational and tactical, as 
defined in this thesis’ initial chapter. The nature of Victorian colonial wars, 
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fought with resource- limited expeditionary forces,20 combined with a 
prevailing tendency for personalisation of command, often resulted in a 
merging of operational and tactical command that permitted an expeditionary 
force commander to exert his own personal style of fighting during an 
expedition. This situation was magnified by the absence of written army 
doctrine. Both Roberts and Wolseley surrounded themselves with selected 
subordinates with proven abilities from a limited pool of aspirants.21 Yet 
increasingly, improving communications technology permitted the 
Government to demonstrate a greater involvement, if not control, at the 
strategic and operational levels of command across the Empire.22  Therefore, 
using four case studies of imperial campaigns, components of military 
effectiveness will be evaluated through analyses of the Mounted Infantry’s 
application of firepower, attainment of mobility, provision of force protection, 
ability in undertaking cavalry roles of reconnaissance and scouting when 
required, specific contribution to the attainment of objectives or fulfilment of 
the campaign, Mounted Infantry officers’ recognition and understanding of 
lessons learned from the campaigns and whether these lessons influenced 
subsequent Mounted Infantry doctrine and training. Thus the focus is more 
on operational and tactical factors rather than the political or strategic 
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although the analysis reflects these variables when necessary to illustrate 
the Mounted Infantry on active service. Whilst a number of metrics are 
considered, part of the difficulty in quantifying specific relevant metrics 
reflects the challenges inherent in the Mounted Infantry model itself. It is 
acknowledged that out of necessity, the majority of the metrics considered 
are qualitative rather than quantitative. Whether casualties, disciplinary 
records23  or awards are considered, the recording of such metrics is usually 
attributed to the parent battalion rather than primarily to the Mounted Infantry 
unit. Similarly, assessing rates of equine loss during the Boer War between 
cavalry regiments and Mounted Infantry is also fraught with difficulty24 as 
simple numerical comparisons fail to take account of different tasks allotted 
to various mounted units, the relative requirements of different mobile 
columns working across different terrains, the nature of their mounts and 
experience of the men - noting that for the Mounted Infantry, length of time 
on active service or possession of pre-war training was directly proportional 
to their competency as horsemasters.25  The other confounding problem of 
metrics in determining success is whether the statistics truly reflect military 
progress and thus indicate who was ‘winning the war’, a problem replicated 
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in other conflicts, particularly counterinsurgencies.26   Most pertinently, 
metrics quoted for the later stages of the Boer War concentrate on 
quantitative values such as numbers of farms searched and burned,27 rounds 
of ammunition and numbers of rifles captured, types and quantum of 
livestock seized28 and prisoners of war captured (despite the ever-present 
problem in determining combatant from non-combatant during an 
insurgency). 29  None of these metrics reliably indicated either military 
success from a strategic perspective nor operationally facilitated easy 
comparison between the achievements of Mounted Infantry and cavalry.30 
Nonetheless, it is anticipated that this analysis will help clarify the Mounted 
Infantry’s contribution to the colonial campaigns under evaluation as a 
measure of its military effectiveness, for as Howard Bailes points out, the 
lessons of Victorian colonial conflicts were ‘neither insignificant nor ignored’31  
by the army’s senior commanders and to an extent, also influenced later 
army doctrine and military planning. 
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Throughout its existence, two fundamental outcomes were central to the 
application of Mounted Infantry firepower, namely the adjunctive effect of the 
Mounted Infantry’s rifle fire in support of cavalry action32  and the Mounted 
Infantry’s functionality as a mobile reserve of infantry bringing additional 
firepower to the firing line.33  The latter function of being a mobile infantry 
reserve was an important attribute that distinguished the regular Mounted 
Infantry from most other nations’ variants of Mounted Infantry.34  Clearly, 
Hutton considered that the ability to apply firepower on the imperial battlefield 
was of crucial if not pre-eminent importance in colonial campaigning, 
asserting that ‘it is firepower which alone is really effective against savages 
or even Asiatics; that lance and sabre is of small real value in comparison’.35  
Hutton subsequently qualified this unequivocal  pro-Mounted Infantry 
statement, acknowledging that mounted pursuit of retreating adversaries 
could be decisive in attaining victory but he stopped short of fully endorsing 
the doctrine of the arme blanche.36  Similarly the 1897 Regulations confirmed 
that the basis of the Mounted Infantry’s effectiveness in battle was predicated 
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on the accuracy and efficiency of its rifle fire.37  For the Mounted Infantry as 
an abstracted infantry force, clearly its attribute of firepower remained that of 
the infantry in general and reflected the infantry’s weaponry, musketry skills, 
ability to take and hold ground, its application of prevailing tactics whether 
‘forming square’ or ‘fire and movement’ and, in part, remained subject to any 
weaknesses of the infantry either from its tactics or weaponry. During the 
Mounted Infantry’s lifetime, the principal infantry weapon, its rifle, underwent 
a number of technological advances. A major change, commencing in 1888, 
was the replacement of the single-shot Martini-Henry rifle with the magazine-
fed Lee-Metford.38 Although this meant faster reloading and therefore, 
potentially, a greater application of firepower,39  the introduction of the multi-
round magazine risked creating tensions between fire discipline,40 excessive 
utilisation of ammunition and, most pertinently for colonial campaigns that 
often had lengthy lines of communication, threatened the adequacy of supply 
of ammunition. This change in rifle also diminished some of the adverse 
factors associated with the Martini-Henry rifle, which in replacing the Snider 
rifle41 had itself contributed to improved accuracy and consequent lethality 
through increased rates of fire. The Martini-Henry was renowned for its fierce 
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recoil that was implicated in the infantry’s inaccurate shooting by the War 
Office’s Committee on Musketry Instruction.42  Yet the rifle was considered 
by the Committee to be superior in accuracy to the cavalry’s Martini-Henry 
carbine at distances beyond 800 yards (730 metres).43 This accuracy at 
greater distance contributed to the accolades received by the Mounted 
Infantry during the Egyptian Campaign in 1882 where the Mounted Infantry, 
alongside cavalry, anchored the right wing of Wolseley’s force against 
flanking attacks coming out of the desert either by regular Egyptian cavalry 
or its Bedouin auxiliaries by shooting accurately at ranges of up to 2000 
yards (1830 metres).44 Admittedly not every military commentator was as 
complimentary about the Mounted Infantry’s musketry prowess as illustrated 
by the German Army’s history of the conflict.45  However British official 
reports acknowledged that the accuracy of shooting reflected that the 
Mounted Infantrymen had been selected for their marksmanship and their 
previous Mounted Infantry service,46  and thus played an important tactical 
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role in the campaign.47 This assessment was despite the fact that the 
Mounted Infantry’s numerical paucity had been exacerbated by needing to 
delegate extra men for horse holding duties due to the nature of their locally 
sourced mounts.48  The Martini-Henry rifle also had another weakness, that 
of frequent jamming during repeated use, particularly in desert conditions, 
thus undermining its reliability on colonial campaigns. Although a weak 
extractor mechanism may have been the culprit,49  a number of additional 
factors were implicated and considered contributory to this flaw, estimated by 
Captain Crabb, an experienced musketry instructor in the Grenadier Guards, 
to have affected approximately 25 per cent of Martini-Henry rifles used in 
action at Abu Klea during the 1885 Nile campaign.50  These additional factors 
included the particular design of the Martini-Henry’s rifling with seven 
grooves that were easily fouled with repetitive firing; the further effects of 
rapid firing contributing to fouling through excessive ammunition charge; the 
ambient heat, and, finally, sand contamination.51  Furthermore the prevailing 
but imperfect cartridge design of a thin coil of brass attached to a disc-
shaped base of the priming cap, either permitted sand particles to foul the 
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cartridge52 or, when combined with the weak extractor, caused the cartridge 
to disintegrate and jam the breech.53 None of these factors should have 
surprised Wolseley at Abu Klea as during his advance up the Nile in 1884, 
50 per cent of the rifles used on a crocodile hunting trip had jammed.54 The 
War Office Committee also postulated an additional human dimension to the 
problem of jamming by suggesting that the ‘excitement of the firer’ was a 
further contributory factor.55  Despite a suggestion to the contrary,56 all 
detachments of the Camel Corps, irrespective of their arm of origin, were 
affected by jamming of their Martini-Henry rifles.57  As selected marksmen 
with exemplary infantry credentials, it is likely that the Mounted Infantry 
Camel Regiment had, at worst, only a comparable rate of jamming to other 
detachments due to these mechanical and environmental issues and 
conceivably perhaps, a lower rate than its cavalry colleagues who were 
unused to firing the Martini-Henry rifle until their on-board training during their 
sea journey to Egypt.58  
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The cavalry would again be at a disadvantage in the Boer War in terms of 
firearm range and accuracy through their preferential retention of the 
carbine59  in comparison to the infantry’s Lee-Metford and subsequently Lee-
Enfield rifles. The latter’s rifling was less susceptible to fouling and wear from 
cordite-containing ammunition.60  The cavalry’s carbine was not only at a 
disadvantage when compared to the infantry’s weapon61  but it was 
significantly inferior to the weapon of its adversary, the Boers’ Mauser. A 
contemporary military opinion indicated that ‘the Mauser will easily kill you at 
a distance of two miles and the carbine does not carry to within half a mile of 
this and does not shoot nearly so well’.62  This deficiency in weaponry and its 
possible impact on the cavalry’s firepower, in comparison to the Mounted 
Infantry, was a concern for Roberts who noted a growing dependency in 
army commanders on the Mounted Infantry for its firepower63  and whilst 
French tried to dispel Roberts’ poor opinion of cavalry firepower,64  the 
cavalry officer, Edmund Allenby, recognised the beneficial effects of re-
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arming the cavalry with the rifle.65  Clearly this change had the inescapable 
effect of propelling the cavalry functionally, if not organisationally, more 
towards the Mounted Infantry paradigm.66  However the rifle was not a 
weapon without its own imperfections with concerns raised by Mounted 
Infantry and infantry officers that the Lee-Metford had a tendency to shoot 
aberrantly to the right,67 an anomaly that also affected the Lee-Enfield 
temporarily until modifications were made.68  Although contemporary 
predictions were made in military publications regarding the additional 
firepower possible from integration of Maxims with both Mounted Infantry and 
cavalry,69 the unreliability of early machine guns, as exemplified by the 
jamming of the Gardner gun at Abu Klea,70  and additional factors such as 
their weight, the problems of transporting them71 and the cynicism regarding 
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the value of machine gun troops by soldiers,72  diminished the popularity and  
tactical value of this technological innovation with officers and soldiers alike, 
until the years after the Boer War.73 Thus the possession of the infantry rifle, 
in comparison to the cavalry carbine, conferred an advantage on the 
Mounted Infantry as mobile mounted troops, yet possession of a superior 
weapon was insufficient on its own to ensure the delivery of effective 
firepower. This also demanded higher standards of musketry skills and 
improved infantry tactics on the battlefield,74 underpinned fortunately in the 
Mounted Infantry by the selection of fully trained infantrymen.75 
Therefore, when evaluating the Mounted Infantry’s military effectiveness in 
the Transvaal Rebellion, it is difficult to assess the hastily extemporised 
Mounted Infantry,76  configured from volunteers from the 58th Foot and 60th 
Rifles who claimed good musketry skills but only basic levels of equitation, in 
terms of its firepower and distinguish it from the infantry as a whole. The 
analysis is obscured even more by the leavening of the Mounted Infantry 
with small numbers of troopers from the KDG and members of the Army 
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Service Corps77. General Colley appeared not to particularly favour Mounted 
Infantry or irregular cavalry78 and thus the ad hoc Mounted Infantry were 
deployed optimistically as substitute cavalry in attempting to supply all of 
Colley’s mounted needs,79  until the arrival of the 15th Hussars immediately 
before Majuba.80  Thus there appears not to have been a specific Mounted 
Infantry component to Colley’s operational plans other than an attempt to 
configure a makeshift cavalry. This underlines the contemporaneous lack of 
understanding within the British Army of how best to tactically deploy 
Mounted Infantry - a vestige of the preceding years of extemporisation when 
needed. Overall the Mounted Infantry would play a minor role in the conflict 
and as such was frittered away at the battle of Laing’s Nek. Here the 
Mounted Infantry’s futile charge uphill into enemy rifle fire sustained 
casualties both from Boer bullets but also from its own inadequate equitation 
and consequently was devoid of any offensive impact. As a result, the 
attacking 58th Foot was exposed on its right flank to enfilade fire that 
precipitated its retreat.81 Clearly a dismounted assault by the Mounted 
Infantry, using favourable cover in a manner shortly to be demonstrated by 
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the Boers at Majuba,82 would have been more suitable for the predominantly 
infantry composition of this mounted detachment. Nonetheless, the 
command of the detachment by a cavalry officer, Major Brownlow of the 
KDG, effectively ruled out this tactical option. Instead, his inculcated tradition 
of cavalry élan verging, in Laband’s view, on incompetent impetuosity, held 
sway.83 Again this underlines the subsequent Mounted Infantry principle that 
wherever possible Mounted Infantry should be commanded by infantry 
officers. Colley’s misuse of the Mounted Infantry as a cavalry substitute 
required to undertake a plethora of potentially contradictory roles, may be 
mitigation with which to partly exculpate Brownlow.84 Despite Colley’s 
effusive post-battle commendation, particularly of Brownlow,85 this was not 
the Mounted Infantry’s finest moment. Yet the mounted detachment’s almost 
complete absence of training, magnified by the wrong tactics on an 
inauspicious battlefield, were errors that are difficult to ignore. The losses 
incurred at Laing’s Nek subsequently impacted on the battle at Ingogo River, 
an action predicated on trying to preserve Colley’s lengthy lines of 
communication86 through the paucity of remaining Mounted Infantry for 
scouting and force protection. Apart from some expert musketry by the 60th 
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Rifles, Ingogo River sheds little light on the remaining Mounted Infantry’s 
military effectiveness.87 Thus the conclusions drawn from the Mounted 
Infantry’s involvement in the Transvaal Rebellion is less about the value of its 
firepower and more about the importance of Mounted Infantry training prior to 
combat, the need for at least basic standards of equitation and a need to 
understand how the deployment of Mounted Infantry, taking into account its 
rudimentary doctrine, contributed to operational planning. The absence of 
staff officers with Mounted Infantry experience, resulting from the ad hoc 
nature of the arm and the lack of higher formations of Mounted Infantry, was 
a deficiency that was never to be wholly corrected even after the Boer War. 
Thus the lesson highlighting the importance of prior training for troops 
destined to be used as Mounted Infantry, seemingly confirmed in northern 
Natal in 1881, formed part of the Intelligence Department’s seminal 1881 
précis and can be considered, arguably, the most important lesson 
recognised by senior army officers in relation to the inception of the Mounted 
Infantry arising from this conflict.88  
The experiences of the Transvaal Rebellion also enhanced the infantry’s 
awareness of the importance of marksmanship as a contributor to firepower. 
The prowess of Boer shooting,89  although by no means accepted universally 
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by British soldiers either in 1881,90 or in the later Boer War,91 was considered 
generally to have been superior to the British soldiers in accuracy, rapidity of 
fire and demonstrated the worth of individual shooting prowess. It was 
considered, with perhaps a degree of hyperbole, as ‘a novel method of 
warfare... demonstrating [the] great skills in use of their weapons’,92  or put 
another way, substantiated the mythology of the Boer as the ‘most perfect 
Mounted Infantry’ in the world’.93  Although there was a desire to emulate the 
Boer rifleman through improved musketry practice in regiments such as the 
58th Foot who had witnessed Boer marksmanship first-hand,94  this ethos 
was neither absorbed by the wider army, still dependent on the infantry drill 
manual, nor did it translate into new doctrine.95 This was despite the efforts 
of individual officers, particularly Ian Hamilton, who advocated superior 
marksmanship through applied musketry instruction that placed a premium 
on personal skill rather than relying on the firepower of the company volley.96  
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Hamilton would re-visit this theme several years later during the Boer War 
where, despite his advocacy of individual marksmanship and dispersed 
attacks to minimise casualties, these techniques were still not universally 
practised throughout the army.97  As Hamilton scathingly wrote: ‘to blaze 
away at a Boer galloping across the veldt without knowing where your bullet 
goes is no better practice than firing blank cartridges’,98 and moreover risked 
excessive utilisation of ammunition supplies that was a continual logistical 
concern during expeditionary warfare. Hamilton’s was by no means a lone 
voice. Major General Bengough called for more tactical rifle practice rather 
than training in volley firing or static target shooting on ranges99  whilst Du 
Moulin, commanding the Sussex Regiment’s Mounted Infantry in the Boer 
War, reflected that ‘volley firing is useless and what should be adopted is 
controlled individual firing using the magazine always and refilling it behind 
cover’.100 One positive driver for the adoption of individual firing as opposed 
to volley firing was prior experience fighting on the North West Frontier of 
India, particularly in the recent Tirah Campaign.101 As Du Moulin reflected: 
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‘the experience gained in this war against the Afridis was extremely valuable 
to the officers and men, as the system of fighting adopted by the crafty 
Pathan bore many points of similarity to that carried out by brother Boer’.102  
In both scenarios, the adversary was adept at using cover and concealment 
whether in ‘hill fighting’ in India or in Natal, using the tactic of ambush with 
long distance marksmanship effecting surprise and inflicting casualties.103  In 
South Africa, these tactics were aided by seemingly special atmospheric 
conditions that enhanced long range musketry.104  If this was an experiential 
lesson learned by individual battalions and commanders, then why was this 
lesson not disseminated throughout the army? The absence of a written 
doctrine promulgated by a General Staff again provided an inhibiting context 
for dissemination of such tactical innovation. Colonel Callwell’s Small Wars, 
part manual, part semi-official doctrine, and the War Office’s Combined 
Training published in 1902,105 began to reverse the preceding decades’ 
reliance solely on drill manuals. However even more retarding was the 
reluctance of senior army commanders for uniformity in operational matters, 
in fairness recognising that no single tactic suited all operational scenarios, 
which constituted the varied challenges of the colonial British Army.106 This 
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was illustrated by the army’s experiences in Africa where the tactics 
employed against the Boer would have been unsuitable against the 
Sudanese warrior. Although successful military doctrine is not necessarily 
scenario-specific, the prevailing status quo without an overarching doctrine 
emphasised the weaknesses of personalised command whereby personal 
experience and opinion erroneously equated to definitive knowledge in a 
limited pool of senior generals.107 
Operationally and tactically, the relative might of infantry firepower ought to 
have contributed to the successful conclusions of expeditionary warfare. In 
many colonial campaigns, pitting technology against the more primitive 
weaponry of indigenous tribesmen meant that concentrated modern 
firepower could easily outmatch the offensive power of adversaries. Yet, 
because of the propensity of tribal warriors to ambush and use the sudden 
onslaught of shock tactics encouraged by terrain, much of the power of 
modern rifle technology risked being blunted.108 Thus protection against 
warriors’ shock tactics required a different approach compared to the 
individual musketry needed on the North West Frontier. A concerted weight 
of firepower was required to stop the momentum of a charge of warriors.109  
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The usual, though not exclusive, solution was the infantry square. The 
formation of square provided 360 degree protection, a hollow centre for the 
wounded and the commissariat and with the formation of two or more ranks 
per face, permitted the firing of continuous volleys by defenders. 
Furthermore, although unwieldy when moving, the square was both a 
defensive and, potentially offensive, formation. Equally though, movement of 
a square risked gaps appearing in one or more of its faces, often the rear 
face which tended to be the weaker of the four sides.110 This risk arose either 
from the orientation of the troops in the rear-face or by disruption of the 
square’s integrity such as at Abu Klea, in part through the dilatoriness of the 
camels accompanying the square. Defensively, the square had other 
weaknesses too with the corners being particularly vulnerable due to the 
abrupt change in orientation of the defenders’ fire.111  Hence tribesmen 
tended to focus their attacks on these corners, often attacking in a pyramidal 
configuration to minimise their own casualties.112  In response, the corners of 
the square fortuitously tended to flatten and thus inadvertently increase the 
firepower produced at these vulnerable positions. Other inherent problems 
with the square was the limiting of firepower to just one ‘face’ rather than 
from the whole force, an observation that stimulated debate in military circles 
whether alternative tactics permitted a greater application of firepower 
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without jeopardising force protection, such as echeloned lines113 or smaller 
squares providing inter-dependent fire support (although the risk of ‘friendly 
fire’ was thus increased).114  Although by the 1880s, in an era of increasing 
lethality from rifle and artillery fire, the formation of square in European 
conflicts was obsolete due to the high casualty rates expected from 
concentrating soldiers in close order, the square remained an acceptable 
tactic in hostile terrain overseas.115  
The squares at Abu Klea and Abu Kru in the Nile campaign in 1885 provide 
suitable models to assess the balance of the benefits and weaknesses of the 
tactic. The near-disaster of the square at Abu Klea, where the integrity of the 
square failed allowing enemy incursion into the centre of the square, had a 
multi-factorial causation. As already indicated, the robustness of the rear-
face was threatened through the slowness of the camels walking up a 
gravelly incline.116  The square was moving slowly and had recently changed 
direction under senior orders117 with this change in direction creating uneven 
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117 Brigadier General Sir Douglas Dawson, A Soldier- Diplomat (London: John Murray, 1927), pp.95-
96, blamed Stewart, commanding the Camel Corps, for changing the direction of travel of the square 
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sides and necessitating transfer of one of the Heavy Camel Regiment’s 
detachments (Royal Scots Greys) to the left face to lengthen it.118 The 
subsequent Arab attack added to the potential for disaster as its start point 
was very close to the square (150 yards / 137m), thus limiting the ability of 
the skirmishers outside the square to return to safety119 whilst simultaneously 
obscuring the defenders’ field of fire and reducing the number of volleys that 
could be delivered in such a short space of time. Snook argues that the use 
of skirmishers from the Mounted Infantry was ill-advised,120  conferring no 
advantage over the square’s firepower. Yet this ignores the increased 
casualties resulting from enemy sniper fire later at Abu Kru where 
skirmishers were not deployed that required the square to lie prone until the 
Arabs charged. Arguably, at Abu Klea, the greatest culpability remains with 
the Heavy Camel Regiment detachments in the rear-face where their 
inexperience in the use of the Martini-Henry rifle was exacerbated by the 
comparatively poor accuracy and rapidity of their rifle fire121 and their lack of 
infantry drill required to maintain the square.122 If a 25 per cent incidence of 
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rifle jamming is applied equally around the infantry square,123  the resulting 
deficit in firepower emanating from the rear face through its inexperience was 
theoretically almost half of that of the other faces.124  This deficiency was 
magnified by the error, almost certainly due to Colonel Burnaby’s orders,125  
of disrupting the square’s defensive architecture through some cavalry 
detachments’ opening out linearly.126  While understandable in the context of 
trying to maximise their firepower,127 this act was a fatal blow to maintaining 
defence through the square’s integrity.128  With a conservative assessment of 
one third of the rear-face out of position and unable to fire cohesively, the 
theoretical calculation of the rear face’s firepower diminishes further to 
approximately a third of the firepower from the other faces where there were 
infantry or Mounted Infantry. Lieutenant Colonel Talbot, commander of the 
Heavy Camel Regiment, tried to deflect subsequent criticism of his 
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cavalrymen by claiming rather disingenuously that the square had not been 
‘broken’ as it had never ‘formed properly’129  on account of the gap caused 
by the wandering camels.  Additionally he also defended his men’s standard 
of shooting.130 Yet in private correspondence, Talbot admitted Burnaby’s 
mistake and consequent culpability for the penetration of the square.131 
Clearly the episode raises questions over the cavalry’s lack of training, the 
issue of inappropriate delegation of command in the square and coordination 
of fire control of the square’s sides, as well as the level of local intelligence of 
terrain and understanding of prevailing Arab tactics. Undoubtedly Wolseley 
should shoulder some of the blame as it was his idea to abstract men from 
cavalry regiments to fight as camel-borne Mounted Infantry132 although he 
too was careful to deflect blame back onto the Heavy Camel Regiment, 
stating his disappointment that as selected men they hadn’t performed 
better.133 Talbot, among other correspondents, praised the performance of 
the Mounted Infantry Camel regiment.134 Although it is difficult to 
quantitatively assess the Mounted Infantry’s firepower in the square at Abu 
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Klea due to problems with metrics, Talbot considered that it was the 
firepower of the Mounted Infantry that rescued the situation following the 
Arab incursion into the square when the Mounted Infantry and Guards 
reversed and fired into the square.135  Eye-witness accounts also describe 
the discrepancy in the amount of enemy dead in front of the front face where 
the Mounted Infantry first countered the Arab charge and the smaller 
numbers in front of the other faces of the square.136 Furthermore, the 
apparent veering of the Arab attack away from the Mounted infantry’s front 
face down the left face and onto the angle of the rear face has been 
considered a response to the Mounted Infantry’s firepower137 and bearing in 
mind the Mounted Infantry’s experienced infantry drill and musketry practice 
in comparison to the Heavy Camel Regiment, it would be surprising if the 
former had not applied greater firepower to the attack. If the metrics of 
casualties is considered, unsurprisingly the Heavy Camel Regiment suffered 
the greatest number of casualties of the Camel Corps (68 per cent) 138 
although interpreting this as failure of effectiveness is difficult in view of the 
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Arab incursion occurring at precisely this part of the square defended by the 
cavalrymen where fighting became hand-to-hand.139 Nevertheless, it was 
ironic that the dragoons of the Heavy Camel Regiment, previously the 
historical prototype for Mounted Infantry, should have been the component of 
the Camel Corps whose effectiveness as Mounted Infantry failed at Abu 
Klea. Some of the lessons of Abu Klea were immediately recognised by the 
Camel Corps commanders when the force next came under attack at Abu 
Kru. Here the field of fire was maintained by withholding the use of 
skirmishers.140 The Gardner gun was not included in the defence of the 
square in view of its proclivity to jam at inopportune moments and the 
integrity of the square was maintained throughout the attack despite the 
preliminary enemy sniping.141 Arguably, the need for force protection, 
particularly against such shock tactics, meant the persistence of the square 
when it was otherwise obsolete in other theatres and, as described 
previously, deterred the evolution of the tactics of individual musketry until 
the experiences of the Boer War. The potential influence of reliable, portable 
machine guns able to deliver concentrated firepower without frequent 
jamming in colonial scenarios remains conjecture but might have been a 
potent stimulus to the adoption of different tactics.  
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Thus, in conclusion from the viewpoint of applying firepower, the Mounted 
Infantry was considerably better than its cavalry counterparts through its 
enhanced musketry skills and familiarity with the rifle and by virtue of the 
Mounted Infantry’s selection as expert marksmen, comparable to the best of 
the foot infantry. However, like its foot counterparts, the Mounted Infantry’s 
effectiveness remained subject to prevailing army tactics including the 
limitations of the square.142 Therefore, in the search for evidence of its 
military effectiveness, the second main raison d’ȇtre for Mounted Infantry, 
that of the application of mobility to firepower, where the challenge was to 
ensure ‘requisite power of locomotion and the same mobility as cavalry 
without loss to its value as infantry’,143 demands analysis in order to 
determine the Mounted Infantry’s military effectiveness.   
Conferring mobility remained a fundamental purpose of the Mounted Infantry. 
Mobility permitted the Mounted Infantry to extend its firing line, retaining its 
firepower but reducing its casualties,144 rather than as a dense formation 
clustered together on foot (although even the foot infantry were starting to 
extend their lines for similar reasons under certain commanders such as Ian 
Hamilton). Enhanced mobility conferred many benefits for the army that 
included allowing wider flanking movements that facilitated effective 
reconnaissance without discovery by the defenders and avoided losses 
through enemy fire; ability to outflank then enfilade in attack; cutting off lines 
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of retreat of the defenders; pursuit of a fleeing enemy; improved protection of 
lines of communication; the delivery of mobile reserves where needed and to 
rapidly reinforce captured ground against enemy counter-attack. The 
assessment of the Mounted Infantry’s mobility needs a comparative 
consideration of the Mounted Infantry’s equitation abilities, its utilisation and 
care of its mounts, whether ponies or camels, the interface between its skills 
and tactics used on the battlefield and its contribution to the overall conduct 
of military campaigns. Reflecting the political reality within the contemporary 
British Army, a backdrop to the evaluation of these factors is the durable 
institutional competition between mounted arms that has been considered in 
preceding chapters, which necessitates comparison and contrast of the 
Mounted Infantry’s mobility in the four selected conflicts with the performance 
of the regular cavalry.  
As previously noted, the equitation and horsemanship of Mounted Infantry 
had been predicated, at least until 1888 with the opening of the Mounted 
Infantry schools, on brevity of training or experiential learning adequate for a 
rider to remain in his seat and care for his horse until the experiences of the 
Boer War.145 Although perhaps an acceptable approach in small policing 
expeditions where the Mounted Infantry only needed to display limited 
mobility when accompanying foot soldiers, the fundamental errors inherent in 
this thinking were exposed in 1881 at Laing’s Nek during the Transvaal 
Rebellion where Colley accepted (or gambled) that perfunctorily mounted 
infantrymen could gallop and charge uphill under fire, tactics which clearly 
                                                          
145
 Mounted Infantry Training 1906, p. 12. 
 
228 
 
exceeded their abilities as horsemen.146 Leaving aside the lack of capability 
for such cavalry tactics, Mounted Infantry needed enough equitation skills to 
be able to ride over difficult terrain along imperial borders, a factor magnified 
in significance when opposed by a highly mobile mounted adversary such as 
the Boers.147  With expediency outweighing the lessons of 1881, Roberts’ 
precipitate expansion of the Mounted infantry in South Africa in January 1900 
was accompanied by little or no equitation training,148 the frequent falls of 
Mounted Infantrymen becoming legend.149 Winston Churchill caustically re-
told a Boer joke that the Mounted Infantry spent most of its time trying to 
keep hold of its hats.150  The requirement for a large number of mounted 
troops should have been come as no surprise to the British Army as this 
potential had been realised presciently following the Transvaal rebellion151 
but had not featured in the initial planning of the Corps sent to South Africa in 
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1899. This error eventually precipitated a plea from Buller for more Mounted 
Infantry,152 thus reflecting both a lack of learning from the previous 1881 
campaign and an unfortunate tendency for both the British public and senior 
army officers to underrate the Boers as a mobile mounted fighting force.153  
Hence the need for appropriate standards of equitation in mounted troops 
would be a pertinent lesson of the Boer War with the post-war 1906 official 
manual, Mounted Infantry Training, stating categorically that ‘the idea that a 
“rough and ready” horseman is all that is necessary cannot be too strongly 
discountenanced.  Sore backs and lack of confidence in the presence of the 
enemy are certain results of bad horsemanship’.154 
As indicated above, by 1901–02 the equitation of Mounted Infantry had 
improved considerably155 which contributed to improved mobility and 
translated into tactical innovation. In particular, the adoption of night 
marches, challenging if soldiers’ equitation was suspect that allowed the 
staging of dawn raids and the ambushing insurgents at first light.156 This was 
a tactical adaptation previously employed successfully by Mounted Infantry in 
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operations in Mashonaland,157 and became a standard operating procedure 
for counterinsurgency operations in South Africa in 1901-02 whereby Boer 
commandos were often captured having rested overnight, falsely assuming 
protection in isolated farmsteads.  
However this experiential ‘learning curve’ had been at the cost of excessive 
equine losses of 326,000 horses which, together with the deaths of over 
51,000 mules and 195,000 oxen, amounted to a financial cost of more than 
£16,250,000.158 In addition to such financial costs, this degree of equine 
wastage posed a major challenge for the availability of remounts159 that was, 
in part, only resolved through overseas sourcing, which in turn added the 
problem of animal deaths during sea journeys160 and the need for animal 
acclimatisation following disembarkation to the conundrum of achieving 
mobility. This need for equine acclimatisation was frequently overlooked by 
senior commanders who quickly dispatched new arrivals to the front to 
satisfy the need for fresh remounts to maintain mobility.161 Clearly the 
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problem of equine losses was not just confined to the Mounted Infantry. The 
official veterinary history identified generic problems with the British Army’s 
treatment of its horses that implicated the cavalry as much as the Mounted 
Infantry.162 These included inadequate forage, inadequate rations for the 
horses, insufficient watering,163 and over-optimistic work schedules for the 
horses with mobile columns often covering in excess of 300 miles per 
month.164 Furthermore, alongside a lack of remount services, veterinary 
services were inadequate, exacerbated particularly by a lack of farriers165 
especially in Mounted Infantry companies where it was recorded that it 
required seventy-four telegrams in order to secure the services of a farrier for 
just one company.166 Unfortunately, this resulted in a tendency to abandon ill 
or lame horses out on the veldt.167 It is difficult not to accuse this disorderly 
planning and disjointed organisation of support services of professional 
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incompetence, mitigated minimally by a defence that the scale of the War 
had not been recognised by the War Office at the outset in 1899. In the 
subsequent atmosphere of criticism and personal exculpation between 
cavalry and Mounted Infantry commanders, witnessed in their evidence to 
the Elgin Commission,168  it is hardly surprising that levels of equine loss 
between cavalry and Mounted Infantry were considered by commentators 
such as Childers as metrics for comparative military efficiency.169  Unproven 
accusations had been made previously about the Mounted Infantry’s 
perceived inadequacies in horse care years earlier following the 1882 
Egyptian Campaign – unsurprisingly by a cavalry officer.170  In his evidence 
submitted to the Elgin Commission, French claimed that ‘excepting local 
garrison companies, few Mounted Infantry could retain their seats at a trot 
over rough ground and were entirely ignorant of the care of their horses’.171  
French conceded that after three months’ experience, the Mounted Infantry 
improved in equitation but it was rarely enough, in the prejudiced views of 
cavalry officers, for the Mounted Infantry be used successfully for scouting 
work. Conversely, Bruce Hamilton, a protagonist of Mounted Infantry, 
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considered, perhaps rather surprisingly, that Mounted Infantry achieved 
adequate equitation standards after only two or three weeks.172 Ian Hamilton 
claimed that the Mounted Infantry eventually demonstrated horse care skills 
equal to or exceeding that of the cavalry and informed the Elgin Commission 
that: 
          In the latter part of the War when the men had learnt to ride and scout,  
          and the officers had gained experience, the regular Mounted Infantry,  
          especially the first ten regiments, were, in my humble opinion, the best  
          mounted troops in South Africa.173  
If accusations of excessive equine wastage tainted both Mounted Infantry 
and cavalry, Kitchener attempted to emulate the mobility of the Boer 
commandos during the insurgency years, by increasing the number of 
remounts available to his mobile columns. This approach though merely 
increased the rate of equine loss through ongoing poor equine care with 
Kitchener noting that ‘Boer ponies thrive; our horses simply die’.174  Thus 
polarity of opinion over equitation standards and training requirements 
between Mounted Infantry and cavalry permeated the submissions to the 
Elgin Commission, reflecting institutional prejudice as much as personal 
opinion and battlefield experience, and clearly demarcated the forthcoming 
battle lines regarding the doctrine and continued existence of the Mounted 
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Infantry in the post-war years, which will be considered in more detail in a 
later chapter. But in trying to establish the comparative nature of level of 
equine loss as a marker for military effectiveness between Mounted Infantry 
and cavalry, the challenges of different military tasks (at least initially), levels 
of training and even initially, different mounts,175 diminish the veracity of 
numerical comparisons until later in the campaign where from 1901 the 
Mounted Infantry and cavalry became largely interchangeable in all but name 
and training.176  Nevertheless, there are anecdotal  reports of greater 
comparative mobility in the Mounted Infantry compared to the cavalry with 
De Lisle boasting of the mobility and manoeuvrability of his New South 
Wales Mounted Rifles in outflanking an enemy-occupied kopje whilst the 
cavalry remained immobile, seemingly paralysed by its orders not to risk 
incurring casualties.177  It is difficult to conclude definitively a true 
comparative difference in equine losses with, for example, the 6th Dragoons 
losing an average of 87 per cent of their horses in the whole of the Boer War 
whereas the 1st Mounted Infantry lost 64 per cent of their horses in just 14 
months.178 Overall the Cavalry Division was estimated to have lost 24 per 
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cent of its mounts throughout the War179 but then even its commander, John 
French, was not immune to criticism, being cited as one of the worst culprits 
for under-watering his horses,180 though this problem was common to most 
mounted units.181 Churchill lectured that the Mounted Infantry’s expenditure 
of horses was three-fold that of the cavalry although this generalisation is 
difficult to substantiate.182 The performance of colonial Mounted Rifles with 
regards to their equine losses, as perceived by senior officers, was 
controversial with Wolseley promoting the natural horsemastership skills of 
colonial volunteers,183  particularly from rural Canada, whilst Kitchener 
bemoaned colonials’ equitable ignorance of matters equine.184  Clearly such 
differences of opinion reflected a multitude of competing prejudices. Climate 
and environment too played their part with Alderson’s column, whilst not 
exclusively composed of Mounted Infantry, losing up to 80 per cent of its 
animals in the inhospitable and disease-ridden lowland of eastern Transvaal 
while the 2nd Mounted Infantry, operating in the higher and drier western 
Transvaal, lost only 11.5 per cent of its horses.185 Cosby Jackson estimated 
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the life expectancy of a horse in his seasoned Mounted Infantry Company 
was only three months, through equine exhaustion and disease, rather than 
enemy bullets.186  Later in the campaign, equine wastage was magnified by 
Kitchener’s operational plans for constant ‘drives’ of mobile columns, even 
though his staff often tried to ‘hide away some detachment of cavalry or 
Mounted Infantry in the hope that he [Kitchener] may forget their existence’, 
but he rarely did.187 Thus despite a traditional self-belief held by  the British 
cavalry of being expert horsemasters,188  a similar woeful picture of equine 
loss affecting all mounted troops189 led to a better appreciation of the issues 
of horsemastership and equitation that included the need to reduce the 
weight carried on a horse’s back.190 Optimising opportunities for dismounting 
and walking their horses for both cavalrymen and Mounted Infantrymen 
became an ethos enshrined in post-war training up to the First World War,191 
eventually yielding dividends in equine health in the initial weeks of war in 
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1914 compared to other allies’ cavalries.192 The sourcing of the remounts 
was another important factor in both the cavalry’s and Mounted Infantry’s 
military effectiveness. The Mounted Infantry’s precept was to be mounted on 
the most suitable animal available in theatre rather than embarking its own 
horses like the cavalry.193 This was appropriate when the Mounted Infantry 
was extemporised hurriedly in theatre for a particular expedition – although a 
limited selection and availability of animals could be problematic.194 There 
were few horses available to Colley in 1880 at the start of the Transvaal 
Rebellion as supplies had been exhausted by the preceding Basuto War.195 
Political concern in avoiding inciting military involvement of neighbouring 
Boer states or fomenting rebellion in Cape Colony prevented more 
geographically extensive searches for remounts thus contributing to the 
shortfall of mounts available for the nascent Mounted Infantry.196  Similar 
deficiencies would befall German troops who adopted the same principle of 
sourcing of mounts locally during the Herero rebellion in German South West 
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Africa in the early 1900s.197 Nevertheless despite such limitations, this 
approach did have its benefits such as the use of the Khedive’s Bodyguard’s 
horses198  in the 1882 Egyptian Campaign. Their tolerance of the 
environment, particularly the heat, manifest as improved stamina, enhanced 
the Mounted Infantry’s mobility, contributing to its early deployment in the 
early policing operations,199 screening of the army on the perimeter of 
Alexandria and Ramleh,200 and its involvement in Wolseley’s vanguard 
advancing along the Sweetwater Canal following the landings at Ismailia. 201 
This advance protected the army’s water supply from Egyptian attempts to 
sabotage the Canal.202  The Syrian ponies on which the Mounted Infantry 
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were mounted did not require acclimatisation unlike the cavalry’s horses 
disembarking after their sea journey203  and coped better with the desert’s 
climatic and geological challenges and lack of forage.204  The result was 
greater mobility for the Mounted Infantry than for some of the disembarked 
cavalry permitting the former to participate in the mounted pursuit of Egyptian 
cavalry after El-Magfar and a cavalry charge at Mahsama,205 despite this 
tactic being unfamiliar to the Mounted Infantry.206  The preferential benefits of 
being mounted on local ponies with reduced logistical requirements 
compared to cavalry horses would be, by necessity, re-learnt in the Boer 
War, trading size and the power needed for the arme blanche for the 
endurance of the local breeds.207 However the limited availability of suitable 
cobs, exacerbated by inflationary prices paid for them by the army, resulted 
in ongoing problems in supply,208  and thus still necessitated procurement 
overseas.209 
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If the principle of procuring the most suitable animal for the conditions in 
theatre was sound enough, the choice of camels for the Desert Corps in the 
Nile expedition of 1885 remains controversial.210  The use of camels seems, 
on first consideration, obvious211 with other nations’ armies also using 
camelry in their overseas forces.212 Yet the camel was a peculiar beast with 
many foibles.213 Not only was the camel difficult to ride and control, it could 
not be easily manoeuvred 214 and thus was selected purely for its endurance 
across desert.215 The camel’s health was notoriously fickle and whilst able to 
withstand significant wounds,216 fell prey to illness unpredictably easily.217  
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Wolseley’s inauspicious choice of the camel was magnified by the Camel 
Corps’ woeful unpreparedness in camel husbandry,218  having embarked 
rough riders with no previous knowledge of camel riding 219  and having failed 
to apply relevant knowledge both from the Indian Army220  and from other 
military sources.221 In 1884, the whole process of purchase and utilisation of 
camels appears fraught with issues as diverse but fundamental as 
purchasing the correct breeds of camels,222 differentiating riding from 
baggage camels, awareness of the animals’ health and age223 and the 
requirements for the animals’ ongoing welfare.224  Officers’ suspicions of the 
local indigenous people were well-founded,225  and thus local knowledge was 
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ignored or, at best, considered unreliable.226  Although as Wolseley’s Chief of 
Staff, Buller has borne a large proportion of the blame for purchasing too few 
camels for the Desert column’s requirements,227  it is clear that he received 
inconsistent and frankly contradictory instructions from Wolseley,228 despite 
Wolseley proclaiming Buller’s ‘great administrative capacity’.229  In addition, 
deficiencies in saddlery, forage and baggage camel drivers230 contributed to 
the logistical nightmare,231 with Buller correctly predicting his future censure 
for any failures and the eventual apportioning of much of the blame to him.232  
From the remarkably consistent estimations of camel mobility,233  the 
traverse of the Bayuda Desert from Korti to Metemmeh, short-circuiting the 
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great bend on the Nile, should have taken approximately five to nine days.234 
Yet the inadequate number of camels necessitated an initial shuttle run 
between Korti and Gakdul Wells followed by rest days that resulted in this 
timing being completely unachievable through camel exhaustion,235 with the 
traverse eventually taking twenty-two days. Considering the completeness of 
the destruction of the camel force during the expedition, there is no useful 
metric available to determine comparative mobility, as a proxy of military 
effectiveness, between the various camel regiments. Nevertheless, for the 
Camel Corps as a whole, considering that reinforcements from the Royal 
Irish Regiment traversed the desert on foot in eleven days, it is difficult not to 
concur with Sir Charles Wilson’s comment that: ‘it would be heresy to say 
that the camelry is a mistake, but if Tommy Atkins cannot march in such a 
climate as this, we had better give up fighting’.236  Furthermore, Wilson 
added that it was only the initial twenty miles of the march that was 
archetypal desert, otherwise the desert was replete with forage, wood and 
water and the ground, predominantly gravel, was easy to march on,237 in 
contrast to the predictions prior to embarkation of the Desert Column.238  
Certainly Major General Edward Gleichen, reflecting with hindsight in his 
memoir, thought that: ‘as things turned out, I really believe that we should 
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have done better had we marched on foot the whole way and used our 
camels as extra baggage animals’.239 Recently Snook has suggested that 
marching on foot might have exacerbated any tendency to dehydration 
among the soldiers yet this might have been off-set by the increased 
logistical capacity for supplies, particularly water, if all camels were loaded 
with supplies.240  Thus the overall effectiveness of the Camel Corps is highly 
questionable, 241  and as Snook has summarised succinctly, it appeared to 
be a ‘resource-intensive novelty’.242  Perhaps more importantly was the fact 
that the delays caused through inadequate camel numbers alerted the 
enemy to the Desert Column’s advance and resulted in the battles at Abu 
Klea and Abu Kru.243 Even if these battles and the delays imposed through 
recuperation did not materially diminish the chances of saving Gordon at 
Khartoum,244  the combination of logistical deficiencies, camel wastage 
through inadequate nutrition245  and overwork,246 such that all the survivors 
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of the camel regiments walked back across the desert in retreat,247 destroyed 
the Camel Corps, reducing mobility and, following two pitched battles, its 
fighting effectiveness.  
Thus the question may be asked legitimately how the Mounted Infantry’s 
mobility, flawed in the Transvaal248 and, as discussed above, in the Sudan, 
but of note in Egypt and eventually in South Africa, contributed to these 
respective campaigns? Clearly the inopportune deployment of extemporised 
Mounted Infantry in the Transvaal and their limited number squandered on 
the slope at Laing’s Nek limited its contribution to the rest of the campaign.249  
The eventual embarkation of Mounted Infantry reinforcements from 
Aldershot, albeit arriving too late to participate in hostilities, was itself novel 
with Mounted Infantry being formed at home then dispatched overseas rather 
than configured solely in theatre.250 The mobility of the Mounted Infantry in 
Egypt conferred both force protection on the extreme right desert flank and 
helped secure the army’s freshwater supply with the Mounted Infantry’s 
mobile firepower being an adjunct to the cavalry in keeping with the doctrine 
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proposed previously by Wood and Hutton.251  Furthermore, the Mounted 
Infantry retained its mobility to the extent that it participated in the dash to 
secure the surrender of Cairo’s citadel, along with some but not all cavalry 
elements252  after the conclusion of the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. This indicates 
impressive comparative mobility, underpinned by appropriate standards of 
equitation, and thus conferred real military value.253   
However it is perhaps the Boer War where the mobility of the Mounted 
Infantry makes its mark on the totality of the campaign254 as attaining mobility 
comparable to that of the Boers was considered by Ian Hamilton to be the 
critical objective towards winning the war.255 The improved mobility of the 
Mounted Infantry256 permitted the development of new tactics, combining the 
ability to rapidly deploy firepower on the flanks or rear of Boer positions as 
well as the evolution of the tactical ‘galloping charge’,257 covering distance 
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rapidly to minimise casualties before rapid dismounting and utilisation of 
dismounted infantry skills to seize enemy territory.258 The Mounted Infantry, 
in reaching its apogee in the application of mobile firepower, arguably 
realised its tactical potential and doctrinally validated the non-cavalry 
mounted soldier paradigm. Such tactical innovations would be adopted in 
official training manuals after the Boer War.259 The insurgency phase of the 
Boer War had stimulated the Mounted Infantry to attain even greater 
mobility260 achieved by reducing logistical requirements, particularly reliance 
on transporting infantry in oxen-wagons,261 but also by improving its 
horsemastership262  that permitted greater distances to be covered especially  
at night.263  Callwell reflected that initial mobile columns were lethargic affairs 
with a large proportion of men marching on foot.  With increasing numbers of 
men mounted, the columns’ mobility improved. Thus, although a greater 
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amount of territory could be traversed, Callwell claimed conversely that the 
thoroughness of counterinsurgency operations was risked through the 
absence of foot soldiers that would have previously stayed in the locality for 
a number of days undertaking policing duties.264 Nevertheless, the British 
mounted troops’ increasing mobility permitted greater surprise with improved 
counterinsurgency performance as evidenced by increased capture of Boer 
combatants,265 their weaponry,266 ammunition, livestock and the reduction in 
ambush and destruction of British convoys.267  Whilst this does not impart 
any estimate of comparative superiority between the mounted arms, it does 
underline the assertion that the Mounted Infantry adapted and improved 
under the pressures of active service and finished the Boer War with 
comparable, if not anecdotally better,268 mobility compared to the cavalry, 
which, in the context of early 1900, is a significant achievement. Thus in 
conclusion, although the Mounted Infantry’s history of mobility was 
chequered, with enough training and experience, its mobility rendered it a 
militarily effective force. 
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So far the analysis of the Mounted Infantry’s military effectiveness has 
concentrated at the tactical level of its relative firepower and mobility. Yet in 
assessing the Mounted Infantry, its responses to the ‘friction of war’ during a 
campaign and ascertaining its contribution both to the success or otherwise 
of its objectives and that of the army, are, as previously discussed, integral to 
determining its military effectiveness. Sources of friction may be external, 
relating to environment and terrain or the tactics of adversaries, or internal, 
related to issues of command, organisation and logistics that span more than 
the tactical level and include political, strategic and operational factors. 
Remaining with the tactical level, the Transvaal Rebellion had been an 
unmitigated disaster for the Mounted Infantry. Although the inadequacies 
identified at Laing’s Nek and Ingogo River have been highlighted previously, 
the near-annihilation of the 94th Foot on the road to Pretoria immediately 
prior to commencement of hostilities, exposed failings at all levels. Politically 
the state of the Rebellion in the Transvaal remained uncertain and handed 
the initiative to the Boers and, to a degree, partly exculpated the casual way 
in which the 94th Foot’s column proceeded without adequate force 
protection269 - although its four Mounted Infantrymen could hardly have 
offered much warning of the ambush that was to befall the column despite 
the regimental commander being pre-warned of this very risk.270 The 
strategic need to concentrate the scattered garrisons in the Transvaal, the 
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precipitating reason for the 94th to be on the road, was not an unreasonable 
premise while a state of peace remained.271  Yet the uncoordinated planning 
fatally exposed Colonel Anstruther and his 94th Foot to an impossible 
dilemma when surrounded and faced with the Boer ultimatum that effectively 
meant either disobeying written orders or massacre.272 Later, although the 
Mounted Infantry’s tactical failures of reconnaissance, force protection and 
the ill-conceived flank attack at Laing’s Nek reflect inadequate training and 
numerical inferiority, operationally the problem for the Mounted Infantry was 
much more fundamental. What Colley really wanted was not Mounted 
Infantry but cavalry,273 and in acknowledging this, Colley committed his 
Mounted Infantry to inopportune cavalry action.274 Colley’s error was 
compounded by a combination of personal haste in wanting to progress with 
the campaign militarily, without recourse to waiting for cavalry 
reinforcements, and political pressure to proceed and lift the investments of 
several towns and their garrisons,275  although the Duke of Cambridge would 
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later advise waiting for reinforcements.276  It appears that Colley fatally 
gambled that his small Mounted Infantry detachment would suffice.277 In 
stark contrast, Wolseley’s Egyptian Campaign appears to have been much 
more clearly considered and planned.278  Even if, as General Alison 
insinuated, the formation of the Mounted Infantry was an impromptu one,279  
the deployment of the Mounted Infantry away from gendarmerie duties 
around Alexandria to accompany Wolseley’s attack appears inspired. 
Wolseley’s limited cavalry numbers, amounting to four cavalry regiments and 
a further three of Indian cavalry,280 were not large,281 yet not of the same 
magnitude of problem as faced by Colley. The Mounted Infantry’s 
subsequent actions garnered much praise from the popular Press such that it 
excessively eulogised the Mounted Infantry as ‘the most prominent feature of 
the expedition’282  and also secured commendation in an official 
appreciation.283  
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Operationally, the terrains encountered in mountainous northern Natal and in 
the Egyptian desert both look inauspicious for the successful use of Mounted 
Infantry. Yet the markedly different performances of the Mounted Infantry in 
these campaigns underlines how the terrain only had a modest impact and 
that other factors, particularly the horses upon which the force was mounted 
and the possession of either experiential learning or previous training carried 
greater weight than geo-climatic considerations in the determination of the 
Mounted Infantry’s military effectiveness. Strategically and topographically, 
Colley had little option in terms of his route of advance into the Transvaal, 
reducing his operational options to three roads284 thus negating any element 
of surprise. Conversely, Wolseley’s feint along the Egyptian coast and his 
disembarkation at Ismailia on the Suez Canal confounded Egyptian defences 
that had focussed mistakenly on a predicted British advance from the Nile 
Delta.285 As already indicated, part of Wolseley’s operations planning was 
founded on securing a freshwater supply for his expeditionary force for, as 
Callwell remarked subsequently in Small Wars, ‘the less fertile and 
productive the theatre of war, the more elaborate have to be the 
arrangements for the commissariat’.286 Despite the climatic difficulties 
encountered in desert warfare such as in the Sudan, Callwell recognised that 
logistics were in fact simplified in this environment by really only needing to 
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protect and defend wells along the lines of communication287  although, as 
the Mounted Infantry Camel Regiment discovered, a dry well at Abu 
Hasheen meant reliance on camel-borne water supplies for 72 hours.288   
Clearly though freshwater supplies were not the only logistical 
considerations, which also encompassed issues as diverse as food, animal 
forage,289 ammunition supplies, processes for casualty evacuation,290 
availability of both reinforcements and remounts and, perhaps surprisingly to 
modern sensibilities, other ‘essential’ supplies such as supply of 
champagne.291 Although the adage that colonial expeditions were fought as 
much against nature as against adversary is inherently true,292  the need to 
protect lines of communication and supply features prominently in all of the 
four campaigns analysed in this chapter. The need to re-trace his footsteps 
to ensure adequate protection of lines of communication was the primary 
factor for Colley precipitating the battle of Ingogo River in 1881293  whilst the 
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need to procure supplies of water in Egypt294 has been mentioned 
previously. The need to transport supplies down the Nile for both River and 
Desert Columns,295 with the latter unable to carry enough supplies for its own 
needs,296  was a limiting factor in logistics magnified by the unsuitability of 
some of the supplies with one-third of biscuits transported being inedible.297  
The need to transport the maximum amount of ammunition into the Sudan 
led to Wolseley’s decision to simplify logistics and only take the 0.45 calibre 
cartridges suitable for the Martini-Henry rifle with, as already discussed, 
unfortunate results for the cavalry detachments unused to the rifle.298  Clearly 
a balance was needed to be found between secure protection of lines of 
supply and needing to delegate excessive numbers of troops to this task with 
the consequent risk of emasculating military effectiveness of the force when 
the army risked becoming ‘merely an escort for its food’.299  As a microcosm 
of this problem of inadequate logistics whilst also reflecting factors 
idiosyncratic to the Mounted Infantry and Mounted Rifles, the Boer War 
Mounted Infantry, fundamentally short of equipment and supplies, attracted 
the allegation of being chronic thieves, particularly of horses.300 Major Lewis, 
commanding the Tasmanian Imperial Bushmen, a colonial Mounted Rifles 
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unit, summed up the enforced mentality, writing that ‘if you want anything in 
South Africa, you must just hustle for it’.301 
The preceding discussion has concentrated largely on the operational and 
tactical considerations in estimating the Mounted Infantry’s military 
effectiveness. At the strategic level, the inception and deployment of the 
Camel Corps in 1884 was indeed relevant to the Camel Corps’ performance. 
Although Wolseley decided on the inception of the Camel Corps in 
September 1884,302  its deployment in a dash across the Bayuda Desert was 
not its original raison d’ȇtre, which was to shadow the River Column as a 
flank guard. The ‘desert dash’ would only be resorted to in the event of 
delays to the River Column.303  Thus the option to risk a march across the 
desert was concluded after Wolseley’s vacillation over the most suitable 
approach to Khartoum, whether riverine, as initially favoured by Wolseley,304 
or potentially utilising an overland pilgrims’ route from Suakin to Berber.305 
These deliberations, the so-called ‘battle of the routes’,306  were also 
influenced by the tardiness of the whole expedition that largely stemmed 
from the Government’s delay in agreeing a response to the problem in the 
                                                          
301
 Lewis, On the Veldt, p.29. 
 
302
 TNA WO 32 / 6111 Organisation & equipment of the Camel Corps 1884, initially indicated the 
need for 1,100 men comprising 40 men from each Household cavalry regiment, 40 men from each 
domestically based line cavalry regiment, 40 men from each Guards’ battalion and 40 men from 
each rifle battalion; TNA WO 110 / 10 Despatch of the Troops to Upper Egypt & Soudan 1884. 
 
303
 Colville, Official History, p.60. 
 
304 Colville, Official History, p.31, and allegedly supported by Gordon; TNA WO 147 / 42 Events in 
Egypt & Soudan 1884. 
 
305 Dawson, A Soldier- Diplomat, pp.88-89. 
 
306 Pimblett, Story of the Soudan War, p.218. 
 
256 
 
Sudan and the dispatch of Wolseley’s expeditionary force.307  This response 
had, in turn, been influenced heavily by public opinion308  including two 
unlikely proposals for amateur relief forces by well-meaning Englishmen 
prepared to undertake what the army was seemingly reticent to do by a dash 
across the desert to Khartoum. The dispatch of Wolseley’s force and then his 
eventual precipitate decision to send a flying column across the desert, as 
Snook remarks, gave Buller little time to prepare the Camel Corps 
logistically,309 an error with ramifications for its mobility and which 
squandered the camels as a means of transport. In turn this delayed the 
traverse of the desert by at least twelve days and, if the battles of Abu Klea 
and Abu Kru are accepted as an unnecessary waste of lives, diminished the 
Camel Corps’ military effectiveness. The issue of whether camelry was in 
fact necessary has already been considered310  but it is arguably another 
example of the terrain featuring excessively in military planning311  and 
affecting the outcome of the campaign. However, local intelligence was 
available to Wolseley regarding the nature of the terrain from officers, such 
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as Major Kitchener312 and Lieutenant Stuart-Wortley,313 serving with irregular 
local troops. The likelihood of needing to rely on camels had been suggested 
well before a decision to dispatch the Desert Column was taken.314  The 
impact on the Mounted Infantry, singled out by Sir Charles Wilson for its 
excellence315  was the same as for the rest of the Camel Corps although the 
Mounted Infantry’s marching discipline during the retreat from Metemmeh 
was also noted approvingly by Evelyn Wood.316 
Returning to other potential frictions of war, the four campaigns under 
analysis illustrate the Mounted Infantry and the British Army,317 not only in 
diverse terrains but against very different adversaries. The Mounted Infantry 
demonstrated its effectiveness against the poorly-motivated yet conventional 
Egyptian infantry and cavalry as well as its Bedouin irregular cavalry, largely 
through its accurate long range musketry, encouraged by the enemy’s tactics 
of movement than concealment. In the Sudan, the retention of the firepower 
of company-level volleys showed its worth in both stopping the incursion into 
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the square at Abu Klea and halting the enemy charge at Abu Kru. However 
the Boers presented a different style of adversary, combining the ‘rapidity of 
Asiatic cavalry with the precision of fire of European infantry’.318  The Boers 
demonstrated an ability to adapt their own tactics in response to poor British 
musketry with galloping charges, rapid dismounting and snap shooting skills 
that Ian Hamilton subsequently advocated for British infantry.319 South Africa 
was the nemesis of the extemporised, inadequately trained, inexperienced 
Mounted Infantryman of circa 1881 and early 1900. With improved 
equitation, shooting and tactics combining mounted and dismounted skills, 
the introduction of surprise aided by the use of Boer scouts and the advent of 
night marches facilitating dawn raids,320  previous nemesis now became 
qualified triumph. Thus if the tactical and operational shortcomings of the 
Mounted Infantry in the Transvaal in 1881 had contributed to the army’s 
failure, the Mounted Infantry in Egypt and in South Africa in the latter half of 
the Boer War can be said to have contributed positively to the army’s 
successful prosecution of these wars. However the nagging concern, fuelled 
by the persisting institutional antipathy between the opposing protagonists of 
the cavalry and Mounted Infantry regarding the existence of the Mounted 
Infantry, remained whether or not the Mounted Infantry was merely a fashion 
or whether, in fact, its successes could have been delivered by more plentiful 
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cavalry. In other words, was the Mounted Infantry’s military effectiveness 
merely a circumstance of chance or indicative of a functionality that was 
irreplaceable by cavalry? 
Of course, part of the answer is that this question must remain hypothetical 
as the comparative paucity of cavalry regiments could never fulfil the 
operational requirements in these four campaigns. The logistics of embarking 
cavalry regiments to serve in Africa was neither straight forward nor cheap 
but was achievable, as illustrated by the eventual arrival of cavalry 
reinforcements embarked from home in the Transvaal Rebellion and Boer 
War. At Laing’s Nek, it is unlikely that cavalry would have been able to attain 
the ridge and enfilade Boer positions321 nor, despite Colley’s protestations, 
have been numerous enough to be able to turn the Boer flanks at Ingogo,322 
although the Boers’ fear of a ranging cavalry threatening their lines of retreat 
may have conceivably helped dislodge the Boers from its defensive line 
spanning from Laing’s Nek to Majuba.323 Certainly this fear was palpable in 
the Boer War where the Boers’ propensity to relinquish territory in favour of 
re-grouping at a distance and preserve their forces was a frustration to 
British forces.324  However irrespective of a putative greater number of 
cavalry squadrons available in the Transvaal in 1881, contemporary reports 
indicate that the disembarking cavalry would have been utilised more as 
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Mounted Infantry than solely arme blanche.325  In Egypt, the unique impact of 
the well-armed Mounted Infantry was recognised by senior commanders and 
the Press and though the Mounted Infantry worked symbiotically with the 
cavalry, it is unlikely that additional cavalry, if replacing Mounted Infantry, 
would have been as effective in its delivery of firepower due to its inability to 
deliver long range rifle fire, a conclusion also reached in official 
appreciations.326 The Nile campaign offers another opportunity for direct 
comparison between cavalry and Mounted Infantry, both functioning in the 
role of mobile infantry. The artificiality of the arrangement of expecting 
Mounted Infantry functionality from cavalry detachments skews the fairness 
of any assessment. Yet the evidence from the square at Abu Klea is that the 
absence of Mounted Infantry would have contributed to a fatal failure of force 
protection and unlike the reality,327 risked the total destruction of the square. 
A hypothetical situation devoid of the Camel Corps but with increased 
numbers of cavalrymen alongside the 19th Hussars, who were the horsed 
cavalry regiment accompanying the Camel Corps, suggests a very different 
force and one that could not have been tasked with the objectives of the 
Camel Corps,328 probably seeking instead to undertake reconnaissance in 
force across to the banks of the Nile but with no aspirations to establish a 
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military presence on the river bank as a stepping stone for the advance on 
Khartoum.329  Perhaps though, it is the Boer War where this hypothetical 
question can be most decisively answered.330  The campaign involved the 
majority of British cavalry regiments with only five cavalry regiments 
eventually not serving in South Africa,331 and whilst admittedly this was a 
numerically inadequate force overall for a campaign largely predicated on 
mobility, the general trend in the campaign was for the cavalry to transition 
towards being Mounted Infantry with the 18th Hussars being the first cavalry 
regiment to relinquish its edged weapons.332  In partial mitigation, the 
duration of training required, should brand new cavalry regiments have been 
raised, was longer than the training of Mounted Infantry and politically, an 
expansion of the cavalry utilising domestic Yeomanry was fundamentally 
difficult through the latter’s terms of service. When Yeomanry served in the 
nascent Imperial Yeomanry,333 it conformed to the Mounted Infantry / 
Mounted Rifles paradigm,334 this being despite the domestic Yeomanry’s 
revulsion at the prospect, before the Boer War, of becoming Mounted 
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Infantry.335 The net result, that the cavalry (and to some extent, the 
Yeomanry) became more like Mounted Infantry, remains a powerful 
endorsement of the merits of the Mounted Infantry - at least for this particular 
colonial campaign. In addition, there is evidence for the almost universal 
appeal of utilising Mounted Infantry in South Africa, including Roberts’ 
recollection that all cavalry commanders requested Mounted Infantry 
support336 as well as the future Field Marshal Henry Wilson’s opinionated 
utterance of ‘what we want is a lot of Mounted Infantry...our cavalry are quite 
useless’.337  Kitchener wrote that ‘I like what I hear of the Mounted 
Infantry’,338 and the official German military opinion was that the Mounted 
Infantry became ‘a most effective and valuable force’.339 Hutton considered 
that the best that the Mounted Infantry could have offered was never realised 
by the lack of latitude given to Mounted Infantry commanders, particularly on 
the march to Pretoria that could have yielded even greater results340. The 
corollary of approbation for Mounted Infantry was deprecation of the 
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cavalry,341  with even Lieutenant Colonel Maude, a renowned supporter of 
the cavalry, acknowledging that: ‘our cavalry have been freely blamed for 
shortcomings in the recent war, which even their best friends must admit to 
have been proved against them’342 - a damning verdict indeed. 
Thus, in conclusion, it is unlikely that even hypothetically, the cavalry would 
have been able to replace the Mounted Infantry in the four campaigns 
analysed as case studies in this thesis.343 If the Mounted Infantry played 
important roles in these campaigns, it is legitimate to question whether the 
Mounted Infantry attained its objectives in these campaigns and what was 
the arm’s contribution to the overall aim of the campaign. Therefore, 
returning to the assessment of the military effectiveness of the Mounted 
Infantry in attaining pre-determined objectives and contributing to the overall 
outcome of the campaign, the Mounted Infantry in the Transvaal Rebellion 
manifestly failed to deliver the cavalry-substitute tactical roles of scouting, 
advance and rear guards, flank attack and pursuit even though opportunities 
for the latter were never possible.344  Equally, the Camel Corps was 
unsuccessful in traversing the Bayuda Desert in a timely fashion to establish 
a base ready for a relief attempt on Khartoum and, of course, the overall 
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343 Bengough Notes and Reflection on the Boer War, p.18, Bengough, while demonstrating pro-
cavalry views and a lukewarm attitude towards Mounted Infantry, reflected early in the campaign in 
1900 that despite his opinion that British cavalry was superior to all other European cavalry, the war 
in South Africa had ‘undoubtedly laid bare certain defects in our cavalry training, equipment and 
organisation’. 
 
344 Laband, The Transvaal Rebellion, p.130. 
 
264 
 
mission to save Gordon failed. Yet these failures are not the whole story as 
exemplified by the defeat of the Mounted Infantry at Laing’s Nek, which did 
not actually precipitate the defeat at Majuba that effectively terminated 
hostilities. Similarly, the relative tardiness of the Camel Corps did not 
condemn Khartoum to its fate,345 for, as Snook concludes, the Camel Corps 
would not have been able to secure Gordon’s escape and the River Column 
was weeks away in its progress towards Khartoum.346  Although the Mounted 
Infantry received plaudits for its actions in Egypt to the extent that Hutton, 
clearly not an impartial observer by virtue of his close involvement with the 
arm, claimed the ‘phenomenal success’ of the Mounted Infantry in this brief 
conflict effectively established the arm’s value,347  it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that the inception of the ad hoc Mounted Infantry was more by 
good fortune than design. There had been no clear overarching operational 
plan to utilise a small Mounted Infantry force (as its inception seems largely 
down to fate) yet it contributed significantly to both force protection and to the 
eventual objective of the campaign of restoring the Khedive’s authority.348 
Nevertheless, this does not diminish the importance of the Mounted Infantry 
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in Egypt,349 in the context of an otherwise limited mounted force. In South 
Africa 1900-02, the Mounted Infantry contributed comprehensively to both 
operational and strategic objectives, particularly in the years of the 
insurgency.350  Once the execrable horsemastership of the early 
extemporised Mounted Infantry battalions had improved, the Mounted 
Infantry conferred increasing mobility to the British Army in South Africa.351  
With predictions of guerrilla warfare voiced comparatively early after the 
crossing of the River Vaal,352 the Mounted Infantry contributed to the re-
focussing of the army into a counterinsurgency force that, it must be 
remembered, won the Boer War. Admittedly the Mounted Infantry was not 
alone in contributing to this process, yet the doctrinal adaptation of other 
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forces into the Mounted Infantry paradigm such as the Royal Artillery 
confirms the importance of the model to senior army commanders in 1901 – 
02.353  Thus the chequered experiences of the Mounted Infantry in these four 
selected campaigns prevents an equivocal conclusion regarding its military 
effectiveness as measured by the metric of contribution to campaign 
outcomes yet, alternatively, the Mounted Infantry cannot be held materially 
responsible for those campaigns that failed and in the Boer War, can 
legitimately be considered to have played a major part in the victory. 
Therefore this conclusion of the lack of consistent military effectiveness 
across the four campaigns under analysis raises the question whether any 
lessons were recognised by senior army commanders and also by the 
commanders of the Mounted Infantry by ‘enquiring as to the causes of 
failure’?354  Moreover, were any of these truly understood by the Mounted 
Infantry and the army as a whole thus becoming embedded in doctrine and 
tactics? In the absence of a British General Staff,355 the identification of 
lessons and their dissemination throughout the army relied less on formal 
edicts from the Commander-in-Chief or the Army Board and more on a 
combination of repeated revisions of official drill manuals,356  teaching of 
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future staff officers at the Staff College, lectures to learned military circles 
(complete with post-lecture debates recorded verbatim), a plethora of 
privately written and published ‘notes’, contemporary memoirs and 
dissemination of ‘good’ practice through reports and personal communication 
between commanders.357  For instance, the impetus to reduce the 
impedimenta of mobile columns has been attributed both to the cavalry 
commander, Major Henry Scobell358 and the 25th Mounted Infantry of Colonel 
Benson’s column, with the latter’s success disseminated widely by written 
order.359 Although haphazard and slow, the processes for limited learning 
and dissemination of military lessons remained in existence throughout the 
years covered in this thesis and if the inception and evolution of the Mounted 
Infantry is considered by way of example, it can be seen that high profile 
personalities such as Hutton were prolific in their activities in promoting the 
arm through lectures to influential military discussion circles, collating 
transcripts of their lectures into pamphlet or book form at the same time as 
contemporary official drill regulations and field service manuals were 
introduced by the War Office. Perhaps this more nebulous approach was 
less direct and immediate in delivering change in comparison to direct orders 
from the Army Council yet the incomplete adherence to the Army Order 39 
on the abolition of the cavalry lance for instance, hardly indicates a foolproof 
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methodology for change management through formal orders either.360 
Regarding the issue of the withdrawal of swords from cavalry regiments 
during the Boer War, Hamilton reflected that despite this being encouraged, 
no definitive order was ever dispatched to the effect thus leaving the decision 
to the discretion of regimental commanding officers which resulted 
unsurprisingly in a lack of uniformity of whether cavalry carried swords or 
not.361  The 1881 Intelligence Department’s précis can be considered to have 
laid down many of the basic tenets of the eventual Mounted Infantry model 
whilst Hutton’s ‘Five Lectures’ can be recognised retrospectively as providing 
doctrinal structure for the non-cavalry mounted soldier paradigm.  
Therefore, what were the lessons for the Mounted Infantry derived from the 
four campaigns considered in this chapter? In the absence of a clear and 
unambiguous consistent doctrine, the lessons arising from these campaigns 
were arguably more about organisation and training than tactics. The 
experiences of the Transvaal Rebellion and the Egyptian campaign362  were 
stimuli to a more considered and formalised approach to the organisation of 
the Mounted Infantry based on abstraction with the company as the basic 
administrative and tactical unit. The functionality of this approach meant that 
the organisational structure was never replaced throughout the Mounted 
Infantry’s existence, despite the introduction of higher formations. As 
discussed previously, the importance of prior training or Mounted Infantry 
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experience was identified in Transvaal, Egypt and the Sudan yet this lesson 
was subjugated to competing military expediency in South Africa in 1900. 
This did not reflect any lack of understanding by Roberts who, as will be 
shown in a later chapter, can be considered as much of a founder of 
Mounted Infantry in India as Wolseley at home. The impact of this failure to 
heed this previous lesson, despite its recognition that had resulted in the 
inception of Mounted Infantry Schools, impaired the Mounted infantry’s 
military effectiveness for several months and effected reputational damage to 
the Mounted Infantry for much longer.  As a corollary to this lesson was an 
increasing awareness that standards of equitation could no longer be basic. 
This was inextricably linked with the greater demands on riding skills of 
Mounted Infantry underpinning the developing requirements for reconnoitring 
and scouting becoming increasingly formalised as doctrinal roles integral to 
deployment in independent mounted brigades or divisional cavalry in the 
years after the Boer War with resulting improved equitation during training.363  
Central to this improvement was the Mounted Infantry’s officers’ belief that 
the Mounted Infantry could indeed undertake duties, even those traditionally 
cavalry, if their equitation and horsemastership was good.364 Arguably this 
realisation was the epicentre of the persisting institutional controversy 
between Mounted Infantry and cavalry that led to the misunderstanding that 
the Mounted Infantry thought itself capable to undertake these roles if 
required but that the cavalry assumed that the Mounted Infantry aspired to 
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replace them initially functionally then organisationally.365  Nonetheless, as 
Henderson argued following the Boer War, 366 perhaps the Mounted Infantry 
fulfilled more than just a tactical need for mobile firepower and, at least for a 
time during its existence, satisfied a psychological need in the army. 
Arguably, the Mounted Infantry’s functionality bridged the waning importance 
of edged steel weapons and reflected the increasing reliance on firepower at 
a time when the army was unable to relegate the arme blanche, whether 
cavalry charge or iconographic bayonet charge,367 as both remained a 
fundamental martial skill of the professional soldier.  
Organisationally, the campaigns in Egypt, Sudan and South Africa showed 
that abstraction could work and the two former campaigns tended to support 
Wolseley’s preference for selected officers and troops on colonial 
campaign.368 ‘Cherry picking’, at least in the numerically limited ‘small wars’ 
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of the imperial battlefield seemed to work.369  Despite the overall failure of 
the Camel Corps, evidence has been provided for the general approbation 
granted to the abstracted Mounted Infantry Camel Regiment. The pre-war 
trained Mounted Infantry in South Africa in 1899 was also applauded 
generally for its performance on the battlefield. In part this effectiveness was 
founded on its rifle power and thus underlined that one of the fundamental 
tenets of the Mounted Infantry was the selection of marksmen and the 
prevention (if at all possible) of quasi-arme blanche tactics, despite the 
Mounted Infantry adopting occasionally arme blanche tactics in pursuit with 
fixed bayonets.  
Despite the post-1902 claims that the Mounted Infantry was only appropriate 
for service in South Africa,370  the historical evidence does not support this. 
The Mounted Infantry, as mobile infantry, was deployed across North African 
sands, the varied landscapes of South Africa, whether arid near-desert or 
grassy veldt, the jungles of Burma and in mountainous Tibet.371  As 
discussed in a later chapter, despite its counterfactual basis, the potential 
benefits of a deployment of Mounted Infantry in Western Europe in 1914 
onwards can be argued convincingly.372 
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However, not all conclusions drawn from or applied to the four campaigns 
were correct,373 and erroneous or overstated lessons were drawn in relation 
to the Mounted Infantry.374 A clear example of the lesson in error was the 
assumption held by senior army officers following the Egyptian campaign 
that brevity of training was preferable to either no prior training or formalised 
extended training,375  a belief, as previously noted, still voiced inexplicably in 
debate in1905 by General Lyttleton, Chief of the General Staff.376 Similarly, 
the fluctuating doctrinal role of the Mounted Infantry would result in the 
default utilitarianism of the Mounted Infantry, a ‘jack-of-all-trades’ filling in the 
gaps exposed by the inadequacy of the cavalry available. The ikona of the 
veldt was in fact the ikona of the counterinsurgency years par excellence and 
did not anticipate or predict the increasingly cavalry-like roles expected of the 
Mounted Infantry in the years 1902-13. Tactically though, the Boer War did 
dispel one misconception, that of the ever-present risk to the Mounted 
Infantry’s horse-holders who had been considered by military theorists to be 
the prime objective of enemy cavalry – previously held to be an 
organisational weak link by cavalry theorists.377 
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In conclusion, referring back to the research question upon which this 
chapter is based - whether or not the Mounted Infantry was a militarily 
effective force, it is clear that this is a challenging and multi-faceted question 
to answer. The metrics with which to assess, either quantitatively or semi-
quantitatively, are limited and much of the criteria used in this assessment 
are by necessity qualitative, anecdotal or circumstantial. Nevertheless, 
despite such shortcomings, in three out of the four campaigns studied, the 
Mounted Infantry contributed positively on a tactical level to the campaign 
even if strategically the campaign was not a success overall. The evidence 
suggests that in these four campaigns, the Mounted Infantry, as mounted 
troops, were no worse than the cavalry in all metrics considered and there is 
evidence that much of what the Mounted Infantry undertook could not have 
been exceeded by the deployment of more cavalry, even if the latter was 
available. A limited number of lessons were identified by the Mounted 
Infantry and the army in general from these campaigns and, despite the 
problems of recognition and understanding of these issues, were assimilated 
into training and peacetime manoeuvres and eventually doctrine. Therefore, 
despite many evident deficiencies discussed in this chapter, it is at the most 
basic of tactical levels, that of supplying both mobile rifle power and acting as 
a reserve of infantry, two of the fundamental aspects of Mounted Infantry 
doctrine, that the Mounted Infantry must be considered, at least to a qualified 
degree, to have been a militarily effective arm.  
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 Chapter Five 
Demise 
  
 Writing in mid-1901, even before the conclusion of hostilities in South Africa, 
Rudyard Kipling confessed critically that:  “We have forty million reasons for 
failure, but not a single excuse”.1  Much of the subsequent decade would be 
influenced by the debate to both understand and address those ‘forty million 
reasons’.2  In a similar vein, The Times was damning of the army stating that 
‘the war in South Africa has brought to light defects in our Army which cannot 
be explained away’.3  Central to the subsequent debate was the need for 
army reform, a need identified sporadically by army commanders before 
1899 as acknowledged by a number of historians including Spiers, Beckett, 
Badsey and Phillips,4  but a process accelerated by the war and which would 
continue throughout much of the decade leading up to the First World War.5 
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While many aspects of this reform comprised high-level organisational 
change including the abolition of the post of Commander-in-Chief, the 
constitution and establishment of the Army Council and the inception of the 
British Army’s General Staff,6  the decade after 1902 witnessed more 
fundamental doctrinal change throughout the army including the mounted 
arms. It is against this contextual backdrop that the last decade of the 
Mounted Infantry’s existence was played out.  
Integral to the Mounted Infantry’s eventual fate was the relationship between 
its organisational impermanence and the role required of it on the battlefield. 
The latter, projecting from the Mounted Infantry’s experiences in South 
Africa, seemed assured in 1902 despite a persisting ambiguity in role 
highlighted by the absence of an official definition of the force until 1909.7  
Framed by the reform of the British cavalry that preoccupied supporters from 
both sides of this institutional divide for at least ten years,8  the Mounted 
Infantry’s search for a role, consistent with the orthodox structure of the army 
and its emerging strategy would influence the Mounted Infantry’s final years 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Technology Before 1914’,  pp. 113-22, nevertheless, the speed, sustainability and extent of post-
1902 reform is both contentious and, through its lack of uniformity within the army, incomplete.  
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until its abolition in 1913.9  Therefore three fundamental themes influencing 
the Mounted Infantry’s ultimate survival, namely its organisation, its changing 
function and the delivery of its training, in the context of strategic, political 
and doctrinal change after 1902, will be the focus of this chapter. Prefacing 
this decade of transition (and one of the enduring legacies of the war in 
South Africa) was the intensification of the simmering cavalry versus 
Mounted Infantry debate.10  The war had been, as a contemporary later 
wrote, “a cavalry war but not quite on old cavalry lines” ,11  largely devoid of 
traditional massed arme blanche tactics, with the cavalry eventually 
subsumed into the monotony of the counterinsurgency work of the mobile 
columns and the primacy of the cavalry’s edged weapon superseded by the 
Mounted Infantry’s rifle.12  With the Mounted Infantry finishing the war in a 
position of unprecedented operational importance, post-1902 the 
organisation of the army’s mounted troops appeared uncertain and 
competitive.13 Thus, although current historical orthodoxy attributes the 
Mounted Infantry’s eventual demise to the cavalry’s doctrinal adaptation, a 
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renaissance unmatched by the Mounted Infantry,14  whether this represents 
the complete explanation remains unclear. Therefore, the chapter’s principal 
research question, through an analysis of the multiple factors linked to the 
Army Council’s decision to abolish the Mounted Infantry, will identify the 
predominant reason for the arm’s demise and why the Mounted Infantry’s 
apparently precipitous implosion occurred when it still remained an 
organisation afforded a definitive role within the army’s mobilisation plans.15   
As hostilities in South Africa ceased, the preparations for war and its conduct 
were subjected to an official post-mortem examination that would aggravate 
pre-existing tensions between cavalry and Mounted Infantry.16 The process 
of identifying what went wrong in South Africa largely centred on the Royal 
Commission on the War in South Africa, better known as the ‘Elgin 
Commission’. Its ‘Terms of Reference’ were both at once extensive, covering 
logistical issues of supply, manpower and equipment, transport by both land 
and sea and the military operations until the occupation of Pretoria, and 
frustratingly vague in expressly avoiding becoming either an official history of 
the conflict or a definitive commentary on military performance.17  The seven 
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commissioners,18  whilst politicians they were not drawn up on party 
affiliation lines, first sat to hear evidence on 7 October 1902, finally 
publishing their report, containing 143 pages of opinion, less than a year later 
on 25 August 1903. The Commission provoked marked reactions in the 
Press and army with The Times initially critical that evidence was to be heard 
in private,19 then promoting the Commission as being the most important 
inquiry affecting the British Army since the Crimea.20  As just one example of 
senior officer opinion, Kitchener agitated to suppress the report’s general 
publication on the grounds of it being ‘prejudicial to the interests of Empire’.21 
The commissioners’ methodology was straightforward, taking oral testimony 
from a large number of senior officers with only a modicum of incisive cross-
examination, none of which was judicially adversarial and only superficially 
cross-referencing testimonies. In this lay both the Commission’s strength and 
its weakness with the breadth of personal testimony impressive yet the non-
judicial process permitted, if not inadvertently encouraged, a furtherance of 
personal agenda,22  inclusion of unsubstantiated if not suspect claims,23 the 
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proffering of irrelevant anecdote,24  and as far as the cavalry versus Mounted 
Infantry debate was concerned, an arena for institutional in-fighting with 
claim and counterclaim expressed in a mesmerising, if not confusing, wealth 
of opinion.25 Furthermore, senior officers, including Roberts, utilised the 
opportunities offered by oral testimony to explain, expiate and exculpate their 
wartime decisions and actions.26  It is not surprising therefore that much of 
the evidence recorded was conflicting and from which clear conclusions 
leading to robust learning for the future was absent.27  Even the 
commissioners urged caution in drawing conclusions from the testimonies of 
these wartime experiences and to avoid unnecessarily provoking army 
reorganisation, warning that the very nature of the War should not be 
extrapolated to future campaigns where conditions would probably differ from 
those in South Africa.28  For the interested public, most newspapers 
produced regular coverage of the proceedings,29  with systemic deficiencies 
in the War Office being emphasised leading to the conclusion that the pre-
war army had been in an ‘appalling’ state of unreadiness for war and was 
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‘devoid of a plan of campaign’.30  As Bowman and Connolly identify, criticism 
of the War Office in the Press tended to obscure the army’s culpability for its 
own shortcomings.31 It is unsurprising that the public’s response to the 
report’s publication was described as ‘shock’ by The Times.32  The 
Commission’s recommendations concentrated on failure of logistics, 
inadequacy of military planning, and the high-level organisational changes 
relating to decentralisation of the War Office, abolition of the post of 
Commander-in-Chief and the organisation of the Army Council.33  Seemingly, 
politicians remained an easier target for disparagement than army 
commanders in the field. The Commission restricted itself to 
recommendations rather than forced implementation of policy changes that 
might have induced tenacious institutional opposition.34  Nonetheless, in the 
face of significant Press censure35  backed by Parliamentary agitation,36 real 
change did occur in the wake of the Elgin Commission and the subsequent 
War Office (Reconstitution) Committee chaired by Lord Esher. As a 
consequence, in 1904, the office of the Commander-in-Chief was abolished 
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in favour of a committee-style Army Council and, in 1905, a General Staff 
was created.37 
Despite reservations regarding the impartiality and objectivity of evidence 
submitted to the Elgin Commission, its effectiveness in identifying lessons 
and its ability to provoke reform, the Commission tackled, if tangentially, the 
issue of the doctrinal debate over the mounted arms. Overall 60 per cent of 
officers rendering oral testimony to the Elgin Commission were favourably 
disposed to the Mounted Infantry concept based on their experiences in 
South Africa.38  Roberts set the general tone stating that ‘the Mounted 
Infantry is a most useful service’,39  albeit this statement being largely 
predicated on his preference for the rifle over edged weapons - a focus on 
armaments that featured prominently in the commissioners’ subsequent 
questions.40 Roberts’ assertion was not only supported by his protégé, Ian 
Hamilton, who considered that, latterly, the Mounted Infantry had been the 
‘best mounted troops in South Africa’,41  but also by senior infantry and 
Mounted Infantry officers including Methuen, Stopford, Bruce Hamilton, 
Kelly-Kenny, Knox, Godley and, perhaps surprisingly, the cavalry officer, 
Robert Baden-Powell, who professed to be a great believer in Mounted 
Infantry,42  an assertion considered by Badsey to reflect Baden-Powell’s 
                                                          
37 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p.214. 
 
38
Elgin Commission, Cd. 1790 – 1791, I & II, 1903, analysis of responses. 
 
39
 Elgin Commission, Cd. 1790, I, evidence from Roberts (Q.10376, p.438). 
 
40
 Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry, p.167 
 
41
 Elgin Commission, Cd. 1791, II, evidence from Ian Hamilton (Q.13941, p.111) 
 
42
 Elgin Commission, Cd. 1791, II, evidence from Colonel Baden-Powell (Q.19939, p.430).  
282 
 
pliable personality and his need for subsequent employment.43  Clearly the 
majority of Mounted Infantry supporters were either infantrymen, particularly 
those with Mounted Infantry experience, or were affiliated to Roberts’ ring of 
loyal supporters, thus demonstrating the complexity of personal agenda and 
professional allegiance that permeated the testimonies submitted to the 
Commission. Roberts’ submission on the missed opportunity for deploying 
large numbers of Mounted Infantry in the field,44  an error for which he ought 
to accept most responsibility as Commander-in-Chief in theatre,45  could not 
absolve him of blame for the logistical nightmare precipitated by his decision 
to extemporise large numbers of untrained Mounted Infantry. In general, 
Mounted Infantry supporters qualified their approbation by stressing pre-
requisites of improved equitation, proficiency in musketry, sustained mobility, 
functional utility, brevity of training compared to traditional cavalry and its 
ease of numerical expansion. Major General Knox considered cavalry 
redundant46 with his extreme view juxtaposed with diametric polarity of 
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Haig,47  who stridently denigrated the continued existence of Mounted 
Infantry, thus contributing to the commissioners’ view that polarity of 
testimony impaired validation and the drawing of relevant conclusions. 
Although Haig was foremost among the Mounted Infantry’s detractors, he 
was not alone. Rimington’s submission,  like Haig’s, advocated the complete 
abolition of the Mounted Infantry on the grounds of its poor horsemanship 
causing excessive equine losses48 and claiming its effectiveness on 
campaign to be half that of trained cavalry.49 Although a cavalry officer well-
regarded throughout the army predominantly through his command of 
colonial Mounted Rifles, his assertion was not without the scent of prejudice, 
clearly delineating the lines for the forthcoming battles for institutional 
survival. Rimington also resurrected the hackneyed prediction that Mounted 
Infantry would be helpless against European cavalry through its lack of 
equitation and absence of a personal defensive weapon.50 As indicated in a 
previous chapter, this prophesy, a presumed fundamental yet 
unsubstantiated flaw of Mounted infantry (at least to its detractors), remained 
a Damoclean threat to its survival whenever the prospect of a European 
conflict was contemplated. Haig also reiterated another durable myth, that 
retention of Mounted Infantry would lead to straightened logistics through 
active competition for remounts and forage, an allegation founded in the 
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experiences of South Africa but with little relevance for the European 
battlefield where forage would be plentiful and cavalry would not rely on the 
small cobs of the Mounted Infantry for remounts. Haig concluded that the 
Mounted Infantry was unnecessary for there was no Mounted Infantry 
function that the cavalry could not out-perform,51 with this confident 
prediction foretelling his involvement in the Mounted Infantry’s demise. 
French’s evidence complemented his cavalry colleagues with his submission 
deprecating the Mounted Infantry through its poor equitation and failures of 
reconnaissance although his evidence lacked the singular cogency of Haig’s 
denunciation by conceding that the Mounted Infantry had been ‘most useful’  
on occasions. 52 The commissioners concluded rightly, after hearing more 
moderate submissions, that ‘in practice there was no real distinction between 
the use of Mounted Infantry and Mounted Rifles and, in the latter part of the 
war, the cavalry were armed and employed in much the same way’.53  The 
commissioners qualified their summation by concluding that whereas cavalry 
could function alone, Mounted Infantry could only function in conjunction with 
cavalry,54  still reflecting the fear of the Mounted Infantry’s predicted tactical 
helplessness against enemy cavalry - a nuance that owed much to Haig’s 
antipathetic submission. 
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Therefore, were there clear lessons to be learned by the Mounted Infantry 
from the deliberations of the Elgin Commission? Although the cavalry versus 
Mounted Infantry debate had been explored through submissions, no 
absolute recommendations regarding mounted doctrine or differentiation of 
mounted roles appeared in the Commission’s report,55  although the 
importance of equitation training to support reconnaissance through 
improved peacetime training was emphasised.56  Importantly the 
Commission re-opened the debate whether the Mounted Infantry should be 
permanent or abstracted, though no clear recommendation was 
forthcoming.57  Therefore, arguably for the Mounted Infantry at least, the 
heightened acrimony resulting from the Commission, whether related to the 
arme blanche debate, the deficits of extemporised Mounted Infantry or the 
question of Mounted Infantry permanence, was its main outcome. 
Thus, although it is tempting to frame the last decade of the Mounted 
Infantry’s existence purely in terms of these factors, this approach would 
overlook the interdependent changes occurring in function and identity to the 
Mounted Infantry. The details of such changes have been explored in two 
preceding chapters yet warrant brief reiteration to contextualise the Mounted 
Infantry’s eventual demise. The Mounted Infantry transposed functionally and 
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in its identity during these post-Commission years from ‘ikona’ utilitarianism 
to the discrete, if theoretical, duality of non-cavalry divisional mounted troops 
(officially referred to still as ‘divisional cavalry’) and cavalry-substitute within a 
Mounted Brigade accompanying cavalry, horse artillery and cyclists. The 
appellation ‘cavalry’ seemed to confirm the worst fears of the cavalry as to 
the Mounted Infantry’s ambitions and while representing a legitimate search 
for a doctrinal role, this duality consigned the Mounted Infantry to a 
conversion from archetype, admittedly perhaps only for colonial conflict,58  to 
a cavalry-substitute, dissipating its fundamental, if idiosyncratic, attributes as 
mobile infantrymen and risking competition and comparison to the reforming 
cavalry. This transition in function and identity was enacted against the 
backdrop of personal antipathy and evolving personal political influences,59  
and, most importantly, the re-focussing of military strategy towards a 
potential European conflict.60 This process gained momentum following the 
Anglo-French Entente 190461 and in reaction to threatened hostilities arising 
from rival German and French North African aspirations during the Moroccan 
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Crisis of 1905.62  The souring of general relations with Germany, in part due 
to the latter’s ambitious naval construction programme,63  and an 
increasingly anti-German British foreign policy to counter German imperial 
ambitions64  resulted in the resolve to deploy troops on the continent if 
necessary.65  In the latter part of the decade, under the auspices of Henry 
Wilson, then Director of Military Operations66 and a keen advocate of military 
cooperation with the French Army,67  an expeditionary force, which included 
Mounted Infantry, expressly for deployment ‘in a civilised country and in a 
temperate climate’68 rather than in the colonies, was devised. Its inclusion in 
a novel continental expeditionary force, rather than for colonial campaigns, 
presented the Mounted Infantry with a number of challenges. As previously 
mentioned, throughout its existence the Mounted Infantry’s ability to 
withstand a clash with European-trained regular cavalry had always been 
doubted by its detractors on the grounds of inferior equitation, lack of 
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personal weapons for defence and the accepted orthodoxy of the irresistible 
momentum of the mounted charge.69  As noted earlier, Hutton had always 
advocated personal defensive weapons for Mounted Infantry use70  and 
equally discredited this doom-laden prophesy by encouraging Mounted 
Infantry to fight dismounted in more favourable ‘broken’ ground if attacked by 
enemy cavalry, noting too that, tactically ‘no commander of a cavalry force 
would risk his Mounted Infantry by employing them in the face of a European 
cavalry when the ground was favourable to the actions of that arm’.71  
However, the Mounted Infantry’s reliability in the face of ‘enemy’ cavalry 
during manoeuvres plus the cavalry’s weakness in dismounted fire tactics 
which persisted as late as 1910,72 should have confirmed the Mounted 
Infantry’s claim as troops of choice for mobile firepower on the battlefield.73 
Naturally, cavalry officers disagreed, with Rimington surprisingly claiming 
parity with the infantry in firepower despite the cavalry’s numerical 
inferiority.74  Hutton was not blind to the risks to his Mounted Infantry of being 
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embroiled in mounted combat but clearly neither did he anticipate that 
Mounted Infantry would be deployed without the benefit of cavalry 
cooperation, thus emphasising that Hutton was never such an unrealistic and 
ardent advocate of Mounted Infantry that he assumed sole ability for his 
force in all possible mounted roles. Indeed, Hutton had recognised the 
lesson arising from previous cavalry manoeuvres of the need, not for 
competition, but for cooperation between cavalry and Mounted Infantry 
despite a dearth of integration or cooperation extant in the army at that 
time.75  Although whether a future European conflagration would necessarily 
be preceded by a large-scale massed cavalry collision and whether this 
really constituted a risk to the deployment of Mounted Infantry remained 
speculative. This scepticism was borne out by subsequent events, at least on 
the Western Front, in August 1914. Although the Mounted Infantry’s 
resilience to cavalry attack was never put to the test, the Inspector General 
of Forces, despite the artificiality of peacetime inspections, deemed the 
Mounted Infantry able successfully to repel enemy cavalry through 
dismounted action with no instances recorded of the Mounted Infantry being 
surprised and attacked whilst still mounted.76 Furthermore, the continent’s 
patchwork of farm, copse and hedgerow was considered eminently suitable 
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the use of mobile riflemen in skirmishing and ambush77 with Mounted Infantry 
Training 190678 recommending these as preferred tactics against enemy 
cavalry. However, the Mounted Infantry now faced further competition from a 
reforming British cavalry79 and military cyclists, whose claim of superiority as 
mobile infantryman in countries with metalled roads,80 will be considered 
later in this chapter. 
A second important influence impacting on the Mounted Infantry’s doctrine 
and identity between the years 1902-13 was the resurrection of the debate 
on whether the Mounted Infantry should be permanent or reconfigured when 
required. The re-assignation of much of the army in South Africa to Mounted 
Infantry or Mounted Rifles was a temporary arrangement without post-war 
longevity as, leaving regimental loyalties aside, the army reverted to its pre-
war organisation with even the Elgin Commission cautioning against 
assuming that lessons from South Africa should drive fundamental changes 
in army organisation.81  Lieutenant Colonel Maude, in his book defending the 
cavalry, pointed out unequivocally ‘the conditions which rendered it [the Boer 
War] unlike all others within human memory’.82 Crucially for the Mounted 
Infantry, less than a third of senior army officers who submitted favourable 
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views of the Mounted Infantry to the Commission, recommended a state of 
permanency.83  While the identity of the Mounted Infantry was functional 
rather than organisational, this rejection of permanency does not imply 
disbelief in the arm or disloyalty from its officers. This realisation of functional 
identity rather than one predicated on organisation negates criticisms alleged 
of Mounted Infantry officers’ institutional negligence undermining the arm’s 
survival. As discussed previously, even junior officers, originally enthusiastic 
for service in the Mounted Infantry in South Africa,84  chose to revert back to 
regimental service after hostilities ended, recognising that Mounted Infantry 
service was temporary and not life-long.85  Furthermore, the subsequent 
rejection of permanency by the War Office, predicated in part on cost-
effectiveness and propensity for numerical expansion when needed,86  was 
paralleled by the almost indecent haste with which Mounted Infantry 
battalions were disbanded in the immediate aftermath of the war when the 
number of Mounted Infantry battalions in South Africa reduced by 63 per cent 
in late 1902 and by another 50 per cent by October 1903, leaving just five 
Mounted Infantry battalions in the country thereafter.87  The corollary of 
abstracted impermanence had been the adverse impact on manpower on 
parent infantry battalions, noted by the Inspector General of Forces as being 
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viewed by infantry battalion commanders with ‘apprehension and alarm’88  
with such numerical deficits ameliorated by reservists. At least for regiments 
garrisoning South Africa, the Inspector General of Overseas Forces, Ian 
Hamilton, permitted the five infantry battalions to recruit above establishment 
by 156 officers and men for their Mounted Infantry companies89  that were 
established as quasi-permanent forces away from the rest of their battalions 
for the duration of the tour of duty. At home, to mitigate against the resulting 
manpower crisis in the infantry battalions, designating an extra company per 
infantry battalion as trained Mounted Infantry was proposed, although adding 
a ninth company to the standard eight company battalion would not only 
have increased its cost but further exacerbate shortages arising from 
recruitment shortfalls.90 The difficulty in balancing the supply of trained 
infantrymen for the Mounted Infantry without affecting the parent infantry 
battalion was never solved satisfactorily despite imaginative suggestions 
including the voluntary extension for Mounted Infantry service by soldiers 
about to be discharged into the Reserve already considered in Chapter Two. 
This would have diminished costs compared to the ‘ninth company’ proposal 
and would have found favour with infantry colonels but, in turn, may have 
jeopardised the numerical adequacy of the Reserve. Furthermore, the 
competency of Mounted Infantry reservists, if their equitation skills atrophied 
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in the absence of retraining, was questioned.91  However, by rejecting 
permanency, the only opportunity to capitalise on the Mounted Infantry’s 
popularity and utility following the Boer War was lost, leaving the 
impermanent Mounted Infantry to political machination and the effects of a 
resurgent cavalry.  
The firepower versus arme blanche debate following the Elgin Commission 
had been marked by Roberts’ policy of the promoting the primacy of 
firepower for all mounted troops,92 highlighted by his ill-fated preface to 
Cavalry Training 1904 (Provisional), and later, his involvement with Erskine 
Childers’ War and the Arme Blanche, both of which were condemned by 
senior cavalry officers.93  An extension of his pro-firepower argument was 
Roberts’ attempted abolition of the cavalry lance except for practice, leisure 
and ceremonial duties in 1903,94  an order never entirely adhered to by all 
senior cavalry commanders.95  If Roberts campaigned on the principle of the 
efficacy of the rifle, cavalry protagonists’ main responses were the need to 
maintain the ‘cavalry spirit’ of the arme blanche96 and, negatively, the 
ineffectiveness of the Mounted Infantry in cavalry roles, particularly 
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reconnaissance and attack, due to inadequate equitation.97  French naturally 
aligned himself with his cavalry colleagues but attempted some degree of 
equanimity regarding the Mounted Infantry,98  never being as vehement in 
his denigration as Haig. Kitchener, posted to India as Commander-in-Chief 
but still under political pressure from Roberts,99  did not display such 
polarised views as Roberts and Haig, showing a modicum of alignment with 
Roberts’ policy by re-designating two (out of thirty-one) Indian cavalry lancer 
regiments.100 In fairness, the retention of the lance in the Indian cavalry was 
probably appropriate and considered useful for ‘show and effect’101  in 
dealing with the civilian population. Nevertheless, it is clear that Roberts 
hoped Kitchener would influence, if not restrain, Haig, now also posted to 
India as Inspector General of Cavalry, in the latter’s promulgation of the arme 
blanche.102 Kitchener responded to Roberts that:  
          Haig has arrived and I have had one talk with him and mean to have  
          another. He seems to have a worrying idea that the moral of cavalry  
          will be injured by dismounted training. I have told him I disagree with  
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          this.103 
Kitchener though recognised the deeper connotations of the proposed policy 
at home, counselling caution, as: ‘the cavalry are, I think, evidently very 
nervous that more is intended than is written down and.....they may lose the 
power or spirit to attack the enemy’s cavalry when it is necessary’.104  
Despite seemingly diametrically opposed, the cavalry versus Mounted 
Infantry debate, played out in the military press,105 official documents,106 
training manuals107  and military debating circles,108  was finely nuanced and, 
as Badsey has shown, the position between the leading protagonists on both 
sides of the debate was less marked than imagined with Roberts admitting 
that the use of the sword may be necessary occasionally, stating that ‘I agree 
with you that a cavalry soldier must have a sword and be able to use it. And 
he must have a rifle and able to shoot well’,109  whilst having previously 
indicated that a limited number of Lancer regiments should be retained.110 
                                                          
103
 TNA, Kitchener Papers, PRO 37/57/29, 5 November 1903. 
 
104
 TNA, Kitchener Papers, PRO 37/57/29, Kitchener to Roberts, 26 January 1905. 
 
105
 Editorial, ‘War and the Arme Blanche’, pp. 283-87, provides a bitterly defensive view of the 
cavalry and a forceful partisan denigration of Childers’ work. 
 
106
 TNA WO 32 / 6782 Debate regarding the abolition of the lance 1903. 
 
107
 Mounted Infantry Training 1906; Mounted Infantry Training1909; Cavalry Training 1904; Cavalry 
Training 1907. 
 
108
Anon, ‘Which is the chief cavalry weapon?’, Cavalry Journal, 1907, 2, pp. 70-75; ‘Lancer’, ‘The 
Question of Mounted Infantry: a reply to ‘A Rifleman’, pp. 228-31; A.B.B., ‘A Defence of Mounted 
Infantry: an answer to ‘Lancer’, pp. 398-99; General Von Pelet-Narbonne, ‘Primary conditions for the 
success of cavalry in the next European War’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 50, 1906, 
pp. 326-34. 
  
109
 TNA, Kitchener Papers, PRO 37 / 57 / 28, Roberts to Kitchener, 30 June 1903.  
 
110
Elgin Commission, Cd.1790, I, evidence from Roberts (Q.10409, p.439).  
 
296 
 
Childers, although firmly antipathetic to edged weapons, certainly did not 
advocate the cavalry’s complete abolition.111 If Haig remained trenchant in 
his rebuttal of everything related to the Mounted Infantry, he still reflected 
that there was a role for dismounted firepower even if it was to be delivered 
by cavalry.112 Although Godley’s submission to the Elgin Commission that 
‘the Mounted Infantry should be trained to take over from cavalry’113  was 
misinterpreted by cavalry officers, the context was if cavalry were unavailable 
then Mounted Infantry, who should not be trained as cavalry per se, should 
have the requisite skills to step up to the challenge. There is no evidence that 
Godley ever actively considered that Mounted Infantry could or should 
replace cavalry in its entirety despite his advocacy for a large number of 
trained Mounted Infantry.114 Thus if polarity between individuals was not as 
extreme as imagined, then optimistically, the official manual Combined 
Training 1902, metaphorically ‘took a step forward’ by actively promoted an 
embryonic inter-arm cooperation that included cavalry and Mounted 
Infantry.115 
If the permanency question and persisting institutional friction, even if not so 
extreme as the protagonists assumed, permeated the decade, both were 
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diversions from the realities of developing a European campaign-focussed 
army. Despite obvious dissimilarities between the Boer War and a predicted 
continental conflagration as the Boers’ style of warfare was very different to 
that expected of European conscript armies, the Germans’ experience of 
French irregular franc-tireurs in 1870 - 71, which would influence subsequent 
German cavalry doctrine, superficially resembled aspects of the Mounted 
Infantry’s counterinsurgency duties in South Africa in 1901 - 02 where even 
the cavalry had needed to eschew traditional tactics.116 As much as the 
‘ikona’ reflected the realities of the war in South Africa, then the changes 
affecting the Mounted Infantry reflected the predicted challenges of war in 
Western Europe. Although Combined Training 1902 still identified with ‘ikona’ 
ubiquity by committing small Mounted Infantry units in vanguards, rearguards 
and flanks, if possible accompanied by machine guns and artillery,117 
Lieutenant Frankland of the 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers, in the Journal of the 
Royal United Services Institute, highlighted the confusion over the Mounted 
Infantry’s roles by listing no less than eleven separate functions expected of 
the Mounted Infantry.118  By comparison, by 1904, the Mounted Infantry was 
designated specifically as firepower support to the cavalry with a Mounted 
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Infantry battalion allocated per cavalry brigade,119  the certainty of its 
institutional survival and deployment seemingly now irrefutable despite the 
benefits of massed Mounted Infantry on campaign never being actually 
realised.120  Acknowledging such sentiment, French wrote to Colonel Plumer 
in June 1904: 
          The Mounted Infantry principle, as it is at present developed, has  
          thoroughly taken hold of our army and is understood by officers and  
          men alike. As such, I regard it as invaluable and I thoroughly agree  
          with you in thinking that the possession of such a force will probably  
          make all the difference between success and failure to a general  
         commanding in the field who knows how to put them to their proper  
          use.121 
This question of ‘how to put them to their ‘proper use’ was inextricably linked 
to its uncertain doctrine, its previous utilitarianism and the paucity of 
peacetime opportunities for senior army commanders to deploy Mounted 
Infantry, a force, it will be remembered, configured only for active service. 
Certainly concerns had been raised by the Inspector General of Forces in 
1905 that ‘there was still considerable doubt as to the correct role and 
organisation of Mounted Infantry in war’,122  indicating that doctrinal clarity 
had not been achieved. Moreover, this would later translate into 
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disparagement of the usefulness of the Mounted Infantry with The Times 
alleging that ‘no one knows how to handle them [Mounted Infantry] in the 
field’.123  If a startling admission, it was clearly self-fulfilling as the persisting 
absence of large formations of Mounted Infantry routinely deployed in 
peacetime manoeuvres precluded practice in the handling of such mounted 
troops as predicted. Nonetheless, by the end of the decade, with a 
noticeable drifting of doctrinal role, the Mounted Infantry was allocated, at 
least on paper, a cavalry-like role in the mixed Mounted Brigades of the 
expeditionary force alongside regular cavalry124  and, in company-sized 
distribution125  as protective divisional cavalry,126  having replaced its 
temporary predecessor, the Imperial Yeomanry, in this function in 1908.127 
These designations predictably further inflamed institutional rivalry. Godley, 
in supporting this dual designation, highlighted its risks of antagonising the 
cavalry and the very real possibility that the Mounted Infantry could be 
expected to assume ex-cavalry roles for which it had not trained.128  While 
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the mobilisation plans of 1906 simplified the organisational reconfiguration of 
the Mounted Infantry through abstraction on an army district basis, with one 
of ten battalions assigned per cavalry brigade or infantry division,129  tension 
between the two mounted arms persisted and despite presenting this 
mobilisation plan as a way of releasing cavalry to undertake independent and 
strategic roles including reconnaissance, cavalry officers presumed, naturally 
perhaps, that this was an unwelcome reiteration of Roberts’ previously 
proposed cavalry reforms diminishing the importance of cavalry and 
attempting forced conversion of cavalry regiments to Mounted Rifles or 
Mounted Infantry,130 despite reassurances from Hutton to the contrary.131  
Clearly confusion reigned in military circles with Captain Battine at the Royal 
United Services Institute exclaiming that ‘we hear a lot of talk about Mounted 
Infantry but I do not think anybody could really tell you what was the 
difference between a Mounted Infantry corps and a cavalry corps’.132 In the 
opposing Mounted Infantry ‘camp’, even the most ardent protagonists of the 
arm, Hutton and Alderson, also demonstrated uncertainty over the survival of 
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their force. As early as November 1900, Alderson had asked Hutton about 
the future of the Mounted Infantry,133  whilst, by mid-1902, just after 
cessation of hostilities in South Africa, Hutton advised Alderson to direct his 
energy into reorganising the Yeomanry into Light Horse, thus mimicking 
Hutton’s strategy in the newly-federated Australia, whilst apologising that he 
could not fund suitable employment for Alderson in Australia.134 
However, these new roles created additional challenges for the Mounted 
Infantry. Allocating a divisional cavalry role to an extemporised force posed 
inherent difficulties as liaison and communication, which would normally 
evolve during peacetime training, would be deficient if the Mounted Infantry 
was unavailable to participate in manoeuvres and if the Mounted Infantry 
was not aligned with a division that contained its parent battalion, a risk not 
lost on the Mounted Infantry’s detractors in the Press.135  Optimistically, the 
Army Council predicted that Mounted Infantry as divisional cavalry would 
ensure that protective duties would be undertaken more effectively than if 
performed by Yeomanry due to bonds of familiarity within the regular army 
which, in turn, would diminish infantry battalion commanders’ reluctance to 
release their men for Mounted Infantry duties.136  For the Mounted Infantry, 
its deployment in mixed Mounted Brigades now necessitated enhanced 
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equitation training in order to undertake the traditional ‘cavalry screen’ role 
that demanded greater riding skills across country.137 Thus, for the first time, 
the Mounted Infantry truly appeared to be about to officially replace the 
cavalry in traditional specific cavalry duties and thus no longer remaining an 
adjunct to the cavalry but becoming the ‘new’ cavalry of the 20th century. 
Godley, writing in the Cavalry Journal, perhaps in an attempt to ameliorate 
cavalry officers’ reactions, emphasised that Mounted Infantry, now assured 
of its mobility through improved equitation training, would not however be 
assuming all traditional cavalry roles but concentrate on its previous tasks of 
protecting horse artillery and establishing a focus or ‘pivot of manoeuvre’ for 
the brigade, only trespassing into traditional cavalry work if absolutely 
necessary.138  Whether the professionally ambitious Godley truly believed 
this apology remains speculation. While the benefits of combining Mounted 
Infantry, cavalry, horse artillery, cyclists and machine guns was promoted by 
the General Staff,139 replacement of the cavalry by Mounted Infantry was 
never realistically entertained.140 True, the concept of a heterogeneous 
Mounted Brigade held many attractions including sparing of the limited 
number of cavalry regiments available for deployment on the continent, 
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ensuring mobile firepower, encouraging improved inter-arm cooperation141 
and deploying a versatile mounted force. Yet the innovation, despite 
formulation on paper and trials of mixed Mounted Brigades in the 1908 
Aldershot Manoeuvres,142  never reached fruition in wartime, foundering on a 
combination of institutional inertia, resurgent ‘hybrid’ cavalry and army 
politics leaving the feeling of ‘too little, too late’. Certainly, a similar symbiosis 
proposed immediately after the Mounted Infantry’s inception could have 
confirmed the Mounted Infantry’s doctrinal position before institutional 
hostility became entrenched143 yet debate had always been dissipated over 
other issues particularly permanency versus abstraction. Eventually, 
following a sustained antagonistic pro-cavalry Press campaign deprecating 
the Mounted Infantry as divisional cavalry144 facilitated by a repatriation of 
two cavalry regiments from garrison duties in South Africa thus increasing 
the number of available cavalry squadrons at home, the Army Council 
replaced the Mounted Infantry with cavalry, in conjunction with cyclists,145  in 
both the Mounted Brigade and as divisional cavalry146  effectively rendering 
the Mounted Infantry redundant.  
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Clearly, this decade of flux in doctrine for the Mounted Infantry was not in 
isolation from changes in the rest of the army. Indeed the years after 1902 
were marked by an expansion in overview and scrutiny of training by senior 
officers through increasing peacetime manoeuvres and inspections.147 This 
increased focus on training and simulation, irrespective of much of its 
artificiality,148  permitted analysis of military performance that, through the 
reports of the directors of manoeuvres, inspectors of individual arms and the 
deliberations of the Army Council, helped to invoke changes in the army and 
facilitated feedback to army commanders. The performance of the Mounted 
Infantry, previously only reconfigured occasionally in peacetime for training, 
was disjointed and inconsistent as judged by official reports,149 arising from a 
lack of clarity as to what was expected of it. The 1905 Manoeuvres used 
Mounted Infantry as divisional cavalry yet their orders confusingly 
encompassed more than infantry and artillery protection duties and required 
the Mounted Infantry to function like cavalry in advance guard and strategic 
reconnaissance roles plus identification of enemy defence points by drawing 
enemy fire (all rather reminiscent of Alderson’s sardonic ‘Decoy Ducks’ 
essay arising from his Mounted Infantry experiences in South Africa)150 as 
well as seizing and defending tactically important features such as 
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bridges.151  Clearly, as the report states, these were the anticipated roles of 
the Mounted Infantry in the next war but, as shown by similar tasks allotted to 
the Mounted Infantry during the 1906 Manoeuvres, remained at variance with 
official expectations laid down in the new Mounted Infantry Training 1906 
which explicitly described the tactical use of Mounted Infantry in terms of its 
cavalry support role.152 This ambiguity harks back to the days of the ‘ikona’ 
when the Mounted Infantry turned its hand to anything as depicted in 
Kipling’s poem. This emphasis on cavalry support faded as cavalry reform 
fulfilled Haig’s prediction that the cavalry could match any task delegated to 
the Mounted Infantry and which supported his assertion, described in his 
1907 Cavalry Studies, that the cavalry’s battlefield roles would continue to 
expand.153 Although minor practical deficiencies in the Mounted Infantry were 
identified during manoeuvres including providing inadequate protection for 
horses when dismounted,154 remaining mounted for too long and, at times, 
manifesting a lack of initiative at company command level,155  the narrative 
following the1905 Manoeuvres remarked on, ‘a standard of efficiency in the 
Mounted Infantry of the Aldershot Army Corps [which] was far beyond the 
GOC’s [General Officer Commanding] expectations’.156  As late as 1909, the 
Inspector General of Force’s report complimented the Mounted Infantry, 
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referred to now in parts of the Press as the ‘maidservants of the English 
military system’,157 not least on its keenness but also importantly, in view of 
criticism founded on its performance in the Boer War, its high standards of 
equitation and horsemastership.158  Not all aspects of such appraisals were 
complimentary with the Mounted Infantry Inspection 1906 concluding that 
there was ‘not much gained by employing Mounted Infantry...and the tasks 
could have been left to the Infantry’.159 Thus the Mounted Infantry’s ongoing 
existence always remained an open question within the army, both at the 
level of cavalry and Mounted Infantry officers but also seemingly in higher 
echelons such as the Inspectors General and the Army Council.   
By the end of the decade the newly formed air battalions began to encroach 
on the traditional cavalry role of reconnaissance and threatened the roles of 
both cavalry and Mounted Infantry.160 Despite the vicissitudes of mechanical 
reliability of primitive aircraft, atmospheric visibility and the challenges of 
interpretation of what could be seen from the air,161 the evident lesson of the 
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1912 Army Manoeuvres was the demonstrable value of the embryonic aerial 
reconnaissance namely that: 
          There can no longer be any doubt as to the value of airships and  
          aeroplanes in locating an enemy on land. Though aircraft will probably  
          have several uses in war, their primary duty is searching for  
          information and consequently their alliance with cavalry will be of a  
          close character.162 
The benefits of aerial reconnaissance meant that the cavalry and other 
mounted troops, whilst not excluded from the duties of reconnaissance, were 
now in danger of demotion as its primary practitioners. Subsequent trials 
confirmed the feasibility of aerial scouting permitting surprisingly accurate 
identification of troops that led to imaginative, theoretical but often 
unworkable advice to troops how to remain unobserved on the ground.163  It 
also became apparent that cooperation with other embryonic branches of the 
army, most importantly military cyclists, would be vital, a novel symbiosis of 
mobility in the air and on ground between aviators and mobile troops,164 
occurring at a time when distrust between cavalry and Mounted Infantry had 
not abated. In a lecture in 1911, De Lisle asserted that ‘Mounted Infantry 
must be capable of all mounted duties except mounted attack’ which, in 
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hindsight, was an important assertion by an officer with experience in light 
infantry, Mounted Infantry and cavalry command as it underlined that just two 
years before its abolition an officer with hitherto balanced experience in all 
relevant arms still considered that the Mounted Infantry performed important 
duties and therefore had a future in the army.165 Furthermore, De Lisle did 
not discount the ability of Mounted Infantry in a European conflict but merely 
accepted combat against enemy cavalry would test the Mounted Infantry 
more than on colonial campaigns. Nevertheless, the lack of evolution in 
Mounted Infantry doctrine apart of the compromise of its participation in 
mobilisation as divisional mounted troops and as a cavalry-sparing 
component of mixed Mounted Brigades, in hindsight perhaps reflecting the 
waning of popularity of the arm with senior army officers, can be seen as a 
prediction of the arm’s imminent demise. To highlight the doctrinal distrust 
manifest in the army, a contemporary briefing paper for the Committee for 
Imperial Defence in 1911, prepared by the General Staff, suggested that “our 
cavalry (was) hardly equal to either French or German”, conversely praising 
both infantry and artillery in comparison to continental armies.166  Thus if the 
cavalry was considered to be inferior to other arms in the army and also in 
comparison to continental rivals, the Mounted Infantry’s demise seems all the 
stranger. It is ironic, therefore, that the decade in which the Mounted Infantry 
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was definitively defined and afforded a discrete military role,167 was also the 
decade in which the Mounted Infantry largely turned its back on its infantry 
doctrine and became a cavalry substitute, explicitly assuming a role 
previously the responsibility of the cavalry of the line, exposing the arm to the 
‘cavalry of poverty’ jibe of its detractors in the Press and to institutional in-
fighting in the War Office.168  Furthermore, as an additional threat, the 
decade also confirmed that the Mounted Infantry was not the only possible 
means of applying mobile firepower on the modern battlefield with the 
appearance of the mobile infantryman in the guise of the military cyclist.  
Thus, with the advent of the military cyclist, the Director of the 1913 Army 
Exercises noted:  
          The value of cyclist battalions in close country came prominently to 
          notice. Cyclists, to perform successfully the many duties for which they  
          are peculiarly fitted, must be fully conversant with the role of mobile  
          infantry, expert in the use of the rifle and thoroughly fit’.169  
The language used mirrored previous arguments regarding the Mounted 
Infantry with its emphasis on mobility, expertise in musketry and requirement 
as fully-trained infantry.170  Similar admonitions against attempting combat 
whilst mounted resembled previous edicts for the horsed Mounted Infantry 
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and underlined the bicycle as a mode of locomotion and not as a weapon of 
war.171  The inception and development of the military cyclist as another form 
of mobile soldier occurred against a background of increasing popularity of 
cycling for leisure among the Edwardian public.172  However military cyclists 
were not a completely new innovation. Previous trials using cyclists in 
European armies had yielded positive results even if the military role of 
cyclists had remained inconclusive.173  The question, which mirrored the 
doctrinal quest affecting the Mounted Infantry, was: ‘granted that the cycle be 
adopted as a new military equipage, to what purposes could it and its rider 
be most advantageously assigned?’174   
Early British trials in the 1880s had been predominantly with rifle volunteers 
rather than regular infantry thus setting the trend almost until the First World 
War where the military cyclist tended to be an amateur soldier in the 
volunteers or, after 1908, the Territorial Force175  rather than in the regulars. 
Cyclists had not been a rarity during the war in South Africa despite Roberts’ 
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poor opinion of their value expressed to the Elgin Commission.176  It has 
been estimated that cyclists comprised three per cent of all British forces in 
South Africa177  and had the occasional notable military success in 
combat.178 Admittedly, terrain constrained the use of cyclists to either 
roads179 or, because of the paucity of suitable roads, to the railway where 
ingenious tandem cycles and four-man squad cycles capable of running on 
rails were used for the purposes of patrolling between blockhouses, for 
reconnaissance and casualty evacuation.180  Even the Boers used cyclists in 
a limited capacity to spare their horses for routine camp duties.181  With the 
development of Cyclist Drill 1890, based on the experiences of Royal Marine 
cyclists,182 and Cyclist Drill 1900,183  the basic organisational structure and 
military pre-requisites for military cyclists were set down and bore remarkable 
similarities to those of the Mounted Infantry. The presupposition of 
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attainment of fully-trained infantry drill, the selection of officers and men on 
merit and the principle that cyclists should be commanded by their own 
officers throughout training and organisation based on small unit size,184  all 
reflected that of the Mounted Infantry.185 Furthermore, in keeping with horsed 
Mounted Infantry, military cyclists rapidly accrued an increasingly lengthy list 
of military roles and responsibilities including reconnaissance, advance 
guard and rearguard duties for which they were considered particularly well-
suited because of their propensity for rapid dismounting and re-mounting.186  
What becomes clear is that cyclists faced many of the same tactical 
problems that had confronted horsed Mounted Infantry such as the optimum 
method of carrying rifles, whether attached to the cycle or slung over the 
man’s shoulder; how should swords be carried; estimates of the load 
permissible on cycles and which cycle design was most appropriate and 
cost-effective.187 Yet the evolution of the military cyclist was far less 
contentious, attracting much less opprobrium from within the army, than 
horsed Mounted Infantry. This lack of controversy extended to the cyclists’ 
role and their organisation.188  The post-war manual Combined Training 1902 
predicted that the cyclists’ main role would be advance scouting when there 
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were metalled roads, anticipating the re-focussing of army thinking towards 
the European continental theatre.189 Yet even this failed to invoke the ire of 
cavalry officers.190  The reason was, seemingly, the perception of identity 
and a consequent lack of competition between two groups. 
It is tempting to equate directly the roles of the military cyclists and Mounted 
Infantry but this was controversial.191  With regards to functional roles, the 
cyclists’ predominant task was scouting with cyclists claiming that their 
resilience,192  speed,193  endurance, and minimal maintenance requirements 
that meant that they were “the beau ideal Mounted Infantry of the road”.194 
The use of cyclists during the Cavalry Division’s training in 1912, whilst not 
quite revelatory, had yielded important lessons as not only were they 
important for communication and as escorts to the supply train but ranging 
‘enemy’ cyclist patrols were considered as much a danger as its cavalry. 
During reconnaissance patrols, cyclists eclipsed horsed Mounted Infantry in 
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endurance and penetration of the opposition’s defences,195  a conclusion 
previously also reached during the 1904 Manoeuvres.196  Contrary to the 
persistent predictions of the Mounted Infantry’s future annihilation on the 
points of foreign sabres, no such concerns were voiced about cyclists whose 
instructions to form a modified protective square behind their cycles with 
wheels set spinning to unnerve the enemy horses, were left untested in 
war.197 Despite trials of regular infantry as despatch rider cyclists in 1888, 
cyclists were, for the most part, members of the volunteer force.198 Indeed 
only Territorial troops formed complete cyclist battalions in 1914 with the 
regular army forming numerically limited sections199  as the Army Council 
demonstrated no pretensions of raising independent regular cyclist 
regiments.200  Clearly, in the context of the wrangling between cavalry and 
Mounted Infantry over reconnaissance roles, cyclists as scouts could have 
been portrayed equally as a challenge to the cavalry, yet there seems very 
little controversy between these two branches.201  In fact, Haig appears to 
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have granted his approbation earlier to the cyclists by promoting cyclists in 
his submission to the Elgin Commission.202  In ‘Our Cavalry’, Rimington 
welcomed cyclists as an ‘accessory’ in outpost and reconnaissance work, 
this being a step-change in attitude from Rimington’s vociferous denunciation 
of horsed Mounted Infantry.203  Being part-time soldiers and not part of the 
regular army, the cyclists were neither ‘smart’ nor from ‘smart’ regiments and 
thus no threat to the cavalry. Although much was made at the time of the 
attraction of cyclist companies encouraging recruitment of men who would 
not have otherwise entertained military service,204 there was an undeniable 
and unbridgeable gulf, professionally and socially, between those in cyclists 
companies and cavalry regiments. Not being horsed, the cyclists did not 
suffer from the Mounted Infantry’s controversial equine focus. From the 
cavalry’s perspective, cyclists had none of the élan of mounted troops and 
patently could not deliver shock tactics.205 Furthermore, the quantum of 
cyclists, even those from the regular army, remained substantially smaller 
than the Mounted Infantry and did not constitute a numerical threat to the 
cavalry, being too few to take on the role of fire support unlike the Mounted 
Infantry. Previously, cyclists’ hopes for an expansion into a large force for 
home defence had foundered through fiscal constraint.206  The long term 
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effect of such constraint was that cyclists would be always used in small 
numbers and a Cyclist Division was never contemplated. Unlike the Mounted 
Infantry, whose impermanence had been a persistent question mark, the 
cyclists’ configuration attracted no dissent. Peacetime permanence, rather 
than abstraction, was never realistically considered, predicated perhaps on 
the Mounted Infantry’s experience but more realistically on fiscal and 
organisational grounds.207  There were similar complaints from infantry 
battalion commanders regarding the loss of their men to the cyclist 
detachments,208 resembling complaints about abstraction to the Mounted 
Infantry, but there was no opposition to cyclist units being configured for 
peacetime manoeuvres probably due to the close cooperation seen between 
cyclists and the infantry divisions. Therefore, it was accepted with almost 
catechismal certainty that cyclists with the state of current technology could 
never replace cavalry but would perform as its auxiliary, its junior partner, 
furnished by abstraction from the regular infantry.209 Thus, from the cavalry’s 
perspective, if there was no doctrinal competition or equine focus, then there 
was no threat to its role, identity, prestige or way of life.210  
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Eventual substitution of cyclists for Mounted Infantry as divisional cavalry, 
with the reduced costs of approximately £4,000 when employing cyclists 
instead of Mounted Infantry, dealt a mortal blow to the fortunes of the horsed 
Mounted Infantry.211  Military cyclists were assimilated quickly into the army’s 
doctrine providing comparatively mundane communications and orderly 
duties, now that the reformed cavalry provided its own firepower, therefore 
not completely assuming the defunct Mounted Infantry’s functionality.212 
Advances in technology during this decade also permitted the advent of 
motor cyclists to aid communication particularly a more rapid transfer of 
intelligence between Headquarters and cyclist advance units.213  Scarcity of 
ownership of motor cycles and the rarity of those requisite skills of 
motorcycle maintenance ensured enhancements to pay and automatic 
appointment of riders to non-commissioned officer rank making motor 
cyclists something of a temporary élite.214 However, numerical insufficiency 
and inherent mechanical unreliability dissuaded the development of 
motorised Mounted Infantry.215 
When hostilities began in August 1914, the General Officer Commanding 
Mounted Division had the 25th County of London and 6th Sussex cyclist 
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battalions available for his use.216 During the retreat from Mons, Brigadier 
General Haldane recalled the multiple roles of the cyclist companies he 
encountered,217  many of whom functioned as despatch riders, rearguard 
patrols, guarding road intersections, blocking roads ready for ambush and 
skirmishing with advancing German cavalry, thus materially contributing to 
the escape of the beleaguered British Corps.218  By November 1914, 
improved organisation resulted in an Army Cyclist Corps serving the whole of 
the British Army, comprising cyclists from both regular and Territorial 
battalions.219  As late as September 1915, when static trench warfare was 
well-established and manoeuvre no longer possible, divisional mounted 
troops continued to combine a cavalry squadron and cyclist company.220  
Although potentially a form of Mounted Infantry in their own right, the volume 
of Mounted Infantry duties undertaken by cyclists was limited, largely by a 
lack of ‘off road’ capability, yet for the campaign in question, cyclists as 
mobile infantry ably maintained the Mounted Infantry ethos and whilst 
traditional Mounted Infantry had disappeared, its functionality persisted in the 
military cyclists, particularly their vestigial roles as scouts and mobile 
riflemen.  
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Whilst the British Army re-focussed on the possibility of conflict on the 
European mainland and attempted to assimilate both the lessons of 1899 – 
1902 and post-war peacetime manoeuvres, the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-05, the decade’s major conflagration, provided a further case study for 
lessons relevant to army strategy.221 Britain was not alone in this as eighty-
three military observers from fifteen countries were attached to the opposing 
armies.222  Although the impact of the Russo-Japanese War will be explored 
in a subsequent chapter, it is worth briefly outlining the conclusions drawn 
from the conflict with reference to the Mounted Infantry. For mounted troops 
at least, the War provided very few clear messages.223  Many reports 
severely criticised both sides’ cavalry forces, including The Times which 
stated unequivocally that ‘cavalry has been conspicuous not by its absence 
but by its utter and astonishing ineffectiveness’.224  The Russian cavalry, 
composed mainly of Cossack regiments,225  fought dismounted and despite 
its numerical superiority over Japanese cavalry, rarely functioned as a mobile 
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force226 despite its doctrine of mobility enabling deep raiding, outflanking and 
penetration of enemy defences.227  Colonel Waters with the British Military 
Mission attached to the Russian Army, considered that the Cossacks were 
‘valueless’ and, in practice, functioned as ‘an untrained yeomanry’.228  A 
similar deprecation was reported by Ian Hamilton attached to the Japanese 
Army.229   
Although mainly dismounted, Russian Cossack attacks were generally 
successful if the metrics of ground captured is considered but the Cossacks’ 
slowness in remounting was so poor that Japanese troops, including its 
cavalry which also favoured dismounted defensive tactics,230  had time to 
assume further defensive positions. Thus Russian cavalry were never able to 
convert dismounted breakthrough into pursuit and potential rout. This led 
Brigadier General Bethune, in his lecture reported in the Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institute, to predict that cavalry and Mounted Infantry 
needed to co-exist, cooperate tactically and that ‘Mounted Infantry should be 
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a source of strength to the cavalry’.231  Obviously such a prediction failed to 
anticipate cavalry reform in terms of improved dismounted firepower but, 
nevertheless, the point was well made that mobility and firepower were 
interlinked co-factors particularly in attack. In the subsequent post-lecture 
discussion, Hutton agreed with Bethune’s opinion and counselled against 
encouraging alternative European views adversely influencing the British 
doctrine of retaining cavalry and Mounted Infantry.232  As Count Wrangel 
succinctly, if erroneously, claimed: ‘sword and carbine are such different 
masters that the cavalryman simply cannot serve both with the same love’.233  
It was a view that had been shared two decades previously by Wolseley.234  
In addition, The Times’ correspondent felt that the conflict did not clarify 
whether cavalry or Mounted Infantry was superior though he retained his 
most acerbic criticism for the Russian Cossacks as ‘truly an absurdity’, with 
its peacetime training focussed on edged weapons but its wartime reliance 
on firearms.235 Irrespectively, the Cossacks were not trained officially as 
Mounted Infantry236  and although there was evidence of sporadic 
extemporised experiments with Mounted Infantry on both sides, mounted 
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troops remained untrained as bona fide Mounted Infantry.237 Captain Seki of 
the Imperial Japanese Army, as an infantry officer perhaps risking the 
accusation of institutional prejudice, claimed that the war had proved that the 
sword, and by extrapolation the arme blanche, was defunct,238  at a time 
when this was still a view not universally shared across Europe.239 
Nevertheless, the inconsistencies of these conclusions meant that there was 
no abandoning of the arme blanche in the European, including British, 
cavalries.240  It is perhaps this consequent retention of the arme blanche 
rather than a wholesale transition to Mounted Infantry that was the chief 
outcome of the Russo-Japanese war affecting British mounted doctrine in the 
first decade of the twentieth century.241   
Returning to the research question defining this chapter, can the factors 
implicated in the abolition of the Mounted Infantry be better understood in 
their comparative importance and can the Mounted Infantry’s apparently 
precipitous implosion whilst remaining a recognised and officially sanctioned 
arm, replete with a designated role at mobilisation, be explained? Current 
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orthodoxy, with Badsey as a leading proponent,242  has postulated a multi-
factorial explanation for the Mounted Infantry’s demise, indicating a gradual 
decline rather than implosion that included lack of senior army patronage, 
lack of loyalty to the arm from its commanders through regimental 
allegiances, institutional failure to train a numerically adequate force,  the 
cavalry’s renaissance, closure of the Mounted Infantry schools and the 
replacement of the Mounted Infantry as divisional troops by repatriated 
cavalry regiments and the nascent cyclist companies.243  Some of these 
factors can be discounted as major determinant factors based on previous 
discussion in this thesis. Although Roberts had been removed from his post 
in 1904, there remained enough senior officers with Mounted Infantry 
experience as supporters (as shown previously in the numbers who attained 
senior army rank in the years post-1902) including protagonists such as 
Hutton, Alderson and Godley but, importantly, also Ian Hamilton and 
Kitchener, the latter showing no obvious favouritism to either camp.244 
Furthermore, despite Haig’s trenchant views, French was considered by 
Godley as favourable to the Mounted Infantry even though a cavalryman, 
writing that: ‘Sir John French was one of the many cavalry soldiers who were 
very good friends to the Mounted Infantry’.245  The allegation of disloyalty of 
Mounted Infantry officers to the arm has been disproven in a previous 
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chapter. Cavalry reform had certainly yielded variable improvements in 
dismounted musketry yet this in itself was insufficient evidence for the 
abolition of the Mounted Infantry as shown by the prevailing opinions of both 
infantry and cavalry officers such as Bethune and Bulkeley Johnson.246  
True, cyclists were proving, at least during peacetime manoeuvres, to be 
promising mobile troops who could perform many of the orderly duties of 
divisional mounted troops yet their limitations off metalled roads remained a 
weakness. Even so, their deployment was not mutually exclusive to that of 
Mounted Infantry as shown by their joint presence in manoeuvres and 
inspections of 1904, 1905, 1906, 1909, 1912 and the Cavalry Division’s 
training exercise in 1912. Yet there was a lack of integration, or at least 
defined cooperation, in terms of training and thus, by extension, doctrine.247  
This then leaves the Mounted Infantry’s numerical weakness, inextricably 
linked to abstraction and the politics around the closure of the Mounted 
Infantry schools, as critical factors implicated in the abolition of the Mounted 
Infantry. 
Certainly the pseudonymous ‘Ikona’, writing shortly after the arm’s abolition, 
blamed the process of abstraction for the loss of the Mounted Infantry though 
the irony of this explanation was not lost: 
           It may appear paradoxical that the very reason that had enabled the  
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           Mounted Infantry in the past to attain such high honour in war is now  
           used by the War Secretary for its abolition – that those in the Mounted  
           Infantry were a loss to their infantry battalions.248 
The paper acknowledged the generosity of spirit that had permitted 
successful abstraction in the first place but overlooked the benefits accrued 
by battalions, at least in earlier times, when a readily accessible mounted 
force from within the battalion proved attractive to its commanders. 
Repington of The Times, never a supporter of the Mounted Infantry concept, 
questioned the viability of the Mounted Infantry because of abstraction’s 
alleged weakening of the infantry battalion.249  What had been considered 
previously to be one of the Mounted Infantry’s strengths, that all infantry 
regiments contributed to the Mounted Infantry through abstraction and hence 
could call upon officers and men trained for these duties, was now depicted 
as a fundamental weakness and one which could be fatal to the 
effectiveness of the army.250 The Times concluded that ‘the effect of these 
arrangements upon the infantry of the line is perfectly deplorable’ and that 
abandoning the model would yield more benefit, both organisationally and 
financially, than any deficit occurring.251  The Army Council’s decision to 
reorganise the cavalry of the British Expeditionary Force in 1913 and discard 
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the Mounted Infantry252  was based on a predicted inability to muster the 
required number of Mounted Infantry companies at mobilisation due to 
inadequate abstraction which, in any case, weakened infantry battalions 
numerically thus requiring returning reservists to make-up the shortfall.253 
This argument, whilst factually correct, appears disingenuous as even 
without the pressure of abstraction, most home infantry battalions required a 
significant injection of reservists to bring them to full establishment on 
mobilisation in 1914.254  For example, almost 40 per cent of the 4th Royal 
Fusiliers in August 1914 were recalled reservists.255 Considering this 
numerical quantum of reliance on reservists, the additional burden of another 
40 men abstracted for Mounted Infantry duties would hardly have 
destabilised the organisational integrity of the infantry battalion. The Army 
Council considered that presence of reservists in the ranks of the Mounted 
Infantry would ‘undoubtedly be a source of danger256  although the rationale 
is not specified. It can only be presumed that the fear was that reservists 
would have become de-skilled in equitation and thus be at the mercy of 
enemy cavalry although this was not considered a similar problem for cavalry 
reservists. Thus this particular argument seems untenable as a definitive 
cause for the abolition of the Mounted Infantry. Additional logistical factors 
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were cited by The Times in its criticism of the Mounted Infantry,257  including 
the need to identify mounts for both the Mounted Infantry and the cavalry 
being an extra burden, creating problems of identifying remounts for the 
latter. This argument, an old recycled canard dredged up from experiences in 
the Boer War, failed to acknowledge that the cobs used by the Mounted 
Infantry would be unlikely remounts for the cavalry who required larger 
horses. Previous estimates suggested that only five per cent of the Mounted 
Infantry’s cobs used in peacetime would be suitable as cavalry remounts. 258   
If there was any numerical shortfall, it was the falling number of infantrymen 
receiving Mounted Infantry training as a result of the closure of the Mounted 
Infantry schools. In the years immediately after 1902, Mounted Infantry 
training had been undertaken at schools in the United Kingdom, Egypt, 
South Africa and India. The closure of the Mounted Infantry schools in India 
from 1908 resulted from a realisation of cost savings and an awareness of 
the role of Mounted Infantry in India being limited as the only likely 
operational theatre for deployment was the mountainous North West Frontier 
which was not best suited to Mounted Infantry.259  The political influence of 
Haig, Inspector General of Cavalry in India between 1903 and 1906,260 in this 
decision remains conjecture but his outspoken views regarding the primacy 
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of cavalry as mounted troops, encapsulated in Cavalry Studies261  written 
during his time as the primary trainer of cavalry in India, leaves little doubt 
that he would not have been supportive of the continued existence of 
Mounted Infantry training. The closure of the remaining Indian schools 
accelerated in 1909, ironically at a time when an Indian cavalry school on the 
lines of the UK school at Netheravon was proposed. Haig’s subsequent 
appointment as Director of Military Training at home,262 a position of pre-
eminence in influencing the direction of military training, raises the possibility 
of his involvement in the closure of domestic Mounted Infantry schools 
although a causal relationship remains uncertain. Certainly Godley explicitly 
blamed Haig, rather than French, for the abolition of the Mounted Infantry, 
claiming that: ‘Douglas Haig [who] never rested till shortly before the Great 
War, when he succeeded in getting the [Mounted Infantry] schools broken up 
and the whole idea of Mounted Infantry training abandoned’.263  Hutton was 
less forgiving about French, blaming him and Jack Seely, the Secretary of 
State for War until resigning in 1914 over the Curragh affair, as the prime 
movers in the Mounted Infantry’s demise.264  Hutton and French had clashed 
previously, most notably during the Boer War, and Hutton’s opinion of 
French’s complicity may have been tainted by further acrimony with French 
over Hutton’s alleged public insubordination in 1906 that threatened to end 
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Hutton’s career.265  However, most pertinently, the omission of any mention 
of Mounted Infantry in Cavalry Training 1907, co-authored by Haig, appears 
to be an indirect statement of intent for a future without Mounted Infantry.266 
Thus, as an avowed opponent of Mounted Infantry throughout his 
professional career, it is difficult not to implicate Haig in the decision to close 
down the Mounted Infantry schools, including Longmoor, which as recently 
as 1909, had received excellent training reports.267  Regardless of Haig’s 
personal complicity, the closure of the schools effectively severed the supply 
of trained Mounted Infantry and, in David French’s construct of factors 
necessary for the survival of a culture,268  asphyxiated the Mounted Infantry’s 
ability to propagate its functional identity, contributing materially towards its 
numerical weakness which, in turn, was implicated in the arm’s abolition.  
Despite Hutton’s suspicions, there is no express evidence indicting French, 
although his predilection for political machination was well-known, having 
been implicated in the sackings of several cavalry commanders during the 
Boer War and possibly obstructing the promotion of at least one Mounted 
Infantry commander.269  Despite peacetime cooperation, the underlying 
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tensions between the two mounted arms, born of professional jealousy and 
magnified by experiences on the veldt, never resolved completely and it is 
difficult to exonerate senior cavalry officers from complicit involvement in the 
decision to abolish the Mounted Infantry. 
The Mounted Infantry’s impermanence, seemingly both its strength through 
ease of expansion and cost effectiveness, also became its weakness.270 Yet 
it is difficult to agree with Badsey’s assessment that the Mounted Infantry 
manifested a slow decline in the face of of cavalry reform as even in 1912, 
the semi-official publication Army Review promoted non-cavalry mounted 
troops for their speed, mobility and combination of firepower and 
manoeuvrability.271  As late as 1910, the General Staff anticipated a written 
policy encompassing all mounted troops including Mounted Infantry.272  
Although the cavalry reformed, a similar option in the Mounted Infantry was 
non-existent. This underlines the view that the Mounted Infantry was not an 
organisational entity but rather a functional identity and as such its 
transformation into non-cavalry divisional mounted troops was ill-advised as 
replacing cavalry in an independent Mounted Brigade was seemingly a 
doctrinal step too far. When reformed cavalry supported by cyclists became 
a viable alternative, the Mounted Infantry discovered itself bereft of a 
functional role. Thus, at the moment when the Mounted Infantry’s quest for a 
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discrete military function was attained, its new role, an explicit threat to the 
cavalry, exposed it to denigration, replacement and redundancy. Irrespective 
of capability, its impermanence and the alleged injury inflicted by abstraction 
on infantry battalions effectively doomed its survival.273  
With the formal abolition of the Mounted Infantry occurring a mere 12 months 
before the BEF embarked for France, it is tempting to speculate how the 
Mounted Infantry would have fared on the Western Front. Although it is 
important not to stray ill-advisedly into the realms of counterfactual history, 
the relative immediacy of the onset of hostilities to the Mounted Infantry’s 
abolition legitimises the question whether or not Mounted Infantry would 
have found a role during the war, both during the mobile operations of 1914 
and late 1918 but also during the intervening trench-based warfare. Badsey 
recognises the difficulty in answering this question274 but quotes Anglesey 
who recounted sporadic episodes of ex-Mounted Infantrymen obtaining 
horses during the retreat from Mons and attaching themselves to the 
cavalry.275 Such episodes were unplanned and incidental as there was no 
organised attempt to either replace cavalry losses with Mounted Infantry or to 
extemporise mounted troops in this way.276 Historically, the cavalry has 
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received much criticism, verging on derision, for its lack of success in the 
First World War with approbation reserved largely for the mounted troops in 
the Middle East in 1917 and 1918.277  This traditional view has concluded 
that cavalry was a force unable to cross the deadlocked trench system 
through machine gun fire and across shell-pocked terrain278 and which 
exhausted immense resources of forage and horseflesh. The cavalry was 
also considered the source of senior generals, destitute of innovation and 
impervious to the tribulations of their troops.279 Such orthodoxy relating to the 
cavalry has been largely replaced by the revisionism of historians such as 
John Terraine, Anglesey, Badsey, Phillips, and, most recently, David 
Kenyon. Terraine concluded that, realistically, the cavalry had been the only 
force capable of exploiting success or breakthrough of any scale despite the 
eventual introduction of tanks and mechanised vehicles.280  Attempting to 
reverse previous decades of denigration, Badsey considers that ‘the cavalry 
may be reasonably said to have succeeded in the War beyond 
expectation’.281 Both Badsey and Kenyon base their enthusiastic defence of 
the cavalry on a number of themes particularly the cavalry’s mobility on the 
battlefield during the periods of mobile warfare and also on a smaller scale 
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during the years of trench warfare where it was able to penetrate defences, 
when feasible, to a greater depth than possible by foot infantry.282  This 
largely took the form of rapid mounted advance followed by dismounted 
attack, supported by machine gun firepower, subsequently defending 
captured territory using its firepower and supporting artillery. John Vaughan, 
Chief Staff Officer Cavalry Division, described how the 5th Dragoon Guards 
executed in August 1914, in his opinion, ‘one of the best-timed cavalry rifle 
attacks’ that he had ever seen283  whilst later complimenting the 16th Lancers 
for their use of machine gun fire in its offensive attack on Mont des Cats, 
north east of Hazebrouck, which facilitated the regiment’s galloping advance 
and subsequent capture of the enemy’s trenches suffering minimal 
casualties.284  Archibald Home, a staff officer with the Cavalry Division, was 
less convinced, recording in his diary on 27th September 1914 that: ‘cavalry 
charging a trench or crawling up with a rifle in the hand and sword between 
the teeth like the pirate pictures one sees – this is infantry work and not 
Cavalry’.285 
Kenyon suggests that, rather than the derided anticipation of an exploitative 
gallop through a breach in defences by the whole Cavalry Division or Corps, 
the cavalry used its mobility to exploit smaller breaches of defences, fighting 
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within the confines of enemy defensive systems, or advancing rapidly using 
small unit tactics of between squadron and regiment size, occasionally 
extending to full brigade as at High Wood on the Somme in July 1916.286  In 
addition to its mobility, the cavalry fought dismounted alongside infantry, 
most prominently at Ypres in 1914, thus fulfilling the role of a mobile infantry 
reserve that had been one of the major roles expected of Mounted Infantry. 
Although Home complained that the Cavalry Division’s numerical weakness 
in firepower in comparison to an infantry division compromised its role as the 
only available mobile reserve, he qualified his criticism with the supposition 
that the cavalry’s added mobility in both attack and defence acted as a force 
multiplier compared to the infantry whose mobility and deployment was 
slower.287 Nevertheless, Home rightly praises the desperate effectiveness of 
using the cavalry as a mobile dismounted reserve, citing its successful 
deployment on the Aisne, at Messines and at Ypres.288 Yet the question 
arises – was this not precisely the role previously envisaged for the Mounted 
Infantry?289 
Not only was the cavalry used frequently in a dismounted role rather than in 
its traditional cavalry functionality, unlike the infantry there was no numerical 
wartime increase either in the number of regiments or their relative strengths 
with losses replaced from reserves or from the domestic Yeomanry. The 
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latter also resumed responsibility as divisional cavalry.290  Arguably this is yet 
another example of where a functioning Mounted Infantry, trained for this role 
and with the ability to expand numerically could have demonstrated its worth. 
The lack of robust expansion of cavalry and Yeomanry numbers, unlike the 
potential of Mounted Infantry expansion commensurate with the growing 
number of infantry battalions, contributed to the statistics that, as the army 
increased in size, the proportion of mounted troops fell in relative terms from 
6.6 per cent of total army numbers in 1914 to 1.01 per cent by November 
1918.291  The comparative strength of divisional mounted troops also 
decreased and despite a centralised reconfiguration into Corps Cavalry 
Regiments from May 1916, further reductions ensued with the dismounting of 
all but three regiments from October 1917.292  Consequently, the deficiency 
in divisional cavalry hampered the chances of rapid cavalry exploitation,293  
which Badsey considers impacted adversely on operations.294  Therefore, a 
number of roles expected of the cavalry and military cyclists in the First 
World War, particularly being a mobile reserve of firepower, and rapid small-
scale tactical exploitation reflected the pre-war roles of the Mounted Infantry. 
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Indeed, the Mounted Infantry had not only been instrumental in the 
development of such roles, learned through its experiences in the Boer War, 
but the Mounted Infantry had equal, if not more, peacetime training for such 
tasks than cavalry and Yeomanry .295  Ironically, Terraine considered that 
even later in the conflict, the cavalry gained credit during the German 
offensives of March 1918 by fighting again as a mobile reserve, very much 
as expected of pre-war Mounted Infantry.296  It was the cavalry’s ability to 
combine mobility and dismounted firepower in defence, rather than its arme 
blanche functionality, that was important during the spring crisis. Kenyon 
adds to this sense of the cavalry performing functions other than its 
traditional arme blanche roles by observing that the regiments of cavalry, 
dispersed as corps troops in August 1918, undertook reconnaissance but 
also despatch riding and prisoner control, functions arguably more suited to 
Mounted Infantry.297  Clearly these had been responsibilities allocated to the 
Mounted Infantry as divisional mounted troops before 1913. Even Haig 
referred, without intentional irony, to the ghosts of the pre-war Mounted 
Infantry when, in fighting a political rearguard action for the very existence of 
the cavalry arm in the War Cabinet in January 1918,298  he claimed that the 
cavalry now resembled highly trained mobile infantry rather than the old 
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cavalry arm - surely a most significant admission by the Mounted Infantry’s 
most arch-critic? Thus, not only did Haig validate the concept of mobile 
infantry, he expressly accepted the blueprint that had been forged in South 
Africa in 1901-02 with, retrospectively, the primacy of firepower superseding 
the arme blanche. A similar dissembling assertion was made by Lieutenant 
General Sir Philip Chetwode, ex-Hussar and previously commander of both 
the 5th Cavalry Brigade and 2nd Cavalry Division on the Western Front, 
regarding his mounted troops in the Middle East theatre comprising 
Dominion cavalry and British Yeomanry which he likened to ‘high-class 
mounted rifles rather than traditional cavalry’.299  As Anglesey has pointed 
out, the Australasian component of Chetwode’s division had indeed elected 
to remain Mounted Rifles, armed with the rifle, rather than adopt the arme 
blanche.300  If cavalry and other mounted troops were thus lauded for their 
non-arme blanche functionality, a functionality for which the pre-war Mounted 
Infantry was also trained to deliver, then a theoretical case can be made 
postulating that employment of bona fide Mounted Infantry during the conflict 
would have been equally, if not more, successful. However, Kenyon in his 
recent doctoral thesis disagrees, concluding that ‘simply putting infantry on 
horses was never a satisfactory solution’,301  which perpetuates the 
erroneous view of Mounted Infantry equitation and tactics as not having 
evolved since the days of the precipitately extemporised Mounted Infantry of 
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early 1900. This viewpoint ignores the professional improvements in 
Mounted Infantry training achieved in the latter stages of the Boer War and 
subsequent post-war years.302 
As indicated above, if the Mounted Infantry had survived, organisationally 
configured on mobilisation and deployed in action in the First World War as 
divisional mounted troops to support the infantry, its inherent ability to 
expand numerically may have been advantageous and would overall have 
mitigated against the reduction in divisional cavalry detailed previously. Of 
course the challenge of procuring adequate numbers of remounts and the 
logistics of providing enough forage for an expanding mounted force remains 
speculative but nevertheless, at least from a manpower perspective, regular 
abstraction for Mounted Infantry training without destabilising infantry 
battalions through excessive loss of the best trained officers and men could 
have continued throughout the First World War in a manner similar to 
secondment for other specialist training such as mortar and trench bombing 
training. Furthermore, the Mounted Infantry’s historical precedence of 
abstraction and comparative brevity of training compared to the cavalry could 
have conferred an organisational advantage previously unsuspected. After 
all, if abstraction was the accepted process then its continuation would 
merely confirm tradition, whilst the size of the Mounted Infantry force could 
expand and shrink at the behest of operational planning and the wishes of 
the senior army commanders. However, even if the Mounted Infantry had 
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survived into the First World War, its doctrinal interface with its cavalry 
counterpart and with the military cyclists would have remained, although 
whether the exigencies of the conflict would have induced tolerance and 
clarity of function remains conjecture. Certainly the pivotal question of 
whether the retention of the arme blanche capability by the cavalry conferred 
additional benefit or whether the Mounted Infantry’s lack of this functionality 
would have diminished its military usefulness in operations on the Western 
Front is difficult to answer with any degree of exactitude. Kenyon makes a 
case for the importance of the cavalry’s retention of the arme blanche, a view 
shared by Badsey, by citing a minimum of twenty actions, often small-scale, 
where British cavalry charged with drawn sabres between 1916 and 1918.303 
He considers the dual psychological effects on the morale of the enemy 
seeing mounted men approaching at the gallop and the beneficial effect on 
the infantry of witnessing horsed colleagues charging as evidence of 
preferment of cavalry rather than Mounted Infantry. If the benefit is from the 
visual spectacle of horsed men at the gallop rather than the flourishing of 
edged weapons, this ignores the possibility that Mounted Infantry could 
gallop into action albeit with subsequent dismounting and continuation of the 
offensive on foot as occurred in the Boer War. Even if mounted charges were 
considered useful tactically, these actions were rarely decisive in determining 
the outcome of battle. Despite Kenyon’s contention that these episodes were 
relatively commonplace,304  their lack of operational impact does not sustain 
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the argument for an overwhelming benefit from the retention of the arme 
blanche. Therefore, the roles required of mounted troops in the First World 
War on the Western Front, the conundrum of identifying adequate manpower 
requirements, the absence of major opportunities for wielding the arme 
blanche and the lack of massed horsed collisions that could, arguably, have 
been deleterious to Mounted Infantry, makes a strong case, albeit 
hypothetical, in favour of the retention of the Mounted Infantry. Its expertise 
would not have been redundant during the First World War, either during 
mobile operations or the years of trench warfare, but surprisingly appropriate 
considering the demands of the campaigns. Pragmatically, with the Mounted 
Infantry only differing from the cavalry in the matter of the arme blanche, 
retention of the Mounted Infantry would have provided senior army 
commanders with a flexible mounted force functioning in the roles originally 
planned after the Boer War. 
In answering the research question underpinning this chapter, the demise of 
the Mounted Infantry can be understood in terms of a series of overlapping 
internal and external factors set against a changing strategic and political 
landscape.305  Perhaps the Mounted Infantry outlived its usefulness in an age 
of reformed cavalrymen and egalitarian cyclists and despite belated 
formalisation of its tactical role and its military organisation, the army 
considered, rightly or wrongly, that the Mounted Infantry was now merely a 
vestige of Victorian colonial warfare.  However, as illustrated above, this 
might not have been the end of the story and, even without the benefit of 
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doctrinal adaptation, the Mounted Infantry could have fulfilled important roles 
in the First World War - even on the Western Front. Clearly there were many 
factors implicated in the abolition of the Mounted Infantry. Reprising French’s 
criteria for organisational survival, the closure of the Mounted Infantry 
schools dealt a severe blow to the chances of survival for the Mounted 
Infantry as further Mounted Infantry could not be trained and renew its ranks. 
Numerical inadequacy, coupled with the problem of identifying enough 
reservists for the infantry, as well as the increased availability of cavalry 
regiments repatriated from South Africa along with the growing popularity of 
military cyclists, created an environment whereby the Mounted Infantry 
became redundant having been doctrinally trapped in a cavalry-substitute 
role. Nevertheless, the decision to close the Mounted Infantry schools seems 
less than transparent with Haig’s role remaining suspect. Although Badsey 
has accused the Mounted Infantry of being instrumental in its own downfall 
through officers’ disloyalty, this seems unlikely as officers’ allegiances were 
by necessity retained with their parent regiments and there was no 
expectation of stronger bonds within the Mounted Infantry’s temporary 
organisation. In the final analysis, the multi-factorial causation of the 
Mounted Infantry’s demise owes much to personality, politics and institutional 
friction. Whilst the military impact of Mounted Infantry, if still in existence, 
between 1914 and 1918 cannot be ascertained reliably, circumstantial 
evidence suggests a useful niche for the Mounted Infantry and perhaps it is 
not too fanciful to imagine that its abolition was detrimental to the army. 
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Chapter Six 
Europe, Empire and Beyond 
 
In his lecture to the Royal United Services Institute on 22nd February 1906, 
Brigadier General E.C. Bethune claimed that Britain was alone among the 
Continental Powers in possessing Mounted Infantry as a branch of the army1 
despite earlier predictions of the advantages inherent in the deployment of 
Mounted Infantry.2  This assertion has remained seemingly incontrovertible 
ever since with the uniqueness of the British regular Mounted Infantry as a 
peculiar adjunct to the cavalry re-asserted recently in an analysis of the 
reforms between the Boer War and First World War in the British Army.3 If 
the inception of the regular Mounted Infantry occurred in response to a 
number of military requirements, particularly the need for improved mobility 
across the greater lethality of the modern battlefield, a numerically 
inadequate cavalry force reluctant doctrinally to embrace dismounted tactics 
and both distant and disparate imperial commitments, then how did other 
military powers balance similar demands? Surely other armies faced the 
                                                          
1 Bethune, ‘The uses of Cavalry and Mounted Infantry in modern warfare’, pp. 619-36; General F.R. 
von Bernhardi, ‘A Consideration of Opposite Views concerning Cavalry’, Cavalry Journal, 5, 1910, pp. 
466-83, held an even more uncompromising view that the Mounted Infantry movement was 
‘entirely wrong’. 
 
2 Hamilton, ‘Mounted Marksmen and the Dismounted Service of Cavalry’, pp. 261-87, ‘Military 
authorities of leading European nations agree that an army possessing a large number of mounted 
men capable of being used as infantry has an incalculable advantage over one that has them not’. 
 
3 Jones, From Boer War to World War, p.190. 
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same difficulty and, although details might differ, the fundamental 
requirements to deliver firepower and mobility remained? 
Edward Hutton considered European cavalry deficient in both delivering 
dismounted firepower and combating enemy infantry4  as he considered that 
modern ballistics must ‘materially modify if not revolutionise the tactics of the 
field of battle’ in future conflicts. However, did his concerns transpose to 
imperial forces?5  Here, across the Empire both immediately before the Boer 
War and with a gathering impetus thereafter, the self-governing colonies and 
future Dominions deliberated the sharing of both financial and military 
burdens of local defence and defence of the Empire.6 Would the Mounted 
Infantry concept, conceived ironically to defend imperial frontiers, transmute 
easily into the emerging Dominion military forces and their defence 
strategies? Therefore, this chapter analyses the solutions developed to 
deliver mobile fire support both in the British Empire but also Continental 
Europe and beyond. As the strategic focus of the British Army started to 
swing from being centred on colonial policing to the possibility of European 
                                                          
4 E.T.H. Hutton, Mounted Service Manual for Australian Light Horse and Mounted Infantry etc. 
(Sydney: F. Cunninghame & Co., 1902), p.xiv. 
 
5
 Hutton, Mounted Service Manual for Australian Light Horse and Mounted Infantry, p.xi. 
 
6 Major General Sir Edward T.H. Hutton, The Organisation of the Military Forces of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, 7
th
 April 1902, Melbourne, pp.1-2;  TNA WO 106 /6293 Imperial 
Conference on the subject of the Defence of the Empire 1909;   G.R Parkin, Imperial Federation & the 
Defence of the Empire, Lecture 9 October 1890, Aldershot Military Series, (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 
1890), pp.2-23; E.T.H. Hutton, Our Comrades of Greater Britain, Lecture at the Aldershot Military 
Society 24
th
 November 1896 (London: Edward Stanford, 1896), p.14, Hutton calculated that the 
colonies spent 2s  9d per person on defence compared to Britain where the expenditure was almost 
quadruple at an average cost of 9s 1d; Richard Lehane, ‘Lieutenant General Edward Hutton and 
‘Greater Britain’: Late-Victorian Imperialism, Imperial Defence and the Self-Governing Colonies’, 
unpublished PhD thesis, 2005, University of Sydney, Australia. 
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expeditionary warfare,7  the deliberations of European armies and their 
impact on British military thinking illuminated the apparent exceptionality of 
the British Mounted Infantry. Consequently, the chapter’s first research 
question asks whether troops with a similar function to Mounted Infantry 
developed in other armies in Europe, the wider British Empire and beyond. A 
subsidiary question considers the conundrum of how armies that did not 
adopt the Mounted Infantry paradigm at a time of increasing technological 
modernity managed the pressing requirement for mobile firepower. Clearly, 
the influences that had encouraged the inception of the regular Mounted 
Infantry included its varied imperial responsibilities distant from home, the 
challenges and cost of deploying a comparatively small cavalry force across 
the Empire, the requirement to match the mobility of rebellious insurgent 
tribes and the logistics of frontier security. Similarly, the solutions arrived at in 
all other armies were influenced by variables that warrant analysis to explain 
their doctrines. 
Although the experiential value of Britain’s extensive colonial campaigning 
was acknowledged by Continental Powers such as France, the relevance of 
colonial warfare to a future European conflict remained questionable.8  
Furthermore, although the British Empire was the most extensive of 
                                                          
7 TNA CAB 16/2 The Military Requirements of the Empire as affected by the Defence of India, 1907, 
clearly pronounced that “In peace, Indian needs govern the normal size of our home army” this 
inextricably linked the strategic planning of the army with the requirement to maintain British forces 
at full strength on the sub-continent yet within four years, the Committee for Imperial Defence 
would be debating the comparative military strengths of potential European combatants and the 
pre-requisites for the army’s expeditionary force; TNA CAB 38 /19 /49  The Military Aspect of the 
Continental problem, Committee for Imperial Defence 1911; TNA CAB 37 / 86 / 1 Memorandum on 
the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany 1907; Clark, The Sleepwalkers, p.148. 
 
8 Captain Hector France, John Bull’s Army: from a French perspective (London: Whittaker & Co., 
1888), pp. 184-85. 
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contemporaneous empires, other countries demonstrated increasing imperial 
pretensions9  and a desire to extend their political and military influences 
distantly,10  each with inherent obligations to provide security in their 
overseas possessions and diluting the focus of military strategy from solely 
preparing for a future European crisis. For the French Empire, the answer lay 
in the development of a Colonial Army distinct from its homeland 
Metropolitan army.11 For Imperial Germany, the answer lay predominantly in 
the development of local forces (Schutztruppe) reinforced by disembarked 
expeditionary forces should the need arise.12  Conversely, the Austro-
Hungarian Empire,13  an empire devoid of overseas aspirations yet with 
imperial expansion in the Balkans, ethno-linguistic diversity, religious 
plurality, political instability and topographic extremes from the mountainous 
Tyrol to Galician marshes, created similar challenges in army organisation, 
planning and doctrine as for those with imperial possessions on distant 
                                                          
9 Clark, The Sleepwalkers, p.139.  
10
 TNA FO 800 / 72 Foreign Office: private papers, Sir E. Grey 1905 – 1907, with the contemporary 
example of the pernicious influence of Germany into the Ottoman Empire and Persia through trade, 
the construction of the Berlin – Baghdad railway and the deployment of military advisers; Clark, The 
Sleepwalkers, pp. 339-41, Britain also contributed in a similar manner with the Royal Navy’s Admiral 
Arthur Limpus seconded to the Ottoman Navy in a training role in 1912. 
11 TNA WO 106 / 6200 Handbook of the French Army 1906; Douglas Porch, The March to the Marne: 
the French Army 1871 – 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.41. 
 
12 Richard Carow, Die Kaiserliche Schutztruppe in Deutsch-Sűdwest-Afrika unter Major Leutwein 
(Leipzig:Berlag von Freund, 1898), p.80; French General Staff, ‘A German Colonial Campaign: the 
operations against the Bondelszwarts and Hereros’, pp. 87-97, 207-14 and 326-34. 
 
13 The Austrian Empire became the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the inception of the Dual 
Monarchy on 17
 
February 1867;  James Lucas, Fighting Troops of the Austro-Hungarian Army 1868 – 
1914 (Tunbridge Wells: Spellmount, 1987), p.12, the reorganisation of the army, precipitated by its 
defeat by Prussia in 1866, resulted in a complex arrangement of three imperial and national armies, 
each of equal standing, within the Empire, namely Imperial and Royal, Austrian Landwehr, Hungarian 
Honved, all of which held equal status, and the territorial Landstűrm. 
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continents. Likewise, the Russian Empire, seeking imperial expansion in 
central and eastern Asia, encountered geographical, climatic and logistical 
problems that influenced its army, particularly its dependence on Cossack 
recruits. Although progressing by contiguous extension rather than, in 
general, through overseas acquisition, the westward spread of the United 
States, supported by the post-Civil War United States Army, encountered 
markedly quasi-imperial challenges in terms of ensuring civilian security, 
quelling sporadic insurgency and logistical challenges, all mirroring those of 
expeditionary warfare elsewhere.14  However eventually, America would also 
acquire a limited overseas empire fighting Spain in Cuba in 1898 and 
subsequently acquiring the Philippines where an insurgency was quelled in 
the years of 1899 – 1902.15 Thus each empire needed to solve the 
requirement for mobile firepower, both at home and in its empire, with the 
latter usually constraining the military options through distance, difficulty of 
logistical supply and difficult terrain. 
For many parts of the British Empire, particularly Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand, the withdrawal of British Army garrisons in the 1870s handed the 
responsibility for land-based defence to these colonies and their citizen 
inhabitants, a process that continued up to the First World War.16  The 
                                                          
14
 Nathaniel Philbrick, The Last Stand: Custer, Sitting Bull and the Battle of the Little Bighorn (London: 
Vintage Books, 2011), p. xx. 
 
15
 Showalter, ‘The US Cavalry’, pp. 6-23. 
 
16 TNA WO 106 / 6344 Handbook of the Land Forces of British Dominions, Colonies and 
Protectorates (other than India), Part II: the Commonwealth of Australia, 1909; Hutton, Our 
Comrades of Greater Britain, Lecture at the Aldershot Military Society 24
th
 November 1896, pp.12-14. 
TNA WO 106 / 6293 Imperial Conference on the subject of the Defence of the Empire 1909, with the 
objective of ‘each portion of the Empire to provide, organise and render efficient such means of 
defence as will form a serious deterrent to the most probable and feasible form of attack’. 
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citizenry and their governments subsequently determined the nature of their 
military forces for territorial and, eventually, imperial defence, giving rise to 
issues of nascent national identity and, closely linked, the heroic iconography 
of the mounted citizen soldier.17 Elsewhere, local inhabitants throughout 
empires influenced army composition, such as Russian Cossacks who 
comprised more than half of all Russian cavalry and whose reputation, in Ian 
Hamilton’s opinion, exceeded their military effectiveness.18 The cultivated 
myth of the fearsome Cossack, forever loyal to the Tsar, remained a 
powerful, if ultimately inaccurate, premise in the Russian Army until the First 
World War.19 The British Raj encouraged, as a matter of policy, the 
recruitment of inhabitants of the North West Frontier of India for local 
irregular levies such as the Khyber Rifles and both the regiments of the 
Indian Army and the élite troops of the Punjab Frontier Force (PFF) and 
Corps of Guides (Guides).20 Identical solutions involving local or indigenous 
inhabitants were introduced elsewhere, usually as auxiliaries, including the 
                                                          
17 Donal Lowry, (ed.), The South African War Reappraised (Manchester: University Press, 2000) 
p.193;  Carman Miler, The Boer War: Army, Nation and Empire (Canberra: Army History Unit, 2000), 
Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (eds.), p.86;  Carman Miller, Painting the Map Red: Canada and the 
South African  War 1899 – 1902, Canadian War Museum Historical Publication No. 28 (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s & University of Natal, 1993, paperback ed., 1998), p.xiv, although Miller is reluctant  
to attribute the war as a ‘crucible of Canadian nationalism’. 
 
18
 TNA, Kitchener Papers, PRO 30 / 57 / 37, letter from Ian Hamilton to Kitchener, 4
 
April 1904, 
concluding that ‘the Cossack is a historical personage...I do not think he is as dangerous as he is 
believed to be’; The Times, 23 August 1905, cited the Cossacks as ‘truly an absurdity’ practising in 
peacetime with lance and sabre but deployed in war with rifle and bayonet; TNA WO 106 / 6216 
Report on the Russian Army 1886, Colonel Chevenix-Trench, military attaché in St. Petersburg, 
highlighted internal differences in whether Cossacks were of ‘exuberant spirit’ and thus the best 
irregular cavalry or whether their deficiencies and ill-discipline, compounded by an apparent 
aversion to being under fire, undermined their reputation. 
  
19 Robert H. McNeal, Tsar and Cossack 1855 – 1914 (London: Macmillan in association with St 
Antony’s College, Oxford, 1987), pp.1-5. 
 
20
 Jules Stewart, The Khyber Rifles (Stroud: Sutton, 2005), p.31. 
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French Saharan Oasis force,21  Native American scouts attached to the US 
cavalry and the multitude of local Mounted Rifle units raised in South Africa 
during the Boer War.22  The benefits of such arrangements were multiple 
including: knowledge of terrain; local intelligence particularly for scouting 
purposes; immediacy of deployment without needing extensive transfer often 
overseas; harnessing of vested interests or extant feuds between tribes; 
lower costs as in the sillidar system in the Indian cavalry; minimisation of 
logistical requirements with a hardiness or resilience not necessarily 
identified in regular troops and a release of resources through replacement 
of regular forces, as shown by the preferential use of Indian rather than 
British cavalry regiments on the North West Frontier.23  Nevertheless, such 
arrangements were not always positive with irregular troops often eschewing 
formal discipline and, at times, being of questionable loyalty, although, as 
noted by Ian Hamilton, ‘with well-trained officers and non-commissioned 
officers even comparatively untrained men can rapidly be made into good 
troops’.24  
However, it was not only the army’s composition that influenced its 
organisational development and doctrine but also lessons construed from 
previous conflicts and predictions of future wars. For the Continental Powers, 
                                                          
21
 TNA WO 106 / 6200 Handbook of the French Army 1906. 
 
22 TNA WO 108 / 405 Anglo – Boer War correspondence,  there were 42 irregular horse units serving 
in South Africa with 20 eponymously bearing the names of their founding officers;  Clayton K.S. 
Chun, US Army in the Plains Indian Wars 1865 – 91 (Oxford: Osprey, 2004), p.33. 
 
23
 Baden-Powell, Sport in War, p.94, fictionalises the discontent of British cavalry officers for their 
lack of active service utilisation in the punitive expeditions of the late Victorian years.  
 
24 Lieutenant H.B.C. Arthur, ‘The Comparative Value for War of Regular and Irregular Troops’, 
Selected Winter Essays 1906 – 07 (London: HMSO, 1907), pp. 31-44. 
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the war of 1866 between Austria and Prussia and the Franco-German War of 
1870 – 71 featured prominently in the reform of their armies.25 Different 
conclusions distilled from these conflicts contributed to the decisions of 
whether or not to adopt Mounted Infantry at a time of a pan-European 
cavalry revival.26  Indeed, study and discussion of the Franco-German War 
was an educational staple of the British Staff College curriculum  and in 
military circles for many years27 yet its interpretation, like that of the 
American Civil War, Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War, differed 
between armies, allowing partisan argument and encouraging polarity of 
opinion and subsequent policy.28  As Yigal Sheffy has remarked regarding 
the Russo-Japanese War, ‘observers and armies alike found whatever they 
were seeking in their analyses and they used it to further establish their 
approach’.29  As Gary Cox has noted in his comparison of British and 
German Official Histories of the Russo-Japanese War, there was broad 
agreement on operational level lessons but different conclusions were 
reached around the use of technology, logistics and the morale of the two 
                                                          
25
 James R. Osgood, The Armies of Today (London: McIlvaine & Co., 1893), p.99 & p.263. 
 
26
 Phillips, ‘‘Who Shall Say That the Days of Cavalry Are Over?’ pp. 5-32. 
 
27 Joint Services Command and Staff College CR/1903/2, Staff College Curriculum, 1903;  Colonel J.F. 
Maurice, How far the lessons of the Franco-German War are now out of date, Aldershot Military 
Society, Tuesday 22
nd
 January 1895 (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1895). 
 
28 TNA WO 106 / 181 Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War 1905;  Wrangel, The Cavalry in the Russo-
Japanese War (London: Hugh Rees, 1907);   Major Balck, General German Staff, ‘The Lessons of the 
Boer War and the battle-working of the three arms’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 
48, 1904, pp. 1393 – 1409;  Walters & Du Cane, The German Official Account of the War in South 
Africa, are such examples. 
 
29 Sheffy, ‘A model not to follow’, pp. 253-68. 
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combatants.30 Even when there was general agreement, such as the 
effective mobility of Boer forces in 1899 – 1902, the recognition of lessons 
remained questionable with few armies, in this example, truly understanding 
the consummate skill of the Boer insurgency and, ultimately, its exhaustion 
through Kitchener’s strategies from 1901 onwards.31  The memory of 
experience of war should not be underestimated. It was the fear of French 
franc-tireur insurgents, originally encountered in the Franco-German War 
that encouraged the use of light infantry for cavalry fire support becoming 
integral to German cavalry doctrine.32  Such memories and their implications 
were transferable as Kitchener described the Boers in 1900 as ‘more like 
mounted Franc-Tireurs than anything else’,33  indicating their elusiveness 
and ability to melt away into the general population and thus encapsulating 
the persisting difficulty of coping militarily with an insurgency where 
combatants may be indistinguishable from non-combatants in the 
population.34 Mirroring the importance of analysing past wars were the 
predictions of the likely nature of future wars by General Staffs and by 
                                                          
30 Gary P. Cox, ‘Of Aphorisms, Lessons and Paradigms: Comparing the British and German Official 
Histories of the Russo-Japanese War’, Contributions in Military Studies, 171, 1999, pp. 41-54. 
 
31 Major General Sir George Younghusband, Forty Years a Soldier (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1923), 
p.214, ‘Brother Boer was as delicate about his rear as is our old friend the Turk’; Arthur, ‘The 
Comparative Value for War of Regular and Irregular Troops’, pp. 31-44. 
 
32 Dorondo, Riders of the Apocalypse, p.35. 
 
33 André Wessels (ed.), Lord Kitchener and the War in South Africa 1899 – 1902 (Stroud: Army 
Records Society, 2006), p.31, letter from Kitchener to Queen Victoria, 26 April 1900. 
  
34 Callwell, Small Wars, pp. 148-49; Gregory A. Daddis, ‘The Problem of Metrics: assessing progress 
and effectiveness in the Vietnam War’, War in History, 19(1), 2012, pp. 73-98. 
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military commentators35.  Although a lack of opportunity for edged weapons 
in close combat, a disappointment for the cavalry, had occurred both on veldt 
and Plains, relegating the usefulness of the arme blanche and its shock 
tactics, the cavalry mêlée predicted to characterise the opening operations of 
a major European conflagration36 and meant an orthodoxy that ensured 
retention of traditional cavalry functionality.37  Such orthodoxy was 
underpinned by scrutiny of both allies’ and potential adversaries’ cavalries on 
manoeuvre.38  Thus a dichotomy over the relevance and lessons of colonial 
campaigning versus the probable exigencies of a European war developed 
influencing the debate how to optimally deliver mobile firepower. The lack of 
written doctrine in the British Army, personalisation of command39 and the 
breadth of the army’s imperial remit,40 were broadly similar to the problems 
                                                          
35 TNA CAB 38 /19 /49  The Military Aspect of the Continental problem, Committee for Imperial 
Defence 1911; TNA WO 279 / 496  Report of a Conference of General Staff Officers at the Staff 
College 1910, where the deployment of a discrete Mounted Infantry Division in a future European 
campaign was considered; Lieutenant General F. von Bernhardi, Reiterdienst Kritische Betrachtungen 
űber Kriegstätigkeit, Taktik, Ausbildung und Organisation unserer Kavallerie [Cavalry: critical 
observations on its use in war, tactics, training and organisation of our cavalry) (Berlin: Ernst 
Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1910); General von Pelet-Narbonne, ‘Primary conditions for the success 
of cavalry in the next European War’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 50, 1906, pp. 
326-34. 
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 Major Viscount Fincastle, VC, MVO, ‘The Strategical and Tactical Employment of Cavalry in War’, 
Selected Winter Essays 1906 – 07 (London: HMSO, 1907) pp. 19-30;  Erskine Childers, German 
Influence on British Cavalry (London: Edward Arnold, 1911) p.47, although Childers countered that 
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often predicted. 
 
37 TNA WO 106 / 6311 French Cavalry Manoeuvres 1892, claimed that the French retention of the 
lance was predicated on the need to match that of the German cavalry. 
38
 TNA WO 27 / 507 Manoeuvres du 2
o
 Corps d’ Armée en 1906;  Lowther, From Pillar to Post, p.221, 
the author calculated that he had attended ten foreign manoeuvres in five years. 
 
39
 Travers, ‘The Hidden Army’, pp. 523-44. 
 
40 I.F.W. Beckett, ‘Command in the late Victorian Army’, Leadership and Command (London: 
Brassey’s, 2002) G.D. Sheffield (ed), pp. 3-56. 
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affecting the US army. Here campaigning ranged across markedly different 
terrain and was pitched against the Native American tribes’ tactical 
heterogeneity that demanded of the US Army a flexibility and initiative which 
defied the constraints of a restrictive doctrine.41 Germany, with its much-
vaunted Great General Staff, possessed a more defined doctrine which 
conferred the benefits of uniformity of training, the development of 
aufragstäktik mission-centred tactics and contributed to the adoption of the 
German / Prussian model in several other armies, most notably those of 
Japan and Turkey plus a general sense, internationally among cavalry 
officers, of German superior military thinking relating to cavalry.42 If Germany 
was considered a major influence on the mounted arm, cultural 
generalisations, beset with racial overtones, such as the stolidity of the 
Russian soldier or the fanaticism of Japanese soldier,43  the latter allegedly 
physically unsuited to equestrian warfare,44  also played their part. Moreover, 
the popular image, however questionable, of the superiority of the 
Dominions’ rural farmer in all matters equine,45  influenced the perception of 
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 Chun, US Army in the Plains Indian Wars, p.16. 
42 TNA WO 279 / 18 Report of a Conference of General Staff Officers at the Staff College 1908; 
Rimington, Our Cavalry, p.17;  C. Battine, ‘The German Cavalry Manoeuvres of 1911’, Cavalry 
Journal, 7, 1912, pp. 47-52, considered the German cavalry to be the best mounted in Europe. 
 
43 Anon, ‘Infantry Combat in the Russo-Japanese War’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 
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44 Wrangel, The Cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War, p.40.  
 
45 Iain G. Spence, ‘To shoot and ride: mobility and firepower in Mounted Warfare’, The Boer War: 
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colonial Mounted Rifles in the higher echelons of the British Army.46 Overall, 
this tendency towards organisational and doctrinal ‘Germanisation’ in 
cavalries internationally47  promoted traditional edged weapons for shock 
tactics, most visibly manifest as the retention of the cavalry lance, with 
dismounted firepower relegated or largely banished by delegating fire 
support to infantry temporarily assigned to the cavalry.48  Naturally, this trend 
played into the hands of the cavalry commanders who frequently, though not 
universally, predicated their arm’s existence and identity on both mounted 
shock tactics and the socio-cultural distinction of being horsed.49  With innate 
traditions and deeply-held conservatism, the cavalry’s response to the need 
for mobile firepower depended on a number of factors including prevailing 
morale, recent performance, relative size, institutional and numerical 
comparative importance in relation to infantry50 and its leadership’s political 
                                                          
46 Miller, Painting the Map Red, p.159; Craig Wilcox, ‘Looking back on the Boer War’, The Boer War: 
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47 Childers, German Influence on British Cavalry, p.45; Hamilton, A Staff Officer’s Scrap-Book, p.36, 
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48 J. E. Edmonds, Handbook of the German Army (Home and Colonial (London: HMSO, 1900, 2nd Ed.), 
p.147; Rimington, Our Cavalry, p.17. 
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50 TNA WO 279 / 496 Report of a Conference of General Staff Officers at the Staff College under the 
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influence. Political influence, at times manipulated by aristocratic interests or 
even the monarchy,51  frequently prejudiced important debate and decision.52 
Therefore, a third research question, addressed in this chapter, will be which 
external and internal factors determined the existence of Mounted Infantry 
outside of British shores? Finally, a fourth subsidiary research question asks 
why, if all other countries seemingly forsook a model which appeared to be a 
workable solution of balancing mobility with dismounted firepower, was this a 
popular stance? Or, phrased another way - if not Mounted Infantry, then why 
not?  
Several different archival approaches investigate these four questions, 
including the use of official documentation and correspondence relating to 
the European nations, Imperial armies, including self-governing colonies, and 
of course British India, as well as memoirs, letters and articles published in 
military journals such as the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 
Army Review and, after the Boer War, the Cavalry Journal. Official Histories, 
handbooks, drill manuals and reports submitted by military attachés and 
senior army officers invited to attend the numerous annual European 
manoeuvres, together with direct first hand analysis from observers 
embedded with combatant armies, permit an understanding of foreign 
military thinking. Clearly, reliance on observers’ evidence can be flawed as 
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embedded observers’ reports were subject to the permission of their hosts,53 
whilst official histories risked bias towards emphasising lessons compatible 
with a specific army’s prevailing orthodoxy.54  However the relevance of such 
conclusions may be triangulated against foreign commentators’ opinions 
contained in articles and monographs published either privately or semi-
officially. Arguably, as important as the official position of other countries, 
was the informed insight into foreign military thinking perceived by the British 
Army. This was achieved through the writing of personal appreciations of 
exchange visits to foreign regiments, military establishments such as staff 
colleges and, with particular relevance to issues explored in this thesis, 
training schools, especially cavalry schools in Neustadt, Pinerolo, Saumur 
and Hanover,55  which contributed to the broader picture of military doctrine 
relating to mounted troops. Translations of articles published in foreign 
military periodicals, whilst acknowledging the risk of personal bias, featured 
frequently in contemporaneous publications and provide metaphorically a 
barometer of contemporary thinking and debate. Therefore, using official 
documents, unofficial intelligence and personal review, the four research 
questions exploring the alleged uniqueness of the regular Mounted Infantry, 
alternative solutions to the application of mobile firepower in Europe and 
Empire and their determining factors will be answered. 
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In considering the British Empire, the defence of India as the pre-eminent 
colonial possession remained of paramount importance in imperial 
strategy.56 Since garrison duties were shared between British regiments on 
rotation from Britain and the Indian army,57 it would be surprising if the 
Mounted Infantry model, imported by British battalions, eluded the sub-
continent entirely, especially as historically the Mounted Infantry’s 
foundations originated in the expediencies of colonial campaigning. Clearly, 
although the duration of garrison duty was lengthy,58 the frequency of 
rotation of regiments to India meant that many disembarking battalions had 
received prior Mounted Infantry instruction back in Britain, an advantage that 
prompted the War Office’s suggestion,59  unsurprisingly rebuffed, that a 
proportion of the costs incurred in training Mounted Infantry should be borne 
by the Indian Government.60 British battalions were rarely called upon to 
contribute men to abstracted Mounted Infantry units in India, unlike in other 
parts of the Empire, especially Africa. This anomaly arose from a number of 
factors particularly the characteristics of campaigning in India, the numerical 
adequacy of cavalry and, most importantly, the distinctive attributes of the 
Indian Army itself.  
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The preponderance of active service post-Indian Mutiny occurred on the 
mountainous North West Frontier.61  This ‘hill fighting’, belatedly recognised 
as requiring specialised operational and tactical techniques62 suited foot 
infantry, preferably skirmishing mobile light infantryman with individual 
musketry skills such as the Gurkhas, rather than regular Mounted Infantry. 
Whilst up to a fifth of British infantry battalions were posted along the North 
West Frontier, the frequent rotation of battalions through garrisons 
diminished their opportunities to assimilate the lessons of hill fighting.63  
Although training in ‘hill warfare’ was advocated unsuccessfully by Sir 
William Gatacre as early as 1899, such training only became part of the Staff 
College curriculum after the Boer War.64 Undoubtedly a role in pursuit did 
exist for mounted troops as fleeing tribesmen were unaccustomed to the 
speed of mounted pursuit thus inducing a terror of being ‘ridden down’.65  
But, naturally, this task of pursuit was the preserve of cavalry rather than 
Mounted Infantry.66 Although India offered one of the few overseas garrison 
opportunities for the British cavalry with a maximum of ten British cavalry 
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regiments stationed in India in 1904,67  few British cavalry regiments 
participated in punitive expeditions. Preference appears to have been for the 
more numerous and less costly Indian cavalry regiments68 - a policy derided 
by Robert Baden-Powell, a future Inspector General of Cavalry, who 
lamented the ‘careful bottling up of British cavalry’.69 Consequently, neither 
British cavalry nor regular Mounted Infantry were deployed consistently or in 
any quantity to the North West Frontier70  although the latter’s employment 
as a mobile infantry reserve was not impossible if Russian imperial 
ambitions, believed to threaten British India, erupted into war. This provided 
military planners with a double challenge that of preparing for ongoing 
colonial conflict against tribesmen but also war between two European 
armies set against the backdrop of non-European terrain such as the Hindu 
Kush. In the latter scenario, with no guarantee of prompt reinforcements from 
Britain by a circumspect Admiralty,71 the combined forces in India needed 
contingencies for a European-style conflict against an enemy with a 
‘Westernised’ army that included trained cavalry. This is where the mobility of 
Mounted Infantry could have been of value with the abstraction of Mounted 
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Infantry from non-mobilised British garrisons and Indian battalions furnishing 
up to three British and six Indian Mounted Infantry regiments .72  
The third factor prejudicing the deployment of Mounted Infantry in India was 
the inherent attributes of the Indian Army in the maintenance of tribal 
borderland security.73  As the Indian Army evolved an informal doctrine to 
counter tribal insurgency, specialist units of both infantry and cavalry, 
particularly the Punjab Field Force (PFF)74 and the Corps of Guides,75  were 
formed.76 Lieutenant General Sir Bindon Blood reflected glowingly on these 
units, remarking particularly on the excellent dismounted work performed by 
the Guides’ cavalry deployed tactically in a Mounted Infantry role.77 As 
specialist units permanently based on the frontier, the PFF and Guides 
developed their own tactical approaches. Unfortunately such lessons were 
not disseminated systematically to other Indian or British battalions who were 
less likely to be employed for extended periods on the frontier and who might 
have benefitted from such experiential instruction. In part this reflected both 
the lack of a British General Staff, in the context of an absence of updated 
formal written doctrine, and the complexity inherent in separate command 
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structures for the Indian Army and the British Army in India.78  Nevertheless, 
the Indian Army, far from ignoring Mounted Infantry, not only adopted the 
model but its origins on the sub-continent represents a parallel phenomenon 
rather than mere passive osmosis of informal cross-fertilisation from British 
infantry garrisons. In the immediate wake of the 2nd Afghan War, Lieutenant 
General Sir Frederick Roberts considered establishing a Corps of Mounted 
Infantry within the Kabul Field Force.79  Brigadier General Thomas Baker 
presciently proposed a self-sufficient corps, by abstraction, of 60 non-
commissioned officers and men per infantry battalion for the purposes of 
‘rapid convergence to any important point’.80  Importantly, this crossed the 
racial and army divides by including both British and Indian battalions.81 
Despite proposals for a state of permanency rather than abstraction, the 
latter principle was retained.82  With strikingly similar proposals appearing in 
advance of the domestic Intelligence Department’s 1881précis,83 Roberts’ 
initiative confirms him as a founder of the Mounted Infantry, at least in India, 
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quite as much as his political adversary, Wolseley, back home. Thus, 
Roberts’ early espousal of the Mounted Infantry concept, overlooked by his 
previous biographers, and his subsequent vociferous support for Mounted 
Infantry in South Africa, England and India,84  can be placed in its correct 
context. Moreover, his founding enthusiasm for Mounted Infantry may be 
considered juxtaposed against his long-standing antipathetic relationship 
with the cavalry, as a contributory factor in the post-Boer War firepower 
versus arme blanche debate.85 
Nonetheless, the Mounted Infantry’s lack of utility on the North West Frontier 
and the preferential deployment of Indian cavalry were to be factors 
implicated in the Mounted Infantry’s demise in India. Previously, in keeping 
with the prevailing vogue for Mounted Infantry at the turn of the century, five 
Mounted Infantry schools of instruction had opened across India. However, 
as early as 1908, the Indian Government proposed the closure of three 
schools and a cessation of the training of Indian infantry as Mounted 
Infantry.86 This was despite the fact that there were extant proposals for 
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closer organisational ties between the British and Indian armies87 with the 
former still training Mounted Infantry in England and Ireland. Ostensibly, the 
closures were predicated on the Mounted Infantry’s lack of utility in the most 
likely operational theatre of the North West Frontier,88 though its participation 
in expeditions on the North East Frontier89 and Tibet90 had been successful. 
The Government of India’s argument was that any role suitable for Mounted 
Infantry could be superseded by deployment of Indian cavalry91. Undoubtedly 
there was a monetary aspect to the decision as British troops could only be 
trained in the schools for half the year due to the climate, with Indian troops 
undergoing training in the same facilities at other times. The Indian 
Government declined to defray any part of the Mounted Infantry costs, 
despite formal sharing of the facilities, whilst the forecasted savings from the 
proposed closures would help reduce the cost of the proposed cavalry 
school.92  Although the decision to establish a cavalry school in India may 
have merely reflected current trends such as the recently established cavalry 
school at Netheravon in England, the potentially pernicious influence of Haig, 
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who had only recently returned to England in 1906 after serving as the 
Inspector General of Cavalry in India since 1903, must remain speculative. 
Reflecting similar justifications later in England, the maintenance of Mounted 
Infantry was also considered to be an unnecessary drain of equine resource 
as well as an unwelcome burden on infantry battalions undergoing 
abstraction. Conversely, from a strategic perspective, the fear of an 
ignominious defeat of the Mounted Infantry by marauding Cossack sotnia93 
seems intentionally overplayed as the growing tension between Germany 
and Russia resulting in a general shift of Russian troops to the German 
border from 1895 diminished the risk of Russian imperial aggression towards 
the North West Frontier, a situation further clarified following Russia’s defeat 
by Japan in 1905.94  
In conclusion, the demise of the Mounted Infantry in India owed more to a 
lack of a foreseeable role and cost pressures than from political machination 
or the British cavalry’s renaissance. However, any impression that regular 
Mounted Infantry had been an irrelevant or wasteful experiment in India is 
wrong. The Mounted Infantry acquitted itself well in Burma in a terrain not 
obviously suited to mobile warfare but where their local Burmese ponies 
conferred welcome mobility and agility thus garnering a reputation that saw 
the Burma Mounted Infantry dispatched to the veldt in the early stages of the 
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Boer War.95 North East India was also well-served by a substantial number 
of volunteer Mounted Rifle units. These were enlisted from European or 
Eurasian volunteers rather than native levies and were recruited by locality or 
through specific employment such as the railway companies, with units 
bolstered by a small number of professional adjutants and instructors.96 
Tracing their origins back to volunteer forces raised during the Mutiny, the 
units functioned as Mounted Rifles despite their confusing nomenclature. An 
attempt was made in 1888 to distinguish between units with two-thirds 
classified as ‘light horse’ i.e. cavalry, with the remaining third as Mounted 
Infantry  with differentiation by size of pony and armaments, with carbine and 
sword or rifle and sword-bayonet respectively.97 This forced delineation 
appears arbitrary and without functional benefit with the generalisation that 
these units were, in fact, all amateur Mounted Rifles in ethos. Although 
primarily for local defence, volunteer Light Horse and Mounted Infantry saw 
active service with the Indian Mounted Infantry Corps (Lumsden’s Horse) in 
the Boer War in Ian Hamilton’s mixed mounted brigade.98 Similarly, the 
Assam Valley Light Horse, comprising tea planters, merchants and civil 
                                                          
95 BL IOR/L/MIL/7/15657 Dispatch of Mounted Infantry from Burma to South Africa 1899 – 1900; 
Maurice, The Life of General Lord Rawlinson of Trent, p.15; Repington, Vestigia, p.81, claimed that 
‘The Mounted Infantry (in Burma) was the favourite arm’.  
 
96 Chris Kempton, The Regiments & Corps of the H.E.I.C & Indian Armies: Volunteer Forces 
(Dunstable: The Military Press, 2012), p.19, the overall ethnic composition of the Volunteer Forces 
was 50.4 per cent European and 44 per cent Eurasian.  
 
97
 BL IOR/L/MIL/17/5/228 Indian Army Circulars: Clause 195, December 1888, ‘Regulations for the 
Equipment and Organisation of Mounted Volunteer Corps in India’; Kempton, The Regiments & 
Corps of the H.E.I.C & Indian Armies, pp.19-20. 
98
 Kempton, The Regiments & Corps of the H.E.I.C & Indian Armies, pp.53-54, it incorporated 
volunteers from other units such as the Behar Light Horse and a Maxim detachment supplied by the 
East India Railway Volunteer Rifle Corps. 
 
365 
 
servants, participated in the Abor Expedition of 1911-12 alongside Gurkhas 
and Sikh pioneers.99 Therefore, Mounted Infantry in India existed in several 
forms including as components of British and Indian battalions, as specialist 
Indian frontier regiments and as Indian volunteer mounted corps, 
emphasising the parallelism of the evolution of Mounted Infantry in India. 
This plurality of the Mounted Infantry functionality, particularly the specialist 
hill-fighting mobile infantry and its sister cavalry, delivered an Indian solution 
to a colonial frontier problem. In its analogous evolution, the Indian forces 
served the Empire well, tentatively releasing the British Army to gradually re-
focus towards the prospect of a European-centred conflict. 
If India offered a parallel solution to the problem of mobile firepower, the 
other major self-governing colonies faced a difference set of challenges. 
Devoid of British Army garrisons, their defence, by necessity, comprised a 
citizen militia that was screened by the protective maritime dominance of the 
Royal Navy, and was reliant on the embarkation of regular army 
reinforcements from England at times of crisis.100 The result, in both Canada 
and the Australian colonies, was the evolution of loosely-organised amateur 
militias supported by small permanent military cadres of instructors and 
technical staff.101 Superficially this situation mimicked that of the domestic 
British Yeomanry in terms of volunteer enlistment strengthened by 
professional adjutants and non-commissioned cavalry instructors. Later, in 
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light of the perceived effectiveness of colonial Mounted Rifles during the 
Boer War, there would be encouragement for the re-named Imperial 
Yeomanry to re-develop along the lines of these colonial mounted troops.102 
Yet the Yeomanry differed crucially as, despite its novel if transient, 
nomenclature of ‘Imperial Yeomanry’ with Mounted Infantry connotations, the 
domestic British Yeomanry still considered itself resolutely a sabre-wielding 
cavalry. Its historic antecedents, aristocratic leadership and cavalry 
influences, inculcated a cavalry ethos resistant to the concept of the more 
egalitarian Mounted Rifles or Light Horse.103 In the colonies, it took the 
organisational flair of Hutton104  and the advent of the Boer War to galvanise 
these militias into formally organised military units, based on the concept of 
Mounted Rifles or Light Horse.105  Arguably, the success of the Mounted 
Rifleman contributed to both the subsequent espousal of a non-cavalry style 
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of mounted arm in the new Dominions106 and, as a heroic icon of martial 
vigour inextricably linked with the growing concepts of national identity, 
political independence and self defence.107  In Canada, Hutton had helped 
organise the militia since 1898 which had facilitated the embarkation of an 
infantry battalion then two regiments of Mounted Rifles, the Royal Canadian 
Dragoons (RCD) and Canadian Mounted Rifles (CMR) in 1899 and 1900. 
Initial political reticence had been matched by civilian apathy, particularly in 
rural Canada, for military involvement in the Boer War.108  The RCD did not 
conform completely to the stereotype of the rugged rural recruit as natural 
mounted soldier,109 as its ranks were filled by volunteers  predominantly from 
east Canada110  although the CMR contained many from the North West 
Mounted Police (NWMP).111 The NWMP furnished 40 per cent all ranks in 
the CMR and nearly 70 per cent of officers but only 0.6 per cent in the RCD, 
largely as a result of different geographical recruiting grounds. The CMR112  
was considered particularly suitable for scouting duties on the veldt due to a 
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preponderance of recruits from rural Canada.113  Similarly, the orthodoxy, if 
at times uncomfortably stereotypical, of the rural farming recruit of Australia’s 
Mounted Rifles, later the Light Horse, was similar to that of the CMR. 
Although citizen militia recruited from town and farm often had pre-existing 
equestrian ability, increasingly unlike recruits in the British cavalry,114  it was 
uncertain whether military training would be able to produce soldiers adept 
with both rifle and sabre. The compromise of Mounted Rifles was the 
successful option with Hutton’s replacement claiming that ‘we can turn out 
Mounted Riflemen in their thousands’.115 In fact Mounted Rifles were a 
particularly suitable defence force for the lengthy coastlines of Australia and 
New Zealand,116 combining mobility and infantry firepower,117  particularly as 
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any enemy incursion was likely to be small-scale, devoid of trained cavalry, 
and thus negating the anxiety that Mounted Rifles could be overwhelmed in 
open country by seasoned cavalry.118 Furthermore, it was considered 
incontestable by the Committee for Imperial Defence that any threatening 
large scale invasion force, which might conceivably include cavalry, would be 
intercepted by the Royal Navy.119 During his earlier posting to New South 
Wales as General Officer Commanding from 1893 to1896, Hutton had again 
organised its disparate forces and had advocated a defence policy, not only 
for New South Wales, but for all Australian colonies, which was eventually 
realised in the newly federated Australia. However this was not without 
incurring unwelcome political interference similar to that encountered 
subsequently by Earl Dundonald in Canada after the Boer War, which 
culminated in Dundonald’s removal.120 If the success of the Mounted Rifle 
paradigm in these colonies121  was confirmed by their performance on the 
veldt, opinions were polarised over their abilities as horsemasters122 and as 
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troops incapable of both general discipline123 and fire discipline when 
compared to British cavalry and regular Mounted Infantry.124  Therefore, 
whilst certainly not cavalry in the true European sense, the Light Horse was 
more than just a transposed Mounted Infantry concept from Britain but 
represented a colonial adaptation of the Mounted Infantry precept in line with 
available resources and requirements. 
If the colonies of the British Empire evolved Mounted Rifles as their solution, 
European armies faced different and, arguably, more complex challenges. 
Unlike the colonies of the British Empire, all European armies cherished the 
traditions of cavalry, mounted shock tactics and the arme blanche yet recent 
European wars had demonstrated the increased lethality of modern 
firepower over edged weapons.125  Therefore, whilst the challenge was how 
to balance the competing demands of firepower, battlefield mobility and the 
retention of traditionally armed cavalry to match their enemy’s capabilities, 
the deliberations were heavily influenced by the cavalry lobby. In this 
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respect, without a major distracting colonial politico-military focus, the armies 
of France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia, particularly those with 
well-established General Staffs contributing to co-ordinated planning and 
development of doctrine, confronted this dilemma earlier than the British 
Army. Their seemingly advanced solutions produced a consequent, if rather 
erroneous, perception of a comparative tactical superiority126 of these 
nations’ cavalries over the British cavalry that persisted until the eve of the 
First World War. 
Whilst it is true that no other European army developed an exact replica of 
the British regular Mounted Infantry, abstracted at times of crisis from its 
main infantry force, a process of ‘dragoonisation’ occurred in several 
cavalries whereby the principle of increased training in dismounted fire 
support tactics was instituted. This was effectively a limited conversion to the 
functionality of Mounted Infantry or Mounted Rifles but without a change of 
nomenclature or designation.127  The usual rationale for not formally 
developing  Mounted Infantry in these armies reflected similar British 
cavalry’s predictions of Mounted Infantry degenerating into inferior cavalry, 
devoid of equestrian skills, bereft of the ability to administer the mounted 
charge and unable to protect themselves against more highly trained enemy 
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cavalry.128 Although, as the French author Picard noted, the perceived 
benefits accrued from the deployment of Mounted Infantry were undeniably 
attractive to army commanders in terms of mobility and firepower, remarking 
that ‘l’idée de l’infanterie montée, présentée ainsi sous ces different aspects 
avantageux, est incontestablement séduisante’.129 The disputed ability of 
large European conscript armies to train their cavalry in both mounted and 
dismounted skills mirrored the debate in Australia and New Zealand with the 
default position being prioritisation of mounted drill and with the infantry 
escaping the unwelcome distraction of abstraction for Mounted Infantry 
instruction.130  By way of example, Russian cavalry in the 1870s were, in 
effect, all converted functionally to Mounted Infantry with the exception being 
the Cossack irregular cavalry who equally began to be incorporated into the 
regular army131 despite a polarity of opinion internationally regarding their 
military value.132  Similarly the Austro-Hungarian cavalry, historically the most 
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favoured arm of the army,133 reluctantly lost its differentiation of light and 
heavy cavalry in all but name134 and became dragoons with Mounted Infantry 
functionality,135 although there were later moves to re-designate back to 
more traditional cavalry.136 Indeed, these trends towards making the cavalry 
responsible for dismounted fire support would be reversed in other armies to 
some degree later in the century, in part predicated on a pan-European 
cavalry revival, but also consistent with the emerging doctrine of the 
offensive.137   
Key to moving away from cavalry being responsible solely for mobile 
firepower was the doctrine of the German cavalry that became an exemplar 
elsewhere.138  After a poor performance in the Austro-Prussian War of 
1866,139 the Prussian cavalry reformed,140 becoming more functional than 
ceremonial, emphasising reconnaissance and raiding without relinquishing 
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its capacity for shock tactics against enemy cavalry or infantry. It was not that 
firepower was ignored but it was however subjugated in importance to 
mobility, a strategic choice that paid dividends against the more indolent 
French cavalry in 1870.141 The German answer to the needs of fire support 
was its delegation of the role to companies of attached light infantry (Jägers) 
converted de facto into Mounted Infantry with their mobility enhanced by 
transport in wheeled carts, occasionally mounted on cobs or, latterly, as 
cyclists.142 Historically, German cavalry did not have a tradition of 
dismounted work143 even during peacetime manoeuvres144 but it had flirted 
with the Mounted Infantry concept in 1870 when mounted Jägers had 
assumed patrol duties and functioned as reinforcement for cavalry embroiled 
in fire fights.145  This contributed to German cavalry tactics in August 1914 
where German cavalry mobility was hampered by a reliance on its slower 
moving Jägers for fire support.146  Such tactical reliance on mobile infantry 
                                                          
141 General von Pelet-Narbonne, Cavalry on Service illustrated by the advance of the German Cavalry 
across the Mosel in 1870 (London: Hugh Rees Ltd, 1906), p.119 (translation); Lieutenant Colonel 
Bonie, La Cavalerie Française en 1870 avec ses resultants tactiques (London: W. Mitchell & Co, 
1873), p.120; Fincastle, ‘The Strategical and Tactical Employment of Cavalry in War’, pp. 19-30; 
Dorondo, Riders of the Apocalypse, pp.18-19. 
142
 BHaStA(K) / Abt.IV. MKR 1201,  Kriegsministerium, Armee-Abteilung I,  Verwendung von 
Jägerbataillonen bei der Heereskavallerie, Műnchen 25 February 1914; James R. Osgood, The Armies 
of Today (London: McIlvaine & Co., 1893), p. 118, Jägers were an élite constituting 3.5 per cent of all 
German infantry and recruited almost exclusively from Prussia. 
 
143
 Drill Regulations for the Cavalry of the German Army (HMSO 1909), p.viii, stated that whilst 
“dismounted action is to be practised in proportion to its importance”, its arme blanche doctrine 
remained for ‘the carbine will only be resorted to when the lance can no longer be used’. 
 
144 Anon, ‘The Kaiser-Manőver in Germany September 1905’, Journal of the Royal United Services 
Institute, 50, 1906, pp. 181-99, where German cavalry was caustically described as ‘seeking 
opportunities for heroic self-immolation’. 
 
145
 Pelet-Narbonne, Cavalry on Service, p.24. 
 
146 Richard Holmes, Riding the Retreat (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995), pp. 112-13. 
375 
 
support, combined with the cavalry’s historical aversion to dismounted work, 
had been predicted by Bernhardi who wrote: ‘I fear that the cavalry will cry 
out for infantry the moment an attack on foot has to be carried out’.147 
If the German cavalry frittered away its advantage in mobility then the French 
cavalry appeared to be neither adventurously mobile nor bristling with 
firepower.148  Roundly criticised following the French defeat in 1870-71 for its 
lack of initiative, 149 disregard of scouting and its wasteful self-sacrifice in 
futile mounted charges, French cavalry diminished its mobility by poor 
horsemastership150  and failed to address its inferior firepower. Certainly the 
French cavalry did not desire either re-development as Mounted Infantry nor 
evolution of its dismounted doctrine,151 dismissively rejecting the idea as 
being suitable only ‘pour les cavaliers timides, ȃges ou fatigués qui ne 
galopent plus!’152. However this does not mean that the potential for Mounted 
Infantry was ignored or dismissed out of hand with debate occurring in the 
French military literature153  concluding that mobile firepower either required 
enhancement in the cavalry’s dismounted expertise as skirmishers or the 
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attachment of cyclists to cavalry units.154  The general European tendency to 
attach light infantry to cavalry units was replicated in the Russian army of 
1914 where, despite training with the rifle, Russian hussars were preceded 
by ‘chasseurs’ on foot155 although, at other times, the hussars continued to 
cherish the arme blanche by considering to ‘charge anything that could be 
taken by surprise’.156  It had been only a mere seven years earlier, in the 
wake of the slump in morale in the Russian army caused by its defeat in the 
Russo-Japanese War157 followed by the disruption caused by the 1905 
revolution158 and the army’s subsequent failure to reform at any meaningful 
pace,159  that the cosmetic differentiation into types of cavalry was 
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reintroduced into the Russian army with hussars, dragoons and lancers 
identifiable by uniform if not by armaments or tactics.160  A similar limited re-
differentiation occurred in the Austro-Hungarian cavalry, which previously 
had been comparatively forward-thinking, removing lances from its cavalry 
as early as 1884.161  Nevertheless, its cavalry remained deeply conservative, 
fiercely retaining its uniform, traditions and sense of social exclusivity162  in 
comparison to other branches of the army including the otherwise élite 
Jägers.163  A tendency for innate arrogance was not an unusual trait of 
European cavalry regiments.164  However in America, there was no deep-
rooted tradition of social superiority or ‘repressive military tradition’165  in the 
US cavalry, a force that had only developed from volunteer units as recently 
as the American Civil War. In many respects the US cavalry of the mid-
1870s until the end of the century was to fight a quasi-colonial war as the 
westward spread of settlers moved into Native American land. Thus, 
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although not ‘overseas’, the US cavalry faced the same operational 
challenges and logistical problems common to all colonial expeditions, 
particularly facing a mobile adversary versed in a variety of tactics including, 
like the Boers, a reluctance for close combat that negated the cavalry’s arme 
blanche, preferring the raid and ambush of the insurgent. In response, the 
US army166 built on its experiences during the Civil War of combining 
dismounted firepower, admittedly with disappointing fire discipline,167  and, 
less often, the attenuated shock tactics of the saddle-fired revolver and 
rifle.168 Therefore it can be concluded that the US cavalry also developed a 
dragoon-like tactical approach, a conclusion underlined by a contemporary 
observation that the US cavalry deployed to China in 1901 were ‘much more 
of the nature of Mounted Infantry than cavalry’.169 Nevertheless, in the early 
part of the twentieth century, American cavalry too changed doctrinal 
direction becoming more traditionally cavalry in a European sense with a 
heightened prominence given to the sabre and the defining attributes of the 
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arme blanche.170 Even so, ad hoc Mounted Infantry units, without any 
pretence to a cavalry pedigree, also evolved mainly in response to the need 
for more mobile troops in the American Civil War171 to counter the roaming 
bands of irregular horsemen, particularly in Tennessee,172  and the 
subsequent campaign against the Sioux in 1866-77,173  appearing falsely to 
offer a more cost-effective alternative to cavalry.174 However, even such an 
egalitarian society was not without institutional friction with similar arguments 
made regarding the limitations of Mounted Infantry in comparison to cavalry, 
noting that: ‘arguments for Mounted Infantry utterly fail to show why there 
should be formed a permanent mounted force capable of performing only 
one half the duties of mounted troops’.175 Cavalry officers expounded that the 
Mounted Infantry would be a force ‘officered by men whose business it is to 
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walk’.176  However, without tenaciously-held traditions and in the absence of 
overt doctrinal competition, the longevity and bitterness of argument and 
obfuscation that marred the relationship between British cavalry and regular 
Mounted Infantry was less apparent in the similar US military debates. 
Nonetheless, it should not be concluded that forms of Mounted Infantry were 
unknown in European armies. However their existence seems predicated on 
either specific environmental challenges occurring through the acquisition of 
imperial possessions in harsher climates177  or as a cavalry-sparing inception 
performing some of that arm’s least popular tasks.178 In support of its North 
African empire, a French colonial army was formed and mirroring the British 
Army’s response to its own colonial challenges, developed the camel-borne 
méharistes of the Saharan Oasis Force that comprised volunteer French 
officers and native Arabs in frontier units deployed in small mobile columns 
also incorporating chasseurs à pied and mobile artillery.179 Camel-borne 
troops were also employed in French West Africa and elsewhere in its 
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overseas empire.180 Moreover, the French colonial army evolved still further 
in the guise of the Armée d’Afrique that included the élite European 
Chasseurs d’Afrique and zouaves,181  native Arab mounted Spahis and the 
locally recruited native Algerian Tirailleurs (Turcos) and Troupe Coloniales 
that were locally raised companies such as the Tirailleurs Sénégalais.182  
Although wedded through natural inclination to cavalry tactics and with poor 
standards of musketry, French colonial cavalry was capable of dismounted 
action and, arguably, should be considered Francophone Mounted Rifles.183 
Elsewhere, reflecting Alpine and Balkan topography, the Austro-Hungarian 
army converted local troops from the Tyrol and Dalmatia into Mounted Rifles. 
The Tirolean Mounted Rifles, colloquially known as the ‘Glacier Hussars’184  
were mounted on local ponies, whilst in Dalmatia specially bred small ponies 
were used to enhance the mobility of Mounted Rifles’ patrols.185 During the 
1893 Manoeuvres, the Austro-Hungarian armies briefly experimented with 
the German-style attachment of two rifle battalions to each cavalry division, 
which unfortunately both retarded cavalry mobility and encouraged the 
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cavalry to remain mounted at all times to the detriment of their horses.186  
Similarly, due to natural geography, locally recruited irregular Mounted 
Infantry were attached to the Turkish Army’s VII Corps in Yemen - the only 
example of Mounted Infantry in the Ottoman Empire.187 The similarities of 
timing in the inception of these mounted rifles in the 1870 – 1880s188 
suggests a development in parallel to that of the British Mounted Infantry with 
contemporaneous military literature indicating international debate regarding 
the value of the Mounted Infantry / Mounted Rifles paradigm.189 
Conversely, the utility of irregular Russian Cossack horsemen, who 
comprised 60 per cent of the Russian cavalry,190  as an additional Russian 
solution to the provision of mobile firepower alongside the ‘dragoonisation’ of 
regular Russian cavalry,191  largely unravelled during the Russo-Japanese 
War. Although previously much-vaunted for their horsemanship,192  the 
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Cossack cavalry’s poor mounted and dismounted actions with paucity of 
initiative, dearth of reconnaissance and worrying aversion to contact with the 
enemy, largely shattered the myth of the marauding invincible Cossack.193 
Urgent cavalry reform through improved training and restoration of morale 
was a key conclusion of analysis of the Russian cavalry’s war effort.194 
However, the poor performance of both Russian and Japanese cavalries in 
1904 should have come as no surprise as their performances during the 
earlier Boxer Rebellion in China had been dismissed by British officers who 
noted reassuringly, that neither cavalry would be a match for Indian cavalry, 
an observation that would be made again in Manchuria in 1904 – 05.195  
Despite an absence of a recognised Mounted Infantry,196  the Russian Army 
developed Mounted Infantry Scouts (Okhotniki) that were well-regarded, 
being of superior intellect and initiative, but which were frittered away 
unfortunately on non-scouting duties in Manchuria.197 
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Even in Imperial Germany, despite an official assertion that ‘Mounted Infantry 
is unknown in the German Army’,198  Mounted Infantry developed but did so 
in order to fulfil a more niche role than in the British Army.199 Originally 
conceived in 1895 as despatch riders attached to cavalry regiments, 
Meldreiter units evolved into Jäger zu Pferde (Mounted Rifles) in 1897,200 
eventually furnishing thirteen regiments by 1913 each with their own 
distinctive permanent organisation, uniform and insignia. The Jäger zu 
Pferde became assimilated into the permanent organisation of the Imperial 
Army in a manner never an option for the British regular Mounted Infantry 
with a correspondingly clearer military identity. However, armed with sabres 
and revolvers and with unquestionable cavalry origins, Jäger zu Pferde 
officers were considered members of the cavalry regiment to which they 
were attached,201 and undertook specific cavalry-sparing orderly roles, 
centred primarily on communications, and if required, independent 
reconnaissance. Thus Jäger zu Pferde were a breed distinct from the British 
regular Mounted Infantry with a different organisation, method of formation 
and role that was significantly less extensive than ascribed to their British 
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namesakes.202 Jäger zu Pferde never functioned as a mobile infantry reserve 
as a source of firepower nor formally as a cavalry substitute,203  being 
distributed among cavalry regiments and larger formations in small 
numbers.204  Nevertheless, the importance of Jäger zu Pferde to German 
military units was recognised by military planners who included companies of 
Mounted Infantry in a putative overseas Expeditionary Force comprising 
20,000 – 25,000 men for future colonial emergencies.205   
It is perhaps opportune to contrast the international response to the need for 
mobile firepower and how the various incarnations of Mounted Infantry 
compare. Despite the overarching generic concept of Mounted Infantry, the 
solutions found by individual armies were markedly different. Whilst no other 
country except Britain attempted to deliver mobile firepower with abstracted 
regular Mounted Infantry, other armies developed alternative approaches 
largely relying on Mounted Rifles, ‘dragoonisation’ of existing cavalry or the 
delegation of mobile fire support to Jägers and Chasseurs à pied. It is 
important to note however that in most armies, the solutions adopted were 
not mutually exclusive with the majority of cavalries recognising the 
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importance to varying degrees of improved musketry and dismounted work 
even if evolving alternative units to supply firepower.206  In many cases, a 
secondary desire was to reduce the amount of additional work no longer 
perceived (at least by the cavalry lobby in those countries) to be the core 
workload for these increasingly specialised cavalry regiments, particularly 
traditional roles as divisional cavalry.207 The lengthy duration of training,208  
expense and, by extrapolation, the inability to improvise or expand the 
cavalry force, contributed to the challenge of identifying non-cavalry mounted 
troops that whilst not cavalry substitutes, could release the cavalry for more 
independent roles. Whether infantry or cavalry were utilised to form the novel 
Mounted Infantry / Mounted Rifles units differed between countries. In the US 
Army in particular, US infantry and cavalry were interchangeable with both 
delivering this generic role at times. This was summarised officially as ‘the 
Cavalry, from the nature of the arm serves equally mounted and on foot; 
while the Infantry is frequently called up to serve as Artillery and to perform 
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duty as cavalry’.209 Where Mounted Infantry was developed, the drivers for 
their evolution appear a response to the exigencies of patrolling imperial 
frontiers,210 whether in Europe or elsewhere without burdening the cavalry. 
With imperial expansion prevalent in the late 19th century, only Austria-
Hungary, almost uniquely among the Great Powers of Europe, did not 
contemplate seeking opportunities for an overseas empire, preferring to 
consolidate her empire in Central Europe and the Balkans following its 
Bosnian campaign in 1878.211  Few other European nations had colonial 
possessions so distant from their home as Britain, thus permitting the 
majority of European armies to retain a continental focus, which, despite its 
territories in Africa and recent acquisitions in the Pacific, profited Germany’s 
military strategy.212 Nevertheless, colonial crises still arose such as the 
indigenous Herero rebellion in German South West Africa in 1908, which 
necessitated the embarkation of a Marine Expeditionary Force in support of 
the local Schutztruppe.213 Needing to counter the tribesmen’s mobility, 
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experimental local Mounted Infantry were formed from existing troops and 
disembarked Jägers mounted on cobs214. Not only does this reflect 
approvingly the British solutions identified in South Africa almost a century 
before215  but also interestingly, problems such as deficient equitation 
impairing mobility, lack of equine resource in theatre, dilatoriness of oxen-
pulled wagons and unimpressive musketry,  dilemmas previously 
encountered by the British Army, re-surfaced to trouble the Imperial German 
Army.216 Demonstrating that the German General Staff had not necessarily 
understood the nature of similar lessons arising from the British experience 
in South Africa despite their voluminous study of the Boer War,217 the ad hoc 
German Mounted Infantry suffered repeated ambushes with their supply 
convoys raided at increasing monetary, political and human cost.218  Even 
though the paradigm of Mounted Infantry was recognised by the Imperial 
Colonial Office, the potential for abstraction of specially trained Jäger zu 
Pferde, expert in ‘snap shooting and navigation’, to serve in the Imperial 
Schutztruppe was blocked. This was ostensibly due to potential conflict with 
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the cavalry whose lobbying limited the availability of peacetime riding 
tuition.219  This resulted in a reliance on training when on overseas duties, 
which, as already seen with the British regular Mounted Infantry, was of 
questionable tactical value.  
Clearly, logistical challenges accompanied all forms of colonial warfare 
reflecting extremes of terrain and weather, uncertain availability of natural 
resources, inadequacy of ammunition supply, availability of forage and the 
length of lines of communication and re-supply requiring protection. Whilst 
these have been considered in terms of their influence on the military 
effectiveness of the British Mounted Infantry in a preceding chapter, other 
nations laboured under these and similar campaign stresses. Russian 
strategic planning for the campaign in Manchuria in 1904 was predicated on 
the cavalry finding local forage - both a false premise and a woeful 
indictment of Russian intelligence, memorably phrased in official British 
documents as ‘the idea of feeding an army from the local resources of 
Northern Korea is about as practical as trying to decorate St. Paul’s with 
flowers from Clerkenwell Green’.220 Similarly the mobility of the US cavalry 
on the western Plains was a balance between its numerical paucity,221  vast 
distances encountered, terrain, weather and the logistics of supplying 
multiple mobile columns. Attempting to enhance mobility by using pack 
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animals in preference to loaded wagons,222 the US cavalry also developed 
the tactics of winter warfare using climatic factors to reduce its adversary’s 
mobility. Native Americans’ nomadic movements were limited in winter by 
snow, mud and exhaustion of local forage, which helped the US cavalry in 
scouting, identification of the enemy and a greater chance of surprise.223  
Although campaigns against the Apaches in the South Western states meant 
desert terrain, heat and a lack of water creating their own logistical problems, 
the northern campaigns ranged widely thus diminishing the cavalry’s mobility 
through equine loss with up to 10 per cent of the US cavalry completing 
expeditions on foot. Fiscal constraints added to the problems of procuring 
remounts with up to one-third of US cavalrymen dismounted in the garrisons 
of the Department of Colorado.224 Fortunately, the nature of warfare on the 
Great Plains favoured endurance over speed as tribes moved slowly en 
masse thus permitting foot infantry to be as useful as cavalry over a 
prolonged expedition.225 Nevertheless, this degree of equine wastage pales 
in comparison to the British and Imperial losses encountered on the veldt. 
Logistically, the US army was fortunate in having established widespread 
military forts, which functioned as effective supply depots unlike the smaller 
British blockhouse system crisscrossing the veldt, and a river system that 
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permitted re-supply using modified paddle steamers.226 Despite the apparent 
usefulness of the fort network, their scattered distribution and numerical 
abundance, which had been based on earlier ad hoc requirements, caused 
problems in garrisoning them leading to repeated attempts to withdraw from 
a proportion of forts by the Adjutant General, not least because small 
isolated garrisons were unable to furnish adequately-sized punitive 
expeditions whilst still ensuring their forts’ ongoing security.227 The issue of 
re-supply was an exacerbating factor contributing to the poor performance of 
the Russian Army in the Russo-Japanese War. The relatively new Trans-
Siberian Railway only offered limited freight capacity228 although failures in 
military strategy, particularly inadequate transfer of better-trained regular 
Russian army formations from the Empire’s western frontier to Manchuria, 
also contributed to defeat.229 Dismissive of his Cossack cavalry, General 
Kuropatkin singled out the Trans-Baikal Cossacks, mounted on small shaggy 
ponies, for denigration, noting that they reminded him more of ‘Mounted 
Infantry than cavalry’.230 Such disparagement was symptomatic, not only of 
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the gulf between Russian army commanders and their troops, but a general 
vilification of the status of Mounted Infantry in Europe.231 
Although the deduction of lessons from wars was often complex and, at 
times, inconclusive, among the conclusions arising from study of conflict 
between the years 1866 and 1914 was the lethality of modern firepower. In 
1866, the Austrian infantry’s muzzle-loading firearms had been outperformed 
by the Prussians’ breech-loaded rifles.232  Despite the importance of 
firepower, this was not enough to guarantee victory as demonstrated in the 
Franco-German War of 1870 – 71 where the superiority of the French 
chassepot rifle and mitrailleuse prototypic machine gun compared to the 
German Dreyse needle gun, did not prevent France’s defeat.233 
Notwithstanding this anomaly, the importance of modern firearms could not 
be ignored even if the true capability of modern ballistics went 
undervalued.234  Certainly, the key attribute of British Mounted Infantry on the 
veldt had been its possession of the infantry rifle as the cavalry’s carbine 
could not compete with the Boers’ Mausers at long range, ultimately 
contributing to the re-arming of British cavalry with the infantry’s Lee-Enfield 
rifle. A mismatch in quantity and performance occurred between the newer 
models of Winchester repeating rifles possessed by some Native American 
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tribes and the US cavalry’s single-shot Springfield carbine,235  a weapon that 
like the Martini-Henry was notoriously prone to jamming.236 This mismatch in 
armaments had been an important factor in perpetuating the Plains wars.237 
Re-arming with magazine-loaded rifles thus became standard practice in 
most armies. Yet whether the possession of such weapons should extend to 
the cavalry remained surprisingly controversial. Certainly Russian and 
Austro-Hungarian cavalry re-armed with rifles rather than carbines as part of 
their ‘dragoonisation’238  whereas German and French cavalries retained 
their carbines,239  the latter being derided for their tenacious hold on this ‘pop 
gun’ by Brigadier General Sir Archibald Home and General Haig in 1914.240  
This underlined the backward nature of musketry in the French cavalry, 
subjugated to the doctrine of the offensive, which for French cavalry meant 
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simply mounted arme blanche tactics.241 Again overlooking lessons from 
previous wars, the value of Russian cavalry rifle power outranging Turkish 
guns in the Russo-Turkish War had been remarked upon 
contemporaneously by The Times, which had also highlighted the 
comparative uselessness of the cavalry’s lances in comparison to its rifles.242 
The corollary of cavalries’ failures to adopt the rifle was their tacit admission 
that dismounted fire tactics remained a low priority and that fire support 
would need to be sourced elsewhere. It is no surprise therefore that the 
default position remained light infantry. Proposals for Jägers functioning as 
Mounted Infantry243  or Mounted Infantry scouts in the German Army were 
accepted with preferential selection of foresters and hunters from Prussia 
and Bavaria whereas similar suggestions in the Austro-Hungarian army 
foundered on grounds of fiscal restriction.244  In societies where a cavalry of 
panache, drawn sabre and couched lance was unknown then arming 
mounted troops with a rifle was obvious in its logic and resulted in the 
evolution of Mounted Rifles or Light Horse. Clearly this is a broad 
generalisation yet it remains essentially true that recruiting men with 
preceding experience of horses and firearms permitted the inception of 
mounted troops capable of delivering firepower that traditional cavalries 
generally did or would not countenance.  
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Another significant deficit in the mounted arm that had an influence on 
conclusions drawn from contemporary conflicts was a failure of 
reconnaissance.245 The emphasis of the German cavalry on ceaseless 
scouting was a product of its failure to do so in the Austro-Prussian War that 
had precipitated doctrinal reform.246 The gulf between the ever-ranging 
German cavalry and the indolent French cavalry in 1870 had been an 
important factor in determining the outcome of the war.247 Similarly, failure in 
reconnaissance during the Transvaal campaign of 1880 – 81 and repeated 
failures subsequently during the initial months of the war in South Africa in 
1899 contributed to a number of high profile failures including Ingogo River in 
the Transvaal campaign and Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso in the 
Boer War.248 Reconnaissance now ranged over much greater distances due 
to accurate long-range musketry and thus tested both equine resilience and 
horsemastership, the latter deficient in British cavalry in South Africa and 
also in the French cavalry in 1914.249 In its favour, whilst not conceived for 
reconnaissance,250  the British Mounted Infantry had learned this skill 
                                                          
245
 TNA WO 33 / 350 Reports on the campaign in Manchuria in 1904; Major the Honourable W. P. 
Ruthven,, ‘The employment of cavalry in combination with the other arms’, Army Review, II (II), 
1912, pp. 110-20; The Times, 23 August 1905, ‘The Cavalry Lessons of the War’; Richard Holmes, The 
Road to Sedan: the French Army 1866 – 70 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1984), p.225; Jones, 
‘Scouting for Soldiers’, pp. 495-513; Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War, p.94. 
 
246 Dorondo, Riders of the Apocalypse, p.17 & p.26, equally it is noted that, in 1866, Prussian cavalry 
advanced behind Prussian infantry thus paralysing its own mobility; Phillips, ‘‘Who Shall Say That the 
Days of Cavalry Are Over?’ pp. 5-32. 
 
247 Fincastle, ‘The Strategical and Tactical Employment of Cavalry in War’, pp. 19-30. 
 
248 C.S Goldman, ‘Cavalry: its true functions in modern war’, Cavalry Journal, 1, 1906, pp. 65-79. 
 
249 Home, The Diary of a World War 1 Cavalry Officer, p.19, diary entry, 6 September 1914. 
 
250 Hutton, Five Lectures on Mounted Infantry, Lecture Four, 20 April 1891, pp.1-27. 
396 
 
painfully on the veldt and that it might be required to scout again in future 
campaigns.251  The use of local experts such as Boer scouts attached to 
mobile columns in South Africa, the ad hoc employment of Native American 
scouts with the US cavalry252  or, for a brief period in 1891, the formalised 
Native American ‘L’ troops of the first eight US cavalry regiments, was 
widespread.253  Another solution, particularly on the metalled roads of 
Europe, was the tentative extension of the communications role of cyclists to 
include the reconnaissance function of scouts.254  The French Army 
experimented with cyclists (vélocipédistes) armed with machine guns on 
Manoeuvres in1910 but more in the role of mobile infantry offering fire 
support rather than scouts replacing cavalry. 255   Nevertheless, this 
experiment mimicked the functionality of Mounted Infantry. Virtually all 
armies experimented with cyclists, concluding that their speed, comparative 
silence and marked endurance compared favourably with horsed 
reconnaissance.256  Indeed, the Belgian Army claimed unrealistically that 
there was nowhere that a cyclist could not travel257 apart from across 
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ploughed fields, although overall, European military cyclists would remain a 
minor component of the infantry, confined predominantly to western and 
central Europe with its viable road systems.258 Of course, the additional 
benefit of infantry-origin cyclists, for all cavalries disdained the prospect of 
becoming wheeled chevaliers, was both their possession of the standard 
infantry rifle for firepower, and its infantry origins, innocent of any 
transgression into the politically-sensitive minefield of the horsed arm, thus 
equally appeasing the cavalry259  who remained, quoted at least in the 
Imperial Russian Army, to be the ‘arm of the gods’.260  Therefore the value of 
scouting and reconnaissance was re-affirmed during these European and 
colonial wars of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, influencing the 
perception of army commanders for the preservation of traditional cavalry. 
Notwithstanding differing interpretations of the War in Manchuria,261 a 
surprising conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War was the apparent 
advantage conferred by the doctrine of the offensive.262 Briefly summarised, 
this concept attempted to circumvent the increased lethality of the battlefield 
resulting from enhanced firepower through technological advances and the 
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increased numerical size of late 19th century armies, by encouraging a 
psychological and moral strength in soldiers to attack despite defenders’ 
firepower263  and their inherent advantages accrued from entrenchment and 
barbed wire.264  Whilst acknowledging that this concept was a reaction 
against modern firepower, Travers also considers that it was a reaction 
reflecting army commanders’ pessimistic views of their recruits’ abilities and 
the orthodoxy that specific military actions could be decisive, equating to a 
conclusion that the army with the strongest offensive spirit would win a 
decisive victory.265 Despite heavy losses pursuing this doctrine, the Teutonic-
inspired Japanese army overcame Russian defences through its infantry’s 
mobility and the dynamism of its offensive operations,266 helped by the lack 
of Russian initiative. Although, as Gary Cox has noted, both British and 
German analyses of the war identified the importance of technology, each 
weighted its importance differently.267  Both also assessed the psychological 
profiles of the combatant armies differently,268  which, by contemporary 
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standards, appear redolent of cultural bias and racial prejudice.269  Against 
this canvas of military mediocrity and cultural stereotyping, the reasons for 
the failure of both cavalries was much debated although a lack of universally 
agreed lessons prompted the Austro-Hungarians to conclude dismissively 
that ‘our cavalry beliefs are in no way altered owing to the experiences of the 
war in the Far East’270  and denounced the Mounted Infantry-style of Russian 
cavalry as a feeble half-measure.271  Clearly, the possibility of contact with 
Cossacks marauding through Galicia in the opening moves of a future 
European war seemed to hold no fear for the Austro-Hungarian cavalry.  In 
the Far East, the Japanese Army had little or no tradition of cavalry as a 
major branch of their army, not least because of its samurai tradition, but 
also through a paucity of equine resource, minimal military equestrianism 
and adverse mountainous terrain lacking in forage.272  The Russians, whilst 
enjoying a numerical superiority of mounted troops of three to one, had, as 
already noted, delegated its cavalry role almost exclusively to its Cossacks 
whose reputation consequently imploded.273  Neither cavalry delivered the 
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‘holy grail’ of mobility in reconnaissance duties, arme blanche-style pursuit or 
effective fire support. With a degree of ‘malicious satisfaction’,274  Ian 
Hamilton, military observer attached to the Japanese Army, reiterated his 
opinion about the utility of Mounted Infantry,275 irrespective of the Japanese 
commanders’ indifference after a brief experiment with Mounted Infantry by 
the Japanese VII Division.276 Surprisingly, a lesson of the war drawn by the 
Japanese cavalry, perhaps opportunistically, was to expand if not double in 
size,277  which was a deduction made all the more incongruous by the lack of 
utility of the ‘idle’ Japanese Divisional Cavalry before the battle of Liaoyang, 
which resulted in their employment as cooks and transport for the infantry 
before battle.278  
Nonetheless, the apparent success of the doctrine of the offensive found 
favour with other armies, proffering a solution to the potentially paralysing 
effects of artillery bombardment, machine-gun fire, barbed wire and 
defensive entrenchment.279 Its international adoption would be tested in late 
1914. Even during peacetime manoeuvres in England, a lack of visible 
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offensive spirit by units and commanders alike frequently drew criticism. In 
the manoeuvres in consecutive pre-war years, the British regular Mounted 
Infantry were alternately accused of excessive caution, showing too little 
‘offensive spirit’, or excessive enthusiasm, ignoring their role and risking their 
mobility by unnecessary exposure of their held horses to enemy fire.280 Of 
course, the corollary of the doctrine of the offensive from a cavalry 
perspective was approbation and retention (or even re-introduction) of the 
arme blanche and, in terms of speed of movement and inculcation of morale, 
the so-called ‘cavalry spirit’. The US cavalry, erstwhile functional Light 
Horse,281 re-introduced cavalry mounted sabre drill in 1911282 whilst Russian 
cavalry were re-issued with lances in 1912, partly reversing the previous 
‘dragoonisation’ of more than three decades.283  The premium placed on the 
offensive also demanded better reconnaissance with the power to disrupt 
enemy forces and their lines of communication by deep penetration raids, as 
exemplified by the Confederate cavalry officer J.E.B Stuart during the 
American Civil War,284 a lesson that had influenced German cavalry tactics in 
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1870.285 Similarly, the Russian cavalry experimented with specialist long 
distance horsed raiding parties (Razvyedchiki)286 prior to 1914 although there 
would be precious little opportunity for such activities other than cautious 
patrols on the East German plain at the outbreak of the First World War.287  
Therefore, as a counterpoint to the cavalry’s renaissance across Europe, any 
enthusiasm for Mounted Infantry began to wane quickly. Although General 
von Pelet-Narbonne lauded the German cavalry’s dismounted firepower that 
facilitated its crossing of the Mosel in 1870, equal accolade had been given 
to the use of the lance in the skirmish at Bolchen in that August.288  German 
analyses of the Boer War, whilst notably critical of the British cavalry with the 
singular exception of the Cavalry Division’s mounted charge at Klip Drift,289 
had been particularly dismissive of the Mounted Infantry, although the 
German Official History grudgingly admitted that the Mounted Infantry had, 
by the end of the campaign, become a ‘most effective and valuable force’.290 
Identical views, born of the institutional prejudices in the French Army, 
particularly in the cavalry, encompassing religious bigotry, political 
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discrimination, anti-Semitism291  and profound professional myopia, ensured 
that any value of dismounted small arms fire, even when shock tactics were 
inappropriate or futile, was disregarded.292 Thus, as instructional messages 
were frequently either misinterpreted or obscured by institutional prejudice, it 
is hardly surprising that the possibility of developing and formalising Mounted 
Infantry, a potential solution for the requirements of mobile firepower, 
reconnaissance and raiding, was actively overlooked, leading to the 
conclusion that ‘there seems no urgent need for the establishment of 
Mounted Infantry units in continental armies’.293 
Thus, in conclusion to this chapter, if the lesson of continental conflict from 
as early as 1866 had been the increasing power of modern rifles and 
artillery, the resulting conundrum for the attacker was how best to traverse 
the fire zone, extend the attacking line to outflank defences replete with more 
effective reconnaissance predicated on better horsemastership, whilst 
ensuring the application of maximum firepower at the point of attack. For the 
British Army, the solution lay for nearly three decades with the transposition 
of the ad hoc abstracted Mounted Infantry from its colonial origins to the 
wider army with the model featuring, albeit transiently, in the strategic 
planning of an expeditionary force for a future European conflict. Until called 
upon to support the mother country during the Boer War, other imperial 
countries had maintained only citizen militia for defence but the inception of 
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Mounted Rifles, superficially resembling domestic Yeomanry but with a 
greatly attenuated or absent cavalry ethos, had been a key component of 
these forces. The often well-regarded performance of colonial Mounted 
Rifles leading to the establishment of Light Horse regiments, immortalised 
the Mounted Rifleman as a heroic icon at a time of burgeoning nationalism. 
India was different, not least due to the persistence of British Army garrisons 
but also by specific organisational parallels in the Indian Army with its 
enhanced opportunities for active service on the North West Frontier. Whilst 
embarked British regiments took their Mounted Infantry capability with them, 
the inception of Mounted Infantry in India was as much a congruent 
phenomenon as a product of cross-fertilisation from Britain. Yet despite the 
provision of five mounted Infantry schools for both British and Indian 
regiments, the Mounted Infantry model waned faster than in Britain. Although 
the needs of mobile firepower and reconnaissance were no less pressing in 
India, the realisation that hill fighting on the North West Frontier demanded a 
different solution undermined the usefulness of Mounted Infantry. The 
formation of specialist frontier troops, particularly the PFF and the Guides, 
both all-arms units of infantry and cavalry capable of dismounted action and 
supported by mountain batteries and local levies, effectively dealt a mortal 
blow to the value and existence of Mounted Infantry in India. The concurrent 
demise of the Mounted Infantry at home negated any objection to the 
phasing out of Mounted Infantry training in India but did not, in its self, 
precipitate the closure of the Mounted Infantry schools. Despite other 
countries’ imperial pretensions, none developed Mounted Infantry strictly 
along British precepts. Nevertheless, both French and German forces 
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resorted to extemporised Mounted Infantry in their African territories when 
exigencies demanded. Neither country routinely ensured tactical Mounted 
Infantry training for their infantry and both relied on either locally raised 
troops or volunteers from local garrisons in a manner similar to British policy 
pre-1880. In Europe however, the general solution to the delivery of 
enhanced firepower evolved dually, namely the re-focussing of cavalry 
training and tactics away from being solely arme blanche or, conversely, a 
delegation of firepower support to another arm, most frequently light infantry. 
Neither solution was mutually exclusive. A wholesale change in the cavalry 
to the dismounted fire tactics of traditional dragoons not only diminished 
traditional differentiation into hussar, lancer and dragoon, now seemingly 
mere historical anachronisms, but, as feared, damaged morale and the 
ability to deliver the panache required of cavalry in the offensive. Such 
orthodoxy was a false premise as these considerations, despite vigorous 
debate in military literature, did not blight the US cavalry whose tactics 
resembled that of Mounted Infantry, or perhaps more accurately, Mounted 
Rifles / Light Horse. The alternative approach, that of delegation of fire 
support, necessitated the attachment of light infantry, Jägers and Chasseurs 
à pied, to the cavalry with varying approaches aiding the infantry to keep 
pace with the cavalry.294 Neither doctrine seemed to bestow both mobility 
and fire support. German cavalry relinquished fire power in favour of mobility, 
although this was lost in needing to maintain contact with its Jägers, whilst 
French cavalry disregarded fire power by retaining its carbine and had a 
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questionable record of horsemastership undermining its mobility. The rare 
occurrence of Mounted Rifles in European armies, such as the Tirolean 
Mounted Rifles, was usually a product of challenging terrain or in niche roles, 
such as the German Jägers zu Pferde. In any case, these were cavalry in 
origin rather than abstracted infantry and did not intend delivering the roles 
assigned to the British regular Mounted Infantry, of either fire support or as a 
mobile infantry reserve.  
With regards to the other important lesson of scouting and reconnaissance, 
an absence of which had been deficient in 1866, 1870, 1899 and 1904, these 
functions would remain preferentially the preserve of the cavalry. Despite 
good examples of reconnaissance in South Africa by the Mounted Infantry, 
only the Russian Okhotniki and the irregular Native American scouts were 
anything other than cavalry-based. The majority of cavalries rejected sharing 
reconnaissance duties with other branches of the army on grounds that the 
role demanded superior horsemanship, except with that of the embryonic 
cyclist forces,295 which were mainly limited to regions with comprehensive 
road systems.296 The cyclist units were no threat to the future of cavalry as 
their mobility was limited and they were neither horsed nor, at least in the 
British Army, social equals in the military organisation. 
Returning to the research questions framing this chapter, Brigadier General 
Bethune’s bold statement of the uniqueness of British regular Mounted 
Infantry, with the caveat of the Indian Army, holds firm in its strictest sense of 
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a formalised, albeit extemporised, infantry-origin organisation abstracted in 
peacetime for training. Yet it is incorrect too as countries resorted to Mounted 
Infantry when colonial imperatives demanded, thus validating the original 
concept. The factors determining resolution of the demands of mobility and 
firepower were multiple including extent of imperial pretensions, pre-existing 
military organisation, predicted future conflict and lessons derived from other 
conflicts. Ultimately the decision whether to develop Mounted Infantry or not 
appears to have rested on the reaction of the army, particularly the cavalry, 
which, with its innate conservatism and staunchly-held traditions, was 
unlikely to welcome the interloper that was the Mounted Infantry and 
therefore effectively suffocated its development. The following sentiment, 
neatly encapsulating the fundamental objection to Mounted Infantry leading 
to its stifling across Europe, was expressed by Lieutenant Colonel Lowther, 
the British military attaché in Paris before the First World War, when he wrote 
that ‘in France, as in England, the cavalryman’s nightmare of being turned 
into Mounted Infantry prevails’.297 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions 
 
          ‘To the unlearned civilian accustomed to regard horse-soldiers as  
           cavalry and foot-soldiers as infantry, “mounted infantry” may very  
           possibly appear as contradiction in terms, but it is not so.’1 
 
The Introduction to this thesis highlighted the previous fragmentary treatment 
of the Mounted Infantry in the historiography of the late Victorian and 
Edwardian army. Acknowledging the consequent challenges inherent in 
collating widely dispersed primary and secondary sources, the purpose of 
this thesis has been a re-appraisal of the British Army’s regular Mounted 
Infantry concept by answering six principal thematic research questions: 
 What was the Mounted Infantry’s position in prevailing army doctrine 
and did the concept fulfil an identifiable need or was it an impecunious 
substitute for an inadequate cavalry? 
 Did the Mounted Infantry evolve a specific organisational identity 
underpinned by esprit de corps? 
 Did Mounted Infantry training successfully produce a ‘fit for purpose’ 
force and did command in the Mounted Infantry enhance future officer 
promotion prospects? 
 Was the Mounted Infantry militarily effective? 
 Was the Mounted Infantry model successfully transposed throughout 
the forces of the British Empire and did other nations’ armies adopt 
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the model or evolve alternative solutions to the problem of achieving 
mobile firepower in their military forces? 
 Among the numerous possible factors implicated in the Mounted 
Infantry’s demise, can a definitive cause precipitating its abolition be 
identified? 
The time period covered by the thesis is 1880 to 1913 and encompasses the 
formal inception of the regular Mounted Infantry following the Intelligence 
Department’s 1881 précis and its years of development until its abolition in 
1913.2  Of course, the history of extemporised informal Mounted Infantry 
predates this arbitrary span of thirty-three years yet the preceding ad hoc 
mounting of overseas infantry companies at times of emergency, through its 
haphazardness, sheds little light on the impact of Mounted Infantry doctrine, 
its projected roles, the interface with the cavalry and the effect on the wider 
army organisation and thus, whilst acknowledged, is largely excluded from 
this analysis. This is not to dismiss the benefits accrued from transiently 
mounted troops in ‘small wars’ but reflects that, in comparison to the 
formalised regular Mounted Infantry that from 1888 underwent  peacetime 
training, the impact of such ad hoc Mounted Infantry on the army’s thinking 
was inconsistent and imprecise.  
In order to understand the impact of the regular Mounted Infantry’s  
organisation and doctrine on both the army and the arm itself, four 
campaigns have been selected for analysis including the 1881 Transvaal 
War that highlighted the problems of ad hoc configuration just before 
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formalisation of the regular Mounted Infantry, the 1882 Egyptian Campaign 
that confirmed the beneficial value of prior experience or training, the 1885 
Nile Campaign that exposed the folly of abstraction of soldiers to whom 
Mounted Infantry tasks were at best foreign and, at worst, anathema, and 
finally the 1899 – 1902 Boer War when arguably the Mounted Infantry model 
attained maturity.3 
The thread connecting all of the research questions has been the 
fundamental purpose of the Mounted Infantry, that of bringing mobile 
firepower to the battlefield. For the colonially-focussed British Army largely 
dependent on infantry to garrison its imperial frontiers, the cavalry was 
numerically inadequate, hampered by the logistics of mobilisation for 
overseas conflict, and doctrinally disinclined to fight dismounted for much of 
the time period covered by the thesis. Hence, only the Mounted Infantry 
combined the two required attributes. The frequent absence of cavalry in 
colonial theatres also meant that the Mounted Infantry would be called upon 
for rudimentary reconnaissance, communications and security duties by 
virtue of its enhanced mobility. When this occurred distantly in the corners of 
Empire, the exigencies of an overseas campaign rationalised any concerns 
that the cavalry might have felt towards the Mounted Infantry regarding the 
latter assuming traditional cavalry roles and hence, the Mounted Infantry 
effectively could be sidelined. However the formal inception of Mounted 
Infantry and its nascent inclusion in the army’s organisation, albeit only on 
active service, resulted in the cavalry’s realisation that the Mounted Infantry 
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was a potential threat, centred on an erosion of the cavalry’s mounted roles 
and, if the cavalry was to be forcibly converted to Mounted Infantry, to its way 
of life as well. The resulting distrust bordering on overt hostility marred the 
interface between the two mounted arms for the subsequent decades, 
contributing directly to the Mounted Infantry’s demise just prior to the First 
World War.  
The institutional friction between both groups of protagonists reflected the 
cavalry’s struggle for existential survival whilst conversely the Mounted 
Infantry, born out of necessity and manifesting a utilitarian attitude when on 
active service, strove for doctrinal clarity and ultimately, a definitive function 
within the army’s organisation. The lack of army doctrine and the absence of 
a General Staff for much of the lifetime of the Mounted infantry model 
permitted such institutional friction to persist with personal opinion and 
prejudice holding sway. The establishment of the General Staff occurred at a 
time when the popularity of the Mounted Infantry with senior army 
commanders had begun to wane and was thus of little influence overall 
despite its apportioning of a clearer role to the Mounted Infantry from 1906 
until 1913. When strategic military planning turned towards the possibility of 
a European war, the question arose whether the Mounted Infantry could 
function as more than a colonial force and if so, how best to deploy it in the 
evolving mobilisation plans. The Mounted Infantry’s detractors had always 
predicted bloody annihilation if the Mounted Infantry was surprised by hostile 
arme blanche-trained cavalry before it could dismount. This unproven axiom, 
one of the mainstays of the cavalry protagonists’ deprecations, revealed 
412 
 
more about the psyche of the cavalry officers than it did about identifying a 
fundamental flaw in the Mounted Infantry’s doctrine. If Mounted Officers had 
already recognised this risk, they did not seriously contemplate their 
companies becoming isolated through working alone in the field.  Instead 
they postulated elementary inter-arm cooperation with cavalry and horse 
artillery. Hutton recognised the mutual benefits of such inter-arm cooperation 
as early as the Cavalry Manoeuvres of 1890.4  Rather it was the reforming 
cavalry whose zeal was for unilateral action as shown by Haig’s competitive 
assertion at the Elgin Commission that there were no tasks that the Mounted 
Infantry could do that the cavalry could not undertake and exceed.5   
If domestic military politics invoked competition not cooperation, the situation 
was somewhat different elsewhere in the Empire including India. Here British 
cavalry regiments rarely deployed on the North West Frontier through issues 
of cost and the inhospitable terrain not being conducive to arme blanche 
tactics. While both British and Indian army infantry battalions did undergo 
abstraction for Mounted Infantry training, this process would be abolished 
eventually, similar to domestic Mounted Infantry training, although the 
rationale for this decision in India appears more logical and transparent than 
at home. Like British cavalry, regular Mounted Infantry risked not finding the 
North West Frontier an auspicious environment for deployment although their 
reversion to foot infantry would be a logical conclusion. More importantly, the 
bespoke frontier forces of the Guides and Punjab Frontier Force regiments, 
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which contained both infantry and cavalry elements, were adept at 
dismounted fighting like Mounted Infantry thus achieving fusion of mobility 
with firepower.6  Through constant active service on the Frontier, these 
Indian regiments developed an informal military doctrine for ‘hill fighting’ 
,which despite a chapter bearing the same name in Callwell’s ’Small Wars’,7 
was less easily mastered by British battalions who undertook limited tours of 
duty along the frontier periodically on rotation.  With such specialised Indian 
forces constantly available for active service, the need for Mounted Infantry 
in theatre was diminished. 
No such rationale exculpated the decision to close the domestic Mounted 
Infantry schools, a decision that effectively strangled the Mounted Infantry 
movement by preventing further training of new Mounted Infantry cadres and 
refreshing of the ranks of men with Mounted Infantry skills. Thus the 
Mounted Infantry was abolished by the Army Council in 1913 as a result of 
several contributory factors ranging from imposed financial constraints, 
withering of numbers of trained Mounted Infantrymen, reformed dismounted 
cavalry tactics and, importantly in the political sphere, overt senior officer 
animosity most probably influenced by Haig.8  Through an exploration of the 
factors usually implicated in this decision, the thesis concludes that there 
was a more political explanation for abolition than previously considered by 
historians. This is at variance with Badsey, who considers the process a 
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gradual decline to extinction predicated predominantly on Mounted Infantry 
failings comparing unfavourably with cavalry reform,9 and Jones who blames 
the Mounted Infantry for its ‘unresolved tactical flaws and structural 
weaknesses’.10 In refuting these arguments, this thesis argues that the 
structural organisation of the Mounted Infantry had been remarkably 
consistent since its inception whilst reconstituted Mounted Infantry 
companies, either with prior training or extensive experience, provided a ‘fit 
for purpose’ force. Abstraction had always had its critics yet despite its pre-
1899 tardiness in training adequate numbers of Mounted Infantry, abstraction 
still held many attractions to the army and War Office. Clearly decisions 
about how to deploy the Mounted Infantry once reconfigured in crisis 
changed over the years. Yet in its final duality of role, whether as divisional 
mounted troops or alongside cavalry in mixed Mounted Brigades, the 
Mounted Infantry’s organisational structure does not appear overly weak. 
With regards to possible tactical flaws, trenchant criticism persisted. This 
centred on the Mounted Infantry’s assumed axiomatic inferiority in combat 
against enemy cavalry and its historical legacy of poor equitation. If there 
was evidence of tactical flaws, this arose largely from a lack of clarity as to 
what army commanders required from the Mounted Infantry which could then 
be incorporated into an evolving curriculum of instruction. As has been noted 
earlier in the thesis, in South Africa most army commanders clamoured for 
Mounted Infantry to be included in their forces for most operations. However, 
when the European war finally arrived, the British cavalry’s effectiveness, for 
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which it has most recently received plaudits, was largely for non-arme 
blanche activity, particularly delivery of dismounted firepower, functioning as 
a mobile reserve and for utilitarian work that previously had been the remit of 
the pre-war Mounted Infantry.  An oblique acknowledgement of both how the 
cavalry’s role had changed and that the new role was more reflective of 
Mounted Infantry doctrine came unexpectedly from Haig, arguably the 
Mounted Infantry’s most tenacious detractor, in his submission to the War 
Cabinet on 7 January 1918 in which he claimed: 
          The value and importance of the Cavalry to be very great not only in 
          offensive but also defensive operations. This was due to their superior  
          mobility and the ease with which cavalry could be moved from one  
          sector to another and then used dismounted. He pointed out that  
          British cavalry resembled highly-trained mobile infantry rather than the 
          old cavalry arm.11 
Although it would be unfair to criticise Haig for any failure of predictive insight 
before 1914, Haig’s subsequent admission is nonetheless startling. Although 
Haig was clearly fighting a rearguard defence against further diminution of 
his cavalry force in the face of political pressure rather than proposing a 
resurrection of the previously abolished regular Mounted Infantry, Haig’s 
approbation of mobile infantry fatally undermines the shibboleth of the 
Mounted Infantry’s supposed tactical uselessness on the European 
battlefield. 
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Of course such assertions concerning the Mounted Infantry’s military 
effectiveness during the First World War are mere speculation, particularly as 
the military effectiveness of the Mounted Infantry in the campaigns used in 
the thesis as case studies was inconsistent if not outright contradictory.  
However such discrepancies must be understood in the context of the 
Mounted Infantry’s evolution in organisation and its military function. For 
instance, the two failings in the Transvaal War from the Mounted Infantry’s 
perspective arose firstly from the mounted detachment’s inexperience 
magnified by an absence of appropriate training and secondly, the error of 
deploying extemporised Mounted Infantry in a traditional cavalry role. 
Nevertheless, these lessons of the Transvaal War were addressed in the 
proposals contained in the subsequent Intelligence Department’s précis, 
which became the foundation for the regular Mounted Infantry. Although the 
Nile campaign was a strategic failure and operationally the Camel Corps did 
not live up to its promise, the comparative success of the Mounted Infantry 
and Guards Camel Regiments, at least in terms of delivering firepower, 
indicated the importance of appropriate abstraction and that in certain 
scenarios of colonial warfare where the adversary relied on shock tactics, 
concerted firepower remained a critical asset for force protection. For the 
small Mounted Infantry contingent, the earlier Egyptian campaign has been 
considered a success as its firepower permitted protection against Egyptian 
incursion around the defensive perimeter of Alexandria and, by anchoring 
Wolseley’s desert flank, against the possibility of being outflanked by 
Egyptian cavalry or Bedouin warriors. Moreover, although the Mounted 
Infantry in Burma had been considered a success in the counterinsurgency 
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duties required in the jungle habitat,12  it was in Africa where the Mounted 
Infantry came to prominence and it was the Boer War in particular, that 
showcased the strengths and weaknesses of the Mounted Infantry model, 
ultimately resulting in it becoming the colonial army’s blueprint on the veldt. 
Although evidence for the transposition of the lessons learned in this 
campaign to future army doctrine and organisation remain contentious,13  
there were a number of factors that made the War eminently suitable for the 
Mounted Infantry. Despite a poor start through Roberts’ unrealistic 
expectations of the capability of untrained and poorly horsed Mounted 
Infantry, the force began to garner plaudits through its firepower and 
improving mobility at a time of criticism of the cavalry’s lacklustre 
performance. However the major factor conferring preferment on the 
Mounted Infantry was the nature of the war after the fall of Pretoria in mid 
1900. For twenty-three of the thirty-two months of war, British forces 
conducted a counterinsurgency campaign, the ‘war of running evasion’,14  
against a decentralised, highly dispersed and mobile adversary rather than 
the more orthodox military operations of late 1899 and the first half of 1900.15 
Counterinsurgency tactics of ambush and raid, underpinned by a 
requirement for optimal mobility, manifest as a focus on armed policing 
rather than traditional infantry and cavalry tactics, especially the arme 
blanche, were essential and suited the Mounted Infantry in both its 
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organisation and function. It is unsurprising therefore that for this conflict at 
least, the Mounted Infantry played a key role. Although fulfilling a 
fundamental requirement in South Africa, the model neither remained 
ubiquitous in the post-war British Army nor did it translate wholesale to other 
nations’ armies. Despite limited Mounted Infantry being present in India and 
the evidence of attenuated versions of the paradigm manifest as Mounted 
Rifles in countries destined to become self-governing dominions, the 
Mounted Infantry concept was largely disregarded elsewhere. The 
conundrum of merging mobility with firepower on the battlefield was 
addressed in different ways: by utilising military cyclists; combining light 
infantry with cavalry units; the ‘dragoonisation’ of existing cavalry and the 
development of light cavalry capable of dismounted fighting. This doctrinal 
aversion to a separate Mounted Infantry reflected a number of issues 
including the predictions that future wars would usually be European, with 
railways and metalled roads contributing to mobility, rather than insurrections 
along wild colonial borders. Nevertheless, as has been shown, both France 
and Germany improvised Mounted Infantry in their overseas territories 
particularly at times of crisis, including the inception of camelry, with such 
doctrinal solutions effectively replicating the British approach that had 
spawned both regular Mounted Infantry and Camel Corps.16  If the pre-
eminent focus of strategic planning for France and Germany had been 
colonial rather than continental, the Mounted Infantry paradigm might have 
evolved further in their armies than it did, although this remains speculation. 
The Russian Empire attempted to solve the problem differently relying as a 
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matter of policy on indigenous people, the Cossacks, for border protection. 
The Cossacks, superficially resembling the functionality of the Guides and 
the Punjab Frontier Force, combined mobility and firepower as de facto 
Mounted Infantry. Their poor showing in the Russo-Japanese War 
notwithstanding, the Cossacks’ military reputation remained almost 
mythical,17  whilst not obviating the need for bona fide cavalry that too also 
vacillated between the tactics and doctrine of Mounted Infantry and 
traditional cavalry.  Conversely, the US army’s plentiful cavalry regiments 
already functioned largely as Mounted Infantry with dismounted firepower 
tactics tempered with occasional shock tactics of a mounted charge, not 
solely predicated on arme blanche but also on firepower delivered from the 
saddle.18  During the Plains Wars, reflecting logistical shortages and fiscal 
constraint, the US cavalry’s deficiency in equine numbers resulted in a 
significant number of dismounted cavalrymen which surprisingly was not 
considered particularly disadvantageous as operations were predicated on 
dismounted firepower and endurance more than speed.19 Therefore, the 
British Army regular Mounted Infantry’s inception and further development, 
when no other nations’ armies adopted the same model, reflects other 
nations’ military strategic planning, their anticipation of the nature of future 
conflicts and their appraisals of their future adversaries rather than the fact 
that the Mounted Infantry concept was derided in its entirety. 
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Even so, the regular Mounted Infantry remained a defined, albeit transitory, 
formalised part of the British Army trained in peacetime and configured for 
active service. As previously indicated, its basic organisation remained 
consistent and it was at this level that its identity was apparent. 
Unsurprisingly, identity reflected the traditions and cultures of their parent 
battalions rather than a novel identity predicated on ‘being Mounted Infantry’, 
Naturally, as the troops abstracted into the Mounted Infantry were only 
temporarily seconded and would return to their parent battalions as planned 
until mobilisation, there was no imperative to evolve a new organisational 
identity based on being horsed troops. Moreover, there is no evidence that a 
novel identity was anticipated by army commanders arising from the 
Mounted Infantry model or its counterpart, the Camel Corps, despite the 
latter’s originality. The exception to this lack of a specific cultural Mounted 
Infantry identity occurred during the Boer War where pride and loyalty 
evolved over the extended duration of the conflict within Mounted Infantry 
battalions as illustrated by Kipling’s verse. However, its true identity was 
functional arising from being mobile infantrymen.  Such a functional identity 
was independent of emblematic traditions and would transpose to military 
cyclists and eventually mechanised infantry. Thus, rather than music, 
emblems or uniforms, it was the Mounted Infantry’s functionality that 
conferred its identity. During the Boer War, as only a minority of Mounted 
Infantry had pre-war training, the experiential learning of practical wartime 
lessons, disseminated by unit commanders and by publication of personal 
notes and manuals, modified the Mounted Infantry’s drill and informal 
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doctrine20 and, in turn, added to its image summed up as the ‘chronic 
ikonas’.  Conversely, the problems of peacetime training, particularly trying to 
match training to the arm’s shifting roles, against a backdrop of fiscal 
constraint and institutional rivalry with the cavalry, was never satisfactorily 
resolved. Although originally training had been predominantly to teach basic 
equitation, the final incarnation of the peacetime training programme had 
expanded in content and complexity. Nevertheless, the reputational damage 
incurred by the Mounted Infantry through its execrable equitation following its 
enforced precipitate expansion in 1900, remained a memory that could not 
be easily dispelled. Such a legacy was difficult to eradicate despite evidence 
of substantial improvements in its equestrian and tactical skills during the 
later years of the Boer War and in the subsequent years of peace.21  
It is a valid question to ask whether the Mounted Infantry paradigm illustrates 
any wider themes of relevance to the British Army, modern warfare and 
military history in general. Clearly the Mounted Infantry’s origins, founded 
through imperial necessity, were inherently opportunistic, as have been an 
eclectic array of other temporary improvisations within the British Army, for 
example, the ‘mounted torpedo corps’ in Pretoria during  the Transvaal War 
of 1880 – 81,22  the Nile Expedition’s Camel Corps in 1885 and, more 
recently, the Chindits of the Second World War. Yet the benefits to the army 
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of the Mounted Infantry paradigm, at least those benefits advocated by the 
arm’s protagonists, were diminished by the retarding effect of army tribalism 
rooted in arm, corps and regiment. As already identified in this thesis, this 
friction was not purely a British phenomenon. Such tribalism, an off-shoot of 
loyalty and identity, has many beneficial effects, not least in promoting esprit 
de corps, but equally it can exert a deleterious effect through magnifying 
innate institutional conservatism.  Although not the only factor, such tribalism 
did not provide a favourable context for either inter-arm cooperation or 
integration, deficits that impacted directly on the functionality of the Mounted 
Infantry. Thus innovation and experimentation may founder and fail to evolve 
into a permanent organisation as seen with the Mounted Infantry.23  
Moreover, tribalism, a theme persisting into the current era and frequently 
magnified by financial constraints, may transcend mere competitive rivalry 
into political conflict upon which a service’s survival may be deemed at stake 
and where strategic planning decisions may go awry.24 Certainly protagonists 
in the Mounted Infantry versus cavalry debate would have recognised this 
scenario. The association of such debate with potentially seismic changes in 
way of life, so apparent in the cavalry’s defiant retention of the arme blanche 
as a proxy marker for a defence of its lifestyle, was re-visited in the 1920s 
with the mechanisation of the cavalry and the friction between mechanised 
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cavalry and their armoured regiment counterparts.25  The component of such 
friction, based on the theme of technology, whether this was ‘firepower 
versus edged weapons’ or ‘mechanised vehicle versus horse’, appears to be 
both a symbol of threatened institutional survival and also an issue of 
operational and tactical planning. At the tactical level, the conundrum of 
combining firepower with mobility that was the sine qua non of the Mounted 
Infantry’s existence remains extant today in our modern versions of 
‘expeditionary’ warfare in Central Asia and elsewhere.26  As previously 
indicated, as the late Victorian age wore on, the differences between the 
cavalry officers’ views regarding doctrine and those espoused by the 
Mounted Infantry officers were, surprisingly in view of the vitriol expended 
during the firepower versus arme blanche debate, not always of diametric 
polarity, despite contemporaneous beliefs. Yet this theme of perception, 
particularly erroneous understanding, remains true today as demonstrated by 
the attitudes of senior Naval, Royal Marine and Naval aviation officers during 
the Falklands Campaign in 1982.27  This thesis recognises that during the 
late Victorian period, the ability to learn lessons from imperial conflicts was 
decidedly limited through inadequate processes for recognising lessons from 
conflict, their validation by senior army officers, their subsequent embedding 
in training and doctrine and, finally, translation into tactics for future military 
operations. Nonetheless, a recent publication has argued cogently that 
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lesson learning in the army remains imperfect and challenging for the British 
High Command.28  Therefore, although an admittedly broad generalisation, 
the Mounted Infantry paradigm represents a microcosm of the organisational 
and doctrinal problems affecting the British Army across the centuries into 
the modern era.  
The Introduction posed the question whether the Mounted Infantry was a 
Victorian paradigm or merely the ‘cavalry of poverty’. In answering the six 
principal research questions, it is concluded that, for much of its existence, 
the Mounted Infantry did not behave as an impecunious makeshift cavalry 
but a mounted force replete with its own drill and embryonic doctrine and, 
contentiously perhaps, an understanding of its tactical limitations. Even when 
latterly its assigned functions trespassed into traditional cavalry territory, the 
Mounted Infantry neither portrayed itself nor considered itself, simply a 
cavalry-substitute. In its ability to provide mobile firepower on the colonial 
battlefield at a time when such functionality was absent from any other arm 
except horse artillery, the Mounted Infantry can indeed be regarded as a 
Victorian paradigm, or in other words, a necessary force for its time. 
However this raises the question: was the model only fit for colonial warfare, 
particularly in Africa, or could the paradigm have translated to other military 
arenas? Although its efficacy on a future European battlefield can only be 
surmised, it is not unreasonable to infer that the arm could have shown value 
away from imperial ‘small wars’ and thus transcend this paradigmatic 
limitation. If such predictions of future utility appear fanciful, Brigadier 
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General Thorneycroft, writing about the Mounted Infantry’s worth four years 
after its triumph in the Boer War, remarked that ‘Mounted Infantry are a 
necessity for the varied requirements of our Army throughout the world’, and 
noted that this ‘is assured fact’.29  This thesis concludes that there is no 
reason why the Mounted Infantry could not have also met ‘the varied 
requirements of our Army’ in 1914.  The Mounted Infantry rightly deserves 
recognition for its participation on active service and, re-visiting a quote from 
this thesis’ Introduction: 
          To the Mounted Infantry as a whole belongs a very large share of the 
          honour of saving the Empire in its most trying hour and it is, no doubt,  
          only an oversight that this has never been fully appreciated by the  
          public.30 
It is hoped that this re-appraisal of the Mounted Infantry, a force born out of 
necessity but whose memory, outliving the arm’s abolition, has been 
preserved in the functional identities of first military cyclists and then modern 
mechanised infantry, has to a modest degree, helped redress the Mounted 
Infantry’s previous historical obscurity. 
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Appendix 1       Biographies of Senior Mounted Infantry Officers 
Lieutenant General Sir E.T.H. Hutton: 
Born 1848, Ensign 60th Foot 6 August 1867, Lieutenant 60th Foot 9 August 
1871, Musketry Instructor 1 February 1873, Captain KRRC 14 July 1879, 
active service Zulu War 1879, Staff College 1880-82; active service 
Transvaal 1881, Brevet Major 18 November 1882, Assistant Military 
Secretary to GOC Egypt active service Egypt 1882, Major 24 January 1883, 
Brigade Major (Aldershot) 19 August 1883, DAAQG active service Nile 
Expedition 1884-85, DAAG (Aldershot) 1 October 1887, Lieutenant Colonel 
29 May 1889, Commandant Mounted Infantry School (Aldershot) until 31 
August 1892, Colonel 21 December 1892, CO New South Wales 1893 until 
26 November 1896, AAG Dublin 26 November 1896, GOC Canadian Militia 
August 1898, CO 1st Mounted Infantry Brigade March 1900 active service 
South Africa, Major General 26 December 1901, CO Australian Forces until 
25 December 1904, Lieutenant General 7 November 1907, appointed KCB 
1912, CO 21 Division, 3rd Army, retired 1915 
Lieutenant General Sir E.A.H. Alderson: 
Born 1859, Norfolk Artillery (militia) 1876, gazetted Lieutenant 97th Foot 
1878, active service Mounted Infantry, Transvaal 1881, active service 
Mounted Infantry Egypt 1882, active service Mounted Infantry Camel 
Regiment 1884 – 85, Captain 1886, Adjutant Mounted Infantry School 
(Aldershot) 1888, Adjutant Royal West Kent Regiment 1890, Staff College 
1894-95, Major 1896 active service Matabele and Mashonaland, Brevet 
Lieutenant Colonel 1896, CO Mounted Infantry School (Aldershot) 1896, 
active service South Africa 1899, Brevet Colonel 1900, Inspector-General of 
Mounted Infantry (Brigadier General rank), appointed CB 1900, CO Mounted 
Infantry Division 1901 – 02, Colonel 1903, Brigadier General CO 2nd Infantry 
Brigade 1903 – 07, Major General 1907, India 1908 – 1912 CO 6th Division 
(Poona), CO 1st Mounted Division 1914, CO 1st Canadian Division October 
1914, CO Canadian Army Corps 1915, Inspector General Canadian Forces 
May 1916 – 1918, appointed KCB 1916, retired 1920 
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General Sir H. De Beauvoir De Lisle: 
Born 1864, gazetted 2nd Durham Light Infantry 1883, active service Mounted 
Infantry Egypt 1885-86 and awarded DSO, Captain 1891, Staff College 
1898-99, active service South Africa CO 6th Mounted Infantry, appointed CB 
1900, Major 1902, transferred 5th Dragoon Guards 1902, 1st (Royal) 
Dragoons 1903, Lieutenant Colonel 1906, GSO 1 2nd Division Aldershot 
1910, Brigadier General 2nd Cavalry Brigade 1911, Major General CO 1st 
Cavalry Division October 1914, CO 29th Division Gallipoli June 1915, acting 
Lieutenant General CO 13 Corps, March 1918, then 15 Corps, April 1918, 
appointed KCMG 1919, Lieutenant General 1919 GOC Western Command, 
General 1926, retired 1926  
Lieutenant General the Earl of Dundonald: 
Born 1852, gazetted Cornet and Sub-Lieutenant 2nd Life Guards 1870, active 
service Nile Expedition 2nd Life Guards detachment Heavy Camel Regiment 
1884-85 Captain, Major 1885, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel 1885, Brevet 
Colonel 15 June 1889, CO 2ndLife Guards 1895, appointed MVO 1897, CO 
Mounted Brigade Natal Field Force 1899, CO 2nd Cavalry Brigade 1900, 
appointed CVO 1900, Major General 7 March 1900, appointed KCB, GOC 
Canadian Militia 1902-04, Lieutenant General 1907, appointed KCVO 1907, 
retired 1907 
General Sir A Godley: 
Born 1867, Lieutenant 1st Dublin Fusiliers 1886, Adjutant and Captain1889, 
Adjutant Mounted Infantry 1894, active service Mashonaland 1896, Brevet 
Major 1897, Staff College 1898-99, Adjutant Mounted Infantry (Protectorate 
Regiment) 1899-1901, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel 1900, transferred to Irish 
Guards 1900, DAAG Mounted Infantry 1901-03, Commandant Mounted 
Infantry School (Longmoor) 1903-06, Brevet Colonel 1905, Colonel 1906, 
AAG and GSO 1 2nd Division Aldershot 1906, temporary Major General 
GOC New Zealand Forces 1910, Major General 1914 GOC New Zealand 
Forces 1914-18, temporary Lieutenant General ANZAC (Gallipoli and Middle 
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East) 1915, GOC 22 Corps and 3 Corps, Lieutenant General 1918, CO 4 
Corps British Army of Occupation 1919, Secretary to the Secretary of State 
for War 1920-22, Commander-in-Chief (C-i-C) British Army of Occupation 
1922-24,  General 1923, Governor of Gibraltar 1928-33, retired 1933 
General Sir I Hamilton: 
Born 1852, gazetted 12th Foot 1872, transferred 92nd Foot 1873, active 
service in India, 2nd Afghan War and Transvaal Rebellion 1873 – 1881, 
Captain 1882, Brevet Major 1882, active service Nile Expedition 1884-85, 
Brevet Lieutenant Colonel 1886, active service Burma Expedition 1886-87, 
Colonel 1891, awarded DSO 1891, AAG Musketry 1890-93; Military 
Secretary to C-i-C East Indies 1893-95; active service AAG and AQMG 
Chitral Relief Force 1895, appointed CB 1896, DQMG India 1895-98, CO 1st 
and 3rd Brigades Tirah Expeditionary Force 1897-98, Commandant School of 
Musketry (Hythe) 1998-99, AG and Chief of Staff Natal Field Force 1899, 
Major General 1900, appointed CB then GCB 1900, CO 7th Brigade 1900-01, 
CO Mounted Infantry Division 1900, Military Secretary to War Office 1901, 
Chief of Staff (South Africa) 1901-02, Military Secretary to War Office 1902-
03, QMG 1903-04, military observer Russo-Japanese War 1904-05, GOC 
Southern Command 1905-08, AG 1909-10, GOC Mediterranean & Inspector-
General of Overseas Forces 1910-14, General Central (Home) Forces 1914-
15, GOC Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (Gallipoli) 1915, Lieutenant of 
the Tower of London 1915-20, appointed GCMG 1919, retired 1920  
Glossary of Additional Abbreviations: 
AG-Adjutant General, AAG-Assistant Adjutant General, DAAG-Deputy Assistant 
Adjutant General, ANZAC- Australian & New Zealand Army Corps, AQMG-Assistant 
Quartermaster General, DAAQG-Deputy Assistant Adjutant & Quartermaster 
General, DQMG-Deputy Quartermaster General, QMG-Quartermaster General, 
DSO-Distinguished Service Order, GSO-General Staff Officer, CVO & KCVO-
awards of the Victorian Order, CB, KCB & GCB-awards of the Order of the Bath, 
GCMG-award of the Order of St Michael and St George.  
 
 
429 
 
Appendix 2    Mounted Infantry Camel Regiment 1884-85: Composition  
Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel E.T.H Hutton (until Nov.1884)  
                                   Bt. Major. Hon. G Gough [14th Hussars] (until 17.1.1885) 
                                   Major C Barrow (from 17.1.85) 
Other Headquarters:  Major T Phipps, Captain J Sewell (Adjutant)  
                                   Lieutenant R Grant (Quartermaster) 
A Company:   CO: Capt. C Payne (Gordon Highlanders) 
Section No. 1 2 3 4 
Parent 
regiment 
1st South 
Staffords 
1st Black 
Watch 
3rd KRRC 1st Gordons 
Officer 
Commanding 
Lt. C Hore Lt. C 
Livingstone 
Lt. P Marling, 
VC and Lt. R 
Bower 
Lt. H Stewart 
B Company:   CO: Capt. H Walsh (Somerset Light Infantry) 
Section No. 1 2 3 4 
Parent 
Regiment 
2nd Duke of 
Cornwall’s 
Light Infantry 
1st Sussex 2nd Essex 1st Queen’s 
Own (Royal 
West Kent) 
Officer 
Commanding 
Lt. C Martyr Lt. F Todd-
Thornton 
Lt. R Tudway Capt. A Morse 
C Company:    CO:  Capt. R Fetherstonhaugh (KRRC) 
Section No. 1 2 3 4 
Parent 
Regiment 
1st KRRC 2nd KRRC 2nd Rifle 
Brigade 
3rd Rifle 
Brigade 
Officer 
Commanding 
Lt. W 
Campbell 
Lt. A Miles Lt. W Sherston Capt. Hon H 
Hardinge 
D Company:    CO:   Capt. C Piggott [21st Hussars] 
Section No. 1 2 3 4 
Parent 
Regiment 
1st Somerset 
Light Infantry 
1st Royal Scots 
Fusiliers 
2nd Queen’s 
Own (Royal 
West Kent) 
2nd Connaught 
Rangers 
Officer 
Commanding 
Lt. T Snow Lt. H Stanwell Lt. E Alderson Lt. C Carden 
Ref: Edward Gleichen, With the Camel Corps up the Nile 1885 (London: Chapman and Hall 1888, 
Leonaur reprint paperback ed.), p.192 
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Appendix 3     The Square at Abu Klea January 1885 
  
                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ref: Lieutenant Colonel R Talbot, ‘The Battle of Abu Klea’, The Nineteenth Century, 1886, XIX, 
pp.154-59 
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Appendix Four    
 
Distribution of Titles among Officers of the Regiments contributing to the 
Camel Corps & actual numbers serving in the Camel Corps1884-85 
 
Camel 
Regiment 
Earl Viscount 
or Count 
Other 
Peer 
Baronet Son of 
Peer 
Number 
(% of 
Officers) 
Number in 
CR 
(% of 
Officers) 
HCR 0 3 6 5 9 23 
(9%) 
but if 
Household 
Cavalry 
only 
included: 
19 
(28%) 
8 
 
(35%) 
 
 
 
GCR 2 2 7 3 32 46 
(21%) 
4 
 
(23.5%) 
MICR 0 0 3 4 9 16 
(1.8%) 
but if 
KRRC and 
Rifle 
Brigade 
battalions 
only 
included: 
13 
(5%) 
2 
 
(8%)* 
LCR 1 0 0 3 14 18 
(7.5%) 
2 
 
(9.5%) 
 
Note: * small numbers skews analysis 
 
Abbreviations: 
HCR:    Heavy Camel Regiment 
GCR:    Guards Camel Regiment 
MICR:   Mounted Infantry Camel Regiment 
LCR:     Light Camel Regiment 
 
Ref: Army Lists 1885 (London: HMSO, 1885) 
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Appendix Five 
The Development of the Regular Mounted Infantry in South Africa 1899-1902 
Autumn 1899 
Buller’s Natal Field Force   
Composite Mounted Infantry Regiment:  
     2nd Dublin Fusiliers    2nd KRRC   Imperial Light Horse Natal Carbineers   
    Natal Police (and part of 2nd Mounted Brigade [CO Dundonald] that included  
     Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry, Bethune’s Mounted Infantry, South African Light Horse) 
 
Cape Colony 
Mounted Infantry companies:  
Southern / Aldershot, South East / Cork, Northern / Western, Dublin / 
Eastern 
 
February 1900 
Roberts’ Field Army 
1st Mounted Brigade [CO Hannay]: 
     1st Mounted Infantry   3rd Mounted Infantry   5th Mounted Infantry   7th  
     Mounted Infantry   New South Wales Mounted Rifles   Roberts’ Horse 
     Kitchener’s Horse   Grahamstown Volunteer Mounted Infantry    City  
     Imperial Volunteers (CIV) Mounted Infantry 
 
2nd Mounted Brigade [CO Ridley]:  
     2nd Mounted Infantry   4th Mounted Infantry   6th Mounted Infantry   8th  
     Mounted Infantry   CIV Mounted Infantry   1st Queensland Mounted 
     Infantry   Nesbitt’s Horse   New Zealand Mounted Rifles   Rimington’s  
    Guides (‘Tigers’) 
 
Buller’s Natal Field Force 
2nd Mounted Brigade (as above) 
Colonial Mounted Rifles at Ladysmith and Greytown 
 
December 1900 
Mounted Infantry Brigade 
 
Corps Corps 
Commander 
MI Battalions MI Commander Parent 
Regiment of 
MI CO 
1 Shekelton 11 
12 
Maj. G Williams 
Maj. N Thomson 
South Staffs 
Seaforths 
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2 De Lisle 6 
NSW MR 
West Austral 
MI 
Qu’land MI 
Maj.Pennefather 
Lt. G. Knight 
Capt. S Harris 
 
Capt. H Harris 
Welsh  
- 
- 
 
- 
3 E. Williams 9 
10 
Maj. Pine Coffin 
Maj. W Marshall 
Loyal N Lancs 
Derby 
4 St. G. Henry 3 
4 
Maj N Anley 
Maj. H Walker 
Essex 
Duke of 
Cornwall’s LI 
5 Jenner 13 
14 
Maj. E Pratt 
Maj. C Heighan 
Durham LI 
West Yorks 
6 Cookson 2 
Roberts’ H. 
 
Kitchener’s  H 
Ceylon MI 
 
Victorian MI 
 
Marshall’s H. 
Maj. Vandeleur 
Maj. Carrington 
Smith 
Maj. Robertson 
Maj. Murray-
Mengiel 
 
Maj. Umpleby 
 
- 
Irish Guards 
Dublin 
Fusiliers 
Connaught R 
- 
 
- 
 
7 Taylor 5 
7 
Composite  
Burmese MI 
Nesbitt’s H. 
MG section 
(2nd Liverpool) 
Maj. K Lean 
Maj. E Lloyd 
   Maj. H Gough 
Maj. Copeman 
- 
- 
Warwicks 
Lincolns 
16th Lancers 
Essex 
- 
- 
8 Hickie 8 Maj. A Gosset Cheshires 
434 
 
15 Maj. H Holmes Yorkshire 
 
Abstracted Infantry Regiments  
MI 
Number 
Abstracted Infantry Detachments 
2 2/Leicester, 1/York & Lancaster, 1/Connaught Rangers, 1/Dublin 
Fusiliers, 2/Royal Welsh, 1/Worcester, 2/South Wales Borderers, 
2/Wiltshire, 2/Lincoln, 2/Bedford, 1/Yorkshire, 2/Hampshire, 1/Royal 
Scots, 2/Dorset, 2/Scottish Rifles, 1/Argyll & Sutherland 
3 1/Northumberland Fusiliers, 1/Loyal N Lancashire, 2/Northants, King’s 
Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 2/Dublin Fusiliers 
4 2/Royal Warwick, 1/Yorkshire, 2/Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, 
2/Shropshire Light Infantry 
5 2/Buffs, 2/East Yorkshire, 1/Royal Irish, 2/Worcester 
6 2/Bedford, 1/Welsh, 1/Essex, 2/Wiltshire, 1/Gordon Highlanders 
7 2/Northants, 2/Lincoln, 1/King’s Own Scottish Borderers, 2/Hampshire 
8 2/Cheshire, 1/Oxs & Bucks Light Infantry, 1/East Lancashire, 2/North 
Stafford 
9 1/Derby, 2/Royal Irish Rifles, 1/Royal Munster Fusiliers, Malta MI, 
2/Derby, 2/Loyal N Lancashire, 3/ Royal Warwick, 3/Lancashire 
Fusiliers 
10 1/Royal Scots, 2/Northumberland Fusiliers, 1/Derby, 2/Royal Berkshire 
11 1/South Stafford, 1/Worcester, 2/Royal Irish Fusiliers, 2/Dublin 
Fusiliers, 1/Royal Irish Regiment, 1/Inniskilling Fusiliers, 1/Leicester, 
1/Royal Munster Fusiliers 
12 1/Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, 2/Seaforth Highlanders, 2/Gordon 
Highlanders, 2/Black Watch, 1/High Light Infantry, 1/Cameron 
Highlanders, 1/Royal Scots, 2/Royal Scottish Fusiliers 
13 1/Royal Sussex, 2/Bedford, 1/King’s Liverpool, 1/Border, 2/Royal West 
Kent, 1/KRRC, 2/Rifle Brigade, 1/Rifle Brigade, 2/Royal Fusiliers, 
2/Somerset Light Infantry 
14 2/West Yorkshire, 2/East Yorkshire, 2/Middlesex, 1/Manchester, 
2/Manchester, 1/Devon, 2/Gloucester, 2/Lancashire Fusiliers, 1/Essex 
15 1/Suffolk, 1/West Riding, 2/South Wales Borderers, 2/Royal Berkshire 
435 
 
Composite 2/Leicester, 1/Royal Berkshire, 1/King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 
2/Manchester 
Burma 2/West Riding, 2/Essex, 2/Durham Light Infantry 
 
 
NB:  
 1
st
 Mounted Infantry (Rifle, South Eastern, South, Cork companies) functioned as 
Brigade troops 
 Some battalions contributed detachments to more than one Mounted Infantry battalion 
 
 
December 1901:  
Mounted Infantry Corps: 
 
Battalion Commander Parent Regiment 
1 Maj. (local Lt-Col) Taylor Gloucester 
2 Bt Maj. Brooke King’s Own Yorkshire LI 
3 Bt. Maj. Anley Essex 
4 Bt. Maj. Walker Duke of Cornwall LI 
5 Bt. Lt-Col. Lean Royal Warwicks 
6 Bt Lt-Col. Sladen Yorkshire 
7 Maj. Lloyd Lincoln 
8 Bt. Maj. Gosset Cheshire 
9 Bt. Maj. Pine-Coffin Loyal N Lancashire 
10 Bt. Maj. Marshall Derby 
11 - - 
12 Capt. (local Maj.) Thomson Seaforths 
13  Bt. Maj. Pratt Durham LI 
14 Capt. (local Maj.) Bridgford Manchester 
15 Capt. (local Maj.) Holmes Yorkshire 
16 Capt. (local Maj.) Going South Stafford 
17 Capt. (local Maj.) Duncan Royal Scots 
18 Maj. Macan Scottish Rifles 
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19 Maj. Lawford Royal Fusiliers 
20 Maj. Du Maurier Royal Fusiliers 
21 - - 
22 Bt. Lt-Col. Sitwell Northumberland Fusiliers 
23 Maj. Ramsay Rifle Brigade 
24 Capt. (local Maj.) Gough 16
th
 Lancers 
25 Capt. (local Maj.) Eustace KRRC 
26 Bt. Maj. Wiggin 13
th 
Hussars 
Burma Maj. Copeman Essex 
 
 
 
Refs. 
 
TNA WO 108 / 80 Forces in South Africa October 1899 – December 1901 
 
Colonel W.H.H Walters & Colonel H. Du Cane (trans.), The German Official Account of the 
War in South Africa (London: John Murray, 1906), Vol. 2, pp.350-53  
 
TNA WO 105 / 29 Mounted Brigade December 1900 
 
Army List December 1901 (London: HMSO, 1901) 
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Appendix Six     
 
Evolution of Mounted Infantry Tactics in South Africa 1899 – 1902: 
‘the Galloping Charge’ 
 
 
Ref:  
Capt. L. Saunderson, Notes on Mounted Infantrymen (London: Gale & Polden, 1904), p.41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Boers 
            No. 4 Coy – advance guard 
 
     No 3 Coy 
No. 2 Coy No. 1 Coy 
No. 1 Coy 
No. 2 Coy 
No. 3 Coy 
              No. 4 Coy – rear guard 
Mobile 
Column 
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